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THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
A STUDY IN NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II

Volume I — The Planting of a Nation
(published October, 1909)

Volume II — The Harvesting of a Nation
(published November, 1911)

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
A STUDY IN NATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY

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VOLUME II



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THE HARVESTING OF A NATION

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

CHAPTER I

PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME

THE Preacher said, "There is no new thing under the sun,"¹ and one who had imbibed much of his wisdom warned that "the master of superstition is the people and in all superstition wise men follow fools: and arguments are fitted to practice in a reversed order."² He who journeys in an unknown or little known country must expect that the accounts he brings back of strange peoples and customs will be doubted, for wise men have no more wisdom than fools in their superstition, and against superstition no argument will contend.

I was aware when I essayed to explain the psychology of the American People that some of my deductions would be attacked, for my research convinced me that there was much superstition and fable to be overthrown, and some truth to be revealed. It was territory that had not been explored. It was to be expected that I should run counter to popular belief, and that it should appear as if I had sought to be iconoclastic merely for intellectual delight.

¹ Ecclesiastes, x, 9.

² Bacon: *Of Superstition*, p. 96.

The reception given the first volume of this work by the Press and the Public has been so generous, and there has been such an encouraging recognition that an earnest attempt had been made to throw some light on an extremely complicated problem, that I may be deemed deficient in gratitude if I refer at all to criticisms. It is not, however, in a spirit of defense or resentment that I answer my courteous and temperate opponents, but this is a convenient way to make clear some things that seem to require elucidation.

It has been asserted that I have given undue importance to:—

- (1) English influence in the formation of the character of Americans and the institutions of America;
- (2) The effect of the physical in race development;
- (3) The Puritan.

And that I have minimized:—

- (1) Dutch influence and that of nationalities other than English;
- (2) The Irish and the Scotch in attributing the formation of American character exclusively to the English.

And, finally, that in asserting that the Americans of to-day are a new race and not a "mongrel" race, I have ignored all the teachings of ethnology, since the study of race development positively teaches that there is no such thing as a "pure," unmixed, uninitiated strain.

It would be tedious and valueless to repeat the proof I adduced that the character of Americans and the institutions of America owe their influence to English inspiration, for to say more would be merely to reproduce in amplified form what has already been stated. To prove a negative is an impossibility; and my critics have contented themselves with questioning my deductions without bringing evidence to challenge my reasoning. An examination of the institutions of America, of its political philosophy, of its system of jurisprudence; of the thought and customs and viewpoint of life of its people, will show that they are English in origin and that they have not been colored or moulded by those of any other nation.

A learned friend of German extraction, whose judgment I highly respect, suggested that Bancroft termed "Holland, the mother of four of our states,"¹ and that it is impossible to conceive a family of four children uninfluenced by their mother. Bancroft's figure is rhetorical fancy rather than historical fact; in truth, it is an historical perversion. Holland did not give birth to four states of the American Union. Nearly nine hundred years have been enwrapped in "the great winding sheets, that bury all things in oblivion," since the Norman conqueror set foot on British soil, and yet nine centuries have not been long enough to stamp out the traces of that invasion. Norman customs, Norman words, some of

¹ Bancroft: *History of the United States of America*, vol. I, p. 527.

the law of the Normans is the legacy of that battle on the sands of Hastings. Where shall we find their Dutch counterpart in the life or speech or customs of America? Is there such a thing as Dutch law in the code of America? Do Dutch words, except those that became incorporated into the speech of the English, crop up in American conversation to visualize to the philologist their exotic origin or to be used unconsciously by the common people? Is there a single Dutch custom that has been virile enough to survive and has in the slightest influenced for good or evil the mental or social development of the American People? If we except the custom, rapidly falling into disuse, of calling on New Year's Day, which is Dutch and not English, we search in vain for any harvest of the Dutch planting of the New World. It was pointed out in the first volume¹ that all a eulogist of the Dutch could discover as their gift to America was that "in New York, the high stoop house, and the peculiar observances of New Year's Day which continued until 1870, are two familiar relics of Holland. The valuable custom of registering transfers of real estate has been received from the same source." This is a pitifully weak foundation, as was already said, on which to attempt to erect a lasting monument to Dutch genius or to trace race influence.²

¹ Page 391.

² "But, their relative smallness of numbers and their local influence considered, the Dutch in New York and New Jersey, and the Germans and Scotch-Irish in Pennsylvania, which of all the states is the least homogeneous,

I have been reminded that some of the men who played a leading part in the early history of New York were Dutch, that to-day the bearers of great names and the possessors of great wealth are of Dutch descent, the lineal descendants of those first settlers who colonized the New Netherlands. This is quite true, but it proves nothing. To deny these things would be to deny a physical fact, a thing too absurd to be worth a moment's serious discussion; but it does not meet the issue involved. The question is not that the Dutch settled New York and begat a sturdy progeny, for that we know to be true; but whether they were able to impress upon an alien people, and a virgin continent, and a plastic society their own language or customs or institutions. If so the proof must be easily accessible. Who will produce this proof? Who will give concrete illustration of the Dutch influence on American character or American civilization? It is not sufficient to rest the argument on generalities, or to be content with the vague assertion of "Dutch influence." To carry conviction something more specific is needed.

It is a striking illustration of "the master of superstition" and ineradicable tradition become respectable through the dignity of age, that while

though they unquestionably give a character to the parts in which they settled, constitute no real exception to the remark that the description of the spread of population from the Atlantic border westwardly is substantially that of the diffusion of English life." — Draper: *History of the American Civil War*, vol. I, p. 173.

every American schoolboy will glibly repeat the parrot cry of “Dutch influence,” French influence is seldom if ever referred to. It is not customary to think of the French as having left any mark on American thought, yet it is a fact that the only system of jurisprudence in the United States that is not English, is French; and while the Dutch came and went and left nothing behind to denote their brief power, not even roads or ruins as the Romans wrote their name on Britain, the French gave to Louisiana a civil code that has survived. With that single exception — all the more striking because it is the sole exception — no other “foreign” influence — using that term to mean non-English — has institutionally affected the United States. The *Code Napoléon* is the memorial that France erected to herself in America. England, France, Spain, Holland, and Sweden almost simultaneously colonized what is now the United States of America, yet, with the exception of England and France, there remains nothing to recall that great struggle for the possession of a continent which was to determine whether the Saxon, the Teuton, the Scandinavian, or the Latin should plant the New World and give to it his character, his language, and his institutions.¹

It is perhaps of sufficient importance to mention that of the signers of the Declaration of Independ-

¹ “For though others, such as . . . Holland, by its establishments in New York, participated in the movement, the share taken by them was so subordinate as scarcely to influence the result.” — Draper: *History of the American Civil War*, vol. I, p. 127.

ence, not one was other than of Anglo-Saxon extraction; not one was of Teutonic or Latin descent. Of the fifty-six signers, forty-eight were American born, two were born in England, two in Scotland, three in Ireland, and one in Wales. Those who were born abroad came to America early; several of those born in America were educated in England. Environment, association, and training were English not "foreign," that is non-English.¹

Nor can there be traced to the great German immigration of the nineteenth century the impress of the Teutonic mind on the American: nor have the Germans modified the political thought of America or moulded its social development. What the founders of the Republic established in the beginning — and these men were Englishmen and remained Englishmen until they became Americans — has endured; fundamentally the same now as it was then, inspired by English training and English tradition; unchanged by forces other than English.

These are facts that neither prejudice nor "patriotism" can controvert. I hold no brief for the English. I repeat what I said in the first chapter of the first volume: I began my investigation with an open mind, without prejudice, and with indifference as to where my quest led. My sole desire was the ascertainment of the truth. Like many others with a general but inexact knowledge of the ele-

¹ Cf. Michael: *The Declaration of Independence*; Sanderson: *Biography of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence*.

ments that enter into the making of the American character, I believed at that time that psychologically the Americans had been influenced by the Dutch and the French, but I now see that this was an error. An investigator who is animated by no motive other than to find the truth must, if he is honest, let truth reveal itself in its own way, no matter how much it may run counter to popular beliefs. For the moment he may invite attack, but that is immaterial. Transient popularity no man cares for whose purpose is worthy.

In the first volume I dwelt at some length on the effect of the physical in its influence on character, partly because it is an element in race development which has not been given sufficient weight; and especially on account of its bearing on the formation of certain characteristics peculiarly American. One of my friendly critics, while generally approving my work, thinks that I have pushed my theories to "fantastic" lengths; and another, equally commendatory, airily dismisses Darwin's observation, that measurements taken during the Civil War showed that the "native" American had a larger bodily frame than recent German and Irish arrivals, by saying that "the great biologist was so far off his own ground that it is hardly necessary to examine this *obiter dictum* closely"; which I suppose means that the *obiter dictum* of Charles Darwin is of no consequence, while the *obiter dicta* of the anonymous book reviewer must be accepted *ex cathedra*!

PREFACE TO SECOND VOLUME 11

To reviewers who so easily annihilate knowledge with a few drops of ink, I recommend the careful reading of the Report of the Immigration Commission,¹ issued since the publication of the first volume of this work. Probably this Report may be regarded as *obiter dicta*, but at least it is of some interest to note that the investigations made by the scientific experts of the Commission sustain Darwin's "*obiter dictum*" and my own "fantastic theories."

To elaborate the theme would be to pile Pelion on Ossa, and in all probability still fail to convince those persons who regard the influence of the physical in race development as "fantastic"; or possessed of the requisite knowledge, one would be tempted to write on the origin and development of species, which in view of the existing library seems unnecessary. To any one who has been given the opportunity to study the races of men in their habitats, or, denied personal observation, has profited by the labor and learning of the masters, the conclusion is ineluctable that it is scientific and not fantastic to find the physical reflected in mental and moral characteristics. Even he whose study of nature ended in his childhood with *Zoölogy for Beginners*, and there learned that the domestic cat is the product of its environment and its habitat, cannot be so blind as not to see that in Europe as well

¹ *The Immigration Commission. A Partial Report to Congress on the Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants.* Senate Document No. 208.

as in America and Asia there is a difference, both mental and physical, between the lowlander and the highlander; that people who live on the plains differ from those who live on the mountains; that those who cling to the seaboard are in many things unlike those who live far from the influence of ocean; that the effects of extreme heat and extreme cold, of a dry arid climate and one where much moisture prevails, are temperamentally reflected in a people or race.¹ The subject must be left here.

Among his other shortcomings the author has been accused of an "exaggerated veneration" for the Puritan and of having attributed to him too great a share in the formation of American character. The American people have always been a sectional people,² and it is doubtless somewhat of a blow to the *amour propre* of Southerners, to Virginians especially, who have been brought up on the traditions of Southern influence in Colonial times, to learn that it was the Englishman of Puritan Massachusetts, and not the Englishman of Anglican Virginia, who laid the foundation for the American system, who gave the American his mental bias, and taught him self-government.

Americans are justly proud of what they have accomplished — of their population, of their wealth, of their great cities; of the railroads they have built, and the rivers they have bridged — in a word, the

¹ Cf. Draper: *History of the American Civil War*, vol. I, sec. I, *passim*.

² See page 360, *post*.

PREFACE TO SECOND VOLUME 13

material. Probably if I were an American these objective things would make a similar appeal to my imagination and I should regard them as the great triumph of my people. To me they make only a minor appeal. The great thing that America ^m has done, the one thing that will make it imperishable, ^{ln} whether the fate of Tyre or Sodom or Nineveh ^m or Herculaneum be in store for it, whether it shall ^o be blotted from the face of the map and only a name remain, whether it shall forget its own teachings or remain faithful to them — that one thing is that America taught the world the meaning of Democracy; ¹ it was America that gave to the world the first concept of human liberty and encouraged man to seek his freedom; a thing so wonderful that now, like all great discoveries, we regard it as a matter of course; but a thing so momentous that it changed the thought of mankind and altered the relations of man to man. It was the Puritan who gave this ^u thought to humanity. It was the Puritan who ^u created Democracy. It was in the Puritan Commonwealth that liberty to resist oppression was born. ^u Narrow, harsh, intolerant, bigoted these Puritans ^u were, but despite the qualities that have given them ^o

^m ¹ "Democracy had been hitherto only a ludicrous effort to reverse the laws of nature by thrusting Cleon into the place of Pericles. But a democracy that could fight for an abstraction, whose members held life and goods cheap compared with that larger life which we call country, was not merely unheard-of, but portentous. It was the nightmare of the Old World taking upon itself flesh and blood, turning out to be substance and not dream." — Lowell: *On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners.*

such an odious name, it was their teachings and their influence that made theoretic Democracy a reality. This is the debt not only of America but of the world to the Puritan. If American civilization and American development are to be understood, it is necessary that the character and the achievements of the Puritan must be minutely studied to explain the motivating causes of American psychology.

I must plead guilty to having employed the term "English" when "British" would perhaps have been more comprehensive. It has been a labor of love and a matter of pride with some American authors to credit to the branches of what we now know as the people of the United Kingdom a particular influence in the formation of American character. Thus Fiske considers the migration of the Ulster Protestants in the seventeenth century, generally spoken of in America as the "Scotch-Irish," "an event of scarcely less importance than the exodus of English Puritans to New England and that of English Cavaliers to Virginia";¹ and Roosevelt says, "The West was won by those who have been rightly called the Roundheads of the South, the same men who, before any others, declared for American independence."² There is a library of very fair proportions on the Scotch and Irish in America and the influence they have had on American development. Englishmen use the adjectives Eng-

¹ Fiske: *Old Virginia and Her Neighbours*, vol. II, p. 390.

² Roosevelt: *The Winning of the West*, vol. I, p. 137.

lish and British interchangeably as meaning a person born in the United Kingdom to distinguish subjects of the Crown born in Canada, Australia, or other parts of the Empire, and not to mark that fine distinction between Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen that is so carefully made in the United States. In the English rather than the American sense I have used "English" when referring to English influence on American institutions and the formation of American character, because it is almost impossible, in some instances, to resolve the Scotch and Irish into their original elements and eliminate the Saxon strain from the Celtic. Thus, one has often heard in America that a certain American is not of English but "Scotch-Irish" descent;¹ but the so-called Scotch-Irish were never Irish except as they became Irish from living in Ireland. The men and women who were brought over to Ireland by the first Stuart King and settled on the forfeited estates of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnel in the Province of Ulster, in the opening years of the seventeenth century, were Scotch and English Protestants, the Scotch predominating, and not Irish; and they became "Scotch-Irish" by habitation and environment. It was these Scotch-Irish, in whose veins ran so much English blood, who left Ulster in large numbers in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and settled in Pennsyl-

¹ This term "Scotch-Irish" is seldom if ever used by Englishmen in England, and seems to be peculiarly a term of American coinage.

vania, thence to spread south through Virginia and the Carolinas, and from the South followed the western trail to the Pacific. I use the term English to differentiate the men of the English-speaking race trained under English institutions and those of Teutonic and Latin descent; and not to magnify the English at the expense of the Scotch or the Irish. Without the slightest desire to detract from Irish or Scotch achievement, it has been my endeavor to make clear the distinction between the English-speaking race and the non-English-speaking races of the European Continent.

Some objection has been raised to my statement that the Americans are a “new” race and not a mongrel race, and I have been told that ethnology knows no such thing as a “pure” race, and that the Americans are no more an unmixed strain than are the English, the Germans, or the Latins. I do not think I have written anything in the previous volume that can be fairly interpreted as my belief in the purity of blood. There I wrote,¹ in I believe not ambiguous language: “There is to-day no unmixed race. The theory of the unvitiated strain, both in man and animals, is now known to be a fallacy. The great races are races of mixed blood and cross-breeding.” I have simply tried to show that the Americans — as the results of environment, political and social institutions, and their own philosophy — are not diluted Englishmen any more

¹ See page 56.

than they are imitation Germans, or transplanted Spaniards, but that they are new in the sense that they have evolved a distinct American type, with mental and physical characteristics foreign to those of other people, or races. What has happened in the more than a hundred and twenty-five years that have elapsed since the beginning of national existence is precisely similar to what has taken place in the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Take, for example, the seedless orange, a new species of a very old fruit. By careful selection and crossing there has been produced an orange that has lost some of the characteristics which mark the family and has acquired new qualities. The seed, without which at one time it was considered impossible to grow an orange, has been eliminated, and the new fruit has a flavor and texture of its own.

Perhaps an even more striking illustration is the *Citrus decumana*, known to all Americans and to many Europeans under its popular name of the grape-fruit or the shaddock. In its original or native form, it was too bitter to be used as an article of diet, but by being crossed with the lemon and the orange its extreme acidity was modified and the fruit made palatable. Here a "new" species was developed, and, while it preserved the physical structure of the parent stock, developed its own character. In the first volume I said,¹ — and I think the statement cannot be challenged, — "In

¹ See page 20.

both the animal and the vegetable kingdoms species, by the irresistible law of evolution and their adjustment to new conditions, retain many of the characteristics of the parent stock, but by conforming to their environment in the struggle for existence create a new type." Darwin repeatedly points out that Nature is continually at work creating new species, or modifying existing ones to adapt them to their environment or the struggle for survival. Thus in North America, he says, "All the wolves, foxes, and aboriginal domestic dogs have their feet broader than in the corresponding species of the Old World, and well calculated for running on the snow";¹ and this, he remarks, is necessary, as the life or death of every animal will often depend upon its success in hunting over the snow when soft; and this will in part depend upon the feet being broad. Again he notes that in England "an entirely new foxhound was raised through the breeder's art, the ears of the old Southern hound being reduced, the bone and bulk lightened, the waist increased in length, and the stature somewhat added to. It is believed that this was effected by a cross with a greyhound. With respect to the latter dog, Youatt, who is generally cautious in his statements, says that the greyhound within the last fifty years, that is, before the commencement of the present century, 'assumed a somewhat dif-

¹ Darwin: *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, vol. I, p. 42.

ferent character from that which he once possessed. He is now distinguished by a beautiful symmetry of form, of which he could not once boast, and he has even superior speed to that which he formerly exhibited. He is no longer used to struggle with deer, but contends with his fellows over a shorter and speedier course.' An able writer believes that our English greyhounds are the descendants, *progressively improved* [Darwin's italics], of the large rough greyhounds which existed in Scotland so early as the third century."¹ It would be wearisome to continue to cite the authorities, for it is no longer open to dispute that animals are the product of their environment and the conditions under which they live, those conditions being food, climate, and natural selection. If animals are subject to an universal law, is there any reason for believing that man alone of the animal kingdom can escape its influence?

In the first volume I said² that the constant effort of breeders of stock and of floriculturists is to improve the breed or the flower by crossing it with a strain the product of a different environment, or to graft on it a growth that has its own peculiarities of soil and climate. "Here we see the recognition of the fundamental law that in the animal and vegetable kingdoms what corresponds to character in man — in animals and fruits and flowers, structure, size, color — is the result of environment."

¹ Darwin: *Op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

² See page 55.

Carrying out that analogy, we find warrant for the assertion that the Americans are a "new" race. It might perhaps have been considered more correct, but it would have been decidedly more cumbersome and offensive to literary taste, and would not have conveyed the exact shade of meaning, to have described Americans as an "unlike" race, that is unlike the English, the French, or the Germans; unlike any other modern European nation from which they are descended or whose blood has mingled with theirs. But a thing unlike that with which it is compared is dissimilar or diverse or bears no resemblance; therefore, it is different and "new." The American people are not entirely without resemblance to the English and other European races, but they have developed characteristics that differentiate them mentally from the races of Europe, and in that sense they are "new."

It is curious, the reluctance of Americans to admit that they have a psychology which sets them apart from the rest of the world and has given them their distinguishing traits. Thus in a sympathetic review¹ of the first volume of this work, the reviewer says that the book "comprises nothing less than an attempt to elucidate the psychology of the American people. Most of us would be inclined at the outset, perhaps, to pronounce such a task impossible of accomplishment. The psychology of any mass of eighty or ninety millions of men and women is

¹ *The Dial*, Chicago, April 16, 1910.

an extremely elusive thing; and furthermore, the people of America represent a conglomeration of racial elements such as would seem scarcely to admit of anything in the nature of composite characterization." This hesitation, this extreme modesty to deny a nation the possession of that which every nation has claimed as one of the elements without which there can be no vigorous nationality, is a thing extremely difficult for a foreigner to understand. No Englishman, no Frenchman, no German would deny that his people have a national psychology; in fact, he would resent the assertion as an insult to his nationality, but the American seems to take pride in the deficiency. I shall endeavor to prove in subsequent pages that the "conglomeration of racial elements" scientifically admit "of composite characterization." It is an American habit, largely reinforced by foreign criticism, to think of the American people as a "conglomeration," the modern tower of Babel, a hodge-podge of races, each of which, while part of a social and political entity, still remains alien, still preserves its mother-language, still remains foreign to its environment, and is uninfluenced by political and social forces; as if America were simply a convention hall for an international gathering, the delegates brought together for a common purpose, but permitted to address the meeting in their own tongues, making no concessions to their hosts in dress or thought or expression, elbow to elbow for the mo-

ment but unchanged by association, and, despite their common purpose, at heart antagonistic and resolved not to yield to "foreign" influence. Americans who labor under this delusion forget the cementing effect of language, — for there is only one language spoken in the United States, — political loyalty, and social institutions. Yet these are the forces to assimilate the peoples of many races and to transform them, physically and mentally, and to make "of them a people essentially one without waiting for the slow process of amalgamation by the mingling of the blood at all,"¹ and thus to produce a national psychology.

Probably my conclusions as to the effect of immigration on the psychology of the American, which are set forth at some length in the present volume, will be criticized because they are opposed to views of other writers. It is unnecessary to forestall what will be found in subsequent pages. It seems sufficient to say that as I have been unable to discover in early American institutions any trace of any influence other than English, so now I have been equally unable to find that the character of the mind or the ethical concept of the American has been affected by the non-English immigration of the nineteenth century. Those mental characteristics and the socialized code which all the world recognizes as peculiarly American, and which have given the American a distinct individuality, are, in one

¹ *Christian Register*, Boston, March 24, 1910.

word, American. Their genesis was in American soil when the Colonial ceased to exist and the American came into being; and as his civilization has developed, so his character has become fixed and the type has been permanently established. The American has an extraordinary and only partially explained power of absorbing alien people into his social and political system, and yet remaining uninfluenced by them. Germans become "German-Americans" and then Americans, but the millions of Germans who have poured into the country have not succeeded in making a single American an "American-German." It is this power of the American to assimilate and not to be assimilated, to influence but to remain uninfluenced, to stamp his individuality upon the alien and not to lose his own individuality, that has incorporated the immigrant into the American without affecting the fundamental ideas of America or its political principles; and has so insensibly affected the mind or philosophy, morals or point of view, artistic development or literary taste of the American. In some other respects, economic especially, the influence of the immigrant has been very great, but more need not be said here, as the subject is treated fully in its proper place.

CHAPTER II

THE STAGING OF THE REVOLUTION

IT is the year 1760. No student of the American Revolution, says an American writer, can have failed to notice how, from the beginning to the end, its several stages unfolded themselves and succeeded one another with something of the logical sequence, the proportion, and the unity of a well-ordered plot. It is quite other than a rhetorical commonplace to speak of the Revolution as a drama.¹

This is choice rhetoric and fits in well with the ideas of many American writers, who have come to look upon the Revolution as the expression of a burning love of an idealistic conception of liberty; as if the colonists had been animated by purely unselfish motives and were, as Otis said in opposing the issuance of writs of assistance, "arguing in favor of British liberty." To Tyler that argument on the powers of the Massachusetts court to grant these writs appears "to have begun a new era in the history of the human race,"² and was "in itself an authentic token of that sensitive and proud condition of the American colonial mind out of which all the later acts of Revolutionary resistance were

¹ Tyler: *The Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. I, pp. 30-31.

² Tyler: *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

born."¹ It has been repeatedly said that no single cause produced the American Revolution and brought a nation into being, and there was no catastrophic climax. The causes began with the first coming of the English. They grew with the years. They were as many and as diverse as the influences that go to make the character of man. It was long held by American historians that the stamp tax was the spark to fire the Revolutionary train. They have since shifted their ground. That event in the harbor of Boston, schoolboys were taught, was the thing to make loyal Englishmen American rebels. No American now teaches that. It is impossible to explain the Revolution in a page or a chapter, for you cannot crowd into any such small space the mind of a people that had been moulded under the pressure of a century and a half of life amidst new surroundings and under new conditions; that had lost some of its old qualities and received new impressions. To understand the Revolution one must read forward and backward; one must know the history of the English people from before the time they settled in America until the middle of the eighteenth century; from then until argument ceased and the sword was drawn.²

¹ Tyler: *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

² "In short, what we call the American Revolution was simply a culmination that had been going on for a hundred and fifty years. New England was never more prosperous and happy than in 1770." — Oration of ex-Governor John D. Long, at Springfield, Massachusetts, July 4, 1909. (*Springfield Republican*, July 5, 1909.)

If for the sake of the rhetorical figure we may regard the Revolution as a drama with "the proportion and the unity of a well-ordered plot," we shall see that here were the coherent motives that every master of stagecraft has always employed; but motives somewhat different from those that popular imagination has created.

In the first volume it was my effort to emphasize certain facts the significance of which it is essential to grasp if American psychology is to be understood and a clear idea obtained of the causes that brought about the Revolution; and although it may be less picturesque, it is more in consonance with truth, to regard the Revolution as an episode in history rather than as a dramatic climax in American development.

From almost the first coming of Englishmen to America they had assumed control over their own affairs and become masters of their own taxation. They had made themselves practically independent of King and Parliament and maintained the inherent right of governing themselves subject only to nominal control of the mother-country. It is no less important to remember that in the hundred and fifty years that followed the coming of the English into the New World they had grown in strength and prosperity; they were no longer small, weak, straggling settlements supported by the money and arms of England, in danger of starvation or destruction if that protection was withdrawn.

“They had taken Louisburg, and had assisted in taking Quebec.”¹ The day of the settlement had passed; the settlements had expanded into miniature states, the seeds of empire and nationality had been sown, the harvest was ripening. The century and a half that followed the planting of Jamestown saw on the American continent a vigorous, self-reliant, masterful race, inspired by their English inheritance of glorious traditions; proud of their achievements, facing the future with the confidence born of success; rich in actual possessions and sustained by the security founded in the knowledge that even greater riches were in store for them.

Materially they were strong; steadfast, too, in strength of purpose, in that resolute courage that has given to the world its fanatics and martyrs, and the world needs its martyrs as much as it needs its saints and prophets and tyrants. In the fibre of their being was woven the Puritan strain. “Faith in God, faith in man, faith in work, — this is the short formula in which we may sum up the teachings of the founders of New England, a creed simple enough for this life and the next,”² — concisely describes them. It was the Puritan teaching and training and the Puritan influence that was the basis of character and gave these men their individuality. The Puritan, with many admirable qualities, was selfish, hard, self-centred. His well-

¹ Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. II, p. 872.

² Lowell: *Among My Books*, vol. I, p. 229.

read Old Testament had given him an exaggerated sense of justice and taught the theologic lesson of vengeance; resistance to oppression was ordained; and he had very pronounced ideas of what constituted oppression. The Puritan, as we shall soon see, passing through the same evolutionary stages that mark the development of all society, ceased to give the first thought to theology and paid more attention to politics, but he brought to his politics the same methods that had distinguished his religion. The Puritan was a fanatic and would tolerate no alien creed; in politics he was equally obstinate. In the early days of Massachusetts we have the gentle Pilgrim and the harsh Puritan. In the drama of the Revolution was the Puritan spirit, not the sweetness and simple charity of the Pilgrim.

A resolute, pugnacious, determined people were making history in the New World when the sunlight of the eighteenth century was dispelling the fogs of Old-World political tradition; a people with a fierce hatred of everything that seemed to savor of tyranny or to curtail their own formulas of liberty. To the south were men of their own race, less austere but no less liberty-loving; softened by climate and with some of the angularities of character rounded; to whom God and the Devil were more impersonal, but who were equally resolute in holding to that which they had won, and who would brook no interference with what they regarded as the imprescriptible right to govern themselves ac-

cording to their own ideas and without the interference of a legislature separated by three thousand miles of sea.

For a hundred and fifty years these people had developed under the stimulus of their own institutions. They had created their own civilization. Their society was formed on their own system. There had grown up their own code. Customs, laws, society had been modified to meet their own requirements. Englishmen they were in name, but America to them was home. These were the people that in 1760 were waiting for the curtain to rise on the last act of colonial history, and put on the stage the drama of the Revolution.

CHAPTER III

AMERICA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

RHETORIC has slain more truths than ignorance. To enhance the dramatic, historian and romanticist have magnified the power of Britain at the time of the Revolution and dwelt with undue emphasis upon "the struggling colonies," upon the hardships and misery of the colonial troops at Valley Forge, upon the difficulties encountered to clothe and feed and pay them, until the world has come to believe that when the colonists declared their independence of the Crown they were not only few in number but wretchedly poor; that they suffered for the necessities of life, that compared with the English they were cave dwellers, their civilization low and their resources scanty. Now as a matter of fact, while in population and wealth they were greatly inferior to the English, in some respects they enjoyed advantages not possessed by them, and nothing is more erroneous than the belief that their poverty was great or that their social organization was still rudimentary.¹

By nature and instinct the Puritan was a business

¹ The country, Fiske says, never put forth more than a small fraction of its available strength in the Revolution. — *The American Revolution*, vol. II, p. 26.

man and never forgot the main chance; while he perpetually thanked God for His manifold mercies, he nevertheless thought much about his money; the fact that he was ingenuous enough to record in the same sentence his thanks to God and his anxiety whether a creditor would defraud him, has given rise to the belief that the Puritan was a monstrous hypocrite, whose religion was merely a cloak for his cant and Pecksniffian ways and a cover under which to exact the last farthing. Thus Sewall in his *Diary* has a characteristic entry under date of March 19, 1693: "Benjamin Hallawell, late captive of Algier, and his infant daughter, Mary, were baptized. When I first saw him in London, I could hardly persuade myself that he could live over the Sea, and now I see him and his daughter baptized. Lord let it be a Token that Thou wilt revive thy work in the midst of the years. In London, 't was some discouragement to me to think how hardly 't would come off for the father to pay me for the English money I had disbursed for the Redemption of a dead Son: but God has given him a new life."¹

Of the New Englander, General Greene wrote shortly after the outbreak of the Revolution: "The common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the people is commercial, from their long intercourse of trade."² A hundred years before Greene, a visiting Englishman discovered America and

¹ Sewall: *Diary*, vol. I, p. 375.

² Irving: *Life of Washington*, vol. II, p. 119.

turned out the usual book. "The grose *Goddons*, or great masters," he wrote, "as also some of their Merchants are damnable rich; generally all of their judgment, inexplicably covetous and proud, they receive your gifts but as an homage or tribute due to their transcendency."¹ A modern New Englander wrote of his Puritan forbears, "It was in the practical that they showed their true quality, as Englishmen are wont,"² and he tells us: "They were business men, men of facts and figures no less than of religious earnestness. The sum of two hundred thousand pounds had been invested in their undertaking — a sum, for that time, truly enormous as the result of private combination for a doubtful experiment. That their enterprise might succeed, they must show a balance on the right side of the counting-house ledger, as well as in their private accounts with their own souls. The liberty of praying when and how they would, must be balanced with an ability of paying when and as they ought."³ It was this money-getting instinct of the Puritan that made the Northern Colonies so prosperous, and stimulated them to engage in manufacturing enterprises despite the obstacle of repressive English legislation.

It is common belief that the Jews, from instinct and as the result of persecution, from being denied other opportunities for displaying their intellectual

¹ Josselyn: *An Account of Two Voyages to New England*, p. 180.

² Lowell: *Among My Books*, vol. I, p. 232. ³ Lowell: *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

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powers, and from a sordid love of money, in the course of time developed into a race of extraordinarily able money-getters and traders; but it is doubtful if they had the same capacity for business and commerce on a large scale as the Puritans. The Jew became a money-lender and a financier, the banker to advance money on a venture that promised a rich return on his capital invested, to speculate through the energy and hardihood of men willing to undergo much toil and meet many dangers for the use of his money; but the Jews were originally a pastoral people and had no impulse for adventure, and it was necessity alone that drove them to the display of physical energy. With the Puritan it was different. He came from a line of men accustomed to hard work, who had toughened under severe manual labor, who had lived frugal lives, who when work was to be done did it with their own hands. The difference between the "money sense" of the Jew and the Puritan is the difference between the banker and the trader. The one discounts paper and makes advances on a bill of lading; the other buys and sells merchandise, or charters a ship in the hope of finding a market for his cargo. It is the trader and not the banker whose knowledge of commerce and the wants of a people is great, because usually he has learned by experience and from having worked his way up; whose success, among other qualities, is due to his frugality and thrift, who sends his cargo to foreign lands,

and knows not only the merchandise in which he deals but how to sail a ship, for he often began life as a cabin boy or a supercargo. If he builds houses he applies on a larger scale the knowledge he gained as a carpenter or a mason.

The banker, whom the Jew typifies, seldom if ever sees the ship or the cargo which his money buys, and personally knows not whether the ship is seaworthy or the cargo of proper quality; he has no technical training, nor is it necessary; it is sufficient for him to be governed by the general law of commerce: that if a demand exists and it can be satisfied at a fixed price there is profit in the venture, for the success of which he relies on others better qualified.

Both the Jews and the Puritans were idealists, in both Jew and Puritan imagination was largely developed, although overlaid by the struggle *for* life in the case of the Jew and the struggle *against* life in the case of the Puritan; but neither idealism nor imagination interfered with the commercial sense; perhaps it was the possession of these qualities that made both so quick to grasp possibilities and to envisage the future.

The method of the historian and the manner in which history is written is to give undue space to describing in elaborate detail military movements, which to the average reader, interested in results but not in technique, mean nothing; and to attach importance to political events, which often left

no lasting impress upon the character of a people or the structure of society. This is perhaps the reason that writers have dealt so inadequately with the material condition of the American colonies at the outbreak of the Revolution. Both in English and American histories are to be found frequent detached references to the commerce and wealth of the colonies; the speeches and writings of the day throw additional light on the subject; there have been studies of the origin and development of a particular industry, but I know of no author who has had the ability and industry to assemble all the facts and present them in their proper relation as a whole. Such a work would be extremely valuable and of great interest.

My attempt to picture the material condition of the colonies from about the middle of the eighteenth century is necessarily fragmentary, and no effort has been made to go into the subject with the thoroughness its importance demands, which would be out of place here; but it is believed the facts presented and the conclusions they develop can be accepted as accurate.

Remembering Macaulay's injunction that "one of the first objects of an inquirer who wishes to form a correct notion of the state of a community at a given time, must be to ascertain of how many persons that community then consisted,"¹ the first inquiry must be directed to learn the popula-

¹ Macaulay: *History of England*, vol. I, p. 138.

tion of the colonies when the Declaration of Independence was adopted. In 1760, according to Channing, the people numbered a million and a half,¹ including the blacks. About one third of the colonists were "foreigners," that is, they were not born in the colonies. At the time of the Peace of Paris in 1763, Lecky computes the population of the thirteen colonies at "about a million and a half freemen, and their number probably slightly exceeded two millions at the time of the Declaration of Independence."² Franklin thought the population doubled every twenty-five years, exclusive of the increase by immigration.³ Wigglesworth agrees as to the time in which population doubles, but includes in that increase immigration.⁴ Winsor⁵ places the population at the opening of the war "at something over a million," which is manifestly inaccurate. "Let it be remembered," Bryant and Gay say, "that Great Britain supplied three millions of people in America with almost every manufactured article which they needed."⁶ Burke in his Speech on Conciliation said he had taken a good deal of pains to ascertain the population, which he placed at "two millions of inhabitants of our own European blood and color; besides at least five

¹ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 491.

² Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. III, p. 267.

³ Franklin: *Works*, vol. VI, p. 49.

⁴ Wigglesworth: *Calculations on American Population*, p. 1.

⁵ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. V, p. 151, n.

⁶ Bryant and Gay: *A Popular History of the United States*, vol. III, p. 331.

hundred thousand others, who form no inconsiderable part of the strength and opulence of the whole"; but he added it was of little moment whether he put the numbers too high or too low, because "such is the strength with which population shoots in that part of the world, that state the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends."¹

Bancroft's estimate of the population in 1754 was 1,165,000 whites and 263,000 negroes; in all, 1,428,000 souls.² Dexter found that in twenty-four years, from 1743 to 1767, the population had grown from one million to two millions;³ and in 1775, De Bow places it at 2,243,000, "an increase of over one hundred per cent in twenty-five years, despite of the troubles of the times, which could not have checked immigration and promoted emigration."⁴ He swells his total by estimating the South to have a slave population of 500,000, making the aggregate at that time 2,750,000. These figures, of course, were not based on an actual enumeration, but are the calculations of careful men; but in 1790 the first Federal census was taken, which returned a total population of 3,929,214.⁵ This was probably under

¹ Burke: *Speech on Conciliation with America*, *Works*, vol. I, p. 456.

² Bancroft: *History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 389. Cf. *A Century of Population Growth*, pp. 3-11, *passim*.

³ Dexter: *Estimates of Population in the American Colonies*, p. 49.

⁴ De Bow: *Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States*, vol. III, p. 404.

⁵ Wright: *The History and Growth of the United States Census*, p. 17.

the mark, as there was a popular belief that the people were counted for the purpose of being taxed, and many of them understated the number of persons in their families.¹ From all of which it is a safe conclusion, I think, that the population of the colonies at the time of the Revolution was not less than three millions. That of England at the same time was about ten millions; but that the population of the colonies increased much more rapidly than that of England is shown by a letter written by John Adams in 1775: "If we can remove the turbulent Gallics, our people will in another century become more numerous than England itself."² Peter Kalm, the eminent Swedish botanist and traveler, was so greatly impressed with the strength and wealth of the colonies that he wrote, "The English colonies in this part of the world have increased so much in their number of inhabitants, and in their riches, that they almost vie with Old England."³

America in that day was not rich in great stores of accumulated capital or the returns from investments; it experienced the economic trials of every other youthful community, and was cramped for ready capital and was always a debtor; its greatest hardship was the scarcity of specie, of

¹ Tucker: *Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth in Fifty Years*, p. 16.

² Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. v, p. 151.

³ Kalm: *Travels into North America*, vol. i, p. 206.

which it was constantly drained by English merchants in the operations of trade. Sir Robert Walpole said he supposed that if the colonies should gain £500,000 in trade, half of it would, in two years, pass by indirect channels into the English exchequer.¹

The position of the colonies in the eighteenth century in their financial relations with England was very similar to that of the Western American States to the Eastern financial centres from 1850 to about 1900. In that half-century, roughly speaking, the building of cities and railways and the bringing of the land under cultivation made the West heavily indebted to the East; money at ruinous rates of interest was lent by the East to these Western pioneers, who had to struggle against adverse conditions and suffer much hardship; who saw their crops destroyed by blight and the elements, but the interest payments on their mortgages must be met or they would be sold out by "the bank," a thousand miles away; and "the bank" was as soulless, as impersonal, and as inexorable as Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. The West came to have for the East much the same feeling that the colonies had for England; they were slaving for a bare existence so that their creditors might grow rich from the profits of their labor; this feeling gave rise to the same resentment that every man in debt has for his creditor; it was one of the reasons,

¹ Bryant and Gay: *A Popular History of the United States*, vol. iii, p. 331. . .

as we shall see, that gave the West a view of life different from that of the East. In the colonies at the time of the Revolution, as in the West a century later, the means existed to create wealth, and although no man could foresee the enormous potential resources of the continent, its riches, both in England and America, were vaguely understood.

Between 1700 and 1760, the value of property in England increased fifty per cent, and Pitt declared this was wholly due to the American colonies.¹ In 1776, he said, "The profit of Great Britain from the trade of the colonies is two millions a year. This is the fund that carried you triumphantly through the last war. You owe this to America." Burke told the House of Commons that for some time past the Old World had been fed from the New, and he gave in striking form the value of the American trade to England. In 1704, the export trade of England to the colonies stood at £569,930; in 1772, it had grown to £6,023,132. Even more impressive is his further statement that in 1704 the whole export trade of England, including the colonies, was valued at £6,509,000, while in 1772 the colonial exports alone amounted to £6,024,000. "When we speak of the commerce with our colonies," he said, "fiction lags after truth; invention is unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren."²

¹ Bryant and Gay: *A Popular History of the United States*, vol. III, p. 331.

² Burke: *Speech on Conciliation with America, Works*, vol. I, pp. 457-61, *passim*.

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Whence came these great sources of wealth which so immensely added to the prosperity of the Empire? Burke has told of the bounty of Nature which enabled the New World to feed the Old, and he found other mines. From the beginning of time the sea has always nourished its people, and the skill and audacious courage with which the colonists pursued their fisheries excited the envy of England. The men of New England, in Burke's high-sounding phrase, carried on the whale fishery "among the tumbling mountains of ice," they penetrated "into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits; whilst we are looking for them beneath the Arctic Circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the South. No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries. No climate that is not witness to their toils."¹

Spurred by necessity, the men of New England had early taken to the sea. Massachusetts reached out slowly from the seaboard, and it was not until about 1725 that she began to colonize the Berkshire Hills.² It was this leisurely control of the hinterland that forced her people out on the sea and made them a maritime race and the ocean carriers of the colonies. "Boston alone in 1664 had three hundred boats fishing in the waters about Cape

¹ Burke: *Speech on Conciliation with America, Works*, vol. 1, p. 462.

² Elson: *History of the United States of America*, p. 129.

Sable; and there were fifteen hundred fishermen casting their nets off the Isles of Shoals. Cod became the staple of New England exports. Salted and packed, it found a ready and extensive market.¹ The choicest fish were sent to the Catholic countries of southern Europe, where the regular fast-days occasioned a steady demand, just as they had done in the fifteenth century for the salt herring of the great Hanse fisheries."² In three years, from 1714 to 1717, there cleared from Boston for the West Indies 518 vessels; the total number of clearances from Boston to all ports in that period was 1247 vessels, employing 8697 men; from the less important port of Salem 232 vessels sailed.³ The prodigious strides made by the sea-borne commerce of the colonies is shown by an account of entrances and clearances for 1760.⁴ In that year there entered all the ports of the colonies from British and foreign ports a total of 3044 vessels, with an aggregate of 188,562 tons; there cleared to British and foreign ports 3523 vessels, having a tonnage of 201,613. The British policy, which restricted the carrying-trade to British or colonial vessels, was of enormous advantage to the shipping interests on both sides

¹ "The merchantable dry cod are carried to the markets of Spain, Portugal, and Italy; the refuse cod are shipped off for the West India Islands to feed the negro slaves." — Douglas: *A Summary of the British Settlements*, vol. i, p. 538.

² Semple: *American History and its Geographic Conditions*, p. 124.

³ Barry: *History of Massachusetts*, vol. ii, p. 107.

⁴ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. ii, p. 525.

of the Atlantic and encouraged the building of ships in the colonies; an industry for which they were peculiarly favored owing to their timber and naval stores.¹ So important did this industry become that in 1724 the ship carpenters of the Thames complained to the King that their trade was hurt and their workmen emigrated, since so many vessels were built in New England. Massachusetts built ships not only for England, but also for European countries and the West Indies.²

The year 1760 was one of the years of war between England and France. The French West Indian Islands produced almost nothing but sugar, and had to rely on the American colonies for food. This trade was illegal, but for fifty years it had been permitted to go on unchecked, and it became so profitable that even in time of war it could not be suppressed, as men were willing to sacrifice their patriotism for the sake of swelling their purse.³ How great the gains were from this illicit commerce is shown by an English author of that year, who declares that a cargo of cotton, linen, and woolen

¹ Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. I, p. 364.

² Beer: *The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies*, p. 156.

³ Vessels sailing under flags of truce were licensed to go to the French West Indies, nominally to exchange prisoners, actually to engage in contraband trade. These licenses were issued by the colonial governors, who knew what they were worth, and exacted full price. Francis Fauquier, lieutenant-governor of Virginia, according to Burnaby, was one of the few governors who refused to issue these permits, although on one occasion Fauquier was offered £200 for a permit for a single voyage. — *Travels through North America*, p. 73.

cloth, and other European goods, would yield fifty to one hundred per cent profit and the return cargo of sugar would bring in another inordinate profit; for £400,000 invested in New York or Boston, a shipowner might earn in one voyage £3,200,000!¹

It is one of the phenomena of a new country that its first settlement by an alien people is always accompanied by an excessively high death-rate because of the hardships to be overcome and the time required to adapt the new stock to the changed conditions of climate and mode of living, but after that period of trial has been successfully met, the increase of population is rapid, provided that the country is suitable and can afford support for a quick breeding race. We have seen² how excessive was the mortality in the early Puritan days, and we are now to observe the other illustration of this natural law. Franklin, testifying before the House of Commons in 1776, was asked the reason that the people of America increased faster than they did in England, and he answered that "any young couple that are industrious may easily obtain land of their own, on which they can raise a family." At the time of the Revolution the first period of the long struggle was over. America was then a sparsely settled, rude country as compared with England, without many of the refinements and the comforts of civilization that Englishmen were ac-

¹ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 567, n.

² See vol. I, p. 82.

customed to enjoy, but it was no barren wilderness nor merely a chain of rough frontier outposts.¹ In Philadelphia, we are told, at the close of the war, it was the fashion to celebrate public events by processions of tradesmen and mechanics, and in one such pageant, nearly fifty distinct trades were represented; companies existed for the better protection of the interests of the trades, and a library had been founded fifty years before, chiefly by this class. Upon the solid foundation of manufactures and trade had been built a society living in comfort and ease.² Philadelphia lacked nothing that was possessed by any city in England, except a close corporation and a bull-ring, is Trevelyan's description of the city.³ Pennsylvania, about the middle of the eighteenth century, could be justly called the most flourishing of the English colonies. A fleet of four hundred sail left Philadelphia yearly with the season's produce. The colony's free population numbered 220,000 souls.⁴ As early as 1700 it was possible to ride from Portland, Maine, to southern Virginia, sleeping each night at some considerable

¹ "As respects cleanliness and that decency of living which distinguishes man from the brutes, though primitive if judged by modern standards, the colonial New Englander contrasted favorably with other communities of the same time, whether in America or in Europe." — Adams, *Three Episodes of Massachusetts History*, vol. II, p. 794.

² Bryant and Gay: *A Popular History of the United States*, vol. IV, p. 91.

³ Trevelyan: *The American Revolution*, part I, p. 77.

⁴ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. V, p. 216. Cf. Grahame: *The History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 403; Douglas: *A Summary of the British Settlements*, vol. II, pp. 324-25; Sheffield: *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, table VII.

village.¹ That there was more luxury in the colonies than we commonly give them credit for possessing is shown by the inventories of estates. As early as 1648, Thomas Nowell, of Windsor, Connecticut, disposed of real estate and personal property valued at £368, and among the items enumerated are "one couerlitt, 4 pairs of sheets, 3 pair pillow beers, 3 tablecloaths, 5 table napkins."² During the following century, as the permanency of settlement became firmly established, the colonists surrounded themselves with greater comforts and luxuries.³

I think it is stating only the exact truth to say that, taking them as a whole, the three million people in the American colonies were, at the outbreak of the Revolution, really better off than the ten million people who constituted the population of England. I do not mean that there was more wealth in America than in England. There was not. I do not mean that any American enjoyed more luxury than did some Englishmen, or that the richest and best provided colonial had the luxuries and comforts that even the moderately rich Englishman was able to command. That were impossible. But the general standard of living among the people was higher; there was less poverty and degradation and vice.⁴

¹ Semple: *American History and its Geographic Conditions*, p. 48.

² Trumbull, in Hart's *American History told by Contemporaries*, vol. I, p. 477.

³ Cf. Bruce: *Economic History of Virginia*, vol. II, chap. xii *et seq.*

⁴ "In colonial Massachusetts there was, outside of Boston, which was a

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A charming picture of life in Penn's colony almost a century before the Revolution is given in a quaint letter written by a young girl. One would like to know more of this Sally Brindley, with her acute observation and sprightly description.

THE MANOR, BUCKS COUNTY, PA.

The 28th of 11th Mo., 1685.

DEAR GRANDMOTHER: —

Mamma has been writing to thee since last Fifth day, and she told me I could put a sheet into the letter. We want to get it off on the packet which sails from Philadelphia about the 10th of the Twelfth month.

Our new house is all done. I wish thee could see our big kitchen. It has a fireplace entirely across one end of the room. Papa brings the back log in with the horse, and when the boys pile wood up against it, such a fire as it does make. We have so much wood. Papa says he would be rich if we had this timber in England. I gather chips. We had a nice time roasting chestnuts this fall in the ashes. I have four quarts dried.

The new house is built of logs and all nicely plastered inside. We'll be good and warm this winter. There is room in the fireplace for papa's big chair and mamma's rocker. There is a bench on the other side of the fire for us children. There is a little narrow window near the

seaport town of large commerce, no appreciable criminal class, whether male or female. There was enough and to spare of individuals with criminal tendencies more or less fully developed, — the weak minded, or the inherently vicious, — and such there will always be in every community; but during the colonial period there was no considerable or recognized portion of the Massachusetts community those composing which made their avowed livelihood, such as it was, by vice or crime." — Adams: *Three Episodes of Massachusetts History*, vol. II, p. 797.

chimney where the spinning wheel stands. I've learned to bake cakes on the coals. We have a Dutch oven now.

I wish thee could have seen our garden this summer. Besides the rows of sage, camomile, thyme, comfrey, and rue, with yarrow and some onions, we have great big love apples. They are almost as large as an apple. They grow up on a bushy plant which starts from a seed in the spring. Uncle Henry found them last summer among the Indians, and brought some of the seeds home. Mamma says they are poison if we eat them. They are just pretty to look at.

The men dug a long, winding ditch around the meadow bank this fall. It will carry the water along the side of the meadow so they can let it out to run all over the bank. It keeps the grass very green and pretty.

We have so many horses and cows that are not ours. Papa is Ranger now, and takes up all strays. Thee don't know about this, does thee? Well, everybody here lets their cows and horses run loose in the woods. Sometimes they don't come back, and it takes a long time to find them. We heard of a little girl this fall who got lost while hunting for the cows. Dark came on her and she heard the wolves howling. It was very late when she found the cows all huddled together. Her father found her next morning fast asleep alongside of the bell cow. She was safe and sound. I'm glad I wasn't that little girl.

All the cows here have ear marks. William Penn's cows have this mark. I copied it from Papa's book: . . . It must hurt to have their ears cut.

I also found this in the book. Papa put it in last summer: —

"Att the fall of the yeare 1684 there came a long-bodyed bb cow with this eare marke. She was very mild, and being a stranger, after publication, none owning her, James Harrison, att the request of Luke Brindley, the Ranger, wintered her, and upon the twenty-third of the 7th Mo., 1685, the cow was slaughtered and divided, two-thirds to the Governor, and one-third to the Ranger after James Harrison had 60 lbs. of her beef for the wintering of her."

So thee sees we have plenty of meat. We have 200 shad that were caught last spring and salted. Some of them are very big. The boys were out hunting yesterday and brought in two wild turkeys. We'll have one for dinner on Sixth-day, which is Monthly Meeting, and the other on First-day.

Mamma has school for me every day. She is the teacher and I am the scholars. I am head of my class. Papa says if I keep on doing that well he will send me to England to school when I get big. Then I'll see thee, grandma, and the dear old place I love so well. There is no more room on the paper so I must stop.

With lots of kisses and two pats for dear Old Rover, I remain thy affectionate granddaughter,

SALLY BRINDLEY.¹

Wages were higher in the colonies than in England.² At the end of the seventeenth century farm hands in New England were paid half a crown a day; if they were hired by the year they were paid from

¹ Sharpless: *A Quaker Experiment in Government*, pp. 84-86.

² For a detailed and extremely valuable compilation of wages and commodity prices from 1630 to 1789, see Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. II, Appendix A.

£14 to £20 a year in corn, cattle, and fish; and even at that day it was noted that clothing cost more in the colonies than in England.¹ The usual wages of skilled laborers in Massachusetts, Adams says, were from sixty-five cents to a dollar a day; those of ordinary, unskilled laborers two shillings or thirty-three cents; and, fluctuations of currency apart, these wages seem to have generally ruled until the end of the eighteenth century.² In England, in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, cooks and dairy-maids were paid £2 10s. a year; mowers of corn and grass, 1s. 2d. a day without meat and drink, and only 6d. with food; male haymakers, 10d. a day without food, and 5d with; female haymakers, 6d.; rough masons, carpenters, and plowmen, bricklayers, and tilers, 1s. 6d. from Lady Day to Michaelmas, and 1s. from Michaelmas to Lady Day. If they were fed, they had only 8d. a day all the year round. Gardeners and thatchers were paid at the same rate. Tailors earned 6d. a day with food, 10d. without; spinners earned only 4d. daily without food. This schedule of wages lasted into the reign of George I.³

In 1703, in Braintree, in Massachusetts, lived John Marshall, mason, carpenter, painter, non-commis-
sioned officer in the militia, and pious Puritan; and

¹ Josselyn: *An Account of Two Voyages to New England*, pp. 207-09.

² Adams: *Three Episodes of Massachusetts History*, vol. II, p. 687.

³ Bryant and Gay: *A Popular History of the United States*, vol. III, p. 127.
Cf. Rogers: *A History of Agriculture and Prices in England*, vol. VII, part II, p. 610, *et seq.*

being a Puritan he kept a diary, for the Puritan took as naturally to making entries in a journal as he did to searching his Bible for texts. Marshall records under date of December, 1703, "that this winter provision hath been more plenty and cheap than is frequently known; beef for six farthings per pound, pork at twopence the most, the best two and a half pence, Indian [meal] two shillings per bushel, mault barley at two shillings and sixpence."¹ The eighteenth century was not a particularly humane age, and in England, so long as the great mass of labor was given just enough to keep body and soul comparatively in touch, society was satisfied that it had done all that was required; in America there was neither more nor less humanity. But in America, while the struggle for existence was in one respect more severe, in another it pressed with less severity; America has always been the land of opportunity, and the opportunity existed in the eighteenth century just as it does in the twentieth for those who recognize it. From the first coming of the English there was always an intense demand for labor, its scarcity had much to do in bridging the gulf between classes, the shortage making labor more independent than in Europe. "The fewness and dearness of servants," Lowell says, "made it necessary to call in temporary assistance for extraordinary occasions, and hence arose the common use of the word 'help.' As the great majority kept no

¹ *Proceedings Massachusetts Historical Society*, vol. 1, second series, 1884.

servants at all, and yet were liable to need them for work to which the family did not suffice, as, for instance, in harvest, the use of the word was naturally extended to all kinds of service. That it did not have its origin in any false shame at the condition itself, induced by democratic habits, is plain from the fact that it came into use while the word 'servant' had a much wider application than now, and certainly implied no social stigma. Downing and Hooke, each at different times, one of them so late as 1667, wished to place a son as 'servant' with one of the Winthrops. Roger Williams writes of his daughter, that 'she desires to spend some time in service, and liked much Mrs. Brenton, who wanted.'"¹

The man dissatisfied with his condition could easily find employment elsewhere; he need not work as a farm laborer, but could take up a farm of his own. The colonial legislatures attempted to transplant the social regulations of England, and keep the laborer to a fixed place of residence, but what was possible in England was impossible in the colonies. Here it is curious to observe how national characteristics originate and are developed by accidental circumstances. Necessity, opportunity, the conditions under which society was then organized, gave the colonial a migratory instinct, and made him seek out a place that seemed to offer an opportunity to retrieve failure. While the inherited

¹ Lowell: *Among My Books*, vol. I, p. 263.

tradition of the English peasantry was an almost limpet-like attachment to the soil and the place of his birth, the Englishman in America was early filled with a spirit of unrest which displayed itself in an adventurous desire to look over the rim. These are qualities that have become part of the fibre of the American, to whom distance means nothing and home is merely a convenient designation.¹

¹ Writing in 1796 from York, Pennsylvania, Weld notes that the Germans settle down and rarely rove about; "the American, on the contrary, is of a roving disposition, and wholly regardless of the ties of consanguinity; he takes his wife with him, goes to a distant part of the country, and buries himself in the woods, hundreds of miles distant from the rest of the family, never perhaps to see them again. . . . Restless and discontented with what they possess, they are forever changing. It is scarcely possible in any part of the continent to find a man, amongst the middling and lower classes of Americans, who has not changed his farm and his residence many different times."

— *Travels through the States of North America*, pp. 99–100.

CHAPTER IV

ROME AND AMERICA — A CONTRAST; NOT A PARALLEL

THE great political contribution made to the world in the closing years of the eighteenth century was the principle of Federalism, which a century later was to become known as Imperialism. From Europe, America borrowed her political philosophy; her institutions had been modeled and her intellect influenced by the accumulated wisdom and practices of English civilization derived from its various sources. Now America begins to mould a political philosophy of her own.

No human institution springs matured from the brain of any one man; no one man is sole originator of a thought, although he may have been the first to give it expression, which entitles him, so far as the world is concerned, to the priority of invention. Ideas that are in the mind of one man are in the minds of many others, they are in the air; and although they remain unexpressed they unconsciously influence thought until the time comes when they find utterance and make themselves felt. Federalism was a discovery when it was first applied to America. Until that time the world had known the existence of no federated republic as it exists in the

place of its birth on the soil of the New World. The so-called republics of Greece and Rome were no more republics in the true sense of the word than their people were filled with the spirit of democracy. From Rome to England, in the day of the Hep-tarchy, in mediæval times, through the Middle Ages, to a period so late as the closing years of the last century, in Asia as well as in Europe, history records numerous instances of *bunds* and confederations, of republics and allied states, of leagues and coalitions, whose people were united, sometimes for the moment and again for years, for a common purpose, usually to resist aggression and not infrequently to carry on a war of aggression, to spread commerce, or to gain territory. But these unions of political expediency were no more republics as America taught the world the meaning of republicanism than was the Germanic Confederation a republic or Britain a democracy in the time of the Saxons. "Old germs had brought forth new fruits that were essentially original and that fairly may be called American. The natural product thus evolved was a cluster of distinct and essentially free communities. The idea of joining these communities for common defense and general welfare grew so naturally under the then existing conditions that the resultant notion of a republic may with equal propriety be called American."¹

The world reveres a fetish, and the more ob-

¹ Avery: *A History of the United States and its People*, vol. II, p. 344.

scured it is in tradition and covered with the patina of the ages the more avidly will the sciolist venerate it; and the universal passion for education has given three quarters of mankind a smattering of knowledge and relieved it of the burden of thinking. Every schoolboy has been taught that Rome was a republic, and he carries that belief with him through life. Rome is the horrible example to Americans. Rome was great, but Rome perished because she gave herself up to corruption and luxury. As Rome died, so shall the United States unless she heeds the warning and turns back to the Spartan life of the fathers.

Spencer somewhere terms history the Newgate Calendar of nations, — a very happy characterization, — and it might also with equal truth be termed the epic of fairy tales, for the pages of history are strewn with myth. The most popular of all the historical fables, which has perhaps done more mischief than all the others combined, by having perverted and confused the youthful mind, even the inquiring mind of more mature years, is the legend of the "Roman Republic," and the attempt to draw from it a moral applicable to the American Republic. Rome, it is true, was a republic in name and the pre-Christian conception of republicanism, but it affords no more just measure of comparison with present conditions than the statistics of railway accidents when Stephenson started the Rocket on its first memorable journey would determine

whether railway traveling is more dangerous now than it was three quarters of a century ago.

In the time of the Consuls there existed no real democracy and no true republic. There was always a dictator, sometimes so officially styled and at other times masquerading under a gentler name, who held power not at the will of the people but by the force of his legions or the more simple and direct method of bribery. The essence of democracy is the power of the people, — it is the one power which is effective in the United States, fashionable although it is to sneer at the people and to magnify the power of the political and plutocratic boss, — and that power can only rest on universal suffrage, which makes every individual member of society a "sovereign," even if through his own laches he surrenders his sovereign rights. In the Roman Republic did the people ever exercise sovereign rights?¹ Instead of the suffrage being universal, it was restricted; instead of the Tribunes being subordinate to the law, they were superior to it; instead of taking their authority from the people, they bribed them.² It was always a one-man power; always one unscrupulous or ambitious man was contending against another; if bribery failed, "bands of supporters" re-

¹ Cf. Guizot: *History of Civilization*, Eighteenth Lecture, *passim*.

² "To increase the popularity of his cause he [Clodius] then began to bribe the public with wholesale donations of corn bought up in all parts of Italy, wasting on this purpose the money brought home by Pompey, which was to have served for the administration of Cæsar's Land Law." — Ferrero, *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, vol. II, p. 29.

sisted "hired ruffians";¹ fearing to offend a Pompey and yet unwilling to quarrel with a formidable colleague, the Tribunes would pass a law and then nullify it by a provision, so that the whole political history of Rome is full of "these strange legal expedients."² If Rome had her Clodius, Greece had her Cleon. When Rome fought, it is true she employed her own citizens, but her ranks were augmented with mercenaries; Cæsar, who had entered Gaul as the destroyer of the German power, enrolled the Germans against the Gauls, and it was "the vigorous horsemen of Germany" who routed the cavalry of Vercingetorix and enabled Cæsar to capture Alesia.³

The splendor of Rome was its degradation, in its greatness were the seeds of decay. The power and popularity of the plutocrats were bought by the corruption of the plebeians; the rich debauched the poor; the poor demoralized the rich. Temples were erected by patrons of extravagant feasts and games, not to gratify a love of art or to satisfy their generous impulses, but because the surest means to gain popular favor was lavish expenditure, which often could not be avoided. The vain or ambitious man was either flattered into giving or forced to yield to the coercion of the mob, which knew it had but to demand and its demand would be satisfied.⁴

¹ Ferrero: *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

² Ferrero: *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

³ Ferrero: *Op. cit.*, p. 183 *et seq.*

⁴ Cf. Dill: *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 4.

This great splendor has never been America's, and America's it can never be. Because there has been no splendor in this sense, there has been no decay; there can be no decay brought about through the poor being debased by the rich and their moral fibre destroyed. Critics have seen atavism in the prodigal benefactions of American millionaires, in their endowments of hospitals and universities and libraries, in their purchase of art treasures, in their munificence as patrons — the American captain of industry self-made is the Roman patrician of the twentieth century. Curiously enough, — and it is this that breaks the parallel and destroys the danger, — the American millionaire who is philanthropist or patron is never politician, he is never ambitious for honors or office, his gifts buy no rewards. An instructive essay might be written on this extraordinary phase of American character, the like of which no other nation can offer. The essayist, if he had made a careful study of American social conditions and was familiar with those in Europe, would doubtless point out, not in the way of criticism but as a sociological phase worthy of the investigator, that in England, for instance, philanthropy is one of the surest foundations for the creation of a family name, for if the benefaction is sufficiently large national gratitude will find its expression in a peerage; or, insufficient to earn nobiliary honors, it may be capitalized into political preferment;¹ in France

¹ "For in England great wealth can, by using the appropriate methods,

a gift to the state may win the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor; in every European country there is a sure reward for public service. For the American there can be no national honors, unless it be a statue after his death or a post-office named in his honor while he is living; he has closed the door to a political career when he becomes a public benefactor. The late Secretary Hay once humorously remarked to me, when a volunteer officer had been appointed a brigadier-general in the regular establishment for a sensational exploit that appealed to popular imagination, "In this country we have no ribbon; we either make a man a brigadier-general or an LL.D."

To-day there is not a single man in public life distinguished because of his magnificent charity or munificent patronage; not one of the men who have founded schools or built libraries or endowed hospitals with royal disregard of cost is a member of the Cabinet, or in either House of Congress, or in the diplomatic service. To forestall the superficial critic, the essayist will demolish the absurd theory that politicians are of a different class or of a lower order morally than philanthropists, or that public service and philanthropy are incompatible in a republic; for he will be able to show that there are in Congress many men who have given generously in proportion to their means and who subscribe to many good causes, but who make no parade of their

practically buy rank from those who bestow it." — Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, p. 749.

beneficence, and who have not used charity to advance their political fortunes.

Seeking for a reason, he shall perhaps discover that it is to be found in that complex and contradictory structure of the American mind, which is as ingenuous as it is suspicious, and as magnanimous as it is envious. The American is jealous of his independence; he is so distrustful lest his political integrity be tampered with — not his personal political integrity, which is a thing between every man and his conscience, but the integrity of his political institutions — that he will not tolerate wholesale bribery in the form of disinterested benevolence, because if so it would be easy for the rich man to buy the office he wants. It is practical common sense which makes the American keep politics and philanthropy apart. Our essayist, to exhaust his theme, would show there are other reasons.

In America millionaires are too unpopular to make it possible for them to hope for political success; in the acquisition of their fortunes they have too often trampled on the weak and aroused the resentment of the people; the power of money has made them scornful of public opinion; the apocryphal rejoinder attributed to a captain of industry — “the public be damned” — was the popular understanding of the millionaire’s ethical code and accepted as concretely representing his utter indifference to the rights of the people. In his pursuit of fortune the very rich man has given his opponents too

many weapons to use against him, he has given the demagogue the one unanswerable argument — his wealth; for in a democracy more than anywhere else, in a land of great opportunity where until recently fortunes were made and not inherited, the possession of great wealth arouses the passions of the less successful, who, having sought their opportunity and missed it, decry the successful man and accuse him of dishonesty to salve their own failure, and make of poverty the handmaiden of virtue. It follows that the state is deprived of the services of many men of eminent abilities and unblemished private life, whose training peculiarly fits them to take part in the business of government, who would give to the people the same devotion which they had used for their own profit, — often at the expense of the people.

A sociological investigator, no matter how conscientious and painstaking his work, faces two dangers. There is always a tendency to generalize, than which nothing can be more misleading; and he is betrayed into believing that conditions are peculiar to political or social institutions, whereas they are world-wide and universal phenomena. It is not alone in America that the business man, the commercial man of affairs, holds aloof from politics. Bodley explains at some length why a French manufacturer prefers not to offer himself as a candidate for the Palais Bourbon,¹ and his reasons are

¹ Bodley: *France*, vol. 1, p. 177 *et seq.*

not greatly dissimilar to those which restrain the American of corresponding type. "Modern industrial communities," an English writer says, referring to Parliamentary representation, "have so far not been very successful in bringing to bear on the work of government any large share of the talent which has been devoted to science, commerce, learning, and finance."¹

While in America the public accepts gifts from its rich men, they are, as a rule, accepted with sullenness rather than with gratitude, with the feeling that the public is only getting back its tithe of what has been wrung from it, but it is not taking a bribe to be paid for later in civic honors. Perhaps, as the idealism of the American would suggest, there is the further feeling, both on the part of the public and millionaire, that well-doing deserves no other reward than its own gratification, and opportunity imposes its obligation. The rich man who left his native village a bare-footed boy gives to it park and church and library, because for the place of his birth he cherishes a deep and abiding affection; the millionaire endows hospital or university because he has suffered with the poor and struggled with the ambitious; and although he may take advantage of the poor in business,—which is the material,—his idealism must find its expression. It is not the atavism of the Roman but the atavism of the Puritan, whose rule of iron was illiberal and narrowing,

¹ Low: *The Governance of England*, p. 304.

but who made men liberal and broad by teaching them to think for themselves. Every college and every library built by a millionaire is a menace to the power of his class, every stone in every structure is a vantage-ground from which the proletariat can with greater intelligence and more skillful weapons carry on the attack against plutocracy, but wealth furnishes the weapons, which are not to lead to its undoing, but to bring about a closer correspondence between classes. The man who has made his money has usually gratified his ambition and finds a satisfaction in generous giving, but in politics no attraction. The conclusion of our essayist will be that between Rome and America there is no analogy; the American need have no fear that the fate of Rome awaits him, or that the power of wealth which corrupted Rome will destroy him.

One other point of contrast must not be omitted. America is the one country that has never had a great standing army, the one country whose ruler has never owed his power to the army, or who has been held in place by the army, or where the army has exercised political influence. The history of Greece and Rome, of Europe in the Middle Ages, of England even long after Puritanism had planted America, is the history of legions and armies who gave vitality to politics and on whom their chief relied when the people rose in protest. No American President has seized the Presidency or surrounded himself with bayonets; no candi-

date has attempted to tamper with the loyalty of the army.

Nor can I leave the subject — for it is intimately associated with it and is still further corroboration that there is no parallel between conditions existing in Rome and those in America at the present time — without calling attention to the very striking fact that to-day in the public life of America there is not a single man who bears the name of any man who played a part in the Revolution, or whose name was appended to the Declaration of Independence, or who sat in the convention that framed the Constitution. When I say there is not “a single man,” I believe I am speaking with literal exactness and not using a generality. In every other country of which we have any record, a ruling class establishes itself by the perpetuation of historical family names, in which the tradition of the family is maintained, and one or more of its members accept public service either as an obligation due to the state or still further to increase the importance of the family or to add to its dignity and position. In America, for some inexplicable reason, historic families do not perpetuate themselves. There are in public life a few, a very few, men who can trace their descent collaterally to colonial times, but the possessors of historic names have gone. Neither in statecraft nor diplomacy are there any Washingtons or Adamses or Jeffersons or Madisons or Monroes or Jacksons; no Franklins or Otises or Hamiltons or Shermans;

no Marions or Greenes or Putnams or Lees. The men whose genius welded the scattered colonies into an empire and set the infant nation on its way to greatness either died childless or — which is another extraordinary thing — left small families, and that in itself is noteworthy in a day when the average family was large and there were usually sons enough to keep the family name alive.

It is not less remarkable that the same phenomenon in statesmanship has its counterpart in finance and commerce. There were men in the early days who were the pioneers in banking and manufacturing and who laid the foundation for family wealth and name. These men, who were always more or less associated with politics and government in the colonial era, who were resourceful and bold, whose ships carried their ventures on every sea, who made America a great commercial nation long before her political power or her physical strength were recognized, who showed their genius in trade as their contemporaries proved it in statesmanship, left their fortunes to sons whose names disappeared after a few generations. In commerce as in public service the men who to-day dominate are not the men who bear historic names, not the men who can trace their descent back in an unbroken line to the first bankers or the first ironmasters or weavers, but men who have no kinship with these founders of an industry; “new” men in every sense of the word.¹

¹ “Run over the list of the inheritors of financial purple, and you en-

I have no explanation to offer for a very extraordinary state of affairs, but the facts are surprising enough to warrant some thought. One would naturally imagine they would have received the attention of American writers; but American investigators, so far as my reading is a guide, have not given the subject any consideration.

What bearing has this glimpse at Rome on the development of the American people? In so far as Rome influenced or affected American character, none at all, but in the strength of contrast is shown that American political institutions and the texture of the American mind are native to the soil and have developed as the result of new conditions confronting the children of an older stock. They borrowed from all the world, but out of the material that long had been used they fashioned something new.

counter some interesting surprises. You will find among them no Vanderbilt worthily equipped to renew the prestige of his house; no Astor to take a leader's place as the wielder of our greatest hereditary fortune; no Gould to sit with authority on the money throne. Instead, newer names — the names of self-made men — dominate the roster of the Wall Street rulers of tomorrow." — *Munsey's Magazine*, May, 1911, p. 152.

CHAPTER V

A COUNTRY WITHOUT A CAPITAL

FROM the beginning American political and social institutions were distinguished from those of any other country or people by three causes that vitally affected national character. These are first, that in essence America has always been a democracy, although it was less democratic before the Revolution than it has since become; second, that in its wars mercenaries were never enlisted. That at times the Indians were found fighting with the colonists did not make of them a hired soldiery ready to sell their swords to the highest bidder, as for nearly two thousand years had become part of the political system of the Old World; and again, the Americans never entered into an alliance — the assistance rendered them by France in the Revolution was not an alliance in the political sense. A moment's reflection will convince that these things tended to produce that intense spirit of self-reliance and independence, that almost religious belief in their own strength and endeavor, that faith in victory and the ability to surmount obstacles and overcome all dangers and adversities, which are such marked characteristics of the American people.

The third cause is perhaps of all the most curious,

and shows again what little weight historians have attached to national psychology, and yet how essential its knowledge if we are really to understand the minute and often dissociated and seemingly unimportant causes that have resulted in the formation of national character.

We are to study the history of a people who from their beginning and up to the present day have never had a capital, in which there has never been one great centre to which gravitated by the natural force of attraction all that was best and worst, which held the highest intellectual and social development, which set for the whole country the fashions, to which men turned as irresistibly in search of fame or fortune as in the time of Cæsar every Roman looked to Rome, or as in our own day every provincial, who has only his courage and brains to inspire him, "goes up" to London to begin his conquest of the world, or the Frenchman of the departments sets out for Paris hopeful of grasping the end of the rainbow.¹ It is true that there is to-day in the United States a political capital, a commercial metropolis, and numerous local political and commercial centres, and it is equally true that from the beginning, in colonial times and until the Revolution, each colony had its seat of government — in Massachusetts, Boston; in Maryland, Annapolis; in the Carolinas, Charleston, and so on — just as to-day each state has its capital; but that is

¹ Cf. Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, chap. cxiii.

entirely different from Rome or London or Paris. Rome, like a great spider, sucked blood from the provinces,¹ and it was in one sense destructive and in another sense beneficial that the capital exercised this centripetal force over the rest of the country. It made both for liberality and intolerance, it broadened as well as narrowed,—curious as the assertion may sound,—it brought about an intense provincialism, or perhaps it would be more correct to term it localism. The metropolis set the fashions in everything, in thought as well as in action; nothing was considered worthy unless it had first received the *imprimatur* of the capital, with the result that initiative was destroyed, and the country slavishly accepted what the whim of the metropolis saw fit to impose upon it.

In all that went to make progress, whether intellectual or material, the trend of thought was not that of the country at large, but of a comparatively small number of men who lived remote from the great mass of the people, who frequently had little sympathy with them, whose condition was different from theirs, who were, it must be admitted, the superior class,—superior in culture, or courage, or cunning;—but whose very superiority made them a class by themselves; who through selfishness, and perhaps more often through ignorance, were unable to understand what the people thought or wanted, or what would best contribute to their welfare. It is

¹ Ferrero: *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, vol. I, p. 140.

often observed that to-day the real strength of a nation is to be found not in its capital but in its provinces; that London is not England nor Paris France. This may be true, — my knowledge of France is too superficial to enable me to offer an opinion, but so far as England is concerned, I accept it as a generalization merely, needing modification and qualification, — but it is indisputable that up to the time of the American Revolution, even at a later day, throughout all Europe, it was the capital that was really the country; it was the capital that influenced all outside of it, and not the country which colored the thought of the capital; and in saying this I do not forget the power exercised by the yeomanry of England or the burghers of mediæval Europe.

This centripetal social force exercised another influence equally as great in the evolution of society and the formation of character, and brought about national characteristics and introduced certain desirable social institutions which have never existed in the United States, and the absence of which is felt to-day. Rome, when nations were to be conquered or subject peoples to be governed, sent forth her *prætors* and her *proconsuls*, who brought with them the civilization, the virtues, the vices of Rome for the alien to emulate. In other parts of Europe it was the same. Organized society has always been in layers — a noble and privileged class at the top, and intermediate strata down to the lowest, the mass

of the people, villeins or serfs or freemen, according to the social conscience of the time. The highest class naturally centred at the capital, but representatives of its order — great landed proprietors, feudal lords, heads of clans — were scattered over the country and their influence was felt throughout the land. Coming down to modern times, we see how this custom has survived in a modified form and the power it has exerted in the civilization of races. In England, in France, in Germany, in Italy, but perhaps more strikingly so in England than in other countries, a modern patriarchal and feudal system still exists, although unrecognized. The great territorial magnates of England, the men of historical name who have been the real rulers of Britain, divide their time between the capital and the country, bringing to the country the social customs of the capital, influencing the manners of and setting a standard for the country to follow. It follows then that there is always a nexus between country and capital; that as in the old days the great lord from the capital brought with him to his province the ways and manners of the city, set up his miniature court and gave to rural life a savor of urban; so to-day the influence of the capital is constantly widening and is the example set for the countryside. The manners and customs and point of view of the castle or château impress the country gentry who are the intimates of the hereditary proprietor; in turn these persons next in the social scale have a moulding

influence on those below them, and in this way the circle is ever expanding and the whole social and intellectual fabric of the nation is woven by the hands of the upper classes whose roots are buried deep in the soil, but who give to the capital its peculiar distinction.

This Old World organization of society has caused many acute European observers of America to make a serious mistake. Recognizing the existence of a governing class in their own countries, that it is the classes who rule — or rather, really a very small and select class — and not the masses, they believe the same thing exists in America, and that the people are dominated by the intellect and culture of the upper circle of the cities. In America we know that every movement derives its strength by being vitalized from below and not by being quickened from above. It is true that the inspiration may often come from what, in the absence of a more precise terminology, may be described as the "best" people, but it is not true — and the assertion will not be challenged by any exact student of American society — that the "best" people can impose their will or their thought on the people at large, or that there exists a governing or *quasi*-governing class; for not even the "professional politicians," of whom we hear so much, are a mandarin caste. It is again only the exact truth to say that the inspiration for great political or social movements often comes bubbling from the subterranean depths of "the

people" far removed from cultural impulse; but whether the impetus is derived from above or below, it cannot exert its force unless the power of the people — as distinguished from a class — is behind it.

In America there has never been the centripetal force of the metropolis, and it no more exists to-day than it did three hundred years ago when the land was unbroken and the Indian roamed at will. Instead of the capital, like a great spider, sucking blood from the provinces, the colonial capitals infused their life-blood into the wilderness and created new provinces; it was their blood and their brawn that always widened the English influence and wrested from the wilderness a new foothold. We have seen that family migration from Massachusetts to Connecticut; the stream of emigration turned from New England to New York; the discontented and the adventurous going from Massachusetts to Rhode Island; the Carolinas recruited by Virginia. Later we shall see how New England fed the West, how the old West gave of her children to the farther West, how that human tide was carried up from the South to break on the plains of a newer West. We shall observe always a centrifugal motion, never a centripetal; we shall constantly notice the phenomenon of the capital or the centre of population sending out its sons to engage in new conquest, but we shall never have to study the octopus-like capital stretching out its tentacles and

strangling the provinces. Toward the latter end of the nineteenth century populous centres stimulated the ambitions of men in smaller places, who saw in the city the chance to win the great prize; but this movement, which is world-wide, which has increased the area and population of London and Paris and New York, which follows logically as the character of a people changes from agricultural to industrial and manufactures take the place of husbandry, has left unchanged that unique system of decentralization which exists in America.

We must examine still further into the effect on character which followed from this peculiar combination of circumstances. One effect is so evident that it is apparent even to the most superficial. As the result of a political and social system there exists among Americans greater local pride than is to be found among any other people. This pride of locality, which has been loosely termed patriotism, is another of those inheritances of colonial days. “There was little in common between the Puritan colonist and the Greek of antiquity, but they were alike in the intensity of their local patriotism and in their vivid sense of a citizenship, which, if not limited to a single town, was at least bounded by rigid conditions of space. Thus in the New England Confederation as in the Achaian League the newer and the wider claims never overrode the older allegiance. The New Englander remained a citizen of Massachusetts or Connecticut, as did the other of

Sikyon or Megalopolis.”¹ Every American is first of all an American, but what the tribe was to the children of Israel, so the state is to the American, who has for the place of his birth or adoption an almost romantic affection — Mr. Bryce crystallizes this sentiment in the illuminating phrase, “the existence of a double government, a double allegiance, a double patriotism”;² and Webster spoke of “local institutions for local purposes and general institutions for general purposes.”³ “State pride” is no mere figure of speech, but is a potent force, an incentive to ambition; the glory of the state thrills, even the meanest feels the shame when his state is disgraced. This interstate rivalry has done much to bring civilization to its high level in America. Let a state make a sociological experiment and that experiment be found to work well, the adjoining state is anxious not only to adopt it, but, if possible, to improve upon it. Each state is the laboratory for all the others. Experimentation is continually in progress. For instance, in the daily papers of June 11, 1909, may be found the following telegram from Seattle, Washington: —

The new state law providing that applicants for marriage licenses must undergo medical examinations, except where the woman is forty-five years old, went into effect yesterday. Ten couples appeared at the license

¹ Doyle: *English Colonies in America*, vol. II, p. 235.

² Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. I, p. 15.

³ Webster: *Forefathers' Day Address*, 1843.

clerk's office with physicians' certificates, and two couples, when informed of the new law, said they would go to British Columbia to marry. County officials say the ~~law~~ will result in many Americans marrying in Canada.¹

In July, 1900, ~~the~~ National Democratic Convention to nominate candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency convened in Denver. It was the first time that a national political convention had been held in a city so far west, and the people of Colorado and Denver were proud of the selection of their state and city for the historical occasion, and that for a week the eyes of all the world would be centred upon them. To an Englishman whose love of county is merged in that of country, whose newspapers take patriotism for granted and are not over-given to proclaiming it, the following editorial from one of the leading newspapers of Denver seems flamboyant, crude, vainglorious, and almost meaningless, but to those who understand the American pride in city and state it has deep significance: —

¹ *Washington Evening Star*, June 11, 1909.

OUR DENVER

OUR COLORADO

SHOW IT ~~to~~ VISITORS AND
TELL THEM OF IT

“Oh, just because the sun happens to go under a cloud for an hour you must n’t say mean things about my Denver.”

That was the expression of a Denver woman on a street car yesterday afternoon, and it was quite good enough to be put in print. She was mildly rebuking a visiting friend, who had complained because the sun was resting for a few brief moments from its eternal labors.

MY DENVER!

There’s a sort of civic pride and municipal patriotism which shines out of those two words like the sunlight of which they are speaking.

It was HER DENVER she was defending. HER DENVER because she lived here in its magnificent climate, beneath its beautiful sapphire skies, and living here had grown to love the city as does every one who tarries for long.

She could not tolerate even the mildest criticism when HER DENVER was the subject. And the best part of the whole thing is, she does not stand alone. There are thousands of her kind in the city and state.

They are proud of their city, proud of their state, and rejoice that hosts of visitors are coming that they may display the glories of the country they love so well.

These delegates, tourists, and visitors who come will see OUR DENVER — yours and mine. They will see the beautiful streets, the green lawns, the magnificent residences, the contented and happy people. They will feel the balmy air, the cooling mountain breezes, the warm, invigorating sun. They will go out into the state and view the grandeur of the mountains, the pine-topped hills, the laughing, bubbling mountain streams, the picturesque cañons. They will see thriving towns, producing farms and orchards, and paying mines.

On every hand they will be met with satisfied people, who have plenty and are joyful because they live in the best state in the Union — the one which God has blessed with an abundance of everything, from sights which please the eye to health-giving air which puts the roses back into the faded cheeks of those who come.

Yes, it is HER DENVER. It is OUR DENVER. It is HER COLORADO and OUR COLORADO. But more than that. Denver and Colorado belong to the world. They form the natural playground of the people of the earth.

Show the city and state to the visitors. Insist that they look them over. For many of them, if they observe closely, will decide it is best to remain here, where God has dealt with so generous hand.

SHOW THEM OUR DENVER. SHOW THEM OUR COLORADO. AND REST ASSURED THEY NEVER SAW ANYTHING THAT COMPARES WITH THIS CITY AND STATE.¹

A country without a capital is a country in which there is no central directing power to exercise an in-

¹ *Denver Times*, July 6, 1908.

fluence over thought or quickly to bring the intellectual forces of a people into responsive action; in a country with a capital, thought radiates from centre to circumference, and the outermost rim is illuminated, just as the darkness of a great hall is dispelled when all the lights are turned on from one switch. Figuratively, it is the difference between the modern steamship, in which engines, lights, ventilation — all the energies that move the great mass of iron and steel — are under the control of one man on the bridge, and the vessel of a past era in which orders were laboriously transmitted and time must elapse before the thought in the mind of one man had been translated into action. The thousands of persons constituting passengers and crew of a great liner may not know the impulse that moves the captain, but the effect of the pressure of a finger lightly laid on a button is felt by all. In a country in which there is no capital, thought is local, and the voice of authority in the village community acquires exaggerated importance.

In England, governed from London, the penal and eleemosynary institutions are the same in all counties, there can be no divergence between the educational system of Devonshire and Middlesex; in France there is the same uniformity in the Departments. But in America one state may hang its murderers and another sentence them to life imprisonment; in one state drunkenness is a crime and in another a disease; the educational system of one

A COUNTRY WITHOUT A CAPITAL 81

state may have no correspondence with that of its neighbor. It might be imagined there would be a tendency to develop an intense type of particularism, that a community or state would profit at the expense of all the others; that certain states would be favored. We find nothing of the kind. If, for instance, the laws of Massachusetts are superior to those of Illinois, Illinois has not been wronged because Massachusetts has displayed more intelligence or greater humanity, but Illinois may profit by the example of her sister commonwealth and improve her own code. It is not necessary at this point for me to say whether this absence of uniformity is advantageous or not; it is sufficient simply to point out the existence of this sociological laboratory and the enormous advantage it gives the United States over all other countries in carrying on experimental research and the practical demonstration of theories.¹

This, the obvious, is readily seen, but the more subtle effect of decentralization on character has escaped attention. The general or the governor who went to his province brought with him his manners and customs; he frequently taught his subjects cruelty and not infrequently refinement; whether for good or evil, he was an example. He came with all the prestige of the capital; he was the last word in fashions or in statesmanship; despised or loved, he was always an influence. No such influence or

¹ Cf. Gray: *The New Federalism*, p. 23.

example is to be found in America. In no other country has individualism been given such free play or so moulded the whole life of a people as in America. In America, society is nothing; the individual is everything. As each man went into the wilderness, as the rim of civilization gradually extended, so each man carried with him his own social standard and his own manners and customs, tempered, it is true, by his community and adjusted to his environment and condition, but required to conform to no standard and with no recognized authority to pattern after. The American brought his civilization with him instead of having it brought to him, and that has been the social history of these people. Like cosmic atoms thrown into space, by the law of gravitation they became new worlds in the political firmament. The younger colony was the offshoot of the older, the territory was the child of the state, the East was parent to the West; but the control of the father ceased when the son strode forth manfully from the new home, then become old, to build himself a newer home and extend the outpost of civilization. Every outpost took on the character of the men who made it, modified again by physical conditions and those extraneous influences that make character. "A frontier is never a line, but always a shifting zone of assimilation, where an amalgamation of races, manners, institutions, and morals, more or less complete, takes place."¹ The

¹ Semple: *American History and its Geographic Conditions*, p. 79.

men who peopled the Western Reserve, out of which later were carved the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, were, the late Senator Hoar said, "the very best specimens of the New England character that could be found. They were among the most steadfast, constant, liberty-loving men that ever lived."¹ They were different from those who sixty years later went from there and the still more remote New England to find the gold of California or who had suffered the hardships of the overland trail in the race for Oregon; the men of whom Joaquin Miller said, "the cowards never started, and all the weak died on the road." But no matter how unlike they were, or how diverse the motives that made them pioneers, they were always alike in that they were their own mentors and must rely on themselves for guidance. There developed in them an intense individualism and a spontaneous sense of democracy. There were no social distinctions, no gradations of wealth to separate men; leadership was won by qualities that were manifest and not by the accident of birth or factitious circumstances.

The effect of this was marked; it was especially marked in one important particular. It resulted at first in indifference, which later became almost a contempt, for manners, for those nicer and finer observances, which are merely *convenances*, but which soften and humanize men and teach them a

¹ *Oration Delivered at the Celebration of the Founding of the Northwest*, p. 15.

love for the aesthetic.¹ "Life in the plains and back-woods had become second nature to men from whom the need of luxury had been eliminated. Mere space, unconstrained existence, a buffalo hunt or an Indian fray was pleasure enough. In the large, fresh environment of the American continent the English race had been born again, and now was animated with the irrepressible vigor of a youthful people. A constant change of environment had given them the adaptability of youth, vast opportunity had bred the spirit of venture and enterprise. Nothing seemed impossible and therefore little was impossible."² It was related of an Englishman, the governor of a black province in the wilds of Africa, who for six months never saw a white man, that he dressed every night for dinner "for the mental discipline." The Americans have never practiced this sort of mental discipline because there was never a time when it seemed desirable, and conditions made it impossible. "The forty-eight men who came down the Ohio in the *Mayflower* to *Marietta*"³

¹ "In talking to a Japanese of high standard and culture who was in this country on governmental business, the impression we make upon an Oriental was finally extracted.

"After evading a long time and paying suave compliments, commenting on our energy and commercial enterprise, he finally confessed that the two most striking characteristics seemed to him to be bad manners and bad taste.

"No one remains long in our land without learning that our bad manners are but the result of overfilling the hours with activity, and that they hide a generosity, a real kindness of heart, that it would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere in the world; but the bad taste is undoubtedly here." — *Harper's Weekly*, quoted in the *Washington Post*, October 25, 1909.

² Semple: *American History and its Geographic Conditions*, p. 230.

³ Hoar: *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

brought no dress-suits with them any more than did those so soon to follow who “effected their removal on horses furnished with pack-saddles,” which was the more easily done, “as but few of these early adventurers into the wilderness were encumbered with much baggage”;¹ or than the California Argonauts impeded themselves with superfluous clothing when it was with difficulty they were able to drag absolutely necessary articles over the blistering plains and the mountains that challenged them.

To the fact that there has never been a capital, with its governing class, its inherited wealth and traditions of caste and aristocracy, may be traced both social and political consequences. To its absence may be attributed that carelessness of social observance, that blatant and rather boyish contempt for manners, that pride in brusqueness, that nervous assertion of equality² which so strikingly impresses every foreigner, and leads him from a superficial acquaintance to misrepresent both American character and American institutions. There is a certain amount of truth — but a partial truth only — contained in the assertion “that you

¹ Doddridge, in Hart’s *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. II, p. 387.

² “Their idea of Equality was equality with people who pretended to be of superior rank to them. As was said sixty years later by Tocqueville, than whom none knew better the true results of the Revolution, the word Equality on the lips of a French politician signifies, ‘No one shall be in a better position than mine.’ Camille Desmoulins . . . wrote privately . . . ‘My motto is that of all honest folks, “no superior.”’ — Bodley: *France*, vol. I, p. 168.

cannot revolutionize classes and their relations without revolutionizing culture. It is idle to suppose you can communicate to a democracy the heritage of an aristocracy. You may give them books, show them pictures, offer them examples. In vain! The seed cannot grow in the new soil. The masses will never be educated in the sense that the classes were. You may rejoice in the fact, or you may regret it; but at least it should be recognized."¹ The same conviction was expressed by Gouverneur Morris, a hundred years earlier, when he told his fellow delegates to the Constitutional Convention that "as to the alarm sounded of an aristocracy, his creed was that there never was, nor ever will be a civilized society without an aristocracy."²

The political effect of decentralization is seen in the spirit that made Americans, first as colonists and later as a nation, regard the community, the colony or the state, rather than the capital, as the seat and source of authority, and made the doctrine of state rights not merely a political principle but an unconscious conviction, all the more deep-seated because it springs from an inherited instinct. It is to be noted, however, that as American conditions change, and Americans become subject to the same influences that have affected older civilizations, the domination of the capital, both socially and politically, makes itself felt. The last decade or two has

¹ Dickinson: *A Modern Symposium*, p. 135.

² *Documentary History of the Constitution*, vol. III, p. 287.

seen a great impetus toward centralization, and a weakening of the extreme doctrine of the rights of the states to be independent of the control of the central government; and it is recognized that certain things, heretofore regarded as matters purely of state administration, properly come within the purview of the general government. The extinction of a destructive moth in Massachusetts, for example, or a cotton parasite in Texas, it is now seen can more efficiently be undertaken by the central government, not alone for the benefit of the state but for the whole country, than by any one commonwealth. With this orientation of the American mind there has been brought about an acceptance of the capital as a social centre, and a desire that it shall have a regard for social dignity and an observance of etiquette; and the habits and customs of the capital, modified to suit local conditions, are imitated in outlying places. At this time it is not necessary to do more than mention this very striking change, as it belongs to a much later period in American development, and was the natural sequence of the modification of political and social conditions.

CHAPTER VI

WHERE WOMAN NEITHER REIGNS NOR RULES

Not less important than the absence of a capital in shaping the mind and influencing the development of a people is the fact that in the social system of the United States woman plays no part. This, I am aware, is contrary to the general belief not only of foreigners but of Americans themselves; for America is supposed to be the paradise of woman, and in America it is thought that woman dominates. Yet America is the one country, civilized or barbarous, in which woman has never exercised the slightest influence on its affairs or in the least degree affected its policies or its politics; who has never been the great social force that she has been in Europe in modern times, or was in the East when the world was young and women wrecked dynasties and made work for the map-makers.

In all the history of America, from the landing of the Jamestown adventurers to our own times, there have been two — and two women only — whose names are rescued from oblivion. One was Mistress Anne Hutchinson in the early days of the Bay Colony, whose influence upon the thought of her time has been referred to in the first volume.¹ The

¹ See page 358 *et seq.*

other is that charming and witty social firebrand, Peggy O'Neill, in Jackson's time. The one attacked the social order, broke the power of the theocracy, and was instrumental in founding a new colony; the other defied society and broke a cabinet. Here ends the story of woman in the affairs of the American state.

The position of woman in America has always been peculiar. In the beginning she was both a luxury and a necessity. We shall see¹ that the history of modern immigration is always attended by the phenomenon of a preponderance of males, and that it is only when the immigrant has made a foothold for himself in his new environment that he sends for the woman he has left behind; that when the aliens have colonized and feel secure of the future, then only does the marked preponderance of the male in the stream of immigration disappear. This was seen in the early days of the English colonization, both North and South. The men heavily outnumbered the women, and after the English had firmly planted themselves, special inducements were offered to the emigration of women. Frequently sent over by the shipload as "servants," they were made wives as soon as they set foot on the New World; often they were wooed before they had left the vessel; if a clergyman or a priest was on board, there are instances on record of the marriage taking place before the end of the voyage. Both as a luxury and a neces-

¹ *Vide* chapter xiv.

sity, — to minister to man's pleasures and give him companionship, and to breed the race and perform the domestic duties for which man is unfitted, — they were in great demand, and their scarcity gave them a fictitious value. For economic and social reasons the Puritan elders urged early marriage on both sexes, for the man or woman of marriageable age who lived in single selfishness was not doing his or her full duty to the community and was socially a menace. In the colonial era no woman need long remain maid or widow. When a man's wife died, — and the women died younger than the men, worn out by incessant labor and child-bearing, — there was only a brief interval before the disconsolate husband went, for the second, third, and sometimes the fourth time, a-courting; for no man believed that it was good to live alone; and "Willing Molly" was always ready to become Molly Willing. In his grief, the thrice widowed and pious Mr. Willing went for consolation to call on the buxom Molly, who showed herself so willing that it needed little persuasion on the part of the elderly widower to induce her to change her name. The frequency and rapidity with which weddings followed funerals and the large families of the early New Englanders are part of their social history.

The fact that women were scarce, and a luxury as well as a necessity from the colonial point of view, ought theoretically to have insured them particularly tender and considerate treatment. Alas, for

theories when they run counter to stubborn facts! Very little consideration was shown the woman; in a country where life was hard and there were few comforts, woman, as always, had to endure more than the man. Physically she toiled as much as he did, often she worked side by side with him in the field, doing her share of the day's work; when she was not a field worker she was giving birth to children or rearing them; always she had the management of the house; she spun and wove, put up provisions against the time of scarcity, scoured and scrubbed. Recreation she had little. Woman, in the colonial era, was regarded as an inferior being; the Bible taught the stern duty of obedience and loyal submission; the Puritan — who knew his Bible — found Biblical warrant for the enforcement of strict discipline. Puritanism, that regarded with disapproval all that savored of the light and frivolous, permitted the man some relaxation, but gave the woman little opportunity to amuse herself.

In the economy of Puritan society there was no place for woman except as the *hausfrau*. She could be neither prophet nor leader; if she aspired to usurp the place of man, she was in danger of being suspected of being possessed of a devil or of suffering the fate of a witch. Anne Hutchinson tried it, and paid the penalty of all reformers in advance of their times. The position of woman was that of a dependent, not an equal.

Sharing to the same extent with man in his labor,

creating with him wealth, but debarred by political conditions from taking any part in the government, woman, at the beginning of the English conquest of the New World, ought to have been looked upon as man's business partner. She never was. Man was always supreme. There is little in the literature or chronicles of the time to convey the suggestion that men consulted their wives about their business affairs, or sufficiently trusted their judgment or capacity to leave to them the management of their estates at death. The woman was neither pampered nor treated as an equal. Her place, as clearly defined as if regulated by law, was quite apart and separate from that of man. When the woman looked after her house or the farm and bore children, she had done all that was required of her.

In the long years that followed the first coming of the English, until the country was changed from a wilderness to a continent of towns and cities, the social status of women remained practically unchanged. With every extension of the frontier there was at first a scarcity of women; the women who followed the pioneer had to endure all the hardships of the men. They were in the vanguard of civilization that flowed South, that from the South went West; uncomplainingly they followed the overland trail, and knew all the misery of heat and cold, the torture of thirst and the horrors of starvation; their fate at the hands of the Indians was always more cruel than that of the men. Yet the woman con-

tinued to occupy the same peculiar and almost anomalous position. In those days she certainly contributed as much to the wealth of the nation, and to that of the one man with whom her fortunes were linked, as the man himself, yet no recognition was accorded her. She had no right in the common possessions that her industry had created; whatever property they possessed it was the man's right to do with as he saw fit. The Salic Law was not more inexorably enforced among the Franks than it was among the Americans. The Roman law of agnates and cognates was revived in the United States, where the distaff side of the house yielded meekly to the superior claims of the spear side.

With the permanency of settlement in the older established East, and the change from rural to urban life, women ceased to be less a luxury or necessity and became to some extent a superfluity, for the women were more numerous than the men, and they were able to exercise a greater choice of selection. Occupying a position politically and socially inferior to man, their status was not improved when economically they became less valuable, and their "price" as a luxury fell with the supply in excess of the demand. The conditions of the colonial era were revived with the opening and settlement of the West, where once again men largely outnumbered women, and scarcity gave them temporarily a fictitious value and caused them to be treated with a deference and rude chivalry they had never known

in the East; neither in the days when they were new to the soil nor when they had become part of it. It was the West, and not the East, nor the South, which created the myth that the American man regards woman as a being spiritually superior, who must be guarded and petted and pampered, so that she may lose none of her moral beauty and æsthetic delicacy by coming in contact with the wickedness of an ugly and coarse world.

It was the West that made woman a luxury. In certain savage and semi-barbarous tribes a man's wealth is counted by the number of his wives, and the more wives he has the more acres he can bring under cultivation and the greater will be his herds and flocks, for it is the women who work on the farms. In the West a man's social status was measured by the "style" affected by his wife. Men as a class—and the type of men especially who reclaimed the West from the wilderness, spanned the continent with railways, ravaged the earth of its riches, built cities and bridged rivers—care very little for the luxuries and refinements that every woman delights in, but it ministered to the vanity of these men, and was more valuable even than a high rating at a commercial agency, to install their wives in great houses, to load them down with enormous diamonds, to see them expensively and garishly dressed. The Asiatic converts his savings into gold and silver ornaments and wears them, evidence to his world of wealth. The Westerner, in

the days when the frontier was always just beyond and the outpost of civilization had no fixed point, put his wife on public exhibition to display to the community his prosperity. When men were poor in the morning, wealthy by noon, if the toiled-for pay dirt had been struck, and rich beyond compare by night-fall, and a few weeks later, after the vein petered out or the boom collapsed, were again slaving with pick and pan, it was difficult to appraise fortunes or to separate the "prospect" from the real. But the house, the servants, the diamonds, the dresses of the wife — these were the solid signs of wealth. The Westerner spent money on his wife with a lavish hand, which gratified his emotional generosity and the love of decoration that is inherent in the American; he was liberal in giving whatever her undisciplined fancy craved, but she must be possessed with no curiosity to discover the Pactolian sands. Let him go about his affairs and make money, for man was put in the world to do that. Let her be content to take care of the house, look after the children, and spend the money which he dropped into her lap, for that was a woman's mission; but the man did not encourage the woman to become interested in or to understand his affairs, and what little curiosity she had at first soon was succeeded by indifference and the comforting and sheltering excuse that women were not made for business. It came to be accepted as a canon of so-called chivalry that men must keep their wives in ignorance of their

business, because knowledge would harass and annoy them; and it was proof of wifely loyalty to accept the gifts that the male god provided in the shape of horses and carriages, jewels and frocks, but to seek no reason why the conjugal heaven rained manna.

The example set by the West was quickly followed by the East, where, with greater refinement and a more vivid sense of the appreciation of luxury and a love of display, which are always part of an increasing civilization, the woman became even more the sign of man's success and his conquest of wealth. Insidiously but rapidly the American man established his dominion over the American woman and reduced her to an adjunct instead of raising her to be his companion and helpmeet. When woman ceased to be merely manual laborer and house-worker, she was content to accept the restrictions placed upon her by the operation of the Salic Law, which debarred her not only from power but also from any active part in her husband's concerns, and she accepted the place that man made for her to be the mistress of his household and a friend rather than a partner; and he, to justify his attitude toward her, sought to treat her as a ward, to keep her removed from an active participation in affairs, and salved his conscience by gratifying her tastes and desires. The more he catered to her feminality, the more he felt he was preserving that boundary between the sexes that had been laid down in the

earliest colonial times; the more she remained the woman, the less danger there was of any disturbance of the relation.

Yet, curiously enough, neither man nor woman realized the injury that was being done. In all sincerity the man believed that he was chivalrous in the extreme; that he was treating woman with peculiar deference and respect; that for the first time in the history of the world she had come to occupy her rightful place; and that she was the envy of her sisterhood in less favored countries. It is foreign to the nature of woman to lead a revolt. By temperament and long enforced habit of obedience she is the conservative element in society and cannot be easily induced to disturb the existing order of things. She accepted, with almost fatalistic resignation, the position allotted her by man; she even gloried in it. She came to believe, for a time, the fable of man's chivalry and disinterestedness. The American woman, until her eyes were opened, boasted of her freedom to do as she pleased, her "equal privileges," and had for her sisters elsewhere pity mixed with contempt. (*En passant*, may I suggest to managing politicians that hereafter, if they will give less attention to how the man in the street will vote and more to what women are saying and thinking, they will come closer to an accurate forecast of elections? For when woman in her rock-ribbed conservatism is in revolt, when woman, with her inability to concentrate, can seize on one issue and hold to it, — as

we have seen she has done in ascribing high prices to the tariff, — it is significant of the wider revolt among the more easily swayed and less stable male.)

Believers in hereditary influences must receive a shock when they study the evolution of the American woman. Her training and her life ought to have made her materially hard. In a word, there ought to have been born in America, as the process of evolution, a new race of women. In all other countries where the Salic Law was the law of the land, or the unwritten law of succession to the throne or chieftainship, women governed even if they did not reign, they ruled even if they were uncrowned or unacclaimed. The American social system has been androcratic. No woman in America has exercised the least semblance of power; seemingly no woman has aspired to this power. Presidents have not been made or unmade by a woman's smiles or a woman's wiles; love of woman has made no man patriot; no man has played traitor to win a woman's favor. In American history there is neither Helen nor Borgia. There is no romance, no epic, not even a mythical character flitting through the pages. Woman, says Balzac somewhere, brings confusion into the affairs of man. No woman has brought confusion into the affairs of America. American history, because woman has neither reigned nor ruled, is at once the most decorous and the dullest of which we have any record.

How far this subordination of woman has influ-

enced the psychology of the American people it is not easy to determine, yet I am inclined to think it cannot have been without influence. The position of the modern American woman is the amazement of the world; in America the worship and glorification of woman is supposed to be the national cult; we are taught to believe that woman is the principal object of creation and that the world revolves around her, man being only secondary, and existing merely for her pleasure and to provide for her wants and luxuries. A distinguished American sociologist carries the national belief so far as to advance, as an original discovery, "the gynæcocentric theory"; that is, the proposition that the female sex is primary and the male secondary in the organic scheme; or, as he puts it in another form, "the male is a mere afterthought of Nature."¹

It has always been a surprising thing to foreigners that American women took no part in politics, for it seemed to them that America would naturally be the one country of all others in which women would be an active force. The existence of the Salic Law explains this seeming anomaly. The road to political preferment is closed to women. No woman can hope to be President or Governor or a member of the Cabinet; but it may be said no Frenchwoman can aspire to be President of the Republic, and no Englishwoman can expect to be Prime Minister. This is true, but in France the tradition of a woman

¹ Ward: *Pure Sociology*, p. 296 *et seq.*

at the head of the state is still powerful to exercise its force; in England women have reigned, so that the position of women in England, historically as well as traditionally and socially, is entirely different from what it is in America. Historical evolution in England has made woman part of the machinery of government; historical evolution in America has from the first closed the path of government to her.

The present mood of woman in America — her restless, nervous energy, her desire for independence, that independence that comes from being no longer financially dependent upon man, that is driving her into the trades and the professions to compete with man, that is making her seek political rights — is the revolt against the subordination to which she has been subjected for three hundred years. During the greater part of that time she has been dissatisfied; she has dimly felt that something was wrong with her world, although the cause escaped her; and not knowing the disease it was impossible to apply the remedy. She was like a little child who thinks the headache is the cause of its fever. For a hundred years or more she has been in fever. Every foreigner, and for the matter of that not an inconsiderable number of Americans, is impressed by the "nervous energy" of the American; but the nervous energy of the American people as a whole can be traced to the mothers of the race, who are straining at the leash that the American man has made for them, who fails to see that it is none the less a leash be-

cause it is made of velvet cunningly worked and not infrequently studded with precious stones. The American woman is at last in revolt. She is tired of inferiority and is satiated with luxury and pseudo-chivalry. She wants what has never been granted to her. She wants the recognition of intellectual and moral equality.

CHAPTER VII

THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA

THREE apparently unrelated causes, beginning toward the last quarter of the seventeenth century, were to bring about that great dynamic movement to be arrested only when the colonies were no longer appanages of the Crown of England, but had become a sovereign nation. In their chronological order they were:—

First. The growth of the intellectual movement in Massachusetts, which, leading to the decline of the influence of the Puritan priesthood and the overthrow of the theocratic state, took out of the hands of the church the supreme power and handed it over to the people; broke down the religious barrier which separated the people of the various colonies, and made it possible for them to come together for the purposes of common defense.

Second. The dynastic and political ambitions of England and other European powers which brought the American colonies into the sphere of their military operations and made America part of the great theatre of war.

Third. A policy consistently foolish and short-sighted on the part of England in endeavoring to prevent the material expansion of the colonies and

to exploit them for the benefit of the English merchant and ocean carrier.

Here we have the three great motives in the universal tetralogy,—religion, ambition, greed,—that, alone or combined, have always been the moving forces to breathe the breath of life into peoples and make of them nations or to accelerate their spiritual development. In the New World as in the Old the teachings of history were again to be vindicated.

The historian, “the prophet of the past,” can clearly see why it was impossible for the Puritan Commonwealth to survive; and it has been pointed out that the passion of the Puritan for education, the encouragement he gave to intellectual discussion, the insatiable desire to know the meaning of things for which the mind of man can find no solution, was the training to breed revolt against theocratic tyranny and eventually lead to the emancipation of a priest-governed people. It was only a few years after the foundation of the theocracy that this spirit broke out, and to escape from the intolerance of the rulers of the church, Hooker led his little band to the banks of the Connecticut, there to found a new colony where all men should have an equal voice in their own government. We recall that striking figure, Roger Williams, in the infancy of the Bay Colony, whose great soul stifled under the formalism of hair-splitting theologians and who found the freedom he craved in Rhode Island. The

power of the theocracy went never unchallenged, and as the attacks became more bold and more dangerous its zealous defenders were driven to a harsher use of the weapons of intolerance and persecution, which still further stimulated the spirit of resistance in men who had asserted their freedom and had emancipated themselves from mental slavery. Once more it can be repeated that Puritanism was a social, an economic, and a political movement no less than a religious; it combined in itself so many diverse forces that it created a healthy opposition — as we should use that term in modern politics — and raised up opponents who needed only slight encouragement to break out into open rebellion.

The Puritan migration from Old to New England is covered in the brief space of a single generation. It began in 1620 and ended really in 1640, although there were slight accessions up to as late as 1642. But from that time until the closing years of the next century, New England was replenished by no foreign stream, — the immigration, the Scotch prisoners of Dunbar and Worcester, some Huguenots, and a few “poor, suffering Palatines,”¹ was too small to vitiate the English blood,² — and the colony multiplied by the breeding of its own people, the children of the first settlers and their descend-

¹ Cf. Faust: *The German Element in the United States*, vol. I, chap. III, *passim*.

² Cf. Palfrey: *History of New England*, preface to vol. I.

ants who were born on the soil of America. In those years there was no county of England that contained a larger, more purely English unmixed strain of blood than the New England colonies descended from their Puritan ancestors.¹ The 26,000 New Englanders of 1640 in two hundred and fifty years increased to something like 15,000,000; from these men have come at least one fourth of the present population of the United States.² It is typical of the "impertinence of the literary journalist," to which reference has been made in the previous volume, that a visiting foreigner should display his ignorance of American history by making the statement that "the mass of white men in America are unable to trace their family beyond the grandfather as coming from American stock,"³ and in this cavalier fashion blot out the settlers of New England of the seventeenth century, and dispose of the Quincys, the Adamses, the Hoars — all those men whose names are the cement in which the stones of American history are embedded!

Puritanism, now using the word as a religious symbol, was not only unable to extend its domination, but its influence decreased, even in the life of the first generation, when memories were still fresh and the recollection of the great struggle remained un-

¹ "In view of these facts it may be said that there is not a county in England of which the population is more purely English than the population of New England at the end of the eighteenth century." — Fiske: *The Beginnings of New England*, p. 141.

² Fiske: *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

³ Reich: *Success among Nations*, p. 268.

dimmed. The Puritans began their government by restricting the right of suffrage to church members, but soon there were many men outside the church, who consequently were disfranchised and resented the imposition of a religious test as a political qualification. Hooker did among others, and it was the influence of the Connecticut colony that as early as 1647 made Massachusetts modify the requirements of citizenship and give to non-church members a limited voting privilege and the right to hold certain minor offices. In 1669 the Crown forced a repeal of the law limiting the franchise to church communicants, and under the charter of William and Mary of 1691 the suffrage was granted to all qualified citizens, and the last hold of the church over the electorate was destroyed.

An American writer regards the struggle between the Puritans of Massachusetts and the Crown as "the most significant fact in American history previous to 1760," and he adds, "The Puritans left behind them an armory full of precedents and arguments in favor of colonial independence. . . . If now at any time in the future the Americans should consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the English Government, the Puritan spirit and theory would be likely to appear."¹ We shall see they were soon to feel themselves sorely aggrieved, and with the sense of injustice the Puritan spirit reap-

¹ Osgood: "England and the Colonies," *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1887.

peared and was one of the causes to lead to separation.

The Puritan fathers did not see power slipping from their hands without making an effort to regain their ascendancy. The famous Half Way Covenant of 1662, which was the beginning of a long and plangent polemical war and divided congregations over questions of doctrinal discipline, as the bishops of the Greek and Western churches argued over ritual and proclaimed to a non-Christian world each other's heresies, was an attempt to make religion easy and soften the conditions of church membership. It was followed by other synods and various expedients to preserve the unity of Church and State. The "Great Awakening,"¹ between 1734 and 1740, the prototype of the modern revival, made memorable by the preaching of Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, was the dying flicker of a theological flame soon to be extinguished. I need merely mention this struggle of a priesthood steeped in legalism against an ever increasing latitudinarianism, but it is of interest to find, if possible, the reason for this decline of religious fervor.

Those first colonists were men of intense zeal and conviction; they became colonists because of religious persecution. Their faith was dear to them, for it had cost them much. Their children knew nothing of persecution, or the ideal of religious exaltation,

¹ Tracy: *The Great Awakening*.

or the hardships that came from devotion to religion ; they were more liberal than their fathers because their intellectual development was higher. The problems of life in a new world under new conditions turned their thoughts from theology to more material considerations. We see here again how a race is influenced by its environment and the conditions of its existence. The English Puritan, living in his village pursuing a daily round of routine tasks, when each day is the exact counterpart of every other, and birth or death the sole break in an otherwise monotonous existence, found in religious frenzy the one thing to furnish him excitement and to appeal to the imagination. Far different with the Puritan of New England. Viewed through the vista of centuries, his life seems to us monotonous and colorless to the last degree, and yet it was a life of variety. These pioneers in a new land had all the dangers of the unknown to guard against and the fear of the Indians ever to keep them alert. As is always the case in every stage of society the clergy lose their hold because with a growing intellectual development theological rule becomes secularized, religion is subordinated to material considerations, political discussion takes the place of theological, and doctrine surrenders to compromise. Religious liberalism, an American historian says, has ever gone hand in hand with religious indifference, and therein he enunciates only a partial truth; but he states an historical fact when he declares that the religious

enthusiast is always intolerant.¹ Henceforth the clergy becomes not a political institution, but a part of the political system; they occupy their proper place as the teachers of morals, and there begins either in fact or form the separation of Church and State.²

It was this inevitable working of a sociological law that brought about the decline of the Puritan influence in New England. Nobly conceived, the Puritan Commonwealth became an instrument of tyranny; born in liberty, it degenerated into oppression. Had there been no change in the political relations between Massachusetts and the mother-country in the latter years of the seventeenth century, and had the colony been allowed to develop its own political and social system undisturbed, we may well believe that the overthrow of the political power of Puritanism would have come much later in the history of the American people; but circumstances that the theocracy could neither avert nor delay were now to drive the clergy forward to rebellion.

In the study of American development, too little attention has been given to the part played by the Puritan elders in the Revolution, and I deal with it here not as an historical episode but as one of the influences on American psychology. The imagination

¹ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 443.

² "The religious element of Puritanism became insensibly merged in the political; and, its one great man taken away, it died, as passions have done before, of possession." — Lowell: *Among My Books*, vol. I, p. 233.

is seized by the man in uniform and the glamour and hardships, the heroism and cruelties of war; the political speeches and the military exploits are recorded, but the silent influences that make men warriors or give impetus to political resistance pass unnoticed. In 1684 the Court of Chancery voided the Massachusetts charter and the colony passed under the dominion of the Crown, which henceforth appointed the governor. When in 1692, King William granted the colony an amended charter which confirmed the right of the people to elect their legislature and placed in its hands the sole power to impose taxes, the appointment of the governor was retained as a prerogative of the Crown, which also reserved the power of veto; but the suffrage no longer rested on the religious test, and a property qualification was substituted. Episcopalians on both sides of the Atlantic had long wanted to bring the Anglican churches under the spiritual hegemony of an English bishop, and thus restore the supremacy of the established religion in the colonies, which Massachusetts had interdicted almost immediately after its foundation. When the brothers John and Samuel Browne, members of the Colonial Council, held separate meetings and used the English ritual, they were summoned before Governor Endecott, who assured them "that New England was no place for such as they," and sent them back to England. This was the first official intimation of what soon came to be a palpable fact,

that the Massachusetts Puritans had cut loose from the Church of England.¹

So long as the Puritan element remained in control, Episcopalianism could make no headway; but when the Crown took over the administration of the colony and made it a royal province, secularized the charter, and substituted the Constitution of England for the Biblical Constitution of the Puritans, there appeared to be no longer any obstacle in the way of the Anglican form of worship and the extension of the Church of England to America. Commissioners were appointed by the Bishop of London, who nominally was the spiritual director of the American Plantations; not alone of Virginia, where the Church of England was recognized by acts of the legislature, but of all the colonies; and at one time the attempt to create an American episcopate approached realization. But while no bishop was sent to Boston, that fear was constantly in the Puritan mind. "An autocratic priesthood had seen their order stripped of its privileges, one by one, until nothing remained but their moral empire over their parishioners, and then at last not only did an association of rival ecclesiastics send over emissaries to steal away their people, but they proposed to establish a bishop in the land. The thought was wormwood. He would be rich, he would live in a palace, he would be surrounded by the patronage and pomp of the royal governors; the imposing ceremonial

¹ Avery: *A History of the United States and its People*, vol. II, p. 156.

would become fashionable; and in imagination they already saw themselves reduced to the humble position of dissenters in their own kingdom.”¹ Jonathan Mayhew, whom Robert Treat Paine, with extravagant and excessive praise, termed “the father of civil and religious liberty in Massachusetts and America,”² by his sermons and writings inspired “many of those young radicals in politics who, long before the final onset of the American Revolution, were unconsciously beating out a path for it.”³ Mayhew was “a man born with so sumptuous a supply of self-reliance as to have little room left in him for such qualities as caution, diffidence, hesitation, reverence,” in the language of his admirer and eulogist;⁴ of “haughty spirit and vanity,”⁵ as a less friendly critic represents him. Mayhew, and other preachers aroused passion against the episcopacy; “the fire, the fury, the venom of his attacks,” we read, “would, in the light of our present knowledge, seem like the ravings of an eloquent maniac.”⁶

In one of his most celebrated sermons, Mayhew counseled resistance, by force even, if necessary. People have no security, he said, against being priest-ridden but keeping all imperious bishops and other clergymen who love “to lord it over God’s heritage from getting their foot into the stirrup at all. For which reason it becomes every friend to

¹ Adams: *The Emancipation of Massachusetts*, p. 334.

² Tyler: *The Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. I, p. 122.

³ *Ibid.* ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 124. ⁵ *Ibid.* ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

truth and humankind, every lover of God and the Christian religion, to bear a part in opposing this hateful monster." Civil tyranny he described as "usually small in the beginning," but ecclesiastical tyranny was "the most cruel, intolerable, and impious" of any. From small beginnings, "it exalts itself above all that is called God and that is worshiped."¹

Mayhew's vehemence increased as the climax drew near. In a sermon delivered in 1763, he denounced the constitution of the Church of England and her mode of worship as alien to the simplicity of the gospel and the apostolic times, "her enormous hierarchy ascending by various gradations from the dirt to the skies." When we reflect, he said, "on what our forefathers suffered from the mitred, lordly successors of the fisherman of Galilee, for non-conformity to a non-instituted mode of worship, which occasioned their flight into this Western world; when we consider that, to be delivered from their unholy zeal and oppressions, countenanced by sceptred tyrants, they threw themselves, as it were, into the arms of savages and barbarians; when we reflect that one principal motive to their exchanging the fair cities, villages, and delightful fields of Britain for the then inhospitable shores and deserts of America, was that they might here enjoy unmolested God's holy word and ordi-

¹ Thornton: *The Pulpit of the American Revolution*, "A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission, by Jonathan Mayhew."

nances, without such heterogeneous and spurious mixtures as were offensive to their well-informed consciences"; in case Episcopacy got the upper hand, "the Church of England might become the established religion here, tests be ordained, as in England, to exclude all but conformists from the posts of honor and emolument, and all of us be taxed for the support of bishops and their underlings." Will they never let us rest in peace, he cries, "except where all the weary are at rest? Is it not enough that they persecuted us out of the Old World? Will they pursue us into the New? — to convert us here; compassing sea and land to make us proselytes, while they neglect the heathen and heathenish plantations? What other New World remains as a sanctuary for us from their oppressions, in case of need? Where is the Columbus to explore one for us, and pilot us to it, before we are consumed by the flames, or deluged in a flood, of Episcopacy?"¹

It was the last stand of an oligarchy that knew it was doomed and yet would fight to the end. The old school of "thundering preachers" and fierce polemical disputants had passed away, the terrors of Hell were no less vivid and no less real to the colonists of the eighteenth century than they had been to the first settlers, although there was a softening of expression; but the power of vigorous denunciation was still possessed by the clergy, who knew how to play on the fears of their congregations and to

¹ Tyler: *The Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. I, pp. 134-35.

hold up before them the dread spectre of ecclesiastical and political slavery.

Generalizations so often mislead in conveying more than a writer intends that it is necessary to be specific on at least one point. In all that has been said about the decline of the influence of the Puritan clergy, I am not to be taken as meaning that religion no longer played an important part in the life of New England, or that the people of Massachusetts and the other New England colonies became irreligious, or from the restraints of Puritanism they went to the other extreme and made mock of the things that hitherto had been held sacred, as was the case in England after the Restoration. In America they became more liberal, but neither dissolute nor licentious; it was never a cult to flaunt vice or to offend the sensibilities of the pious by flagrant acts of impiety. Puritanism so profoundly affected the English character on both sides of the ocean, and so deeply graved itself not only on the thought of the day but on its actions, speech, and literature — more powerfully in America than in England — that the impress has never been effaced. All that Puritanism believed, all that Puritanism was, all that Puritanism taught remained, weakened, it is true, but not destroyed. Above all, that basic foundation of character survived; but character had been modified, it had become more pliant and less self-centred; the Puritan was no longer a man of a single idea; he saw life with enwidened

focus. He was less particular as to form and more insistent as to essentials. He had begun to appreciate values and to weigh life in the scales of a rational intellect. It would have been impossible for Puritan New England in the eighteenth century to have wasted long years in that empty discussion of the covenant of works and the covenant of grace; for it would have seemed as futile then as it does to us to-day. Although subtleties and quiddities no longer appealed to the New Englander, his character was in essence still Puritan; and the strength, the courage, the self-reliance; the hatred of injustice and oppression; the bodily and mental vigor; the natural instinct for right living and the hatred of all that was unclean — these were the qualities of Englishmen of the eighteenth century, these were part of the texture of the English mind and body, and these could be destroyed only by destroying the Englishman, by blotting out his past and effacing all that heredity had done in his making.

As the intellect of the Puritan broadened, it drove out superstition; philosophy made a more vivid appeal than dogma; a world in which reason reigned was more attractive than a cosmos in which a vindictive God ruled. The Puritans had never really known themselves, they did not know that at heart they were doubters, scoffers, questioners; that Anne Hutchinson and not Governor Endecott was the true type of the Puritan mind; that the Puritan could no more remain enslaved and chained to a

decaying moral consciousness than Nature can be bottled up or defied. Expansion must find its outlet. The essence of religion remained, but its form was modified, and it became tempered by philosophy; minds disciplined by Puritanism could find delight in intellectual discovery and yet not lose spiritual support. For the Puritan of the eighteenth century, now emancipated from priestly control, there was no conflict between Plato and God. He could read the "Laws," and still accept the Old Testament.

The "tonitruous cogency" of the Mathers and other pulpiteers had lost much of its effectiveness. "The people grew to be disenthralled in large numbers. There was a growing belief that there could be graces even in dogma — a gospel that never a Mather preached."¹ With the weakening of the hold of the clergy over their congregations, the people, schooled by a long course of severe mental discipline and training to delight in argument, now turned their attention to political discussion, to find the actions of kings an even more enticing subject than the works of the King of Kings. No race had ever been better prepared for revolt or to find justification for resisting lawful authority with subtle argument than these transplanted Englishmen, with disputatious minds grown rich in the luxuriant soil of New England theological dispute. It was no mere chance that Massachusetts led in revolt, it was

¹ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. v, p. 126.

the natural consequence of Puritan training, the moral result of Puritanism. The Puritan mind, the men who were not Puritans as that word was used in a strictly dogmatic sense, but who were still influenced by heredity and environment, craved intellectual excitation, which in the earlier days had been furnished by sermons and tracts. That stage had passed; philosophy was now more attractive than dogma, doctrine less important than economics. In the ten years or so preceding the Revolution there was no market for theological tracts, but an active demand for political pamphlets. Mather would have starved and the *Magnalia* would have been hawked about among booksellers and declined with curt thanks; Franklin grew prosperous out of his printing-press. In the seventeenth century politics, as we now understand that term, had no meaning for the great mass of the people; in the eighteenth century, in America even more than in England, politics were a very real thing.

From the incorporation of the colonies with the mother-country the Puritan clergy had nothing to gain. They vainly believed that with the declared independence of the colonies from the Crown the old order would be restored and the power of the priesthood would be re-established. In their own way they were as foolish and narrow as George III and his short-sighted ministers. Like them they were unable to gauge the force of public opinion or to realize how the character of the Englishman liv-

ing in America had been modified. If George III and his ministers in England are to be blamed for not knowing the temper of their kinsmen across the ocean, what shall be said of the American clergymen, who were equally unable to read the characters of their own countrymen? The clergy fostered and encouraged the Revolution, and were as vehement in urging their congregations to resist what to them was the tyranny and injustice of the Crown as their fathers had been in waging that never-ending conflict against the powers of evil; but now they were largely influenced by selfish considerations instead of being animated by sublime faith and a spiritual craving that could not be denied.

In an interview between the King and Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts in 1774, the King asked: "But, pray, Mr. Hutchinson, why do your ministers generally join with the people in their opposition to Government?"

To which Hutchinson replied: "They are, Sir, dependent upon the people. They are elected by the people, and when they are dissatisfied with them, they seldom leave till they get rid of them."¹

Beginning as religious zealots, the clergy had now become politicians and time-servers. Just as at first they were narrower, more intolerant, less charitable than the people to whom they ministered, so now they had become more resentful and less in a mood to seek compromise or conciliation than their con-

¹ *Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson*, vol. 1, p. 169.

gregations. It was the law of Israel that he who enticed to the worship of false gods should be killed, and for him there was no pity.¹ The Puritan elders were equally as merciless in the execution of the sentence upon the men who sought to introduce a new worship and set up new gods. "They persecuted as a part of their faith."

There was another reason why the power of the theocracy was weakened, and in some respects it was perhaps the most powerful of all the agencies to diminish the authority of the Puritan elders. I have so frequently referred to the universality of thought and the recurring phenomenon of a movement in one part of the world finding its reflex in another, that it is not at all surprising that in Scotland and in America at the time of which we are treating the same causes were operating to produce the same results. Buckle notes that "the spirit of trade became so rife, that it began to encroach on the old theological spirit, which had long been supreme. Hitherto the Scotch had cared for little except religious polemics."² These discussions, on which "men had wasted their energies, without the least benefit to themselves or to others,"³ now gave way to considerations of the improvement of manufactures, which became a common topic of discourse. This change marked "a tendency to turn aside

¹ Deuteronomy, xiii, 6-10.

² Buckle: *History of Civilization in England*, vol. II, p. 248.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

from subjects which are inaccessible to our understanding, and the discussion of which has no effect except to exasperate those who dispute, and to make them more intolerant than ever of theological opinions different from their own."¹ It was a blow to superstition. It diminished the inordinate respect formerly paid to theological pursuits, and it was an inducement to ambitious and enterprising men to abstain from these pursuits and to engage in temporal matters, where ability has more scope and enjoys more freedom of action.² The result was the creation of a class whose aim was essentially secular. Heretofore the intellect of Scotland had been absorbed by the church, and the industry of the country was controlled by the nobles.

We see the same change in America in the eighteenth century and the same weakening of the power of the church. There were other and better — at least men deemed them better — things to be done than to preach sermons or indulge in endless discussion of the meaning that dull brains could twist into a text. In the early days the church gave respectability and influence; now the trader and the shipper exercised an even greater influence; and men of ability saw there were opportunities for the use of their talents other than in the pulpit. With the church supreme, men were made superstitious, narrow, warped in their view of life; if the church did not teach selfishness, it caused men to become

¹ Buckle: p. 249.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

selfish, hard, and uncharitable. Paradoxical as it may sound, it was the pursuit of gain that made men generous, tolerant, and liberal in their dealings and their relations with their fellow-men, and not the teachings of the church. Commercial activity rather than charity modified the principle of stern justice and the exaction of vengeance against the transgressor. As commerce increased its hold, that of the church relaxed, and the clergy were held in less reverence than formerly, and to question their inerrancy was no longer heretical.

It is a very curious thing, striking enough to be worth a moment's consideration, that when political independence was gained, the power of the Church in the affairs of the State ceased. New England in 1783 was still Puritan, its people were English, the Middle Colonies and the South were dominated by men of English thought, and English traditions controlled the country. It would only have been natural, one would have thought, that at least the attempt should have been made to give the church standing, or to concede it official recognition; that lands or money would have been set apart for its support, that the long inherited customs of Europe would have been respected. Nothing of the kind happened. With one sharp stroke Church was cut from State; things temporal and things spiritual were kept separate; politics was to find no ally in a state-endowed priesthood, nor to be served by it. As we come later to study the men who framed

the Constitution, we shall see that a Church as the ward of the State could play no part in their scheme.

The Puritan elders lived to see their desire fulfilled. They lived to see the colonies throw off their allegiance to the Crown and give birth to a Nation. With that birth came the death of their hopes. England would send no more royal governors to lord it over her colonials. No longer need there be fear of a bishop living in the midst of luxury in his palace. America had become free, and with that freedom the Puritan theocracy disappeared below the horizon of political and religious freedom. A new era was to dawn.¹

¹ "No class of citizens have contributed more to the Revolution than the clergy, and none have hitherto suffered more in consequence of it." — Ramsay: *The History of the American Revolution*, vol. II, p. 324.

CHAPTER VIII

ENGLAND AND HER COLONIES DRAW APART

FOR almost a century after the first coming of the English to America we find no evidence of the existence of the seed of union from which later was to spring a nation. The new English nation that Raleigh dreamed of on the shores of Virginia was to be not a nation in the modern sense but royal provinces always governed from home, which were to redound to the glory and strength of England, whose people, while acknowledging the authority of proprietors or governors, would recognize a still higher allegiance to the Crown, and in America continue to be Englishmen as much as they were in England. As charters and patents were granted for each new colony, there was no comprehensive plan of coördination, and no attempt to lay the foundation of a political or social system that admitted of easy and harmonious expansion. The circumstances under which the colonies were founded made this to a large extent impossible. Differences of religion, climate, and social conditions repelled rather than attracted the settlements stretched along the Atlantic seaboard from Massachusetts to the Carolinas. Common purposes and aspirations and a moral and political concept of life frequently, but not always,

brought about unity of action between the men of New England, but they were suspicious of and disliked the settlers of New York, who fully reciprocated the feeling; Penn's religion destroyed sympathy between his colony and New England; religious and political differences kept New England apart from Maryland and Virginia; no strong ties bound the Carolinas and later Georgia with their southern neighbors or the more remote colonies of the North.¹

"Down to the eve of war which began in 1775," Palfrey tells us, "New England had little knowledge of the communities which took part with her in that conflict. Till the time of the Boston Port Bill, Massachusetts and Virginia, the two principal English colonies, had with each other scarcely more relations of acquaintance, business, mutual influence, or common action, than either of them had with Jamaica or Quebec."² Between the several

¹ "A voluntary association or coalition, at least a permanent one, is almost as difficult to be supposed: for fire and water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies in North America. Nothing can exceed the jealousy and emulation, which they possess in regard to each other. The inhabitants of Pennsylvania and New York have an inexhaustible source of animosity, in their jealousy for the trade of the Jerseys. Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island, are not less interested in that of Connecticut. The West Indies are a common subject or emulation to them all. Even the limits and boundaries of each colony, are a constant source of litigation. — In short, such is the difference of character, of manners, of religion, of interest, of the different colonies, that I think, if I am not wholly ignorant of the human mind, were they left to themselves, there would soon be a civil war, from one end of the continent to the other; while the Indians and Negroes would, with better reason, impatiently watch the opportunity of exterminating them all together." — Burnaby: *Travels into North America*, p. 92.

² Palfrey: *History of New England*, vol. i, preface, p. ix; cf. Parkman: *Montcalm and Wolfe*, vol. i, chap. i, *passim*.

members of each group there were, perhaps, special intimacies, domestic, commercial, military, religious; but between the several groups there were almost no intimacies at all.¹

Every colony had its own domestic and military problems which fully taxed its resources. The North made war against the Indian and had the fear of the French; in the South there was another form of Indian warfare and the menace of Spain. Trade, which knows no barriers and no nationality, which gives birth to no sentiment and teaches no patriotism, brought these widely scattered settlers together; but it fostered no spirit of a new nationality and offered no inducement to cast off the old; for while trade brings nations in contact in the common meeting-place of the market-house and ought to soften national animosities and break down prejudices, it is one of the anomalies of commerce that it engenders envy and creates a longing for conquest. The men of New England traded with those of the South, but there the intercourse ended. A colonial league was beyond their political philosophy. Yet unperceived there was a force at work that was to unify these people when the time was ripe. Unlike as they were in many things, in one thing they met on common ground.

The constitutions of all the colonies were modeled on that of England; in all the colonies there were the same political methods; the same politi-

¹ Tyler: *A History of American Literature*, vol. II, p. 9.

cal principles animated men North and South; and men thus trained in the same school found it not difficult to work together when political union could no longer be delayed. This power of cohesive attraction was stimulated by the policy of the English Government. It was an influence "strongly tending to counteract the principles that separated the American communities from each other, and to unite them by a growing sense of common interest and common injury in a confederacy fatal to the prerogative of the parent state. Every added year tended no less to weaken the divisive influence of the distinctions imported by the original colonists into their settlements, than to enhance the sense of united interest, and to augment the power by which this interest might be sustained and defended."¹

Pressure from without as well as their own needs brought about the first loosely formed confederacy, which was to foreshadow the union of the next century. The New England colonists had early been taught respect for the fighting ability of the red man and made to realize that he was a foe constantly to be guarded against. To the north were the French, a peril equally as great as the Indians; to the west were the Dutch, whose military power was less to be feared, but whose pin-pricking policy and claims to English territory were a constant source of friction. And the skies were black at home.

¹ Grahame: *The History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 411.

In this year, 1638, when the proposal for the New England Confederacy is first made by Connecticut, civil war is raging in England and the defeat of the Parliamentary Party will, the colonists fear, see the old order restored, and Laud, delivered from his prison, more determined than ever to enslave conscience and "harry and besett" the Puritans of New England as he had those of the Old.

Negotiations begun in 1638 culminated in 1643 in a union of the colonies of Connecticut, New Haven, Massachusetts, and Plymouth, which an American historian has well described as "merely a business arrangement; it did not conduce to arouse any particular attachments or patriotism."¹ Each colony retained its own government, and no provision was made for a Federal Congress or *Bundesrath* or for federal taxation; the affairs of the Union were to be administered by eight commissioners, two from each colony; the vote of six was required to carry any measure, and from their vote there was no appeal to the people. The expenses of war were divided among the colonies on a *per capita* basis, as were the spoils of war. The Union, which was declared to be perpetual, was dissolved in 1684. It was never satisfactory, for it made Massachusetts, whose population and resources were larger than those of the other three colonies combined, subordinate to them, and when Massachusetts was outvoted her only remedy was to violate the compact,

¹ Elson: *History of the United States of America*, p. 120.

which she did. The real weakness of the confederation was that the Union could not reach the individual colonists. They were not citizens of "The United Colonies of New England," which was the official style of the confederacy, but remained as before citizens of their own colony.

To us this first experiment in union is significant as indicating a marked trend of thought. Just as Hooker and his associates went forth from Massachusetts and settled in Connecticut without asking the permission of the English Government or obtaining a charter for their lands from colonial governor or higher authority, so the four colonies brought about their confederation without the authorization of the Crown or its ministers. In the articles of confederation only incidental reference is made to the home government. The preamble recites that "the Natives have formerly committed sondry insolences and outrages upon seueral Plantacons of the English and have of late combined against us. And seeing by reasons of those sad Distracons in England, which they have heard of, and by which they know we are hindered from that humble way of seekinge advise or reapeing those comfortable fruits of protection which at other tymes we might well expect."¹ This is the sole allusion to a paramount authority. Yet it was really a defiance of England, for it was an arrogation of the right of the colonists to conduct their own political

¹ Wilson: *A History of the American People*, vol. II, appendix, p. 331.

affairs and to form alliances without the consent of the Crown. It shows, what I have repeatedly urged as the lesson of colonial history, that the spirit of colonial independence manifested itself from the beginning, and that while the colonists always regarded themselves as Englishmen and acknowledged the suzerainty of England, they did not concede that their fealty robbed them of the right of creating their own political administration.

The weakness, the incapacity, and the short-sighted greed of the British Government, following the line of least resistance, allowed the colonists to make their own laws and practically to do as they wanted, so long as they did not interfere with England's control of commerce. This was the rotten link in the chain that was continually strained to the breaking-point and then suddenly relaxed when the strain became too great; it was this extraordinary control of their local affairs and the commercial tyranny of Britain that made a dissolution of the connection between the colonies and the parent state inevitable.¹

It will perhaps be asked how it came about that the English in America were so different from the English in England and thus early developed new characteristics. Genetically they were not different, although they appeared to be. Man adapts himself to his social environment and develops his political *milieu* in the same way that animals adjust

¹ Cf. Hutchinson: *History of Massachusetts*, vol. III, p. 353.

themselves to physical conditions. The cumulative effects of climate, the obstacles to be overcome, the quickening of the perceptions that necessity exercised, the constant spur to individual initiative made these English in America a more alert and self-reliant people than their kinsmen at home; faculties which had lain dormant in England were in America revitalized. What did Suffolk yeoman or Norfolk yokel know about going into the forest and swinging his axe so as to make a clearing and with his own hands building his own roof-tree; of trapping and hunting; of working with gun in hand, and by the sign of a broken branch or grass crushed down reading the presence of his enemies? Their forefathers had been brought in close contact with Nature, they had worked fearing attack, they in their day had the same qualities that were now being displayed in the American wilderness, but the generations that came in between had developed along other lines.¹

¹ "In all Thomas Hardy's work," a recent reviewer of that novelist says, "there is something of the grave simplicity of places, like his Wessex, where man has lived long in close relationship to earth and the seasons. Most of his characters have grown to be what they are by slow and gradual changes, like the woods or the surface of the downs. They are deep-rooted in far-off traditions of the generations which have passed and left them there. . . . Amid their drama of events we hear singularly little exclamation of joy or sorrow, and hardly any wailing or excessive grief. Little fuss is made over birth and death and the fortunes that may come between. The earth turns upon her ancient round, man appears upon her surface to run his course, and the eyes of the trilobite that died millions of years ago, stare from the rock into the eyes of the dying." — *The Literary Digest*, New York, September 9, 1905.

There is no spirit of Wessex in America; there never has been. That growth

Civilization, the complex fabric of society, specialization—for society less complex and less highly specialized at that day than it now is was still no chaotic jumble but refined and articulate—had done to the mind of man what it had done to his body, and in the brain there were rudimentary cells, as in the body there were rudimentary organs. In America Nature demanded certain things, and man responded or perished. A people who were to give birth to a new race had become inured to hardship and hardihood. They had assimilated the lesson of their enemies and practiced the craft and cunning of the Indian; had Braddock listened to the advice of Washington and followed Indian tactics, in all probability he would have won.

The independence of the English and their political genius distinguish them from other races. Out of it is their history wrought. In England at the time of which we are treating, social and political institutions had become formalized, and after each progressive movement society appeared to lapse into its original state. It appeared to, because society quickly absorbed the new conditions, but the structure was not changed, although the interior arrangements were modified. In America it was

of slow and gradual change was possible in England, in America it has been impossible. Under the weight of tradition and a narrow life, emotion has been crushed out of these descendants of the West Saxons and imagination stifled. The American is both emotional and imaginative, his sense fed by the forced draft of youthful energy and activity and the appeal that novelty always makes.

otherwise. Here the Englishman was given the opportunity to exercise his natural tendencies; not really to do anything new, but simply to repeat what had been done by his forefathers; his method of doing it was new, to meet the new conditions, but the substance was old. Englishmen in England in the seventeenth century, suffering under religious or political persecution, could not, as Hooker or Williams did, wander away a few miles, obtain land by squatter sovereignty or from the Indians for a few trinkets, and lay the foundation of a new state, because in England land was not free and political and social conditions made the creation of a new state impossible. But the Englishman does not submit to persecution or suffer without resistance. In him the spirit of defiance is never crushed. Forced to remain, he agitates; knowing what he wants, he is doggedly determined to gain it, and in the end he wins. We see Hooker go out from Massachusetts and Massachusetts make no attempt to stop him, because Massachusetts had no power of coercion, she was too weak to use force, and it was as well perhaps to be rid of such an objectionable person; at any rate, make a virtue of necessity and put as good a face upon it as possible. Two hundred years later we see South Carolina and her sister states attempt to leave their mother's house, and is the door thrown wide open to them and are they bid to depart in peace?

Englishmen in America, then and for many years to come, called themselves Englishmen, and yet

there was an unconscious force working, the meaning of which they appreciated as little as Englishmen at home, which was to go on gathering strength until it spent itself in nationalization and the Englishman had become an American.

The first germ of union has for us another interest. The recognition of the principle of the equality of representation without regard to the size or population of the colony, by which each colony was given two commissioners, is the same principle that prevailed almost a century and a half later when the Federal Constitution was adopted and the states, irrespective of size or population, were given equal representation in the Senate of the United States. This is peculiarly an American political principle. It was as foreign to English ideas then as it is to-day.

The example set by the New England Confederacy was not imitated by any of the other colonies, and it was not until six years after the dissolution of the confederacy, in 1690, that the colonies were again brought together to take measures to repel invasion. Then the struggle between England and France became American as well as European. A French and Indian war party from Canada, their movements veiled by a heavy snowstorm, one night stole silently into Schenectady, in the northern part of New York, and massacred men, women, and children. Schenectady was the Fort Sumter of that day.¹ New York as well as New England realized

¹ Frothingham: *The Rise of the Republic*, p. 89.

its danger, for although the real meaning of the struggle was not yet understood, the ambitious schemes of Frontenac were clearly seen, and then began a contest that was to end eighty years later in the expulsion of France from America, the overthrow of English rule in the American colonies, and the birth of the American Republic.

Massachusetts took prompt action by inviting New York, Maryland, and Virginia to meet in New York to take measures for the common defense and to resist the French invasion. This was the first call for an intercolonial congress. Commissioners from Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New York met in that city; appeals to Virginia had not been successful, but Maryland promised aid. The political effect of union and the meaning of the great undertaking on which they had embarked only a few prescient minds were able to grasp, yet it showed that men had set foot on the road that leads to union. Heretofore the Puritan colonies had been proud of their exclusiveness and would have no intimate associations with the other provinces; there had always been friction between New England and the New Netherland. In the face of common danger everything else was forgotten but the fate that threatened and the measures that were necessary to avert it. The fact that the Congress met in New York, then only sixteen years under English rule, is proof of the statement made in the preceding volume that the Dutch colonists were entirely indiffer-

ent to political control and exercised no influence on the political development of the colonies. The emergency of Englishmen was the opportunity of Dutchmen, but they looked on with indifference, and what Englishmen wanted Englishmen did without Dutch interference or assistance.

With the fortunes of the military expedition to Canada we are not concerned, as it changed nothing, and peace between England and France was restored by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, which gave a breathing-spell for the next five years, when the war of the Spanish Succession, known in American History as Queen Anne's War, again unsheathed the tomahawk and brought English and French settlers in the New World face to face. The first war in which the colonists had borne an important part had shown them as well as the home government the necessity of greater coördination and a central military control. About 1690, Francis Nicholson, Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, proposed a Grand Union of the English Colonies for mutual defense against the encroachments of the French; there was to be a viceroy appointed for all the colonies, which were to be taxed for the support of a standing army. The scheme was rejected by the ministers, and what Nicholson proposed no British ministry deemed politic to revive until the reign of George III.¹

More efficiently to administer the colonies, in

¹ Cf. Fiske: *Old Virginia and Her Neighbours*, vol. II, p. 30.

1696 a Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations was appointed by the King, whose functions were primarily commercial, but which in the following year found the most pressing necessity the unity of the colonial militia; and it recommended the appointment of a captain-general of all the forces on the continent of North America, with power to levy and command them for their defense, under such limitations and instructions as His Majesty should deem best.¹ Penn, with more statesmanlike vision, in the same year proposed a plan of American union by the appointment of delegates to a Federal Congress which should exercise real federal powers. In his "briefe and plaine scheam how the English Colonies on the north parts of America may be made more useful to the crowne, and one another's peace and safety with an universall concurrence," he provided for a congress of twenty delegates, two from each colony, who should meet once a year, or oftener if necessary in time of war, "to debate a resolve of such measures as are most adviseable for their better understanding, and the public tranquility and safety"; the "Congresse" (and it is interesting to note that this was not a mere conference or council, but was a congress of the representatives of *quasi-self-governing states*) to be presided over by the King's Commissioner, whose functions were to be similar to those exercised by the King's High Commissioner "after the manner of Scotland." The

¹ Bancroft: *History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 74.

business of the congress was "to hear and adjust all maters of complaint or difference between Province and Province," and "to consider of ways and means to support the union and safety of these Provinces against the public enemies"; the congress to have the power to determine "the Quotas of men and the charges." In time of war the King's High Commissioner became "generall or chief Commander of the several Quotas upon service against a common enemy as he shall be advised, for the good and benefit of the whole."¹ Nothing came either of Penn's plan or the recommendation of the Board of Trade for the appointment of an English commander-in-chief. The colonies were to be permitted to drift.

From that time and for the next half-century the thought of a colonial union, or at least a league of closer relationship, was never absent from the minds of English statesmen or the leaders of political thought in the colonies. On both sides of the Atlantic the controlling motive was the same, although the influences had a different inspiration. In England it was seen that while the colonies were rapidly growing in population and wealth, their administration had become unwieldy, owing to their diverse forms of government and the absence of any central authority; and English statesmen appreciated the importance of the American colonies in the great game of war and politics that made Europe an armed

¹ Preston: *Documents Illustrative of American History*, p. 147.

camp. In the colonies it was seen that no one colony was strong enough to stand alone against the French and the Spanish and their Indian allies, and if Englishmen were to hold what they had won and bring the hinterland under their control, — and the pressure of a constantly increasing population made it an economic necessity that they should no longer cling to the seaboard, — they must call on each other when assistance was necessary to resist aggression or to make war.

There were, besides, continual sources of friction between the colonies arising out of indeterminate boundaries and other disputes that could be settled only by vexatious and costly appeals to the home authorities. A court of appeal on American territory, invested with power by the consent of all the colonies, could speedily and equitably pronounce a verdict. Penn recognized this in his plan of union by providing that the functions of the congress should be “to hear and adjust all matters of Complaint or difference between Province and Province. As 1st, where persons quit their own Province and go to another, that they may avoid their just debts, tho they may be able to pay them, 2nd, where offenders fly Justice, or Justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the Provinces that entertaine them, 3dly, to prevent or cure injuries in the point of Commerce, 4th, to consider of ways and means to support the union and safety of these Provinces against the public enemies.”¹

¹ Preston: *Op. cit.*

In the more detailed and elaborate Plan of Union offered by Franklin in 1754,¹ a comprehensive written constitution was prepared which delegated to the Grand Council power to make laws and levy duties and imposts for colonial purposes, but reserved to the separate colonies the right to make their own laws and the control of their own taxes. Franklin's plan was rejected by both sides; by the English Government because it made the colonies too independent; by the colonists because they believed it robbed them of their power and placed them too much under the domination of the home government. These objections Franklin records, perhaps not without reason, "makes me suspect that it was really the true medium."

On the American continent there developed almost a passion for a formal and precise instrument of government, which is exemplified in every successive stage of American empire building. To other peoples the necessity of a written constitution had not seemed vital, to Englishmen in England it was not essential, but to Englishmen in America it could not be dispensed with. To what cause shall we ascribe this peculiar social development that has so markedly affected American thought?

The beginning of English colonization in America was a beginning of the new conception of the relations between the parent state and its colonies, and for the first time in the history of the world colonies

¹ Bigelow: *Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*, p. 294 *et seq.*

were not subject to the arbitrary will of a sovereign or a conqueror, but acquired certain rights and privileges, and their inhabitants were guaranteed the liberties and immunities specifically set forth and enumerated in their charters. All that the colonists did, all the acts of proprietors or governors that the colonists resisted or opposed, were based on the powers conferred by the charters or the colonial interpretation of an assumption of power by those in authority for which the charter gave no warrant. Here again is cumulative proof of English influence on the institutions and thought of America. Colonization was old when the Jamestown adventurers and the Massachusetts Pilgrims cleared the forest and planted their fields, but they brought with them a new principle that was to be the foundation of Americanism, that has survived and remained uninfluenced by any political principles or teachings from any non-English source.

Coming to the New World to execute a definite purpose and to carry out a well-defined scheme, the importance of a precise social compact was perhaps for the first time felt, and it was this influence that in the following century made the teachings of the French Encyclopædists, with their confused ideas of the *contrat social* and the absurd theory of "natural rights," find such ready support in the American colonies. Had the settlement of America been on the lines of the military conquests of Europe, — an armed rather than a social and industrial invasion,

— the English would have brought with them their military and civil code, which would have been enforced without regard to the wishes or protests of the conquered. But in America the conditions were different; the English came not as conquerors but as settlers, not to establish garrisons to keep a native race under subjection and to levy tribute, not to hold by the sword what they had won by the sword, but to build villages and plough their fields, to make the soil yield its wealth instead of to extort a tithe from its peasants, to harrow the earth instead of to harry the people. In these circumstances a social compact was necessary or society would pass under the government of a military dictator or an autocratic oligarchy. English political training and the qualities inherent in the Englishman were as much opposed to the one as they were to the other, and to escape dangers which no Englishman could regard without concern was the reason the New World gave to the Old the written constitution; and in this it gave something more than the voice of the lawgiver reduced to precise terms.

For the love of a written constitution, the respect and veneration it inspires have had lasting political, social, and psychological effects. We shall see how the Constitution has influenced social action, how it has been an obstacle to progress and a protection to liberty, how it has exercised a moral influence on politics and a political influence on morality. There is a marked difference between the mental attitude

of a people governed by an unwritten constitution and those under the control of a written constitution. A law is an expedient, but never sacrosanct; no morality attaches to a statute, which, in all progressive society, is never a finality but merely a stage in evolution; which, being the handiwork of man with all his limitations, man recognizes as fallible, useful if it accomplishes the purposes for which it is intended, but which may without impiety be modified as circumstances require, or even be abandoned without offense when society has outgrown its scope.

Far different with a constitution. Here speaks not the voice of finite man, but the prophet and seer, for idealism invests the makers of a politico-moral code with the qualities of almost divine understanding and knowledge, whose work is to be venerated, but may not be criticized. Lawmakers are contemporary, and the living man who has to take part in the rough and tumble of life is seldom an object of veneration to his associates or rivals; they either know him too well or not well enough to know him at all. Death has sanctified the makers of a constitution; time has crowned them and age justified their work. It may be said that their work could not have endured if it had not the qualities of permanence, but with equal truth it may be added permanence is not the highest test to which it can be subjected; for it begins as an experiment and becomes a part of life, it gains strength with age, and

youth is taught to have for it the respect due to years; to question its wisdom is to be guilty of apostasy; it is treason to the state and to society; and, short of revolution, it is almost impossible to bring about a change, so far-reaching are the effects of a written constitution on the mind of a people.

Beginning with the first constitution of the Puritans, the Bible, we next see Hooker's written constitution in Connecticut, then the charters, which were the constitutions of the colonies and the authority by which the Assemblies passed the various provincial laws; Penn's plan of union, Franklin's scheme, the Articles of Confederation adopted by the thirteen states twenty-three years after Franklin's proposal had been rejected, and, finally, the existing Constitution of the United States of America. No great body of unwritten or common law is called into existence by the necessity of circumstances, no precedents have the force of statutes, no Congress or Legislature is able to make the Constitution conform to the latest enactment of the lawmaking power; but the lawmaking power is narrowed by the terms of the Constitution, and authority is expressed in the specific words of a statute.

Franklin's Plan of Union is worth brief study as prefiguring the Constitution adopted thirty-three years later, and as pointing the road on which American thought was marching even while no man challenged the authority of the Crown or attempted to obtain for the colonies independence. In Frank-

lin's preamble it is proposed "that humble application be made for an Act of Parliament of Great Britain, by virtue of which one general government may be formed in America." A President-General was to be appointed by the Crown and a Grand Council formed, consisting of forty-eight members, of whom seven were to be from Massachusetts, two from Rhode Island, and the other colonies in like proportion, but after three years each colony should be entitled to representation proportionate to its contribution to the general treasury, in no case, however, exceeding seven or less than two. The Council had the appointment of its own Speaker.

All acts were to receive the approval of the President-General, and were to be transmitted to the King in Council for approbation, and if not disapproved within three years were to remain in force. The President-General, with the advice of the Grand Council, had power to make treaties¹ with the Indians and to declare war and make peace with them; to make new settlements and provide laws for their government until given their own government by the Crown, to raise armies for the defense of any of the colonies; but men could not be impressed in any of the colonies without the consent of its legislature,

¹ Cf. *Constitution of the United States*, art. II, sec. 2: "He [the President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties;" art. IV, sec. 3: "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union," etc. In Franklin's plan is found the germ of the American Constitution, and it is striking with what fidelity his ideas were later enlarged to meet the requirements of a nation.

which alone could make laws and levy the colonial taxes. Recalling the long struggle that has divided men in the United States over the tariff, Franklin's economic philosophy is of interest. In giving the Grand Council power to levy taxes, that power was to be exercised "as to them shall appear most equal and just (considering the ability and other circumstances of the inhabitants in the several colonies), and such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people; rather discouraging luxury, than loading industry with unnecessary burdens."

It has often been asked what made the Americans adopt the peculiar and, to many European students of American political institutions, confusing dual system of government, the *imperium in imperio* of the state sovereignty within the national sovereignty; and the convenient answer has been that it is an original American discovery. The dual system of government, the rights of the state subordinated to the general government, and the powers of the general government held in check by the rights of the state, simply continued in unbroken form the government that from the first day had marked the relations of the colonies not only to the Crown but also to each other. A political system as remarkable as any the world has known was the result of pure accident.

A company of merchant adventurers received a charter to land in Massachusetts, a court favorite

was rewarded with a grant, a royal relative was given a patent, but each colony as it was planted was independent of all the others, each was governed by its own laws, each was subject to the King, but owed no allegiance to its neighbors. So strong was this spirit of independence, so much had it become a part of the nature of the English in America, that when necessity drove the colonies into concerted action, as we have repeatedly seen, nothing could make them surrender their *quasi-autonomy* or yield control of their domestic affairs to a central authority. Colonies were willing to provide for the common defense, but they retained the right to levy their own taxes; they would furnish their quota of troops, but the enlistment must be carried on under their own supervision. From the day when the English first set foot on American soil until the Constitution of the United States was adopted, there was never any departure from this principle, which by the force of tradition and political circumstances became a fixed law.

But by no strength of the imagination can it be twisted into a moral law or an ethical principle. It was not so regarded by the men of its time. It was conventional, but not sacred. Beginning as an expedient, it became a custom, later to develop into a conviction that it was a wise arrangement it were well to leave undisturbed, but it made no appeal on moral grounds; it was only when men had to palliate their wrong-doing and find a defense for slavery

other than greed that they found in a political institution a "moral" justification.

In the United States the judiciary is elevated above the legislature, for the sufficiency of a law depends not upon its enactment by Congress but whether it passes the test of constitutionality as applied by the Supreme Court of the United States. This is in opposition to the English system, where the law of the land is the last enactment of Parliament, and this divergence from the model might be assumed to suggest an inspiration other than English, but a careful examination will show that the makers of the Constitution did no violence to their traditions.

In the colonial period, when there was a conflict between the colonists and their governors, an appeal lay to the courts of England or the Sovereign and his Privy Council, and in those days the Privy Council exercised much more important functions than it does now; and it was the courts and the Sovereign and his Council who construed the charters and determined whether an act of a provincial legislature or the order of a governor was violative of the charter. This taught the colonists to look to the courts, not only to protect their rights but also to determine how far laws were in harmony with the spirit of the charter, and when the tie with England was broken and the people instead of the King were sovereign, it was not easy for them to escape from the habit of turning to the courts for

the ascertainment whether a law was within the scope of the Constitution; so that while apparently the Americans introduced a new element into their political system, really they merely continued the English practice. It is proper to add that there is no express warrant in the Constitution for the determination of the constitutionality of an Act of Congress by the Supreme Court. The Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are declared to be the supreme law of the land,¹ and it inferentially follows that the question whether a law is made in pursuance of the Constitution can only be determined by a court and not by the body the validity of whose act is under review. It was for many years earnestly argued that the Supreme Court had arrogated to itself a power not conferred by the Constitution,² but that question has long ago been thrashed out, and whether the authority was delegated or arrogated is now of no consequence, as the question is *res adjudicata*.

Of the conferences held from time to time with the Indians, to bring them into alliance with the colonies and keep them from assisting the French, little need be said, nor need we follow in detail the

¹ Article vi, section 2.

² "In the State Constitutions, and, indeed in the Federal one also, no provision is made for the case of a disagreement in expounding them; and as the Courts are generally the last in making the decision, it results to them, by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its final character. This makes the Judiciary department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be proper." — Madison: *Works*, vol. 1, p. 194.

history of those years in which England and France struggled for the mastery of a continent. It was in 1759 on the Plains of Abraham that Quebec passed into the hands of the English and the power of France in the New World was broken forever. The political and psychological effects of these long years of war demand attention.

England had sent her troops to America to save America from the French, but this the colonists only partly comprehended. The Seven Years' War, in its political consequences one of the most important periods of European development, which was fought on three continents and was to end by the English driving the French both from India and America — this titanic struggle was for the English colonists in America only "the French and Indian War." "Their own continent was the seat of their thoughts."¹

The process of national transformation was actively at work and weakening the bond with the mother-country; to the men of Massachusetts and Virginia, to colonials wherever found, their own colonies were now the first consideration and were to them more important than the affairs of England. As the mother-country developed that policy of imperialism which made her supreme in the world's affairs and planted her flag wherever there was trade to be gained or territory to be acquired, the colonists became more provincial and self-centred,

¹ Wilson: *A History of the American People*, vol. II, p. 85.

and the effect of this became incorporated into the fibre of Americanism, to remain uneradicated for the next hundred and fifty years. To the colonists it seemed that they were drawn into war by the entanglement of European politics, and they believed that if left to themselves they could hold their own against the French. That belief was the conceit of ignorance. The military power of France on the American continent was better organized than Britain's, whose system of separate governments made united action impossible; and while from time to time the colonists gained signal victories over their opponents, it is not at all improbable that in the end they would have been worsted. The wars not only made the colonists believe that they were fighting for England instead of England fighting for them,¹ but they emphasized certain national traits of the English which had been modified in Englishmen in America by the new environment and the new conditions.

The Englishman is by nature arrogant, a prussian, a stickler for form, wedded to precedent, and possessed of the immedicable vice of regarding with contempt any one who is not of his caste or trained to his ways. Robert Hale of Beverly, who com-

¹ Sabine says that in the Seven Years' War the colonies furnished "quite 28,000 men in more than one of the campaigns, and every year to the extent of their ability. In fine, it is literally true that, for five years together, more troops, in proportion to population, were raised in America than in England; while, on the ocean, full 12,000 seamen were enlisted in the Royal Navy and in the colonial privateers." — *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 70.

manded one of the regiments at the first siege of Louisburg, makes frequent reference to English insularity and arrogance. "A strange prejudice possesses ye minds of those of our mother country against ye Americans," he writes; and he charges that commanders would "take the wrong path preferably to any an American would point out." Rather than follow the advice of the New England pilots, Admiral Walker ran his vessel on the rocks.¹

Englishmen in America, whose military knowledge was the rough-and-ready education of the frontier settlement, commanded by their own officers, who were not professional soldiers, fought side by side with English regulars commanded by officers whose profession was fighting. For these irregular levies the redcoat as well as his officer had little respect, nor did they disguise their contempt. At the beginning the colonial had for the King's soldier that admiration which precise technical knowledge always inspires in the amateur, who is conscious of his deficiencies and is anxious to become proficient; as the war went on and the colonials learned that they had in them the common qualities of Englishmen, that their courage was not less than that of their oversea kinsmen, that they could face fire without flinching, that they could endure equal hardship and suffering, their respect for the uniform vanished, and they saw that man for man the King's soldier and the King's officer were no better

¹ Weeden: *Social and Economic History of New England*, vol. II, p. 669.

than they. In some things the colonials were superior.¹ With the grand strategy of his day the English officer was of course more familiar than the colonial, but his tactics were frequently futile because of his ignorance of local conditions. The colonists were better equipped, by knowledge and experience gained in many an Indian skirmish, to fight the Indians and their French allies on their own ground, than were the English officers who knew nothing of Indian warfare or bush fighting; yet the English officers refused to consult with the colonials or contemptuously rejected their advice when it was offered.² It was the complaint of the colonials that officers of distinguished military ability were denied promotion, and a captain in the regulars outranked and commanded a provincial colonel.³

Braddock, a typical Englishman, with all of an Englishman's bravery and all of an Englishman's

¹ "The genius of circumstance, the power of adaptability — almost always lacking in European strategy on this continent — was bred out of the comprehensive experience of the American merchant, shipper, and builder. With close contact with nature and man in his home, from wide intercourse with the world across foreign seas, he learned to master difficulty in peace, until he became the natural leader of his country's forces in war." — Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. I, p. 365.

² Soldiers spoke of the Americans with professional arrogance. Lord Sandwich, in March, 1775, in the House of Lords, described the Americans as raw, undisciplined, cowardly men. He accused them of having shown egregious cowardice at the siege of Louisburg, and he predicted that they would take to flight at the very sound of a cannon. — Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. III, p. 416.

³ Sabine: *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution*, vol. I, p. 3.

arrogance and disdain for an opponent whose methods were inferior because they were not his own; "pragmatical and obstinate, impatient of novel expedients not laid down in the books, but dictated by emergencies in a new country,"¹ made an "angry reply" when Washington suggested that the Virginia rangers, being accustomed to the country and Indian warfare, should be thrown out in advance.² Franklin warned him of the danger of an Indian ambush, to which Braddock scornfully replied: "These savages may, indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia, but upon the King's regular and disciplined troops, sir, it is impossible they should make any impression."³ Yet Franklin was generous enough to say of Braddock that he "was a brave man, and might probably have made a figure as a good officer in some European war. But he had too much self-confidence, too high an opinion of the validity of regular troops, and too mean a one of both Americans and Indians."⁴ Braddock must needs make war as laid down in the regulations, which were as rigid in the heart of the forest as they were in the heart of London; so his troops advanced with bayonets fixed, colors flying, drums beating and fifes shrilling, a gallant spectacle as they went forward to their death to the tune of the *Grenadier's March* as if in

¹ Irving: *Life of Washington*, vol. I, p. 189.

² Irving: *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

³ Bigelow: *Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*, p. 311.

⁴ Bigelow: *Op. cit.*, p. 310.

a review in St. James's Park.¹ When the battle broke, the Virginians, accustomed to the Indian method of fighting, scattered and found cover behind trees; Braddock formed his stiff grenadiers into solid platoons, where they made a splendid target for the raking fire that the Indians delivered from their concealment. When at last some of the grenadiers attempted to imitate the example of the Virginians and fire from behind cover, Braddock beat them back with the flat of his sword and called them cowards.² To expose yourself to the enemy and be shot down was, according to English traditions, courage; to make his tactics your own and shoot instead of being shot, was cowardice. It was magnificent, but it bore no semblance to war. It was the same magnificent folly that has cost England hundreds of lives in every war she has engaged in. It cost her the American colonies.

We see the same failure on the part of the English to profit by experience and the quickness with which the Americans imitated Indian strategy, when a few years later Howe stormed the fortification of Bunker Hill. Against an enemy behind intrenchments, the English commander sent his force in solid lines, unprotected by cover, without first attempting by artillery to keep down his opponent's fire or render his position untenable. But Howe's troops, as an American writer says, were "three thousand well armed, uniformed, and drilled sol-

¹ Irving: *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

² Irving: *Op. cit.*, p. 237.

ders, who had never known defeat in equal fight," and "fifteen hundred farmers" constituted the opposing force; and naturally an English general leading three thousand veterans held lightly enough fifteen hundred farmers, and forgot, or if he remembered held it of no consequence, that these farmers cut their teeth on the stock of a musket and were able to use a gun with the same precision as their forebears did at Agincourt their cloth-yard shafts.¹ Until the attacking column was within one hundred and fifty feet of the fort and was preparing for the final rush, the defenders held their silence. When they could look into the whites of the eyes of their adversaries they spoke, and the lifting smoke showed the hill covered with dead and wounded. It was the same throughout the war. The British fought well and with courage, but carelessly; the Americans with equal courage and greater skill and more caution.

Before Bunker Hill, in the time of Braddock, the mischief was being done. The colonies were willing to be treated as younger sons whose future was yet to be made, but to be regarded as inferiors,² to have this contempt so openly displayed, was not only

¹ A boy of the wilderness at an age when in England he would have been scaring crows, was sent to kill squirrels, under penalty in case the number of the squirrels did not tally with the number of bullets that he expended. — Trevelyan: *The American Revolution*, vol. I, part II, p. 209.

² "The English regarded colonies, even when settled by men of their own land, only as sources of emolument to the mother-country; colonists as an inferior caste." — Bancroft: *History of the United States of America*, vol. II, p. 427.

galling to their pride, but it made them feel a sense of injustice that during the course of the next few years was to become stronger and at last prove the incentive for action. In all the debates and appeals made to arouse the patriotism of the colonists you will hear that note of injustice like the dominant theme of a fugue. It was on every man's tongue, it dropped from every man's pen. Iteration made it a conviction. Otis, as was said of Rousseau, "uttering words of warning which sounded through the speculation of his time like a passing bell across a marriage feast,"¹ bitterly complained of English indifference and ignorance and the studied contempt with which the colonies were treated. "Even their law books," he says, "and very dictionaries of law, in editions as late as 1750, speak of the British plantations abroad as consisting chiefly of islands; and they are reckoned up in some of them in this order — Jamaica, Barbadoes, Virginia, Maryland, New England, Carolina, Bermudas. At the head of all these 'islands,' and no distinction is made between islands and continents, stands Jamaica; yet many of the colonies are larger than all the islands put together; and the colonies are well settled, not as the common people of England foolishly imagine, with a compound mongrel mixture of English, Indian, and Negro, but with freeborn British white subjects."²

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. vi, p. 265.

² Otis: *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, p. 36.

To the obsession of a sentiment may be traced the causes that have dominated peoples and affected the destinies of mankind. A thing in itself, a motive or an action, is often of no consequence; men are less controlled in their reason by a fact than they are influenced by what they believe to be a fact, which, whether for good or evil, becomes a fixed idea. The "unjust" actions of the British Government and the "injustice" which was the constant complaint of the colonies were less unjust and more foolish, less inspired by injustice and more the result of stupidity and a deficiency of imagination than the colonials were able to see; but the result was exactly the same as if the English had deliberately determined to treat the colonies as conquered provinces and their people as aliens to be exploited for the benefit of their masters. This policy broke down loyalty and encouraged resistance and a spirit of resentment; it made men dissatisfied and fostered a feeling that they were being discriminated against; it created friction and supplied a wrong interpretation for every act of imperial policy that affected the colonies. The sum of it all was the deep sense of injustice that entered into the blood of the colonists and could only be cured by blood-letting.¹ It unconsciously gave the impetus

¹ "The beginning of strife between the Parent State and her Colonies was like the letting-out of waters. From inconsiderable causes love was changed into suspicion that gradually ripened into ill-will, and soon ended in hostility. Prudence, policy, and reciprocal interest, urged the expediency of concession; but pride, false honour, and misconceived dignity, drew in an opposite direc-

to nationality by making men see that their strength lay within themselves, that they had at their command the means to win respect, and if they would enjoy that respect they must show that they were entitled to it. It somewhat altered the relation that they imagined existed between themselves and the English. New England years before had seen a "Great Awakening" that was religious and appealed to spiritual emotion; this was a second "Awakening" whose message was political.

Another cause, quite unconnected with any of those already mentioned, was now operating to create colonial discontent with the mother-country. New England, as we have already seen, was of unmixed English blood, but both the Middle and the Southern colonies were rapidly filling up with Scotch and Irish. Religious persecution and commercial oppression drove the Scotch-Irish of Ulster across the Atlantic; the same motives that impelled Pilgrims and Puritans and Cavaliers to find in the colonies new homes were now to bring about a migration that was only again to be equaled when America called the famine-stricken Irish of the nineteenth century to plenty. English manufacturers, jealous of the woolen and linen industries of Ulster, ruined them by Acts of Parliament; a

tion. Undecided claims and doubtful rights, which under the influence of wisdom and humility might have been easily compromised, imperceptibly widened into an irreconcilable breach. Hatred at length took the place of kind affections, and the calamities of war were substituted in lieu of the benefits of commerce." — Ramsay: *The History of the American Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 185.

spirit of persecution again possessed the Church of England, and civil and religious liberty was denied the Irish Presbyterians. There was hope for them nowhere except in the colonies, and between 1730 and 1770 five hundred thousand had cut themselves adrift and begun a new life in America. Very few of them came to New England; the majority went to Pennsylvania and spread through the Shenandoah Valley into the Carolinas. In 1770, we are told, they formed a third of the population of Pennsylvania,¹ and at the time of the Revolution they constituted a sixth of the population of all the colonies.² There were also in Pennsylvania a great many Germans, "who had known not a little of Old World oppression,"³ and a not inconsiderable sprinkling of Welsh.

The Irish came to America bitter and desperate men, rebels at heart against the British Government, and vengeful, eager to retaliate. A century earlier the Puritans had fled from England to escape religious persecution, but they were not driven out

¹ "The number of foreigners, principally Germans, imported into this province or colony, in the course of about twenty-five years last past, has been so excessive that if it is not limited by a Provincial Act, or by the dernier resource, an Act of the British Parliament, the Province and Territories of Pennsylvania may soon degenerate into a foreign colony, endangering the quiet of our adjacent colonies." — Douglas: *A Summary of the British Settlements*, vol. II, p. 326.

² Cf. Coman: *The Industrial History of the United States*, p. 58; Fiske: *Old Virginia and Her Neighbours*, vol. II, p. 390 *et seq.*

³ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. V, p. 216. Cf. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 515; Lodge: *A Short History of the English Colonies in America*, p. 227 *et seq.*

by starvation. "Thirty thousand Protestants left Ulster for a land where there was no legal robbery, and where those who sowed the seed could reap the harvest."¹ The same causes sent forth the Catholics from the southern provinces. "Agriculture was the national pursuit, but the men employed in it were steeped in poverty and misery; and this poverty and misery were traceable to English law and the English connection as its fountain head."² The Catholics, who formed the majority of the population, in the seventeenth century and for two hundred years later, were deprived of all natural and political rights. By a statute of William and Mary, Roman Catholics were not allowed to act as the guardians of their own or of any other person's children. Laws of the same reign prohibited the marriage of Catholics with Protestants; Catholics were not allowed to be solicitors, nor were they permitted to be employed as gamekeepers. By a statute of Anne, the Protestant son of a Catholic father was to be taken from his father and confided to the care of a Protestant relation; a Catholic could not purchase real estate or hold land on a lease longer than thirty-one years; he could not inherit real property from a Protestant; he was disqualified from holding any office, civil or military. The history of Ireland under English rule is one of the most

¹ Froude: *The English in Ireland*, vol. II, p. 125.

² Duffy: *Young Ireland*, vol. II, p. 141. Cf. Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, chap. VII, *passim*.

shameful the world has known. Irish Catholics were treated as strangers in their own country. "The House of Lords, the House of Commons, the right of voting for representatives in Parliament, the magistracy, all corporate offices in towns, all ranks in the army, the bench, the bar, the whole administration of government or justice, were closed against Catholics. The immense majority of the people of Ireland were simply hewers of wood and drawers of water to their Protestant masters, who still looked upon themselves as mere settlers, who boasted of their Scotch or English extraction, and who regarded the name of Irishman as an insult."¹ Hatred, kept down by fear, festered in the hearts of the children of the soil,² and it was with this hatred festering in their hearts that the Irish came to America, Protestants and Catholics fiercely hating each other, but united in a fiercer hatred of the English who had made them exiles.

The Germans, escaped from Old-World oppression and charged with a vague spirit of liberty, although they had no wrongs to revenge against the British, dimly felt that to resist the authority of the British Government was to encourage the Irish to fight the battle against tyranny. The immigrant has always been the radical; the reaction from monarchical institutions and the stifling weight of aristocratic class privileges and unequal conditions

¹ Green: *A Short History of the English People*, p. 787.

² Macaulay: *The History of England*, vol. II, p. 296.

has made him a fiercer "democrat" than the native; democrat in name, although he has no comprehension of the real political philosophy of democracy or its social significance. Thus we see why the Irish in America, in the days when they were new to the soil and political excitement ran high, were always the fiercest agitators; why their place was taken by the later German arrivals; why an extreme school of socialism finds few disciples among native Americans, but must rely for support on the foreigner who has not yet become naturalized, or who has been in America such a short time that he is still foreign to the spirit of his environment. In the pre-Revolutionary days, wherever these Ulster Irishmen and Germans settled, there was always created a revolutionary nidus; a coldness toward English rule was kept up, an observant Swedish traveler remarked; it was a coldness soon to be transformed into passionate heat under the fierce fire of hate — "by the many foreigners such as Germans, Dutch, and French settled here, and living among the English, who commonly have no particular attachment to old England."¹

There was still another reason to make the colonists feel that the support of the mother-country was less vital than it had been. The rashness and impetuosity of youth is the characteristic of all virile colonization, for an outpost of empire is made bold and self-reliant, audacious and resourceful, by

¹ Kalm: *Travels into North America*, vol. i, p. 206.

the fact that it must rely on itself for protection and the means of existence. These colonists were no braggarts concealing their fears by proclaiming their courage; they believed they were able to hold their own against the French and the Indians,¹ and they gave many proofs of their strength and military capability, yet it created a sense of security to know that in reserve were the ships and men of England, and that England must come to their assistance whenever she was called upon. When the lilies of France went down before the red cross of St. George on the Plains of Abraham, the succor of England was no longer needed. With the expulsion of the French the fear of invasion disappeared; made safe from attack by the courage and diplomacy of the English, the country won by the English was now theirs for them to develop in unmenaced security.

Did the English do more than they really intended,—did circumstances quite unforeseen force their hand and Fate play the usual ironic juggle? A disquieting thought this that robs history of its dignity and turns tragedy into farce, and yet not without evidence to sustain it. There is a good deal of contemporary writing to show that there were men who saw the danger to England when the colonies were no longer dependent upon her. Peter

¹ John Adams wrote to George Alexander Otis: "Of this number, I distinctly remember, I was myself one; fully believing that we were able to defend ourselves against French and Indians, without any assistance or embarrassments from Great Britain." — Jay: *Life of John Jay*, vol. II, p. 416.

Kalm, the eminent Swedish botanist who traveled in America from 1748 to 1750, "a painstaking and accurate observer,"¹ wrote: "It is, however, of great advantage to the Crown of England, that the North American colonies are near a country under the government of the French, like Canada. There is reason to believe that the King never was earnest in his attempts to expel the French from their possessions there; though it might have been done with little difficulty. . . . I have been told by Englishmen, and not only by such as were born in America, but even by such as came from Europe, that the English colonies in North America, in the space of thirty or fifty years, would be able to form a state by themselves, entirely independent of Old England. But as the whole which lies along the sea-shore is unguarded, and on the land side is harassed by the French in times of war, these dangerous neighbors are sufficient to prevent the connection of the colonies with the mother-country from being quite broken off. The English Government has therefore sufficient reason to consider the French in North America as the best means of keeping the colonies in their due submission."² In the earlier days the colonists were held to the coast by their dependence upon England for supplies, but they had now become self-supporting and enjoyed, as

¹ Hart: *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. II, p. 324.

² Kalm: *Travels into North America*, vol. I, pp. 206-7. Cf. Hutchinson: *History of Massachusetts*, vol. III, p. 100.

we have seen in a former chapter, a surplus for export, and the new country was able to "put the full breast of its youthful exuberance to the mouth of its exhausted parent."¹ To a sagacious observer of colonial politics two facts were becoming evident. "The one was that the deliberate and malignant selfishness of English commercial legislation was digging a chasm between the mother-country and the colonies which must inevitably, when the latter had become sufficiently strong, lead to separation. The other was that the presence of the French in Canada was an essential condition of the maintenance of the British Empire in America."²

Fear of invasion no longer threatening them, and no longer drawing sustenance from England, the relations of the colonies with the mother-country assumed a different aspect. If gratitude is a sense of favors conferred, the colonists ought to have realized that it was to the mother-country they owed their security; it was her genius that made them masters in their new home. They did not. The past was forgotten. The colonists lived in the present and looked forward to the future, the continent theirs and the foe driven out. England had served them well in the past, — it was her duty, and it is always an easy way for the ungrateful to escape an obligation by finding that the service rendered was simply the performance of a duty, —

¹ Burke: *Speech on Conciliation with America, Works*, vol. I, p. 461.

² Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. II, p. 11.

but the thoroughness with which she had done her work was one of the main reasons why she was no longer needed. Heretofore they had leaned on England; now they knew — and the knowledge was theirs long before England possessed it — that they were able to stand alone.¹ It was this knowledge that made them self-reliant, and hardened character, that gave them a feeling of independence, and made them regard England as useful but not vital to their development.

¹ Cf. Green: *A History of the English People*, book ix, chapter 1, *passim*.

CHAPTER IX

COMMERCIAL SELFISHNESS WEAKENS THE BOND

THE greater grew the prosperity of the colonies, the more they developed and threatened competition with English trade, the more it was in accord with the economic and political teachings of the time to keep the colonies in subjection, and by the enactment of restrictive legislation destroy the danger of rivalry. Colonial prosperity was to be fostered and the colonials given encouragement so long as they provided the raw materials which English manufacturers needed — for England has never been a self-contained country, and has always had to look to the outside world for its crude supplies, although up to 1765 she had been an exporting country in divers agricultural products; subsequently she became an importing country,¹ but when they ceased to be content merely to furnish the products of the soil in which England was deficient, and English merchants saw that their trade was in danger, the growing ambition of the colonists must be checked by statute.²

This was not political, it was purely commercial;

¹ Rogers: *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 485.

² Cf. Doyle: *English Colonies in America*, vol. II, p. 325; Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. II, chapter v, *passim*.

and men at that day not being learned in the principles of political economy, they were unable to understand that as colonies were fertilized by the mother-country, so the wealth of the mother-country grew as did that of her dependencies. In those days, merchants, land-owners, and men of education were united in believing that the exploitation of the colonists for the benefit of the people of the mother-country was right and proper. Such a policy does not indicate that they were actuated by a spirit of despotism or disregard of colonial interests, but simply that they were living in the days when the existence of colonies could only be defended on business grounds.¹

With this spirit prevailing it needs no elaborate explanation to understand why the English Parliament passed those numerous navigation, tonnage, poundage, and trade acts that aimed to confine the carrying-trade to vessels of English register, and made it obligatory that colonial staples before being shipped to a foreign port should be first laid on the shores of England; and prohibited the importation of foreign goods, with certain enumerated exceptions, in foreign vessels. "A colony was not looked upon at that time as forming a part of the parent state. It was a business venture, entered into directly by the state itself, or vicari-

¹ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 8. Cf. Wilson: *A History of the American People*, vol. II, p. 101; Fiske: *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 134 *et seq.*

ously by means of a grant to some individual or company. If the colony did not earn money, it was a failure. . . . To preserve the proper relations to the parent state, the colony should have within itself elements of wealth which should enrich its projectors; it should absorb the productions of the state which founded it; and in no event ought it to come into competition with its progenitor.”¹

Every European nation endeavored to monopolize the commerce of its colonies.² The Act of 1660 was designed to make England the *entrepôt* for colonial staples; that of 1663 was intended to give her merchants the profits of handling all European goods that were consumed in the plantations.³ Lord Sheffield defended the Navigation Act. It prevented the Dutch, he wrote, “from being the carriers of our trade. The violation or relaxation of that Act in favour of the West India Islands, or the American States, will give that advantage to the New Englanders, and encourage in the greatest degree the marine of America, to the ruin of our own. The Bill in its present state, allowing an open trade between the American States and our Islands, relinquishes the only use and advantage of American Colonies, or West India Islands, the monopoly of

¹ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. v, p. 59.

² Smith: *Wealth of Nations*, vol. II, p. 83; see also Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, chapter XII, *passim*.

³ Bell: *Colonial Administration of Great Britain*, p. 47.

their consumption, and the carriage of their produce.”¹

While it is true that the selfish spirit of commercialism made English merchants and adventurers petition Parliament and the Council for the imposition and strict enforcement of these restrictive acts, it is equally true that they were partly urged by necessity and by the belief that in the strands of a tariff were to be found the bonds of empire. The Act of 1663² was passed to “maintain a greater correspondence and kindness between England and the colonies, and to keep them in a firmer dependence upon it, and rendering them yet more beneficial and advantageous upon it”; in 1719, Parliament declared “that the erecting of manufactories in the colonies tends to lessen their dependence on Great Britain.”³ Here the dual purpose is revealed. The colonies were to be “advantageous unto” England, but the statesmanship of that period also believed that if colonies were permitted to follow the natural laws of trade and form commercial alliances, it would be an easy and short step to a political union. Every act of dependent provincial governments, Sir William Keith, Governor of Pennsylvania, wrote, “ought to terminate in the advantage of the mother-state, unto whom it owes its being and protection in all its valuable privileges; hence

¹ Sheffield: *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, pp. 135-38.

² 15 Car. II, cap. 7.

³ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. v, p. 223.

it follows that all advantageous projects or commercial gains in any colony, which are truly prejudicial to and inconsistent with the interests of the mother-state, must be understood to be illegal, and the practice of them unwarrantable, because they contradict the end for which the colony had a being, and are incompatible with the terms on which the people claim both privilege and protection.”¹

In his official report upon the Province of New York, Lord Cornbury wrote in 1705: “I declare my opinion to be that all these colloneys which are but twigs belonging to the main tree [England] ought to be kept entirely dependent upon and subservient to England, and that can never be if they are suffered to goe on in the notions they have, that, as they are Englishmen, soe they may set up the same manufactures here as people may do in England; for the consequence will be; if once they can see they can cloathe themselves, not only comfortably, but handsomely too, without the help of England, they, who are already not very fond of submitting to government, would soon think of putting in execution designs they had long harbourd in their breasts. This will not seem strange when you consider what sort of people this country is habited by.”²

To avert the danger of the colonies injuring the mother-country and to prevent the tenuation of the

¹ Byrd: *The History of the Dividing Line between Virginia and North Carolina*, vol. II, p. 215.

² Bishop: *History of American Manufactures*, vol. I, p. 329.

political union, restrictive legislation was imposed. The impulse of necessity was the old one of filling an empty purse. The Stuarts were notoriously hard up, and their successors were equally driven to find money to finance the long series of wars which taxed to the utmost the resources of the country. The dance went on and the piper had to be paid, and the colonists must stand their share.

Whether a colonist was taxed so that a King's mistress might indulge her latest extravagant fancy, or that a war in which the colonist had little interest might be carried on, or that the merchants of London or the shipowners of Plymouth might become rich — whatever the motive it did not soften the resentment of the colonist, who on general principles objected to paying tithes from which he derived no benefits. After the first years of struggle had passed, the American colonists went steadily forward in improving their material condition, although like all bounty-fed people they came to regard it as their due that the home government should foster domestic industries and grant them liberal subventions. On the one hand, there were these repressive Trade and Navigation Acts, yet the English Government was paying heavy bounties and premiums on the production of rice, indigo, naval stores, and timber suited to the purposes of the Royal Navy.¹ It was in 1660 that the celebrated Navigation Act was passed that restricted

¹ Channing: *Op. cit.*, p. 495.

the ocean commerce of the colonies to vessels flying the British flag and gave England a monopoly of American commerce; yet in the same year an Act was passed¹ for the benefit of the colonists which prohibited the cultivation of tobacco in England, Ireland, Guernsey, and Jersey. In the four years from 1713 to 1717, £90,541 were paid as premiums on naval stores.² In the natural products of the South the colonies had a sure source of wealth; the Middle Colonies did a profitable export trade in wheat with the West Indies; New England sent her agricultural products and her fish to the South and to Europe, her rum to Africa, her timber to England; through the port of New York went bales of furs and pelts. The rapid increase of population and the exhaustion of arable land, first appearing as an economic factor in New England, directed the energies of the colonists into other channels, so that her people were early forced into industrial commercial enterprises. Manufactories for the most common articles of consumption were established; the forests were levied on for shipbuilding, and American vessels were soon doing all the carrying-trade between the colonies.³ It was only a few years after the arrival of the Puritans that iron was discovered in the bogs of Massachusetts, and Winthrop and his associates set up their first furnace

¹ 12 Car. II, cap. 34.

² Chalmers: *Introduction to the Revolt*, vol. I, p. 323.

³ Semple: *American History and its Geographic Conditions*, p. 46; Oldmixon: *The British Empire in America*, vol. I, introduction, *passim*.

in the neighborhood of Lynn,¹ which Parliament of course tried to suppress, "but after much insistence the people were allowed the boon of making their own nails."² Before that, in 1621, iron works were established in Virginia.³ At one time the manufacture of iron in Pennsylvania reached such proportions that iron was actually exported to England, whose iron manufacturers made their usual complaint, and Parliament passed an Act prohibiting its fabrication beyond a certain stage.⁴

This put an end to the Pennsylvania export trade, but the domestic manufacture still continued. In 1699 another Act was passed, forbidding the manufacture of wool for export and interdicting the trade in manufactured wool between the colonies. This was one of the most indefensible and annoying statutes in the long series of protective legislation, and it was solely in the interest of the English woolen weavers, whose trade with the colonies was too profitable to be endangered by colonial competition.⁵ The farmer was still permitted to turn the

¹ Bishop: *History of American Manufactures*, vol. I, p. 472. Cf. French: *History of the Iron Trade of the United States*; Bolles: *Industrial History of the United States*, p. 189 *et seq.*; Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. I, p. 174 *et seq.*

² Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. V, p. 118.

³ Bruce: *Economic History of Virginia*, vol. II, p. 448 *et seq.*

⁴ Channing: *Op. cit.*, p. 494. Cf. Byrd: *History of the Dividing Line between Virginia and North Carolina*, vol. II, p. 58; Eggleston: "Commerce in the Colonies," *Century Magazine*, June, 1884.

⁵ It would be burdensome to recount in detail the numerous acts designed to hold the colonies dependent upon the mother-country for manufactured articles. These measures encumber the statute books from early in the six-

wool of his sheep into cloth for his own use, and the village weaver might work his loom for his neighbors, but when he crossed the colonial boundary with his few yards of rough cloth he was engaged in an illicit trade, and of course smuggling went on extensively. In the making of beaver hats the colonists were able to undersell the English because of their control of the raw material, and they drove the English out of the West Indian market. In alarm the Master Wardens and Assistants of the Company of Felt-Makers of London petitioned the Lords of Trade to order that the people of the colonies should wear no hats except those made in Great Britain. This unselfish request curiously enough was denied, but to compensate, Parliament, in 1732, passed an Act¹ prohibiting the exportation of hats from the colonies or the intercolonial trade in hats;² hatmakers were forbidden to have more than two apprentices each.³

These efforts to stifle the legitimate expansion of
teenth century. The exportation from the United Kingdom of machinery for
the manufacture of woolen, cotton, silk, or linen goods was prohibited by the
statute of 21 Geo. III, cap. 37; by the Act of 25 Geo. III, cap. 67, any person
enticing artificers or workmen in iron or steel out of the kingdom was subject
to severe penalties; the long list of "enumerated articles" was to give England
a monopoly of colonial commerce.

¹ 5 George II, cap. 22.

² "Almost all the American planters and merchants were continually in debt to their English correspondents; and so partial was the parent state to their interests that in the year 1758 she prohibited the Province of Massachusetts from adopting the bankrupt law of England, lest its operation should be perverted to the injury of English creditors of American debtors." — Grahame: *The History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 424.

³ Elliot: *The Tariff Controversy*, p. 12.

trade kept the colonists and the mother-country in a state of constant friction. In the minds of the colonists there was implanted a sense of injustice which was rapidly to gather strength and culminate in that dramatic episode in the harbor of Boston on the night of December 16, 1773. The great grievance of the colonists was that they had been unjustly treated by the home government, and that further submission would subject them to greater oppression and the loss of those rights they prized so dearly. The Boston tea riot was not the sudden flaming of a people into revolt or the result of a specific grievance to be redressed in summary fashion by a drastic remedy. The spirit of dissatisfaction had existed for three quarters of a century before it took the form of open defiance to the Crown of England.

Washington, writing to George Mason on April 5, 1769, says: "At a time when our lordly masters in Great Britain will be satisfied with nothing less than the deprivation of American Freedom, it seems highly necessary that something should be done to avert the stroke, and maintain the liberty which we have derived from our ancestors. But the manner of doing it to answer the purpose effectually, is the point in question. That no man should scruple, or hesitate a moment in defense of so valuable a blessing, is clearly my opinion; yet arms should be the last resource — the *dernier ressort*. We have already, it is said, proved the inefficacy of addresses

to the throne, and remonstrances to Parliament. How far their attention to our rights and interests is to be awakened, or alarmed, by starving their trade and manufactures, remains to be tried.”¹

Yet a contemporary American writer who occupies a distinguished position in the world of letters and education has read his American history to so little purpose that he quite misses the whole spirit that animated the colonists, and in a burst of *naïve* amazement shows he is as ignorant of the causes of the Revolution as was George III. “The more one considers this stupendous imperial disruption, the more puzzling it appears. There was no tyranny on the part of Great Britain so galling as to account for the passionate revolt of America or to justify the blatant traditions of Fourth of July oratory.” To put the final touch on his obtuseness he somewhat unctuously observes, “Yet, beyond question, the revolt of America was not only passionate but deeply sincere.”² Much more illuminating, because it has the merit of philosophical insight, is Morley’s exposition that the “vicious spirit of adherence to the very letter of legal or *quasi*-constitutional rights had ever marked the whole policy of England towards her American dependencies. It was the same spirit which, long before Grenville’s scheme of taxation, had planted and nourished the germs of discord between the mother-country and the colonies.

¹ Irving: *Life of Washington*, vol. I, p. 403.

² Barrett Wendell in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. VII, p. 730.

The Stamp Act and the Tea Duty were no more than the last drops in a full cup.”¹

The temperament and physical energy of the men who settled the Northern Colonies, as well as the spur of necessity from a steadily increasing population, made them no longer content to remain simply tillers of the soil, but drove them into manufacturing, and it was the repressive policy of England which aroused their resentment. To enable them to manufacture profitably they needed capital, and it was to England they must look for money to carry on their ventures. English capitalists and merchants were eager to finance plantations and extend liberal credit to the producers of colonial raw materials, but they would furnish no money to create a rival to their own profitable monopoly, and they further fortified themselves, as we have seen, by the passage of discriminatory legislation.² Yet, despite obstacles, manufacturing increased and added to the wealth of the colonies.

¹ Morley: *Edmund Burke*, p. 152.

² “The commercial code was so stern and cruel, that an American merchant was compelled to evade a law of the realm, in order to give a sick neighbor an orange or cordial of European origin, or else obtain them legally, loaded with the time, risk, and expense of a voyage from the place of growth or manufacture to England, and thence to his own warehouse. An American shipowner or shipmaster, when wrecked on the coast of Ireland, was not allowed to unload his cargo on the shore where his vessel was stranded, but was required to send his merchandise to England, when, if originally destined for, or wanted in, the Irish market, an English vessel might carry it thither.” — Sabine: *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution*, vol. I, p. 11.

CHAPTER X

THE BIRTH OF A NATION

BURKE, in that famous *Speech on Conciliation with America*, which every American schoolboy knows (by title) and no American reads, told the House of Commons that “in this character of the Americans, a love of freedom is the predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole: and as an ardent is always a jealous affection, your colonies become suspicious, restive, and untractable, whenever they see the least attempt to wrest from them by force, or shuffle from them by chicane, what they think the only advantage worth living for. This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English colonies probably than in any other people of the earth.” He explains the causes that have produced this spirit. They are liberty-loving because they are the descendants of Englishmen, and England “is a nation, which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles.”

In England, Burke pointed out, the great conquests for freedom were from the earliest times chiefly upon the question of taxation. "The colonies draw from you, as with their lifeblood, these ideas and principles. Their love of liberty, as with you, fixed and attached on this specific point of taxing." Religion and education were also contributing causes to the spirit of liberty, and "the last cause of this disobedient spirit" was not merely moral but "laid deep in the natural constitution of things." Three thousand miles of ocean separated the mother-country from her colonies. "No contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in weakening government. Seas roll, and months pass, between the order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to defeat a whole system. . . . From all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in your colonies, and increased with the increase of their wealth; a spirit, that unhappily meeting with an exercise of power in England, which, however lawful, is not reconcilable to any ideas of liberty, much less with theirs, has kindled this flame that is ready to consume us."¹

Words of wisdom to fall on deaf ears. Burke saw that the colonies had grown to miniature states, so did Walpole and Pitt and a few others, but these few stood almost alone, clear-eyed while the men

¹ Burke: *Speech on Conciliation with America, Works*, vol. 1, pp. 464-469, *passim*.

around them were blinded by their conceit to the temper of their kinsmen across the Atlantic. The colonies had not only become miniature states, but the men who governed them had developed qualities of statesmanship; they had become practiced men of affairs, jealous of control, conscious of their power, fortified by their own strength, impatient of the suggestion that they were incapable of managing their own concerns. But it must never be forgotten that while the Americans won their independence at Yorktown, it was in London itself that no mean battle was fought. It has only been in recent years that American historians have realized¹ that the opposition of the Whigs, the sonorous eloquence of Burke, the mordant sarcasm of Fox, the defiant championship of Pitt — that notable declaration: “I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest”² — not only encouraged the colonists in their resistance, but hampered the Government. Had England been united, had the best brains of England acquiesced in the policy of the coercion of

¹ Cf. Fiske: *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 1 *et seq.* “What would have been the result of our recent war for the Union if Charles Sumner and Thad Stevens and John A. Andrew had espoused in Congress and in the public forum the cause of the South, as on the floor of Parliament Chatham and Hampden and Fox and Burke and other English leaders were thundering for the cause of America?” — John D. Long, oration delivered at Springfield, Massachusetts, July 4, 1909, *Springfield Republican*, July 5, 1909.

² *Chatham's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 369.

the American colonies, we shall not say that Yorktown would not have been won, but independence would have been purchased at a heavier cost.¹

Nor again must it be forgotten that what had been going on in America was symptomatic of a world-wide movement; that in England there was an intellectual revolt against the control of Parliament by the King; that there was an intense desire to make Parliament really representative instead of seeing it packed to carry out the King's pleasure. Burke voiced the new thought in England as John Dickinson did in America; John Wilkes was its victim there as Samuel Adams would have been in the colonies had the hand of the King stretched so far; "Junius" was its pamphleteer in London and the "Pennsylvania Farmer" in Philadelphia. The old spirit of resistance was revived; the old feeling was again springing into life that men must govern themselves and not permit themselves to be governed by a ministry responsible to no one except a sovereign's arbitrary will. As always happens, a

¹ "The difficulty of procuring voluntary recruits for the army and navy seems to show that, if the bulk of the poorer population of the country did not actually sympathize with the Americans, a war with a people of their own race and language had at least no popularity among them." — Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. III, p. 540.

"I am grieved to observe," Lord Camden wrote, "that the landed interest is almost altogether anti-American; though the common people hold the word in abhorrence, and the merchants and tradesmen, for obvious reasons, are likewise against it." — *Chatham's Correspondence*, vol. IV, p. 401.

Chatham, faithful to his principles, compelled his oldest son to resign from the army rather than see him fight his kinsmen; and Lord Effingham, for the same reason, threw up his commission.

long period of indifference, of the surrender of "natural rights," of acquired privileges, was succeeded by extreme radicalism. In England it took the form of constitutional reforms and the rise of an independent press to give expression to public opinion that had gone unvoiced.

In the correlation of widely scattered events we see the universal play of forces. Regarding each occurrence as detached and apart from all others and not as a link in the sequential chain of causes, the vital bearing on the consequences are overlooked, and it appears as if there were no relation with effects far removed; but when we understand that the same impulse, manifested in different forms of energy, inspires the same purpose, that thought is never local and aspirations are common to mankind no matter how remote their origin or the conditions which give them birth, the logical juxtaposition of events stands revealed. Nothing is more misleading than to read history as a chapter instead of a volume; to regard an incident as typical of a period; to think that the world of intellect moves only in one direction. For that reason the pragmatic method must be employed if the truth of history is to be revealed. Those few years immediately preceding the Revolution may seem to have produced in the Englishman in America qualities of mind peculiar to himself, but they were really not different from the same qualities developed in the Englishman in England. The results were different

simply because the circumstances were different. In America the end could be attained in only one way, in England it was reached by another, but both roads led to constitutional freedom and the assertion of popular sovereignty. It was the culmination of two centuries of struggle. It began long before the Puritan set foot on the barren rock or ministers devised schemes of taxation. It sprang to life in the soul of man; persecution could not quench it nor death destroy it; it survived the rack and the stake, and in all countries its prophets were preaching the word.

Up to the time of George III, kings ruled; now the people governed; and it was in America that the effect of the social revolution was first seen. King George was not wise enough to know this; a few men, but all too few, could dimly see what had taken place; the great mass was in ignorance that society was soon to be swept from its old moorings and that the People were to count for more than the King.

It was the King and not Parliament to whom men had always looked for justice, and to whom they owed allegiance,¹ and it was now the King and not Parliament who they believed had the power to redress their grievances; but where the power of the King ended and that of Parliament began was

¹ "We have already seen . . . how Franklin was exerting all his powers to prove that, though America was subject to the English King, it owed no allegiance to the British Parliament." — Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. iv, p. 469.

uncertain. Parliament, they contended, had no authority to tax them, "their business was with the King";¹ it was the Crown and not Parliament that had created the corporation known as the colony.² The title to the English colonies was not in the people of England nor in the state, but in the Crown, and descended with it. The Crown could make laws for the inhabitants, and repeal them; could appoint the rulers and remove them. Parliament could do neither.³ This theory was inconsistent with the claims of the colonists to rights that were derived exclusively from English law; and that it was not within the prerogative of the sovereign to emancipate English subjects by charter from the dominion of Parliament.⁴ The authority of Parliament to legislate for the colonies was acknowledged,⁵

¹ Franklin: *Works*, vol. vi, p. 143.

² Howard, in Hart's *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. ii, p. 395.

³ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. vi, pp. 2-3.

"A bill having been introduced into the House of Commons, in the reign of James I, for regulating the American fisheries, Sir George Calvert, Secretary of State, conveyed to the House the following intimation from the King: 'America is not annexed to the realm, nor within the jurisdiction of Parliament; you have, therefore, no right to interfere.'" — Grahame: *The History of the United States*, vol. ii, p. 417, n.

⁴ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. iii, p. 297.

⁵ Story: *Constitution of the United States*, vol. i, p. 174.

Otis asserted that the colonies were subject to and dependent upon Great Britain, and therefore the Parliament had the power to legislate; but he also maintained that every British subject born in America "is by the law of God and Nature, by the common law, and by Act of Parliament (exclusive of all charters from the Crown), entitled to all the natural, essential, inherent, and inseparable rights of our fellow subjects in Great Britain." — *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, pp. 49 and 52.

although at times under protest. As there was no central colonial legislature, Parliament had to assume that function and establish the post-office, regulate the currency, provide a naturalization law, and do other things that were imperial rather than colonial.¹ It was in keeping with the political philosophy of the eighteenth century, that the Declaration of Independence should indict the sovereign and absolve his ministers and Parliament; but when Parliament undertook to tax the colonists, they were forced by the logic of the situation to claim that, though subjects of "the best of kings," they owed no more allegiance to Parliament than the Scotch did before the Union.²

Millions of pounds had been spent by England to put the French out of America, and England was now feeling the pinch of national taxation; thousands had been spent by the colonists in their own defense; and both sides felt that the other should repay at least a part of this outlay. English statesmen saw the means of replenishing the Exchequer by laying additional taxes upon the Americans; when Massachusetts sought to impose a tariff of merely one per cent on English importations, the bill was vetoed by the King, who imperiously told the colony that its charter would be forfeited if it made any further attempt to exceed its powers.

With the overthrow of the French the English

¹ Hildreth: *History of the United States of America*, vol. II, p. 517.

² Winsor: *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

went swarming into what had been the French possessions, and here again was an additional cause of friction with the English Government. Down the Mississippi, along the lakes, following the streams, across the Alleghenies, poured a flood of immigration from the older settled colonies of the South and the North, the only bar to their progress the forces of Nature and the relentless determination of the Indians not to be driven out of what they regarded as their own territory. Nothing could stand in the way of the ever-advancing host. The Indians were as powerless as the mandates of a government three thousand miles away, which had set aside this vague and unbounded "back country" as the hunting-grounds of the Indians, to provide a permanent source of supply for the furs which were so profitable an article of commerce between the mother-country and the colonies. Indian cunning was matched by English courage, Indian cruelty by English skill. Summer came and went, and forts fell under the torch, and peaceful slumber was broken by the war whoop of painted savages, who spared neither young nor old; but the settlers held on with grim steadfastness, and in the end the English were masters and the great war chief Pontiac made his submission.¹

The entering of the English into what is now known as the Middle West introduced a new element in colonization and added to the difficulties

¹ Cf. Parkman: *The Conspiracy of Pontiac*.

of the English Government in governing a colonial empire so far removed from the seat of central authority. It produced that tendency towards defection which, an American writer has discovered, is "characteristic of all peripheral holdings."¹ The great wealth of America, present and prospective, Englishmen were now to begin to realize, and it was obvious to even the most short-sighted statesman that when the time was opportune France would make an attempt to recover what she had lost. French statesmen, indeed, consoled themselves for the loss of Canada by predicting that it was a sure prelude to the independence of the colonies; and there were some English statesmen who advocated the surrender of Canada and the retention of the sugar islands.² Franklin, clear-visioned as ever, was not deluded by the attentions shown him by the French ambassador. "I fancy that intriguing nation," he writes, in 1767, "would like very well to meddle on occasion, and blow up the coals between Britain and her colonies; but I hope we shall give them no opportunity."³ Heretofore the colonists had been left to themselves to concert measures for their defense and the power of the Crown was represented by a governor; now it was necessary to provide government, both civil and military, for a vast extent of territory over which no colony exer-

¹ Semple: *American History and its Geographic Conditions*, p. 87.

² Cf. Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. III, p. 268; Bancroft: *History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 564.

³ Franklin: *Works*, vol. IV, p. 32.

cised jurisdiction. Forts must be erected and garrisoned, a permanent army of occupation maintained, judges and other civil officers appointed. This involved a heavy expense, estimated at not less than £300,000 a year. It was proposed that a third of this sum should be raised in America, and that the whole amount should be expended in America for the benefit of the colonies.

On the face of it the proposal seemed reasonable and fair, and any other people than the English colonists in America would undoubtedly have accepted it as an equitable arrangement; probably they would have acquiesced had they not for a hundred and fifty years been trained in a school that, as Burke declared, made their love of liberty fixed and attached on this specific point of taxing. They submitted with ill grace to repressive legislation in the interest of the English manufacturer because they could not help themselves, but they could resist the payment of taxes levied without their consent, and they had no hesitation in making the British Government understand their opposition. In 1764, while Englishmen in America are contesting with Pontiac and his allies for the possession of the Far Western frontier, so that America shall be the undisputed possession of Englishmen, Englishmen in England begin that policy that is to lead to separation and America for the Americans. George Grenville, now become Prime Minister, introduces a bill, which Parliament passes, laying fresh taxes on

American importations, extending the always objectionable Navigation Acts, and still further discriminating against the colonists in favor of the English manufacturer; and notice is given that next year an act will be passed requiring the colonists to make additional contributions to the Exchequer by requiring them to stamp their commercial paper.

The Stamp Act has been popularly regarded as inciting the Revolution. It was no such thing; for it cannot be too often repeated that the Revolution was the result of no one cause; its roots drew far deeper from history. It is an equal popular delusion that the Stamp Tax was an unjust tax, and that it was proposed to pay the revenue accruing from its operation into the British Treasury, and that the colonies would gain nothing by it. In the interest of truth, and to correct a popular fallacy, it is permissible to give the final section of the Act: —

Section 55 — Finally, the produce of all the aforesaid duties shall be paid into His Majesty's Treasury; and there will be held in reserve, to be used, from time to time, by the Parliament, for the purpose of defraying the expenses necessary for the defense, protection, and security of the said colonies and plantations.

Grenville and his colleagues had been warned that the Stamp Act would arouse discontent. Franklin, then in London, and the other agents of the colonies, urged the Ministry not to resort to this form of taxation, as it was contrary to American ideas; and they pledged themselves that the

colonies would out of their own treasuries pay into the Exchequer more than the sum produced by the Stamp Act. The Ministry expected the usual opposition that always follows the imposition of new taxation, although they were not prepared for open defiance. Stamp taxes were not a discovery intended to irritate the American colonies, nor did they seem to be a particularly oppressive form of excise. Stamps were in use in England, they were not regarded as burdensome or unjust, and they were considered a convenient method of bringing money into the Exchequer; the colonies had themselves used stamps. In London everybody took it for granted that while the Act would be resented, it would be submitted to as the expression of legitimate authority.

The historian can find proof in support of his argument that the British Government acted with moderation, fairness, and scrupulous regard for the welfare of the colonies; that the means it employed to raise taxes to pay for the expenses of a long and costly war and to provide for the future administration of the country were not revolutionary, but simply an extension of the system then in force in England, and of all forms of taxation the most equitable and the least likely to press with undue severity upon the mass of the people; that it could not anticipate that such a moderate exercise of imperial authority would make loyal colonists rebels; that the colonists were not justified in their resistance; and

that, having been pampered and coddled and allowed too great a control of their own affairs, they were unmindful of all that England had done for them or that they owed their freedom and safety to the statesmanship of the mother-country no less than to her arms and her treasure. The historian who holds a brief for the other side can show with equal plausibility that the colonists very properly resisted "taxation without representation"; that after these years of what was practically autonomy so far as domestic taxation was concerned, the British Government now attempted to reverse its policy and take out of the hands of the colonists the taxing power, which men trained to freedom must oppose. An argument equally good can be made on either side, convincing according to the ability with which it is presented and the dexterity with which the facts of history are colored to sustain it.

There has seldom been a more striking illustration of a great historian led to a wrong conclusion, because he failed to interpret historical events by the light of national psychology, than Lecky's statement that "every grievance the Americans had put forward as a reason for taking up arms had been redressed; every claim they had resented had been abandoned from the time when the English Parliament surrendered all right of taxation and internal legislation in the colonies; and when the English Commissioners laid their propositions before the Americans, the character of the war had wholly

changed. It was no longer a war for self-taxation and constitutional liberty. It was now an attempt, with the assistance of France and Spain, to establish independence by breaking up and ruining the British Empire.”¹ This assumes that the repeal of a single obnoxious act is sufficient to efface national characteristics or that national sentiment is satisfied by concessions grudgingly granted. A century of training in self-government demanded expression, and the aim of independence was not to break up and ruin the British Empire, but to give the Americans that control over their own affairs which they had been taught to exercise from the day they first established their colonies.

To us the merits of the controversy, on which the dust of history has long settled, and there may lie undisturbed, are of minor importance only. To us now it is not of consequence whether the English were right and the colonists were wrong; whether there was injustice on both sides that neither was able to see because of stupidity and obstinacy; whether if there had been a greater man than Grenville or a less ambitious and contentious man than Samuel Adams, — who, graduating at Harvard in 1740, had taken as his commencement thesis, “Whether it be lawful to resist the superior magistrates, if the Commonwealth cannot be otherwise preserved?”² — there need have been no rupture

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. iv, pp. 153–54.

² Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. v, p. 139.

of the tie that held the colonies to England. The argument either way is probably sound, and an intellectual diversion almost as profitable as the discovery of a new cipher in the plays of Shakespeare, and as unconvincing. We are concerned not in what might have been, but what gave that impetus to national character that made the Americans what they are and welded those detached colonies into an empire.

Puritanism as a religious force, as we have before pointed out, had in the last quarter of the eighteenth century lost much of its former vigor, and the preachings of its preachers were no longer listened to as the thunderings of the voice of Jehovah; but the old spirit of Puritan resistance to injustice survived, and it was held to be not only proper but praiseworthy to oppose lawful authority when it attempted to do that which was unjust. The theocratic state had crumbled and on its ruins had risen a political state, but a part of the intellectual heritage of the theocracy lived in the children descended from the theocrats. "Schools made New Englanders a reading and writing people, and no subject was more palatable than themselves."¹ The seventeenth century in Massachusetts had seen the intellect developed by the discussion of abstruse theological questions that were, if we may use the expression, local, for whether men died and went to hell or were redeemed by grace was

¹ Shea: *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, vol. ix, p. 71.

not influenced in the slightest by the price of furs in London or an Indian uprising in Virginia. When theology no longer occupied the first place in men's minds, material questions, never to be dissevered from political, were discussed with greater zest, because, say what we will, man is by nature material and more easily influenced by the things of this earth than he is moved by the thought of the hereafter, although it has always colored his life and moulded his actions. An inherited tendency for love of argument and disputation must find its expression. The theological politicians had now become political theologians. Succeeding generations, who at an earlier period would have gone into the Church, now went in for politics. The State, and not the Church, was now the dominant force in society. There existed in Massachusetts — not alone in Massachusetts but also in the other colonies — a body of men who by descent and training were skilled in the use of argument, who were equally facile with pen or tongue, — "The Boston man of the early part of the eighteenth century resorted to the typesetter as readily as he gossiped, and that was easily enough,"¹ — to whom argument was an instinct as natural as the shaping of rude pottery was to the Aztecs an unconscious heritage. Kept within bounds, this American love of argument was not dangerous, and chiefly manifested itself in an ever-widening assertion of the political rights of the

¹ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. v, p. 120.

colonists and a firmer grasp on their liberties; but given the incentive to resistance, it became rebellion.

Public opinion has always been an Archimedean force in America, and, at a time when there was no great body of political public opinion in Old England, it had vitalized and restrained as well as given impulse to society. New England had the advantage over Old England in that her people lived in close community, the area of the settlement being of course much smaller than England stretching from Land's End to John o' Groats; there was no gulf between village and capital; the educational and intellectual level was higher.¹ In England, we are told, "there hardly existed any opinion outside parliamentary circles and the drawing-rooms connected with them. Outdoor opinion had no means of expressing itself; the platform and public meetings scarcely existed; the means of communication were difficult; the press, which was crushed by heavy duties, had a very limited circulation. . . . The general public paid little heed to politics. It was the pet hobby of a select group, the sport of an aristocracy. And it was only in this latter capacity that it interested the English masses, who were full of a deferential admiration for all the doings of their nobility. There were a few eccentric individuals who followed and discussed the policy of the Government, but they were looked upon as armchair

¹ Cf. Burke: *Speech on Conciliation with America*, p. 83.

strategists, who spend their time in criticizing the commander-in-chief. The knowledge of what went on in Parliament was slight and inaccurate; the reports of the proceedings were of the most summary descriptions; the division-lists were never published, except on great occasions, when private copies of them were circulated. It was consequently difficult for the constituents to follow the conduct of their members, even if they wished to do so. The latter, for their part, were by no means anxious to be under control, and opposed the publication of their votes in the House, being of the opinion that secrecy was essential to their independence.¹" In New England especially, in the other colonies in scarcely less degree, politics, as we have seen, was the constant theme of discussion, and every act of governor or legislator was open, known to the colony or community, and attacked or approved. This force of public opinion in America went unrecognized in England, whose public men, with the exception of Burke and a few others, were as little able to calculate its dynamic energy as the savage to explain the mystery of the white man's bullet.

The Stamp Act was to go into effect on the first of November, 1775, but it soon became evident that the only way the British Government could put it in operation was by force. Its passage was the signal for protests from the Colonial Assemblies, and

¹ Ostrogorski: *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, vol. I, pp. 22-23.

Massachusetts took the first step to offer formal resistance by proposing that a Colonial Congress be called to consult on such measures as might be necessary. Events were swiftly moving to their climax. Heretofore there had been congresses called to fortify the power of England, by making the colonies stronger to resist attack or to carry on an English war; now for the first time the colonies were called to meet for the deliberate purpose of defying England and rendering inoperative a parliamentary measure lawfully enacted. Nine of the colonies sent delegates to this congress, which met in New York in October, and adopted a declaratory resolution of loyalty to the Crown, but resolutely affirmed their right to tax and govern themselves without the interference of Parliament. Meanwhile there had been riots and disorders in Boston, New York, and other places. Houses of the stamp collectors were sacked and burned and the hated stamps destroyed; moved by one impulse, the colonists would not use the stamps; the courts at first showed inclination to compel their use, but public opinion was too strong and the courts were forced to yield to it. No paper was stamped, and in the following year Parliament repealed the obnoxious act, but coupled the rescission with a reaffirmation of its right to tax the colonies and legislate for them.

Nothing more was needed than the repeal of the Stamp Act to impress the colonists with the consciousness of their own strength and importance

and the fear of English statesmen to provoke resistance. America was to accept it as a concession, as proof of the gracious affection the Crown had for the colonies, not as a matter of right; for Parliament had reaffirmed its right of taxation and legislation. The colonists were too hard-headed and too practical not to understand the real motives that had brought about repeal. In those few months of agitation following the passage of the act, English trade with the colonies had become demoralized and was threatened with ruin. American merchants agreed they would no longer take English goods or ship their cargoes to England if clearance papers and bills of lading and other commercial documents must be stamped; and trade is always more sensitive than the conscience of statesmen. On both sides of the Atlantic motives were conveniently ignored. English merchants saw their trade flowing on undisturbed and were happy; Americans realized their victory, and rejoiced.

Goldwin Smith regards it as unfortunate that when Quebec fell and the bonfires of loyalty were lighted, England did not say to the colonies: "I have done for you all that a parent could do, I have secured to you the dominion of the new world, you have outgrown my protection and control, follow henceforth your own destiny, cultivate your magnificent heritage, and be grateful to the arm which helped to win it for you!"¹ If England had at that

¹ Smith: *The United States*, p. 67.

time made the offer, it is certain it would have been rejected. "However singular I may be in the opinion," George Mason writes to Washington in 1769, "I am thoroughly convinced, that, justice and harmony happily restored, it is not the interest of these colonies to refuse British manufactures. Our supplying our mother-country with gross materials, and taking her manufactures in return, is the true chain of connection between us. These are the bonds which, if not broken by oppression, must long hold us together, by maintaining a constant reciprocation of interests."¹ The latter part of the above quotation, Irving says, "shows the spirit which actuated Washington and the friends of his confidence; as yet there was no thought nor desire of alienation from the mother-country, but only a fixed determination to be placed on an equality of rights and privileges with her other children."²

What had the colonies to gain by independence? — a word which no one then used nor the meaning of which any one then understood. British trade laws were often obnoxious, but each year saw the colonists acquire a greater control over their own affairs, and the connection with the Crown was a policy of insurance the value of which no man underestimated. America was free of France, but it was a comforting thought to know that the power of England was in reserve if it should be needed, and that England must defend her colonies in case

¹ Irving: *Life of Washington*, vol. 1, p. 405. ² Irving: *Op. cit.*, p. 405.

France made an attempt to regain them. The oppression of English trade laws was complained of, yet there was in England a great and sure market for American products, and the price that the colonists had to pay for entrance into this market was not too heavy. It was in truth a one-sided arrangement, with the benefit really in favor of the colonists, who knew it, and had no desire to dissolve a partnership that yielded so large a profit. Contemporary writers give us abundant evidence of this. Thus Neal, after showing that the New England colonies were prosperous and carrying on an extensive trade with Europe, says: "But after all, it will be impossible for New England to subsist of itself for some centuries of years; for tho' they might maintain themselves against their neighbors on the continent, they must starve without a free trade with Europe, the manufactures of the country being very inconsiderable; so that if we suppose them to rebel against England, they must throw themselves into the arms of some other potentate, who would protect them no longer than he could sell them to advantage; the French and Spaniards are enemies to their religion and civil liberties, and the Dutch are too cautious a people to run the hazard of losing their own country, for the alliance of another at so great a distance; 't is therefore the grand interest of New England to remain subject to the crown of England, and by their dutiful behavior to merit the removal of those few hardships and incon-

veniences they complain of; no other power can or will protect them, and next to their own, 't is impossible their religion and civil liberties should be in better hands than in a Parliament of England."¹

Neal's testimony is important, not only as showing the self-interest that bound the colonies to England, but also because he unconsciously throws a brilliant light on the English mind and the political philosophy of his time. It was not with intention that he reveals the scarcely disguised feeling all Englishmen entertained: the colonists were well enough in their way, but America was not England; and the Englishman of the colonies was inferior to the Englishman at home.

Neal has for us further interest. In his day neither philosopher nor statesman conceived it possible that an offshoot from the parent stem could rival in sturdiness the stock from which it sprung. Colonies could not stand alone, but must receive the support and assistance of the mother-state; they were not an entity but an appurtenance; they could be trafficked in and handed over as any other possession; to be protected no longer than they could be sold to advantage, as the farmer buys cattle to fatten until they are ready for the market. It was in keeping with the spirit of Neal's age that he should point out as a matter of course that the colonies must be either English or foreign; and under the rule of France or Spain or Holland they would be worse off

¹ Neal: *History of New England*, vol. II, pp. 615-16.

than under England. That they could successfully defend themselves against invasion or resist oppression, that a colony had in it the germ of independent statehood, was beyond the imagination of the keenest intellect of the first three quarters of the eighteenth century. It was impossible because it was a thing unknown to the world, and that precedent-loving English mind found no precedent, and therefore dismissed it as unworthy of consideration.

If we are to believe the declarations of Franklin, John Adams, Jefferson, Washington, and others, and all the surrounding circumstances proclaim their sincerity, up to the time when the colonists took up arms against England, the idea of separation was discouraged as unnecessary and opposed to colonial interests.¹ Franklin told Lord Chatham that he had never heard any person, drunk or sober, give the least expression to a wish for separation, or hint that such a thing would be advantageous to America.² Washington denied that the idea of separation was entertained.³ John Adams, when he went as a delegate to the Philadelphia Congress, was warned that he must not use the word independence, "for the idea of independence is as unpopular in Pennsylvania and in all the Middle and

¹ Cf. Sabine: *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution*, vol. I, pp. 64-66; Curtis: *History of the Constitution of the United States*, vol. I, p. 18.

² Franklin: *Works*, vol. V, p. 446.

³ Washington: *Works*, vol. II, p. 401.

Southern States as the Stamp Act itself. No man dares to speak of it.”¹ When a letter in which he advocated independence was published, he was avoided “like a man infected with the leprosy,” and in solitude he walked the streets of Philadelphia, “borne down by the weight of care and unpopularity.”² No man did more than John Adams, unless it be Samuel Adams, to bring about independence, yet when the bond was broken and independence won, John Adams wrote: “For my own part, there was not a moment during the Revolution when I would not have given everything I possessed for a restoration of the state of things before the contest began, provided we could have had a sufficient security for its continuance.”³

Some ambitious men there were of course, the clergy especially, to whom the thought of separation was dear, but to the majority it was extremely repugnant; they wanted self-government, to enjoy the same autonomy that the Canadian and Australian dominions do to-day; to control their finances and make their own trade regulations; but even more they wanted to preserve intact the political nexus that bound them to England.

Otis, in the most celebrated and important of his

¹ Adams: *Works*, vol. II, p. 512.

² Adams: *Works*, vol. II, p. 513.

³ Jay: *Life of John Jay*, vol. II, p. 416. See also Almon: *A Collection of Interesting Authentic Papers*, pp. 29 *et seq.*, 167 *et seq.*; Bigelow: *Franklin*, vol. V, p. 440 *et seq.*; Ford: *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. I, p. 482 *et seq.*; Force: *American Archives*, 4th series, vol. III, p. 794; Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. VII, p. 192.

political writings, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, curiously enough used the word "dominions." He argued "that the colonies are subordinate dominions, and are now in such a state as to make it best for the good of the whole, that they should not only be continued in the enjoyment of the subordinate legislation, but be also represented in some proportion to their number and estates in the grand legislative of the nation: that this would firmly unite all parts of the British Empire, in the greatest peace and prosperity; and render it invulnerable and perpetual."¹

It was in 1759 that Quebec fell and the bonfires of loyalty were lighted in the hearts of the American colonists, but the seventeen years which followed were to see the fire, after the flame had first leaped up high to heaven, die down and the embers smoulder with sullen resentment rather than glow with the white heat of loyal affection. At the time of the conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the colonies showed the gratitude they felt to England. Fort Duquesne was renamed Pittsburg in honor of the great minister; Massachusetts erected a costly monument in Westminster Abbey to the memory of Lord Howe, who had fallen in the conquest of Canada; addresses were adopted acknow-

¹ Page 99. Otis was wiser than all the British statesmen of his day; wiser than all, with few exceptions, of the present day; for it is as true now as it was then that the only way to "unite all parts of the British Empire" and to "render it invulnerable and perpetual" is by the representation of the "subordinate dominions" in "the grand legislative of the nation."

ledging the assistance that England had rendered, and loyalty was pledged anew.¹ The year of the Stamp Act was 1765, but four years earlier the eloquence of one man had made all the colonies realize the policy of the British Government in the attempt to extend its authority. For years there had existed a large and profitable trade between the colonies, the West Indies, and the Spanish Main, an illegal trade under the laws of England, but which had been winked at by the home authorities. Now it was made plain that the laws were to be rigorously enforced. The crown officers in Boston applied for "writs of assistance," which enabled them to enter and search any place believed to contain smuggled goods; and still further to destroy the illicit trade, revenue cutters were placed off the coast to seize as lawful prize vessels with contraband cargo. With torrential eloquence James Otis, "a flame of fire,"² — of whom Adams wrote, "I hope it is not impious or profane to compare Otis to Ovid's Jupiter"³ — in the General Court of Boston, denounced the issuance of these writs and the policy which prompted them; New England as well as the South was stirred, for the new policy, if rigidly enforced, would bring ruin to the colonies. Their sea-borne commerce with the islands of the West Indies was making the colonies rich, and had developed

¹ Cf. Grahame: *The History of the United States of North America*, vol. II, p. 321; Hutchinson: *History of Massachusetts Bay*, vol. III, p. 101.

² Tudor: *Life of James Otis*, p. 60. ³ Adams: *Works*, vol. X, p. 342.

channels of trade that provided the regular medium of exchange for the settlement of the debts of American merchants in London. Franklin, testifying before the House of Commons in 1766, gave the value of the annual imports from Britain into Pennsylvania at £500,000 and the reverse movement at £40,000. Asked how the balance was paid, he thus explained: "The balance is paid by our produce carried to the West Indies, and sold in our own islands, or to the French, Spaniards, Danes, and Dutch; by the same carried to other colonies in North America, as to New England, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Carolina, and Georgia; by the same carried to different parts of Europe, as Spain, Portugal, and Italy. In all which places we receive either money, bills of exchange, or commodities that suit for remittance to Britain, which, together with all the profits of the industry of our merchants and marines arising in those circuitous voyages, and the freights made by their ships, centre finally in Britain to discharge the balance, and pay for British manufactures continually used in the province, or sold to foreigners by our traders."¹

Statistics of the oversea commerce of the eighteenth century are misleading, as there was a large

¹ Bigelow: *Life of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. I, p. 473; Neal: *History of New England*, vol. II, pp. 600-16. Neal values the New England imports from England in 1720 at £100,000 and the exports at £80,000. Hildreth: *The History of the United States of America*, vol. II, p. 559. Hildreth says the trade between Great Britain and the colonies in 1770 was, exports, £1,014,725; imports, £1,925,570. The surplus of imports was paid for by the profits of the trade with Spain, Portugal, and the West Indies.

contraband trade both in exports and imports,¹ and transactions were not settled exclusively in money. The scarcity of specie made the colonies resort to barter. In Virginia, tobacco was currency; in New York, at one time, beaver was the medium of exchange; in New England, certain commodities were legal tender at a fixed value;² and wampum was the magnet to draw the skins of the fur-bearing animals from the forest and settle accounts with the Indians.³

The men of New England had early become a seafaring people and were the marine carriers for the colonies,⁴ and in 1766 there were in New England five thousand men who were dependent upon the sea for their livelihood.⁵ Than the Puritan "there have seldom been better shipbuilders, and their descendants are still among the best sailors in the world."⁶ It was in Gloucester, Massachusetts, in 1713, that Abraham Robinson launched the first

¹ Cf. *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 67.

² "For want of current coin, sufficient for the trade of the country, the New England men are forc'd to barter goods, and exchange one commodity for another." — Oldmixon: *The British Empire in America*, vol. i, p. 98. "There being little money in this Province [Maryland], and little occasion of any, as long as Tobacco answers all the uses of Silver and Gold in Trade." — *Ibid.*, p. 203.

³ Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. i, p. 40 *et seq.*

⁴ Cf. Lodge: *A Short History of the English Colonies in America*, p. 410.

⁵ Pitkin in *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States*, pp. 37-41, says that "previous to the American Revolution" the cod-fishing alone gave employment to about 4,000 American seamen and about 28,000 tons of shipping; from 1771 to 1775, Massachusetts employed annually 304 vessels in the whale fishery with crews of 4059 men.

⁶ Fisher: *Men, Women, and Manners in Colonial Times*, vol. i, p. 114.

schooner-rigged vessel that ever sailed the seas. As the strangely rigged craft slid into the water, a spectator exclaimed, "How she schoons," and her builder cried out, "A schooner let her be."¹ The money invested in ships was considerable,² yet this money was to be lost, ships were to be tied up to their wharves to rot, and their sailors starve, so that English merchants might increase their profits. John Adams said that the trouble between England and her American colonies began not in 1765 but in 1761; at the door of George III must be laid the American Revolution, a modern historian says;³ but far more true is the observation of Oliver that "the misrepresentations of Samuel Adams, the craftiness of Franklin, the heroics of Henry, and the phrases of Jefferson, were no more the cause of the rebellion than the obstinacy of George the Third, the pedantry of Grenville, the flippancy of Townshend, the indecency of Wedderburn, or the easy, good-natured facing both ways of Lord North."⁴ We whose perspective of events is more correct than John Adams's, because time has clarified our vision, can see that it was not the specific Acts of 1761 or 1765, or any one year or any one event, that brought about the culmination. The spirit of

¹ Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. II, p. 573.

² Douglas. *A Summary of the British Settlements*, vol. I, p. 538 *et seq.*

³ Elson: *History of the United States of America*, p. 232. "George III and Lord North have been made scapegoats for sins which were not exclusively their own." — Morley: *Edmund Burke*, p. 75.

⁴ Oliver: *Alexander Hamilton*, p. 27.

revolt had taken possession of men and with irresistible force was driving them forward to resistance.¹

We have seen in the earlier days how infectious was the spirit of opposition to the usurpation of the Crown and how defiance of royal or proprietary authority in one colony always had its counterpart in the others, and we see again how quickly defiance spread. The eloquence of Otis in Boston was sustained by the challenge of Patrick Henry in Virginia, who with the fiery impetuosity of youth declared, at the time of the enactment of the Stamp Act, that the right of the colonies to tax themselves was established and could not be questioned; that any Act of Parliament which attempted to weaken an established privilege ought not to be obeyed, and any person who acquiesced in the action of Parliament made of himself an enemy to the colony. This was so close to the border-line of treason and open rebellion that Henry's older and more conservative colleagues in the House of Burgesses toned down somewhat his speech, but the mischief had been done. In the original form what he said had been circulated broadcast; his dissident words were on the lips of every man in the colony; from there they spread north and south; the first word of revolution

¹ "Which only served to show, over and over again, how the main root of the trouble was the incapacity of the British official mind to understand the character of the American people and the new political situation created by the enormous growth of the colonies." — Fiske: *The American Revolution*, vol. I, p. 114.

had been spoken, "and no man ever thought just the same again after he had read them."¹

In their attempt to lay the responsibility for the severance of the political ties that bound the colonies to the mother-country, Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic have wasted almost as much time and twisted subtleties almost as ingeniously as the Puritan elders racked the Bible to find warrant for a particular line of conduct.

What no Englishman appears then to have understood, what few Americans since then have seen the importance of in its bearing on future events, was that, while the colonies were still unfederated and politically detached and officially unrelated commonwealths, the latent impulse to federation was so close to the surface that only a very slight impetus was needed to call it into life. Ministers had from the first dealt with each colony separately, they had administered the affairs of each without regard to the others; it had become an official habit — and nothing is worse than the official habit in forcing men's minds in a groove and keeping them there — to think of America not as a continent, but as colonies, not as a people, but as colonists. That the colonies were being welded into a confederation, that the settlers were fast becoming a nation, the official mind, unimaginative, dull, precedent-loving, could not see, although more than one thing had occurred that to alert minds would

¹ Wilson: *A History of the American People*, vol. II, p. 149.

have been a warning. These congresses were not without their significance. The tendency of the colonies to come together when threatened foreshadowed union. Defiance of lawful authority pre-dicated rebellion. Yet nothing made its impression on the official mind. It was Boston that was rebel-lious, not America; why should Virginia — that colony founded on the tradition of loyalty — resent what Massachusetts complained of? And Eng-lish Ministers of that day, who neither knew nor understood America, really believed that Virginia Cavaliers still hated the Massachusetts Puritans for their share in the tragedy of the Martyr of Blessed Memory; that nothing more than Massa-chusetts disloyalty was needed to strengthen the ties of loyalty which bound Virginia to the Crown. Religious differences, social traditions, political af-filiations, as we have seen, kept the colonies apart, but they sunk everything when the spirit of nation-ality was awakened, and each in its own way went about the business in hand for the common purpose. "Connecticut as her wont is," we are told in a pas-sage that gives us the key to the curious mixture of the practical and the piety in the Yankee char-acter, — "Connecticut as her wont is, when moved to any vital occurrence, betook herself to prayer and humiliation," — this was when the news of the Boston Port Bill was received in America, — "first, however, ordering an inventory to be taken of her cannon and military stores."¹

¹ Scott. *Development of Constitutional Liberty*, p. 280.

Whether Puritans or Cavaliers, men of the North or the South, they never forgot the Cromwellian injunction to trust in God and keep their powder dry; and it is noteworthy that it was resistance to the Stamp Act and other measures that brought the colonies into union. In 1773 there appeared in the *Boston Gazette* a letter written by Samuel Adams, who urged the necessity of a "Congress of the States," — colonies no longer, but now States, — and these States were to be represented by an ambassador at the British Court. In a second letter written about the same time he asked, "How shall the colonists force their oppressors to proper terms?" and he answered, "Form an independent State or American Commonwealth." The man who urged this advice "was no mere rhetorician, but one of the subtlest, the most patient, and the most persistent of organizers."¹

Samuel Adams — in a sense the evil genius of the Revolution, as much a root-and-branch man as Cromwell and as thorough as Laud, who was satisfied with nothing short of independence — is proof, if proof were necessary, that the spirit of the Puritan who founded America lived in his descendant in the eighteenth century. For one person who remembers Adams a hundred recall Washington, yet Washington would have been given little opportunity to display his military genius had it not been for Adams and the other eighteenth-century Covenanters,

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 160.

whom he gathered about him. Much has been written of Adams, but no one has so concisely and so vividly summed up an extraordinary character as Lecky, who says: "Poor, simple, ostentatiously austere and indomitably courageous, the blended influence of Calvinistic theology and of republican principles had permeated and indurated his whole character, and he carried into politics all the fervor of an apostle and all the narrowness of a sectarian. Hating with a fierce hatred Monarchy and the English Church, and all privileged classes and all who were invested with dignity and rank; utterly incapable of seeing any good thing in an opponent, or of accepting any form of political compromise, he advocated on all occasions the strongest measures, and appears to have been one of the first both to foresee and to desire an armed struggle."¹

To keep colonial animosities alive was regarded as wise statesmanship. "It is morally impossible," writes Sir William Keith, Governor of Pennsylvania, "that any dangerous union should be formed among them, because their interest in trade and all manner of business, being entirely separated by their independency, every advantage that is lost or neglected by one colony is immediately picked up by another, and the emulation that continually subsists between them in all manner of intercourse and traffic, is ever productive of envys, jealousies, and cares how to gain upon each other's conduct in

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. iii, p. 361.

government or trade, every one thereby endeavoring to magnify their pretensions to the favour of the Crown by becoming more useful than their neighbors to the interest of Great Britain.”¹

Had a stupid king and his equally foolish Ministers been able to comprehend that the lightly held settlers were on the verge of nationality, that Virginia must resent the injustice of which Massachusetts complained, because Virginia, no less than all the other colonies, was filled by the same national spirit; that to attempt to chastise Massachusetts was to make every Englishman elect whether he should be Englishman or American; that the first act of war swept away all provincial boundaries and made America continental — had the English Government realized this, it is probable that their policy would have been more conciliatory and less arrogant, and a way would have been found to settle differences without resort to the sword, but “the blundering management of the British Cabinet always pushed things to extremes at the wrong moment.”² “They went to war against a preamble. They fought seven years against a declaration,” Webster said.³

Political conditions, physical causes, and commercial interests had made the Englishman in America as different mentally from the English-

¹ Byrd: *The History of the Dividing Line between Virginia and North Carolina*, vol. II, p. 225.

² Oliver: *Alexander Hamilton*, p. 25.

³ Webster: *Works*, vol. IV, p. 109.

man at home as he was divergent from the type physically;¹ he had new attachments and a new point of view; in many things London was now of less importance to him than Massachusetts or Virginia.² These colonials were in a restless, angry frame of mind, needing but a thing trivial in itself swiftly to drive them to a definite course of action. Forgetting all that had happened, ignoring the years that had formed character and prepared men for action, ignorant of or indifferent to a long list of grievances, we seize on a salient incident and say it was the spark to fire rebellion, as if it were the spark which works destruction instead of the mine it liberates. "See how tragedy is caused when common things happen to silly men," Epictetus wrote; and in the drama of history the emergency has always produced its fool when tragedy was to be staged. The genius of Pitt, who was a statesman because he had imagination and that sixth sense of sympathetic comprehension of the aspirations of the people whom he governed, the lack of which is the reason there have been so pitifully few really great proconsuls and colonial ad-

¹ "The round, red look of the Englishman had gone, and the New Englander was a tall, sinewy, powerful but spare man, with rather a gaunt look, and a face in which all the lines and contours had been sharpened and strengthened." — Lodge: *A Short History of the English Colonies in America*, p. 449.

² "The interests of the incipient state were growing too large for the rickety hoops of parliamentary legislation; the personality of the citizens was over-topping that of the insufficient agents of the Crown and the feeble representatives of English pride. Waning dependence, in the course of nature, must give birth to a new independence." — Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. II, p. 671.

ministrators, was thwarted by smaller men in whom there was neither statesmanship nor wisdom. They must needs, under the leadership of Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, lay new taxes upon the colonies and revive those obnoxious Trade Acts which no colonist would tamely accept. Wise men and loyal men on both sides of the ocean, men whose love for England did not weaken their affection for America, — such men as Pitt and Burke in England and Hutchinson in America, royal lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts, although colonial born and reared, — saw only too clearly what was coming, and dreaded it. Obstinacy coupled with ignorance on the one side aroused passion and a deeper sense of injustice on the other. As happens at such times the voice of the moderate man urging conciliation and caution, making his appeal to prudence and common sense, is drowned by the inspiration of the patriot or the perfervid eloquence of the demagogue who always follows in the wake of the patriot and turns patriotism to the profit of demagoguery; for patriotism and demagoguery have this at least in common: both are an appeal to the emotions and the passions; patriotism to the highest and demagoguery to the lowest. "That slow and familiar process of popular education through which a whole people is gradually worked up to the war pitch was now going on. It was the same process in 1765 which had been witnessed in England one hundred and thirty years before, and which was

again to be witnessed in America ninety years later, — the process by which, as the necessity for action becomes gradually apparent, the spirit of conservatism, expressed through doubts and fears and efforts at compromise, is slowly overcome.”¹

Dazzled by the glamour of history and victory, we are apt to invest a whole people with the qualities and virtues of their chosen leaders. Among the men who gave force to the movement that ended in the overthrow of English power in America were men morally and intellectually great, noble and unselfish men who cherished an ideal and from it never swerved; and there were men who were great neither in intellect nor moral stamina; who were governed by selfish motives, who were opportunists and not idealists. We are apt to think that the flame of patriotism never burned low; that it was a united people who became fanatics in the cause of liberty and gave all as they gave their lives to fight for an abstraction; and we forget or gloss over the thieving contractors to whom war was merely profitable trade,² the petty politicians who carried on their intrigues in the face of the enemy, the “patriots” (the “chimney-corner heroes,” was Washington’s term of contempt,³) who hung back when there were gaps in the ranks to be

¹ Adams: *Three Episodes of Massachusetts History*, vol. II, p. 840.

² That ardent loyalist Justice Jones, in his *History of New York during the Revolutionary War*, writes with fierce scorn of the “trading rebellion.” British commissioners retired with fortunes; American army purveyors found war an easy road to wealth.

³ Washington: *Writings*, vol. III, p. 415.

filled and every man with a musket was needed.¹ The dreadful sufferings of Washington's army at Valley Forge, we are reminded by Fiske, have called forth the pity and the admiration of historians; but "the point of the story is lost unless we realize that this misery resulted from gross mismanagement rather than from the poverty of the country."² We are dealing with men, not the heroes of mythology.

It is unnecessary to follow in detail the events of the next few years. British policy swung between the extremes of vacillating compromise and harshness, and "from this time the English government of America is little more than a series of deplorable blunders."³ Alarmed at the ever-growing spirit of resistance, obnoxious measures were relaxed or partially repealed, which was still further invitation to the colonists to agitate so as to secure the concessions they demanded; the agitation never ceased and the spirit of the people was inflamed by the appeals of their leaders. Then in March, 1770, came the first shedding of English blood by Englishmen on the soil of America, when English soldiers fired on a Boston mob and five persons were killed and six wounded; then, in the following year, the same thing in North Carolina; next year saw one of His Majesty's armed sloops, engaged in the enforcement of the Navigation Acts, burned by the men

¹ Cf. Hart: *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. II, p. 481 *et seq.*

² Fiske: *The American Revolution*, vol. II, p. 29.

³ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. III, p. 349.

of Rhode Island. Thus matters went on until the night of December 16, 1773. The English Ministers retain the duty on tea as proof that they possess the right to tax, even if they do not care to exercise it. Tea-laden ships come to New York and Philadelphia, but their captains are not permitted to land their cargoes and they sail away. In Charlestown the tea is discharged, but no one will buy it. In Boston lie three ships with three hundred and forty chests of tea in their holds. On that December night fifty men of Boston, disguised as Mohawk Indians, board the vessels, break open the chests, and throw their contents into the sea. Not a shot fired, not a life lost, not a person injured, hardly a word spoken. The time of protest has passed; the time to resist has come. The loose strands of colonialism have been so securely twisted into the rope of nationality that it defies the sword. A Nation is born.

CHAPTER XI

WHAT IS A NATION?

WHAT constitutes a Nation? There is perhaps no more difficult and perplexing question for the student of historical development to answer. Politically and legally there is an accepted definition that meets the requirements of social and political intercourse. "A nation is an organized community within *a certain territory*; or, in other words, there must be a place where its sole sovereignty is exercised,"¹ Woolsey says, which is comprehensive enough to define the legal and political status of nationals; and the same principle is applied by Cooley, who says, "The word nation [in America] is applied to the whole body of the people embraced within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government."² When we leave the precise sphere of law and attempt a sociological interpretation, precision is replaced by vagueness. "Among the French a nationality is regarded as the work of history, ratified by the will of man. The elements composing it may be very different in their origin. The point of departure is of little importance; the only essential thing

¹ Woolsey: *Introduction to International Law*, p. 62.

² Cooley: *A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations*, p. 3. Cf. Story: *Commentaries on the Constitution*, vol. I, p. 192.

is the point reached," is a French definition.¹ "A nation," says Ward, "may be defined as a body of population which its proper history has made one in itself, and as such distinct from all others";² which is a definition entirely too general. In fact, it is somewhat curious that a subject so important as this has received such scant treatment at the hands of writers; but perhaps usage has given the word a conventional meaning which connotes an economic and political state popularly requiring no analysis. Yet it is a point that must be definitely determined. Europeans frequently deny that the American People are a Nation. They are, many European writers assert, a congeries of peoples, a mixture of races, an ethnic collection, but as yet they have not been infused by a spirit of nationality. "A few years ago the American Protestant Episcopal Church was occupied at its Triennial Convention in revising its liturgy. It was thought desirable to introduce among the short-sentence prayers a prayer for the whole people; and an eminent New England divine proposed the words, 'O Lord, bless our nation.' Accepted one afternoon on the spur of the moment, the sentence was brought up next day for reconsideration, when so many objections were raised by the laity to the word 'nation,' as importing too definite a recognition of national unity, that it was

¹ Lavisce: *General View of the Political History of Europe*, p. 147.

² Ward: *A History of English Dramatic Literature*, vol. 1, introduction, p. xvi.

dropped, and instead there were adopted the words, 'O Lord, bless these United States.' To Europeans who are struck by the patriotism and demonstrative national pride of their transatlantic visitors, this fear of admitting that the American people constitute a nation seems extraordinary."¹

To-day there would be less objection raised in any convention, lay or religious, to the use of the word Nation; but one is impressed by the timidity displayed by Americans in declaring that there is an American Nation. It is now no longer open to question, they assert, that politically and materially the people on that part of the North American continent geographically and politically known as the United States constitute a Nation; they use the term as frequently and invest it with the same meaning as the English do when they talk and write of the English Nation; they resent the suggestion implied by non-nationality, that is, a divided political allegiance or an inarticulate spirit of patriotism; but they hesitate to declare that they have arrived at nationality in the widest and fullest sense of the word. Difficult as it is scientifically to determine what constitutes a Nation, it is not impossible, I believe, to ascertain whether an organized society is merely a collection of individuals bound together by material considerations or is infused with the spirit of nationality and held in union by something more substantial and more spiritual than

¹ Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. I, p. 15.

the selfish purpose of resisting aggression or waging conquest or making money.

In an endeavor to find an answer to the question, "Is There An American Type?" the *New York Sun* said:¹—

In the consideration of this question it is important to avoid the confusion of nation with race which is so often met with. In common parlance, race is a vague word, for we use it, first, to distinguish men from other animals, speaking as we do of the human race; next, to differentiate various branches of the human family, speaking, for example, of the Aryan, Semitic, and other races; then we employ it for subdividing Aryans into Teutonic, Celtic, and Slavic races; and again for subdividing Teutonic races into English, German, Dutch, and Norse. Race, in other words, may mean half a dozen kinds of division, so that we cannot identify it with nationality. Another bar to such identification is that while a Jew can no more change his race than an Ethiopian can his skin, he can assume English, French, or American nationality with very little trouble. . . .

Nationality, then, is something more and something less than race. It is complex, it is mutable, and compared with race it is modern. As Professor Pollard, of University College, London, has pointed out, English national character did not exist when the Teutonic invaders of Britain left the shores of Germany. The tribes which migrated were no more distinct from those that stayed behind than were the Pilgrim Fathers, who settled New England, from the Puritans of the Long Parlia-

¹ May 25, 1908.

ment. In both cases the different national character is due to a different environment and the interaction thereof upon heredity. In a word, nationality is the effect rather than the cause of history, though in its turn it affects the course of history. It is not a thing to be assumed without discussion or proof, like a definition in geometry; it is a mass of acquired characteristics, each of which has its definite and more or less ascertainable causes. One of these causes is the home which wanderers, weary of wandering, make for themselves. They settle on the soil and the soil grips them. Their abode becomes fixed and so does their horizon. The stranger within their gates becomes a neighbor; the bonds with distant kinsmen are relaxed. Territorial proximity replaces that of blood as the basis of human society. The *genius loci* casts its spell over the emigrant; it includes the effects of climate and the results of previous occupation. The Goth who conquers Italy becomes an Italian; the Goth who conquers Spain becomes a Spaniard. The Frank who settles in France becomes a Frenchman, while he who remains at home continues a German. Subtler still is the influence of climate and geographical conditions. It used to be said more frequently than it is now that the Yankee was developing the same features, the high cheek bones, the prominent nose, the straight, lank hair, and even somewhat of the color of the American Indians whom he displaced. However this may be, there is no doubt about the intellectual and moral differentiation of the average American from the average Englishman.

We arrive then at the conclusion that at the beginning of the twentieth century, just as the national unifica-

tion of the United States is far advanced, so also has the intellectual and moral, if not also the physical, differentiation of Americans from Britons been emphasized. We may, therefore, with more and more correctness speak of an American type.

Note here that the *Sun* contents itself with an American "type," but displays that same reluctance, previously marked, to assert that the "type," as the result of the influences it has mentioned, and some even more important which it has omitted, has evolved into nationality.

A modern American historian is equally timorous in accepting the fact of American nationality. "In recent years," says Channing, "historical societies have been founded for the express purpose of exploiting the virtues of immigrants of particular races and creeds, to secure for this element or that 'its due place in history.' A recent writer, indeed, contends that Julia Ward Howe's descent from General Marion 'made a battle hymn her natural expression.' It is difficult to define American or Irishman. Is the place of a man's birth the determining factor? Is any man born in Ireland an Irishman? Was the Duke of Wellington an Irishman? The case of James Logan, Penn's agent, is to the point; he was born in Lurgan, in the northern part of Ireland, while his parents were temporarily residing there; they had come from Scotland and passed the remainder of their days in England,

while he lived and labored in America for more than half a century, — was he a Scot, an Irishman, a Scotch-Irishman, or an American? The American Nation is composed of so many elements that one man may be descended from half a dozen different stocks and as many religions. Shall an historical society belonging to each one of these races and religions claim the distinguished personage for its own? Names are an insecure guide in tracing ancestry. For instance, a Frenchman named Blond-pied settled in New England; his sons became respectively Blumpey and Whitefoot; and Israel Israel of Pennsylvania was not a Jew at all, but a Quaker.”¹

It would seem as if Mr. Channing, by the very question he asks, had settled all doubts. The place of a man’s birth, it is obvious, can in no sense be a determining factor; for it would surely be a fanciful stretch of the imagination to hold that a child born in Russia of American parents, brought to America when three weeks old, unable to speak a word of Russian, is to be accounted a Russian. One does not like to dispose of a serious question by treating it as a jest, but is it not just as pertinent to assume that the hypothetical American child born in Russia is a Russian as to say that a child born on board ship is a sailor? We should have heard less of the efforts of historical societies to obtain for certain races their “due place in history” had it not been

¹ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. II, p. 241, n. 2.

for the political advantage hoped to be gained, as we shall see later.

It is perhaps easier to begin our investigation by a negative attack. Not religion, not language, not common allegiance, not a political system in themselves alone make for nationality; not even marked racial traits that set a people apart from all others. Are the Jews a Nation? Bound together by religious and social observances, by peculiar circumstances an infusible people and retaining their racial characteristics, their descent and traditions unbroken, they remain to-day, as they have existed for centuries, a People, but not a Nation. Are the Negroes of North America a Nation? Obviously the answer must be that they are not, and the explanation will perhaps be offered that they are a part of a greater nation and derive their nationality from the stem to which they have attached themselves, as the ivy its sustenance from the oak. Yet the explanation does not suffice. Popular instinct, which is often intuitively more correct than the reasoned investigations of science, has placed the Negro where his present development has brought him by speaking of the "Negro Race," but never of the "Negro Nation." Are the Poles a Nation? Their kingdom dismembered, hawked about from sovereign to sovereign to satisfy dynastic ambitions, forced to abandon their religion, and their language placed under the ban, Poland as a political entity no longer exists; still no one questions that

there is to-day a Polish people in whom the spirit of nationality lives as vitally as it did when John Sobieski's "*Non nobis, non nobis, Domine exercituum, sed nomini Tuo da gloriam*" was the inspiration to break the power of the Turks before Vienna.

Yet again, we may be told that nationality cannot exist unless it is founded upon a common religion and a literature of history and tradition, that in the struggles and triumphs of the past is the cohesive power to instill into a people patriotism and make of them a Nation. This theory collapses when we turn to Iceland, where for a thousand years a people enjoyed independence, *quasi*-independence, and autonomy, who have a wealth of tradition in which to seek inspiration and a literature which is a part of the world's heritage, for the genesis of all European literature is the Norse Sagas. There is to-day no country whose people are so little vexed by religious differences as Iceland, and where, with such few exceptions that they are negligible, a whole people are members of the same church. Are the Icelanders a Nation? Once again the obvious answer must be in the negative.

What, then, constitutes a Nation, and how are we to determine whether the American people to-day are a Nation or merely a People? The elements that go to constitute a Nation are many, and all must be present to form nationality. These elements are: an unchallenged possession of the country from which a people derive their national name;

a common attachment to the political and social system that they have created or that has descended to them; a belief in their own strength and invincibility; a common language — one language that is the universal means of communication between the people no matter how widely they are separated, which is alone officially recognized in courts and legislatures; a spirit that animates men to strive for the advancement and higher development of themselves and their country and to see in such development their own advantage; a universality of religion or a tolerance of religion that makes religion a matter of conscience between man and man and not under the control of the state; a literature that is truly national,—i. e., that is based on heroic achievement or a struggle in defense of an ideal or to widen an idealistic conception; a dominant virility that enables a people by imposing their own civilization to absorb and assimilate into themselves aborigines and aliens so that they become a part of, and do not remain apart from the dominant race; uniform — it might almost be termed a stereotyped — code of morals and manners; so that in language as in thought, men find the same forms of expression, and expression finds the same form of action. Morality is not merely a matter of latitude, and there is no meridian of ethics; he who utters a sublime thought has a Nation for his audience; a thing disgraceful is not condoned because morals are local or conventions topical.

Many of these elements are combined in the one word Patriotism, a word convenient enough for ordinary use if no attempt is made to be scientifically exact or analytic. Without patriotism no nation can exist, but patriotism is not everything. A man may heroically fight for his country against a foreign foe or a despotic ruler or to resist an oligarchy, and he is acclaimed a patriot; yet he may be so illiberal in religion, for instance, that he checks instead of stimulates nationality. Without patriotism there can be no nationality, but patriotism alone never made a nation nor kept the spirit of nationality alive.

Now if we are to weigh the American people by the tests we have imposed, we shall see that they measure up to all the requirements. In the fulfillment of the purpose to examine into the mind of a people and to ascertain the motives that have governed them, we shall consider separately each of the elements that are necessary to make nationality; and it may be parenthetically added that while many people have possessed some of these attributes, no nationality has existed where *all* were not present.

Since the colonists declared their independence of the Crown of England and by purchase from France obtained possession of the Louisiana territory and by annexation Texas, the Americans have been in unchallenged possession of their country. Since the Civil War settled forever that the union

of the states was not a compact to be dissolved at the pleasure of any of the parties to it, but was a union one and indissolvable, no American has questioned the wisdom of the political system to which he owes allegiance. We do not have to prove that the Americans have confidence in their strength and reliance in their power to overcome obstacles; it is so much the foundation of their character that when other qualities are obscured this stands forth preëminently as "Americanism." The speech of America is English. All the world has contributed to make the American and to develop the greatness of America; its prairies have been tilled, its iron highways built, its cities created by men of diverse nationalities, black men and yellow men, the fair-haired men of Northern Europe and the swarthy men of the South; from the two hemispheres have come men and women and little children, bringing with them their civilization, their religion, their language; in a single year there came more than a million immigrants, of whom only 113,567 were from the United Kingdom,¹ and yet no language is recognized but that of the men who first planted America, no language concession is made to the foreigner; in America, unlike Canada, for example, two languages do not exist side by side; in the court as in the legislature a man to be heard must know the tongue of Shakespeare. As a man thinks, so he is, and the lan-

¹ *Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1907.*

guage in which he thinks fashions his thoughts and controls his actions; for the language of a people represents all that has made them and holds all their past development and the history of their civilization. It is not sufficient that a man should be able to translate his mother-tongue into that of his adoptive parent. It must become the unconscious medium of his thought, he must be absorbed by it and all that it represents — the morals, the manners, the view of life that find concrete expression in the language of a nation.¹

In a subsequent chapter I deal at length with the absorption of the immigrant and the causes that have merged him into the American. For the present it is sufficient to state a fact, the meaning of which European commentators of America do not fully understand. Reading the immigration statistics, hearing in the large cities the tongues of all mankind, seeing on the streets many foreigners, they are led to the conclusion that America is the modern Tower of Babel, that the alien always remains an alien, and that among so many antagonistic nationalities there can be no patriotic spirit of attachment or sense of national feeling. The foreigner, they believe, always remains a foreigner, an outlander living in America, but not an American. They forget that the real America is not its cities, especially those on the Atlantic seaboard; they do

¹ The Census Office reports (*Census of Religious Bodies for 1906*, part 1) that English is the sole language used by 85.5 per cent of all the religious organizations in the United States.

not know that the process of assimilation is so rapid that usually in the second generation it has been completed.

In one of his speeches in the West, President Taft referred to the homogeneity of the American people. "We all wear," he said, "the same clothes, even to the latest fashions in the bonnets of the ladies; we all speak the same language and have the same ideas and aspirations. One of the things that strikes one going around the country is the exactly similar attitude the people all occupy toward the questions that affect them in the same way."

Commenting on this, the New York *World* remarked that "manners, morals, political views have all undergone a standardization which is one of the remarkable aspects of American evolution. Perhaps it is in the uniformity of language that this development has been most noteworthy. Outside of the Tennessee mountains and the back country of New England there is no true dialect. History affords no example of so complete a linguistic fusion among so large a population."¹

Mr. John D. Long, formerly Secretary of the Navy, similar to many other careful observers, brings testimony to the swift transformation of the foreign child into the American. In the course of an address he said: "I went last year to the graduating exercises at the Hancock School for Girls at the North End of Boston. It was once the aristocratic

¹ October 1, 1909.

part of that city. Later our Irish people had filled it. But last year in the graduating class was neither a Yankee nor a Celt. They were all Russians, Jews, Poles, and especially Italians. Arrayed on the stage in their white dresses and neat shoes, singing with exquisite voices, showing in their written and spoken exercises the best scholarship, differing in appearance in no respect from a similar gathering in the most old-time Anglo-Saxon community in one of our rural villages, they sang 'America' and 'The Star-Spangled Banner.' They declaimed of our country and our great names; they were full of the inspiration of American life. In short, they were American citizens."¹

An American author who is opposed to unrestricted immigration and regards it as a menace, is nevertheless forced to admit that "it would be absurd to treat the whole twenty or twenty-five millions whom we have reckoned to be of foreign descent as alien elements in our civilization. Many of these persons have been born on our soil and know no other country and no other language or institutions than ours. They are as truly American in thought and feeling as any descendant of the Puritan fathers. Even where they have come to this country poor, ignorant, and perhaps vicious, they have seized upon the chance to begin a new life and have elevated themselves and their children to a higher plane of civilization. Economic well-being

¹ *Springfield Republican*, July 5, 1909.

and the practice of free institutions are the most powerful agents of civilization.”¹ If birth, language, and institutions do not create nationality, what does? If men are “as truly American in thought and feeling as any descendant of the Puritan fathers,” even although they have foreign instead of English names and their fathers were foreigners instead of Englishmen, it is something of a tax on the imagination to regard them as anything but Americans or to see wherein they differ from other Americans, or why it should be imagined that a man born in America, who knows no language except English and is familiar with no institutions except those of America, is any less American than an Englishman born in England and speaking only English is English, albeit he has French or German blood in his veins.

Nor can I at this time touch on what all the world has come to know as the “American Spirit,” which is the result of political and other causes.² In their proper place these causes will be explained, and it will be seen that political and social institutions unlike those existing in any other country have produced momentous psychological and sociological consequences that have contributed to the sum of American nationality.

¹ Smith: *Emigration and Immigration*, p. 66.

² “The spirit of a people, like the spirit of a man, is influenced by heredity. But this heredity is not merely physical, it is spiritual. There is a transmission of qualities through the soul as well as through the flesh.” — Van Dyke: *The Spirit of America*, p. 16.

A religion to which an entire people subscribe is a powerful stimulus to nationality, and all history bears distressing testimony to the hopelessness of nationality existing when a people is torn by religious differences. Fortunately for the American people, God was kept out of their Constitution; Church and State, which had been married in the day of the Puritan theocracy, were divorced when the colonies expanded into States, and religion became a matter of personal belief for each man to cling to or to cast from him as his conscience might dictate. On great economic questions men have divided in the United States; slavery and personal liberty at one time threatened American nationality; but it has never been menaced by religious differences.

There is an American literature, a literature peculiarly rich at that critical period in the nascent life of a people when either the seeds of a vigorous nationality are implanted or the spiritual soil is too barren to flower. "These first writers in America were Americans; we may not exclude them from our story of American literature. They founded that literature; they are its Fathers; they stamped their spiritual lineaments upon it; and we shall never deeply enter into the meanings of American literature in its later forms without tracing it back, affectionately, to its beginning with them. At the same time, our first literary epoch cannot fail to bear traces of the fact that nearly all the men who made it were Englishmen who had become Americans.

merely by removing to America. American life, indeed, at once reacted upon their minds, and began to give its tone and hue to their words.”¹ The pre-Revolutionary period is an era of heroic literature, not heroic or mythical in the sense that we apply the term to the Norse Sagas or the Arthurian legends; there is here no search for the Holy Grail or vows of pious knights; there are no beauteous maidens to be rescued or symbolical tales of temptation of the flesh to be overcome; but there are tracts and sermons and volumes to inspire men with courage and to make them cling to an ideal; to implant in them the sense of tradition and ever to foster the spirit of liberty.

It has been pointed out in the previous volume that the Indian exercised a certain influence upon the civilization of the white man in the colonial period and taught the Englishman some of his cunning and love of cruelty; that the Englishman profited by the Indian’s knowledge of nature, and that these were influences that survived long after Englishmen had become Americans. But the Indian was never able to impose his civilization upon the Englishman or American, nor did he in any lasting way modify or temper the civilization of the white man. The language of the Indian did not color that of his conqueror; aboriginal customs were not permanently adopted by a race more highly developed; the slight admixture of Indian blood in certain por-

¹ Tyler: *A History of American Literature*, vol. I, p. 7.

tions of the United States has not influenced the people as a whole or affected their thought or institutions, as in some other countries, — in Latin America, for instance, where the Indian strain is noticeable. A power at once absorptive and repellent, antithetical forces simultaneously at work, have enabled the Americans from the first to incorporate into themselves physical and mental elements that were desirable and reject those that were destructive. It is this force that transforms the alien into an American in the course of a generation, but makes it impossible for him to graft upon the American his language or his customs; it was the same force that in early days enabled the settler to draw from the Indian all that was useful to him and yet to keep his blood unvitiated. "It is a fact worth noting by those who study questions of race," Murray observes, "that among both the Greeks and the Hebrews the most prominent and characteristic part of the nation was also the part most largely mixed with the race of the despised aborigines. The tribe of Judah had the largest Canaanite element. As for the Athenians, they always claim to be children of the soil, and Herodotus actually goes so far as to describe them as 'not Greek but Pelasgian.'"¹

And lastly, we find, as one of the elements without which there can be no sense of nationality, that in a country so vast in area as the United States, some of whose people dwell on the seaboard and

¹ Murray: *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, p. 50.

others far inland, where there is great diversity of soil, climate, and occupation, where there is great poverty and great wealth, whose people are both urban and agricultural, there is only one moral code and the ethical concept of conduct is the same whether in the metropolis or the hamlet. This broad general statement is not to be accepted as meaning that the conventions of the city are those of the village, for the refinement of wealth and intelligence, the stress of competition, and the tension of life in the city, as opposed to a more placid and reposeful existence in the village, enforce broader views of conduct and sanction customs that the village, unable to comprehend, frowns upon; nor is it to be accepted as meaning that the arbitrary code of the long-established city, where there is great wealth and much luxury and the latest expression of modern civilization, is that of the newer city of the plains or the half-neglected town that progress has left in a back-water to drone out an existence. Nor again must it be accepted as meaning that the summary social methods of a younger community not yet disciplined into respect for the law are those of an older, more stable, and better organized society, or that where society delegates to the state the function of vengeance and makes it the executioner, the law of private retaliation meets with no condemnation.

Yet, accepting the statement broadly, its truth remains unchallenged. Principles of morality, of right and wrong, of probity, integrity, and honest dealing

between man and man and the relations between man and woman, and of both man and woman to society at large, are the same, whether East or West, North or South, in the city or the village; in the cities with a historical past and those whose history dates from yesterday. We hear much of the frivolities of the "Four Hundred," of the immoralities of "society," of the extravagance of the idle rich, of divorce, of a corrupt and arrogant plutocracy; but admitting all that is said to be true, — and it is not all true by a great deal, — we see that a few idle or dissolute or foolish men and women are not typical of a people; we see, moreover, that the vices of society are not condoned or secretly admired by the people, who have a rugged idea of virtue and are not ashamed to confess it. And we shall further see that the moral backbone of America is not to be found among the rich in the large cities, but it is among the "common people," — using that expression precisely in the same spirit that made the words linger so lovingly on the lips of Lincoln — that is to be found the moral stamina and the strength of purpose that make a people great. Let it be understood, however, that I disclaim the popular hypocrisy of attributing all the virtue to the poor and lowly and all the vices to the rich and exalted. Neither rich nor poor possess a monopoly of vice or virtue, and in this respect America is no different from any other country, even although the attempt has been repeatedly made to

prove that its people claim the prerogative of a special law. Here, as everywhere else, there are more people of small means than of great wealth, more men who work with their hands than idle with their bodies, more inducements to "straight" living than an aimless existence.

When does the animal, human or otherwise, cease to be foreign to the soil and become native to it? The time required to domesticate an animal no scientist has yet been able to determine with authority, any more than he has been able to determine its origin.¹ This much, however, science has established for us: after a certain length of time, varying according to circumstances, the animal, influenced by climate, food, and other conditions, ceases to be wild or alien to his new environment and becomes autochthonous. "How many generations are necessary for one species or race to absorb another by repeated crosses has often been discussed; and the requisite number has probably been much exaggerated. Some writers have maintained that a dozen or score, or even more generations, are necessary; but this in itself is improbable, for in the tenth generation there would only be 1-1024th part of foreign blood in the offspring."² In the time required to transform men from aliens to "natives" science is even more vague, but argu-

¹ Darwin: *The Origin of Species*, *passim*; Spencer: *Principles of Biology*, *passim*.

² Darwin: *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, vol. II, p. 65.

ing on the examples furnished by the animal and vegetable kingdoms, there is nothing to discredit the hypothesis that after man has been local to the soil for a certain number of generations,—after, through descent and birth, he has become the product of that soil,—he ceases to be “foreign” and becomes “native”; mentally and socially no less than physically he adapts himself to his *milieu*, and habits and customs become fixed, and are not only incorporated into national character, but become a part of it; they give to a nation its distinguishing characteristics. When shall we say that this transformation took place in those Englishmen and their descendants who inhabited America?

A precise date is not of consequence. We have seen that the immigration to New England ceased about the year 1643, and from that time until there was a second and larger immigration from Europe in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, New England was fed by the breeding of its own people. In the year 1735, there would be no man or woman living who had come over in the original migration; every man, woman, and child in New England was “native” so far as birth is concerned. Professor Tyler places the dividing line as early as 1676, but, as I have said, the exact date is in no sense material. Let us, he says, “glance for a moment at the men and women who, in that year, constituted the larger part of the population of the English colonies. Here, at length, we confront a new race of beings

under the sun; people who loved England, but had never seen England; who always called England home, but had never been at home; who spoke and wrote the English language, but who had learned to do so three or four thousand miles from the island in which the language had been hitherto cooped up. Before 1676, the new civilization in America was principally in the hands of Americans born in England; after 1676, it was principally in the hands of Americans born in America, and the subjects of such training as was to be had here.”¹

Recalling the passage, that has already been quoted in this chapter, from Channing, it is not without interest to note that later in the same volume the author sees that it is not so difficult to determine American nationality as appeared to him earlier. “What constitutes nationality?” he asks. “Community of race, language, religion, institutions must be present in the make-up of a nation,” he says. “The people must be of one racial stock;² they must have a common mode of speech; their

¹ Tyler: *A History of American Literature*, vol. II, p. 7.

² If by the expression, “one racial stock,” Mr. Channing means that it is impossible for a nation to exist unless it is a pure and unmixed race, — that is to say, that other races and nationalities and strains have not been engrafted upon it in the process of nationality, — he would perform a great service by naming one modern nation that has not amalgamated into itself other races. As a matter of fact, there exists to-day no such race or nationality, with the possible exception of the Japanese, as I have incidentally noted on a subsequent page, who come nearer, perhaps, to being an unmixed race and contain a smaller infusion of alien blood than any other people; although our ethnological knowledge of the Japanese is too scant to justify any but the most cautious statement.

religious aspirations must find expression in common lines; their institutions for government and the protection of person and property must be substantially similar. In 1660 the people of England and the English colonies in North America may be said to have formed parts of one nation; in 1760 this was no longer true. The absorption of Dutch New Netherland, the great flowing-in of immigrants from Germany and from France, and the importation of thousands of negroes from Africa, had given to the colonies racial elements that were not present in England. Moreover, although there had been as yet no considerable amalgamation of the white elements in the colonial population, it may be said that changed climatic conditions and environments had already begun to alter the racial characteristics of the descendants of the first comers from England. In religion in England, the Church Establishment had bound itself more firmly to the State; while in America dissent had thriven under radical conditions of living — not one colonist in forty owed fealty to the colonial representative of the Established Church of England. Above all, colonial institutional ideas had developed on lines which were opposed to those prevailing in the home lands. Finally, the commercial interests of the two great divisions of the British Empire were now distinctly different. In all that constitutes nationality, two nations now owed allegiance to the British Crown.”¹

¹ Channing: *A History of the United States*, vol. II, pp. 598-99.

And yet in the face of this presentation there are still Americans who maintain that the century and a half that has elapsed since 1760 has destroyed American nationality and converted the dawning nationality of the eighteenth century into an American "type" at the beginning of the twentieth!

It may be questioned whether mere transplanting will radically change the character and mentality of a people. We have already seen that climate and other physical phenomena influenced the temperament of Englishmen living in America, and of course the effect of heredity was making itself felt in the children of Englishmen born in America; but it is not likely that the American Englishmen would have diverged so radically from the parent stock, or that their sentimental attachment to England would have weakened, if with the beginning of the eighteenth century — again using that as a convenient date and not marking an exact historical period — two conflicting forces had not been at work. Tradition, sentiment, habit, and the ties of blood and family made the American Englishman regard England as the mother-land, the place clustered with sacred and intimate associations, where there was for him always a welcome and a mother's love and blessing. It was in that spirit that he pictured England; but now the other force operated. England became a vague recollection rather than an actuality. The material interests which bound the

colonists to Great Britain were real, "but they were too indirect and remote to appeal to ordinary men. The tie of sentiment was actually weakened by the necessary closeness of administrative relations. The vague reverence of the mediæval ecclesiastic for the grandeur of Rome failed as he was brought face to face with the intrigues and corruptions of the Papal Court. Not dissimilar were the feelings of the colonist who like Franklin was driven to contrast the vast responsibilities of the British Government with the sordid realities of parliamentary corruption and ministerial intrigue."¹

The interests of the colonist were centred in America and not in England; his interests were, as we have often seen, frequently opposed to those of England. It was not England he looked to as his father's house where a mother waited to welcome him with outstretched arms, to share his triumph or to encourage him in the face of failure; rather, it was a stepmother who ruled, who felt little affection, and made him understand that he occupied second place in the home of his father.

Conclusive proof that a *national* spirit existed in America before the Revolution, and made it imperative that men should be either English tories or American radicals, is afforded by the action of South Carolina, which was symptomatic of the spirit that prevailed in the North as well as in the South. There was a homogeneous and united white population in

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 234.

South Carolina, which was one of the pampered colonies; its trade was more largely with England than with the Northern Colonies, it held close and intimate intercourse with the mother-country. Everything should have tended to make it support England rather than those firebrands of the North; if it could not approve the Stamp Act and the tax on tea, it would at least maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality. But, on the contrary, we are told, South Carolina was the first colony outside of New England to send delegates to the Congress which met in New York to resist the Stamp Act. When afterwards the East India Company shipped tea to all the colonies, the cargoes sent to Charleston were stored and the merchants forbidden to sell them.¹ When the port of Boston was closed and Massachusetts appealed to the other colonies for assistance, a mass meeting was held in Charleston and the people of the province voted unanimously to support Massachusetts in its resistance to the Crown. The reason South Carolina was so prompt to come to the support of Massachusetts may be found in the resolutions adopted at the mass meeting, which declared that the recent acts, "though leveled immediately at the port of Boston, very manifestly and glaringly show, if the inhabitants of that town are intimidated into a mean submission to said acts, that the like are designed for all the colonies, when

¹ Fisher: *Men, Women, and Manners in Colonial Times*, vol. II, pp. 321-25, *passim*.

not even the shadow of liberty to his person or of security to his property, will be left to any of His Majesty's subjects residing on the American continent."¹ Causes that affected similarly the people of all the colonies, that were national in scope, were the ties to bind a people into nationality.

To deny that the Americans are a Nation has seemed to be a matter of pride with a great many European writers. How can the Americans be a Nation? they ask, when its people are composed of so many antagonistic races with no common speech. If these writers turn to the history of England, they will see that America is passing through the same process of race amalgamation that produced the English Nation, the only difference being that what took place in Britain was in the time of mythical legend, whereas what is taking place in America is in a day when all that happens is carefully recorded and minutely weighed in the scales of science. He who doubts whether the Americans have been able to evolve a nation out of the races of Europe may read with profit the first half-dozen pages or so of the first chapter of Macaulay's *History of England*, and there find how race has been imposed upon race and language upon language. But it will be said that this happened in Britain a thousand years or more agone, and while in the course of ten centuries a nation may be created, it is as impossible to accomplish the same result in a hundred years as it

¹ Fisher: *Op. cit.*

would be to raise a forest of oaks from acorns between seasons.

To hold to this belief argues the theory that human development can be as precisely measured as the time required to produce certain crops under normal conditions may be accurately determined. The development of man is neither uniform nor constant, nor has it progressed at the same pace at all periods in his civilization, nor is it uninfluenced by the general civilization of mankind, or the conditions under which civilization in general advances. What at one period may have required two hundred years, to bring the world forward a single step, may to-day be accomplished in a decade; for so much higher is the general level of intelligence, so much more responsive are men's minds to accept progress, so much easier is it to communicate thought, that time, measured by the past, is relative only. Mere time, therefore,—so many months or years or centuries,—means nothing, and to attempt to prove that sufficient time has not elapsed to develop the American Nation is not only unscientific but foolish.¹

Fortunately, we are able in a measure to demon-

¹ "One must not overlook the Law of Acceleration. Man probably dates from the Tertiary Period — three hundred thousand years. He has developed more in the last three thousand than in the preceding two hundred and ninety-seven thousand, and more in the last three hundred than in the preceding three thousand, and in some respects more in the last fifty than in the preceding two hundred and ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and fifty. We see more change now in ten years than originally in ten thousand. Who shall foretell the developments of a generation?" — Angell: *The Great Illusion*, p. 175.

strate that the European immigrant is in some respects physically affected by his American surroundings, and if rigid physical conformation is subject to exterior influence, we may reasonably conclude that the mind — more sensitive and plastic than the body — equally responds to the pressure of environment and association. Under the direction of the Immigration Commission an investigation of the physical changes in the descendants of immigrants has been conducted by Professor Franz Boas, of Columbia University, a foremost authority on anthropology. The investigation was carried on in New York City and its immediate vicinity, and the results to which reference is made are based entirely upon the measurements of Sicilians and East European Hebrews. In introducing Professor Boas's report the Commission says: —

The results, in the opinion of Professor Boas, are much more far-reaching than was anticipated. It is probably not too much to say that they indicate a discovery in anthropological science that is fundamental in importance. The report seems to indicate that the descendant of the European immigrant "changes his type even in the first generation almost entirely. Children born even a few years after the arrival of the immigrant parents in America develop in such a way that they differ in type, essentially, from their foreign-born parents. These differences seem to develop during the earliest childhood and persist throughout life. It seems that every part of the body is influenced in this way, and even the form of the head, which has always been considered as one of the

most permanent hereditary features, undergoes considerable changes.

"The importance of this entirely unexpected result lies in the fact that even those characteristics which modern science has led us to consider as most stable are subject to thorough changes under the new environment." This would indicate the conclusion "that racial physical characteristics do not survive under the new social and climatic environment of America." The adaptability of the various races coming together on our shores seems, if these indications shall be fully borne out in later study, to be much greater than had been anticipated. If the American environment can bring about an assimilation of the head forms in the first generation, may it not be that other characteristics may be as easily modified, and that there may be a rapid assimilation of widely varying nationalities and races to something that may well be called an American type?

The Commission feels that it is too early to pronounce absolutely upon this question. The investigation is by no means complete, and moreover, considering the importance of the subject, it should clearly be carried on on a larger scale and in different surroundings in various parts of the country, and perhaps also be checked up by certain investigations made upon the same races elsewhere. Without venturing, therefore, to pronounce as yet a definite judgment, the Commission expresses its confidence in the training and ability of Professor Boas in charge of the work, and urges strongly the desirability of continuing this most important investigation on an extended scale.¹

¹ The Immigration Commission: *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants*, p. 6.

Professor Boas sums up the general results of the investigation as follows: —

The head form, which has always been considered as one of the most stable and permanent characteristics of human races, undergoes far-reaching changes due to the transfer of the races of Europe to American soil. The East European Hebrew, who has a very round head, becomes more long-headed; the South Italian, who in Italy has an exceedingly long head, becomes more short-headed; so that both approach a uniform type in this country.

The head form may conveniently be expressed by a number indicating the transversal diameter (or width of the head) in per cents of the diameter measured from forehead to the back of the head (or the length of the head). When the head is elongated (that is, narrow when seen from the front, and long when seen in profile), this number will be high. The width of head expressed in per cents of the length of the head is about 78 per cent among Sicilians born in Sicily; it is about 84 per cent among Hebrews born in Eastern Europe; among Sicilians born in America this number rises to more than 80 per cent, while among East European Hebrews born in America it sinks to 81 per cent.

This fact is one of the most suggestive ones discovered in our investigation, because it shows that not even those characteristics of a race which have proved to be most permanent in their old home remain the same under our surroundings; and we are compelled to conclude that when these features of the body change, the whole bodily and mental make-up of the immigrants may change.

The influence of American environment upon the

descendants of immigrants increases with the time that the immigrants have lived in this country before the birth of their children.

We have proved this statement by comparing the features of individuals of a certain race born abroad, born in America within ten years after the arrival of the mother, and born ten years or more after the arrival of the mother. At present this investigation has been carried through only for East European Hebrews. It appears that the longer the parents have been here the greater is the approach of the descendants to the American type. The approach of the Hebrew and Sicilian types becomes very clear when we divide the American-born descendants into those born less than ten years after the arrival of the mothers and those born ten years and more after the arrival of the mothers.¹

In the first volume of this work the writer laid stress on the influence of environment in race development. Professor Boas deems it of equal importance.

According to our knowledge of anthropological conditions in the whole world [he says], the forms of the body seem to be the most stable characteristic of any given race or type. Indications have been found, however, showing that under more favorable environment the physical development of a race may improve. This was shown by Gould and Baxter in their investigations of the physical characteristics of the soldiers enlisting during the war of the rebellion.² . . . No evidence, how-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 7 *et seq.*

² Doctor Woods Hutchinson (*Saturday Evening Post*, November 6, 1909), referring to these measurements, says "that the average height of the Amer-

ever, has been collected which would show an actual change in type due to the influence of environment. . . .

From a practical point of view it seemed all-important to know whether American environment had a favorable or unfavorable effect upon the descendants of immigrants.

The investigation has shown much more than was anticipated. There are not only decided changes in the rate of development by immigrants, but there is also a far-reaching change in the type, a change which cannot be ascribed to selection or mixture, but which can only be explained as due directly to the influence of environment. This conclusion has been tested, and in many different ways, and seems to be amply proved. It has been stated before that, according to all our experiences, the bodily traits which have been observed to undergo a change under American environment belong to those characteristics of the human body which are considered the most stable. We are, therefore, compelled to draw the conclusion that if these traits change under the influence of environment, presumably none of the characteristics of the human types that come to America remain stable. The adaptability of the immigrant seems to be very much greater than we had a right to suppose before our investigations were instituted.¹

ican-born soldiers exceeded that of the foreign-born soldiers of the nations from which they were descended by an inch and three quarters. Not only this, but further analysis showed that the greatest heights, chest expansions, and weights in the entire series were found in the recruits from those states which were most purely American in blood, in the sense of having been free from foreign admixture by immigration for at least one hundred years, so that most of the people were probably Americans of from the third to the fifth generation. . . . The girth of chest of our native-born recruits was nearly half an inch greater than the average of the European-born."

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

Finally Professor Boas says:—

If the material here discussed were not derived from pure sources,—in other words, if father and mother were not both Hebrews or both Sicilians of pure descent,—an approach of the descendants, due to mixture with the prevailing type of Americans, might explain the approach in type of the descendants. We have, however, selected only individuals of pure descent, and there is no reason to assume the occurrence of mixtures in the group of American-born.

I think, therefore, that we are justified in the conclusion that the removal of the East European Hebrew to America is accompanied by a marked change in type, which does not affect the young child born abroad and growing up in American environment, but which makes itself felt among the children born in America, even a short time after the arrival of the parents in this country. The change of type seems to be very rapid, but the changes continue to increase; so that the descendants of immigrants born a long time after the arrival of the parents in this country differ more from their parents than do those born a short time after the arrival of the parents in the United States.¹

Professor Boas has shown that cranially the difference between the East European Hebrew and the Sicilian disappears in their American-born descendants and that the tendency is to a common type. Physically and facially there is a distinct American type, although some European observers deny

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

this.¹ National instinct, self-taught, makes a people realize their own racial peculiarities. Uncle Sam of cartoon and caricature — lean, lithe, angular, lantern-jawed, and sallow — is the exaggeration of the American type; all the more striking when compared with the typical caricature of the Englishman — red-faced, rotund, with limbs and body shorter and better proportioned than the American. It is not the “mere outward marks, the style of dress, the *tournure*,” that differentiates the Englishman and the American; it is that we have two races with characteristics so marked that they are easily distinguished. The mind of each is reflected in his physical structure. The build of the American proclaims nervous activity, restless energy, force always in motion, much of which is dissipated because the energy is not under the control of discipline, — that unconscious mental discipline which is the heritage of a society long established, where

¹ “It would be fantastic to expect the various European races in America to fuse physically. There is no such thing as an American type, and even if in the towns of Europe it is possible at first glance to point out such and such a tourist as an American, recognition is effected by mere outward marks, the style of dress, the *tournure* or the alert expression which soon characterizes people who always have to ‘hustle.’ It must take many generations before Americans are physiologically differentiated from Europeans as much as, say, the French are from the Germans. But assimilation of a simpler and more superficial nature has been in progress ever since the country was colonized, and it is not easy to discern any force sufficiently strong to stop it now. By heredity, doubtless, many traits of European characters may be perpetuated here; but the force of environment is overpoweringly at work to maintain at a high level the habits of life and social aims of the newcomers.” — *Report on Immigration into the United States by the Honourable R. C. Lindsay, Second Secretary to His Majesty’s Embassy at Washington*, p. 25.

tradition and form and precedent check, to a certain extent, enterprise, and discourage innovation. The Englishman is commonly supposed to be more phlegmatic than the American, which means that he has himself under better control, the result of that discipline to which reference has been made; in his manner and speech and methods he is deliberate, which does not necessarily mean that his is a slower mind,—although that is the common belief of Americans,—but is the effect of requiring time for consideration before action, of the long practiced habit of rejecting the new simply because it is new, and being compelled, often against his own will, to accept what progress finally forces upon him.

The popular idea seems to be that the “foreigner,” that is, the non-English-speaking person, is in a majority in the United States, and that the annual accessions of non-English-speaking immigrants weaken the vitality, the character, and the institutions of America. Statistics, however, show the fallacy of this belief. The Twelfth Census returned a total population of 76,303,387, of whom 65,843,302 were native-born, and 10,460,085 foreign-born.¹ The designation “native parentage,” as used by the Census Office, comprehends all persons having both parents native-born, one parent native-born, and one parent unknown, or both parents unknown, while “foreign parentage” comprehends all persons having one or both parents foreign-born. Of the 1,282,288 whites

¹ *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900*, vol. II, part II, tables I and II.

enumerated at the last census, ten years of age and over, unable to speak English, 65,008 were native-born of foreign parents, and the remainder, 1,217, 280, were foreign-born,¹ showing again how quickly the foreigner becomes Americanized through the influence of language. We know further, through careful investigation, that the 26,000 men who in 1640 constituted the population of New England have in this day multiplied to 15,000,000, so that about a sixth of the present population of the United States can trace its descent back in an unbroken line to the men who first planted the English-speaking New World.² But the greatest force operating to merge nationalities and to make of the alien an American is the necessity, quickly learned by the alien, that, if he is to succeed in the new country, — and it is the hope of success under new conditions which has always been the incentive to emigration, — he must speak the language of the country, cast off his customs and habits, and become in all things an American. “It is the English language which in the United States has welded into one nation the motley crowd of immigrants landing from so many countries and professing so many religions.”³

“The closing of New York’s solitary German theatre,” the *New York Sun* recently commented,⁴ “calls attention to the fact that one of the largest

¹ *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900*, vol. II, part II, p. cxxiii.

² Fiske: *Beginnings of New England*, p. 143.

³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. VIII, p. 546.

⁴ May 16, 1909.

German cities in the world has ceased to possess many features once thought indispensable to the colonies of expatriates from the Fatherland. It is now uncertain that there will be a German theatre of a serious character here in the future, and practically only one characteristically German restaurant makes any claim for the patronage liberally divided among the numerous eating-places described as French. Thus, in spite of its large German population, New York will soon show few of the superficial evidences of its right to rank among the largest of the German cities."

Explaining that New York's Teutonic colony "is not composed of recent arrivals who are constantly seeking reminders of the home they left behind them, whether in the playhouse or in their way of life," the *Sun* continues: "It used to be said that the German theatre could rely on only two classes for its support. These were the Germans who had been here too short a time to learn the language and those who were too far advanced in years when they arrived ever to hope to acquire it. There were other elements in the audiences, however, for it has become an established fact that German plays were never profitable unless there was something in them to attract the interest of American theatre-goers. Even the two divisions of the German public on which the theatre could formerly depend seem to have passed away. The older Germans have ceased to go to the theatre, while the younger have

learned English well enough to find pleasure only in the American playhouses."

Since the above was written, the world has been amused by the rival claims of Doctor Cook and Commander Peary to the honor of having been the first at the North Pole. Doctor Cook's father was a German, who anglicized his name by translating it, which is always the first step in the transformation of the alien into the American. Will it be asserted that because Doctor Cook's father was a German, Doctor Cook, born in America, is not an American, or that the accident of descent outweighs the facts of education, association, environment, companionship, language, and political teaching? If Doctor Cook is not an American, what in the name of ethnology is he? If Doctor Cook is not an American because his father was a German, is the son of an English duke any the less an Englishman because his mother is an American? Are Doctor Cook's children, born in America, educated in America, speaking the English of America, to be accounted Germans because their grandfather was a German, or shall their father's birth and their own birth and training and environment be accounted of less weight in the formation of national character than the strain of blood derived from a man whom they never knew and who could have influenced them only indirectly? No one will question the Americanism of Doctor Cook's children; thus we see, in this specific instance, which is typical of

a process continually at work, that in the life of one man the German element has been obliterated by American nationality.

Equally significant is this telegram, which was inconspicuously printed in the American newspapers and excited no comment — so much is it taken as a matter of course that in America ultimately all nations must speak, and *think*, in English: —

NEWARK, N. J., May 8. — Despite strong opposition, especially on the part of the older members, the Atlantic conference of the German Evangelical churches in session here to-day decided to allow the use of English in the service and business meetings of the churches. The opposition maintained that the use of English would deprive the churches of their distinctive character. The younger members declared, however, that it was almost impossible to reach American children of German parentage, because of their not speaking German.

The resolution adopted provides that English may be used when it is demanded by a portion of the congregation, provided the pastor and elder of the district approve and it is sanctioned by the next conference.¹

In the *New York Sun*, of March 11, 1910, a correspondent, writing from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, tells of the suspension of *Der Volksfreund und Beobachter*, up to that time the only surviving German newspaper in Lancaster, which had an existence of nearly one hundred and two years. "For more than one hundred years," he writes, "Lancaster has had

¹ *Washington Star*, May 9, 1909.

her German newspaper actively competing with the English. For a number of years the community ably supported a German daily. It is a significant fact that there are not now sufficient readers of German to support even a weekly. Pennsylvania Dutch is still spoken in the northern parts of Lancaster County, but comparatively few of the population can read German; and while they may converse in the German dialect, having been educated in the public schools, they read English newspapers. Journalism in English has now completely crowded out the German here." Ceaselessly this irresistible force of amalgamation and assimilation is at work. The schools, the newspapers, "the spirit of America"—vague, intangible, but very concrete—encompass the foreigner to draw him under its influence and to make him what he desires to be—an American.

It was remarked in the first volume that the belief long held in the intellectual and physical vigor of an unmixed strain has now been scientifically proved to be a fallacy, and that as a matter of fact there are to-day no unmixed races,—with the possible exception of the Japanese, who are as much of a puzzle ethnologically as they are in nearly everything else,—and the great races, those that have dominated the world, have in their veins the blood of many peoples.¹

¹ "There are few unmixed languages in the world, as there are few unmixed races; but the one mixture does not at all determine the other, or measure it.

Luther Burbank, perhaps the world's foremost scientific plant breeder, in a magazine article written a few years ago, says: —

In the course of many years of investigation into the plant life of the world, creating new forms, modifying old ones, adapting others to new conditions, and blending still others, I have constantly been impressed with the similarity between the organization and the development of plant and human life. While I have never lost sight of the principle of the survival of the fittest and all that it implies as an explanation of the development and progress of plant life, I have come to find in the crossing of species and in selection, wisely directed, a great and powerful instrument for the transformation of the vegetable kingdom along lines that lead constantly upward. The crossing of species is to me paramount. Upon it, wisely directed and accompanied by a rigid selection of the best and as rigid an exclusion of the poorest, rests the hope of all progress. The mere crossing of species, unaccompanied by selection, wise supervision, intelligent care, and the utmost patience, is not unlikely to result in marked good, and may result in vast harm. Unorganized effort is often most vicious in its tendencies.¹

Mr. Burbank notes that in the year 1904, 752,864 immigrants came into the United States, assigned to more than fifty distinct nationalities.

The English is a very striking proof of this; the preponderating French-Latin element in our vocabulary gets its most familiar and indispensable part from the Normans, a Germanic race, who got it from the French, a Celtic race, who got it from the Italians, among whom the Latin-speaking community were at first a very insignificant element, numerically." — Whitney: *The Life and Growth of Language*, p. 9.

¹ *The Century Magazine*, New York, May, 1906.

Some of these immigrants [he says] will mate with others of their own class, notably the Jews, thus not markedly changing the current; many will unite with others of allied speech; still others marry into races wholly different from their own, while a far smaller number will perhaps find union with what we may call native stock.

But wait until two decades have passed, until there are children of age to wed, and then see, under the changed conditions, how widespread will be the mingling. So for many years the foreign nations have been pouring into this country and taking their part in the vast blending. . . . In my work with plants and flowers I introduce color here, shape there, size or perfume, according to the product desired. In such processes the teachings of Nature are followed. Its great forces only are employed. All that has been done for plants and flowers by crossing, Nature has already accomplished for the American people. By the crossings of types, strength has in one instance been secured; in another, intellectuality; in still another, moral force. Nature alone could do this. The work of man's head and hands has not yet been summoned to prescribe for the development of a race. So far a preconceived and mapped-out crossing of bloods finds no place in the making of peoples and nations. But when Nature has already done its duty, and the crossing leaves a product which in the rough displays the best human attributes, all that is left to be done falls to selective environment.

Mr. Burbank closes an extremely suggestive and instructive article in these pertinent words: —

Whenever you have a nation in which there is no variation, there is comparatively little insanity or crime, or

exalted morality or genius. Here in America, where the variation is greatest, statistics show a greater percentage of all these variations.

As time goes on its endless and ceaseless course, environment must crystallize the American Nation; its varying elements will become unified, and the weeding-out process will, by the means indicated in this paper, by selection and environmental influences, leave the finest human product ever known. The transcendent qualities which are placed in plants will have their analogies in the noble composite, the American of the future.

This is the dictum of the scientist. Here is proof offered by the practical observer, and there is nothing more practical in America than its newspapers: —

Two years ago in Fall River, Pawtucket, Lowell, Lawrence, and other smaller manufacturing centres, on Saturday afternoons, Sundays, and holidays, it was a sight to watch the crowds, — not a few, but hundreds, in their native dress, representing about every nation under the sun. Very little of the conversation was understood by the American mixing in the crowd. To-day the foreigner in native dress is comparatively a rare sight, as they are so much Americanized by contact with native help in the mills, by the instruction and advice of their overseers and second-hands, that they are good spenders for American clothing, and each year finds them living in better style and in better localities, and many are already property owners, which means they have come to stay.¹

¹ Quoted by the Springfield, Massachusetts, *Republican*, August 12, 1909, from the *American Wool and Cotton Reporter*.

The writer of this article notes that at first it was difficult to teach these foreigners. "They could be told nothing, as our language was entirely unknown, so that their early training was largely through motions and personal demonstration on the part of the department heads. But they came here to get money, and were reasonably willing and quick to learn, and to-day the growing mill population is of these people and their offspring, who will prove a fine class of help within a few years, as they reach the necessary age."

Only a person hopelessly blind or willfully prejudiced could deny the self-evident truth of the Americanization and nationalization of the immigrant.

Mr. Bryce, with his penetrating insight into American sociology, was impressed with the uniformity of American life,¹ this uniformity seeming to him to be almost monotonous in its reproduction of a fixed type, so little did he find Americans of East or West to differ from one another, so well established are the characteristics of the American, with such fidelity are the habits and customs in one part of the country reproduced in another. Could there be any stronger testimony that there exists an American Nation, that the people are as one in all the essential things that go to make a Nation? If there were men of diverse race and nationalities living under a common political system which had

¹ Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, chap. cxvi, *passim*.

no power to weld them nationally, instead of uniformity so striking as to force itself upon the acute observer, diversity would be the most salient characteristic. Mr. Bryce would have been as much impressed by their dissimilarity as he must have been by the difference between Englishmen and Frenchmen when for the first time he crossed the twenty miles of open water that separates England from France. But in America, although three thousand miles had to be spanned between East and West, he found a people who in their essential characteristics were in all things the same, whose civilization had absorbed into itself that of the foreigner instead of having been modified by foreign influence.

A constant effort is made to have it appear that the civilization of America is like unto a desert, the sands of which are the foreign element, with here and there an oasis, which is the "native" or "American" element; and that the oasis is continually in danger of being engulfed by the ever-increasing sand. It would, I think, be more correct if the simile were reversed. In some of the Western states there are great stretches of desert land, valueless and incapable of supporting life, an alien and rebellious element in a land of peculiar bounty. This may be likened, although the comparison is extreme, to the newly arrived immigrant. These worthless arid lands are brought under control and become productive by artificial irrigation, and the desert, now made tractable, takes on the character of the land

in more favored regions and performs its useful part in the American economy. The bringing under cultivation of the desert is analogous to the physical process that is constantly in progress in the mental and racial assimilation of the immigrant. The desert does not encroach on the farm or the city; the farm and the city are projected into the desert; daily there is less desert and more farms. Similarly we do not see the alien submerging the American or pulling down his civilization. He is the desert to be reclaimed, and he *is* reclaimed. In a few years the desert has lost all traces of its origin and makes excellent farming-land, frequently better than any other, for it is one of the peculiarities of these arid lands that they need only water to yield phenomenally. So with the human desert, the alien. Alien he was, but fertilized by the influences of American civilization his character has been changed; he has become as much assimilated with America as the once desert land has been transformed and incorporated into the productive land of the nation.

As far back as 1782, St. John Crèvecoeur, a land cultivator in New York, and later French consul in New York City, observed the phenomenon never absent in America of the melting process of race. Remarking that the Americans are a "mixture of English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes," he thus explains the welding of these diverse nationalities into the American: "He is either an European, or the descendant of an Euro-

pean, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country. I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, whose son married a Frenchwoman, and whose present four sons have now four wives of different nations. He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an American by being received in the broad lap of our great *Alma Mater*. Here individuals of all races are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world. . . . The Americans were once scattered all over Europe; here they are incorporated into one of the finest systems of population which has ever appeared, and which will hereafter become distinct by the power of the different climates they inhabit."¹

From 1782 to 1909 is a far cry, as far as from St. John Crèvecoeur to the anonymous editorial writer of the daily newspaper. The Frenchman was able to see what would happen, the American has seen the prediction verified. Discussing the "Effects of Immigration" the *Washington Post* says:² —

That each race brings its influence is not to be denied, but it would seem that the genius of the nation proves

¹ Crèvecoeur: *Letters from an American Farmer*, p. 48 *et seq.*

² August 23, 1909.

too powerful. The newcomers apparently imbibe a new spirit and the old customs and prejudices insensibly melt away. Within three generations, or even less, the controlling stamp of a foreign ancestry, dominant for ages, has been known to disappear. English, German, and French forget their antipathies. They commingle and intermarry, and soon there is posterity that is none of these, but altogether American.

Even among the nationalities that keep the blood unaltered, the character of the social life and the trend of thought are soon affected. The Jews may be cited as an instance. Uninfluenced for centuries by contact with the people of other countries, they have not so well understood the breadth of the American spirit and its modifying effects, and the old orthodox generation, strict in its observances, stands aghast at the enthusiasm with which the new generation adopts the free manners of the country, ignoring those exclusive barriers which the race itself has set.

Should an attempt be made to stem this tide of immigration, who would be the "Americans" to lead in the movement? It could not be other than amusing to trace their ancestry. Whatever their origin, all would be alike in their patriotism.

Mr. Burbank has said that man is not able to prescribe for the development of a race. This is true, but man can indicate the path along which that development will lie. Let us see what man has done in America to prevent a reversion to original types, to secure the stability of the new type, and to make an American Nation.

CHAPTER XII

THE CONSTITUTION

A MONUMENTAL episode in the world's history — the American Constitution. Never was there anything like it except when the lawgiver delivered to his people the Ten Commandments, which, like the American Constitution, was not only a code of civil law but a moral code; the precepts of life for a nation; its material as well as spiritual guidance. The American Constitution changed the whole thought of mankind; it affected all the world; it introduced a new system of political philosophy; it gave to man, the individual, a dignity he had not before possessed; it re-created the relations between the individual and society; "humanity stands forth in more grandeur and power."¹

Excessive and extravagant praise this, it may be said, and yet a philosophical examination of the Constitution and the results that have flowed from it will sustain this view. The history of mankind is a struggle for liberty and equality. From the time that there were men to teach and to preach,

¹ "In America the leading principle of constitutional liberty has from the first been, that the sovereignty reposed in the people." — Cooley: *General Principles of Constitutional Law*, p. 23.

they taught liberty and proclaimed equality, but neither liberty nor equality existed as we to-day know them until liberty and equality were written into the American Constitution, there to remain and to be a beacon light to all the world.

Other constitutions have grown slowly; this was born with full stature. Other constitutions have been the concrete history of a people who painfully and after many sacrifices won their struggle for freedom and justice. This was the voluntary surrender by an entire people at the birth of nationality of certain so-called "rights" and the legal recognition of "rights" supposed to be inherent in the individual. Never before had the universal equality of man been established by law. In the democracies of the past there were always class distinctions, caste became established, society either fell into or created for itself orders; the gulf between patrician and plebeian, between freeman and slave, between knight and vassal, was too wide to be crossed; and the world believed that in the perpetuation of class distinction was to be found the salvation of society. A few pages of manuscript brought social chaos, according to the teachings of the past; the foundations of society were leveled and on their ruins was imposed a new structure.¹ Before that blast walls buttressed for centuries in the customs

¹ "Democracy had produced a force against which the old systems could not stand. It rushed forward with a fervor, an energy, and a wild faith which nothing could resist." — Lodge: *The Story of the Revolution*, p. 554.

and habits of man, which had resisted all assaults, went down.¹

The world was now to see the experiment, not of classes, but of one class; not one man legally above another, but each man the legal equal of all others; not one man endowed with superior rights, but all men enjoying the same rights; not one man elevated above his kind, but all men on the same plane.²

There was something mystic in this, something that to the ordinary mind seemed the work of a power greater than the finite intelligence of man. The elements of a constitution "which excite the most easy reverence," Bagehot says, "will be the *theatrical* elements — those which appeal to the senses, which claim to be embodiments of the greatest human ideas, which boast in some cases of far more than human origin."³ The glamour of the Declaration of Independence — which of course has no legal force and is simply a declaration, but which popularly is regarded as a preface to and a part of the Constitution — and the preamble to the latter, wherein it is recited that one of its objects is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and

¹ "The advent of democracy shattered the old framework of political society. The hierarchy of classes and their internal cohesion was destroyed, and the time-honored social ties which bound the individual to the community were severed." — Ostrogorski: *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, vol. I, p. 3.

² "In our days it is hard to believe that during the monarchical *régime* in France, there was definitely established the maxim that 'the right to labour is a royal right which the prince may sell and subjects must buy.'" — Spencer: *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. II, p. 458.

³ Bagehot: *The English Constitution*, p. 76.

our Posterity," have always seemed to the American to endow him with a special grace not vouchsafed to other people.¹ It is idle to contend that imagination does not play a part in the formation of national character. When we say that no Englishman has read *Magna Charta*, we indulge in little exaggeration, yet the Englishman knows what *Magna Charta* means and feels his sense of security; *Magna Charta* and the writ of *habeas corpus* are real things to him, although he would be hard-pushed to explain them with legal accuracy. In the same way the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution make their appeal to the American, whose imagination is stirred by the thought that they have given him his birthright, that they invest him with liberty and equality; he is fired with the belief that he has something not possessed by other people.² The legal and political aspects of the Constitution have been much written about, and they do not properly belong in a work of this character; but it is the moral and psychological influences of the Constitution, those influences that have had so much to do in forming the American character and

¹ "The Declaration of Independence is a kind of war song; it is a stately and passionate chant of human freedom; it is a prose lyric of civil and military heroism." — *The Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 521.

² "Our country is still figured in the imagination of its citizens as the Land of Promise. They still believe that somehow and sometime something better will happen to good Americans than has happened to men in any other country; and this belief, vague, innocent, and uninformed though it be, is the expression of an essential constituent in our national ideal." — Croly: *The Promise of American Life*, p. 3.

giving to the American qualities that set him as a man apart from other men, that have been less considered by writers, and to me seem, in a sense, of even greater importance than the political consequences of the code. The thought again forces itself on my mind that the only instance in the world's history comparable to the work of that assembly in Philadelphia were the tables of stone that Moses brought with him from the mount; both were political as well as moral codes; both have governed the lives of a people; both were a warning and a promise; both made that appeal to imagination without which a commandment or a code may be a rule of conduct but can never arouse the emotions.

One other observation is pertinent. The message delivered to the lawgiver on Horeb was graven on stone, symbolical that it was to be as enduring as the everlasting hills whence the stone was hewed. The men who wrote their message on parchment had the superb confidence of genius that they labored not for men but for mankind, that their work was not for the moment but would triumphantly defy time. Rutledge expressed the feeling that so filled the convention when he said: "As we are laying the foundation for a great empire, we ought to take a permanent view of the subject and not look at the present moment only."¹

While undoubtedly the American Constitution has made its appeal to the American and left its pro-

¹ *Documentary History of the Constitution*, vol. III, p. 641.

found influence upon him, it has, to a very large extent, been an unconscious influence, in the same way that men without conscious deliberation are swayed by their religion or controlled by their inherited prejudices; and the force of tradition, the bias and tendencies that are born in men, as a rule, exercise their dominating influence. It has been a matter of surprise to me to find how very little real knowledge the Americans have of their Constitution, although it is on their lips as frequently as the names of the saints are on those of good Catholics. Boys and girls usually have only a vague idea of the great charter, some of them confusing it with the Declaration of Independence, of which they believe it is a part; while with the exception of a few constitutional lawyers, public men are not much better informed.

Before the adoption of the American Constitution it had been beyond the power of man to conceive that organized society could exist without the recognition of a Supreme Being shaping the destinies of the state, which involved its corollary, the worship of God according to the prescribed formulas of temporal authority; in a word, the establishment of a state religion. The makers of the American Constitution could find no place in it for God. Thus the Constitution did that which had never been done before — it elevated man and deposed God; it set man above God, some of its critics have charged.

To read any expositor or historian of the Constitution is quickly to have it made apparent that the Constitution was a compromise, a political compromise; it was a compromise between big states and little states, between North and South, between men of opposing views; it was a critical moment, and the danger that threatened could only be averted by concessions. I have not, however, been able to find any writer who has explained the religious compromise, for it must be evident to every one that it was no accident by which God was left out of the Constitution. There was substantial reason. Either the men who framed the Constitution were irreligious, in the ordinary use of the term, — and we need waste no time in overturning that man of straw, — or they were of such extraordinary tolerance and liberality of view and endowed with such prescience that they were willing to deny their own principles for the sake of the common good.

In an address delivered by the editor of the *North American Review* before the University of Kansas the simple explanation is found in the word Tolerance. In the discussions over the Constitution there was never for an instant, he says, the spectre of religious bigotry. “A new force had arisen. A new king was born. The adoption of the Constitution signalized the crowning of Tolerance. If tomorrow this Nation should be obliterated, if the earth itself should be destroyed, the greatest glory of any people would be left in these imperishable

words: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'"¹

In the previous volume reference has been made to the convenient custom of historians in explaining a mystery by a miracle, and it is in the same spirit that the editor of the *North American Review* credits Americans of the eighteenth century with a tolerance possessed by no other people. Whence came this tolerance? Why were Americans superior to men of other nationalities? There was certainly nothing in their past training or their lives to make them less intolerant than Englishmen, or more liberal in matters of religion; not when we recall the harshness of Puritanism or the persecutions of Maryland Episcopalians. The mystery is not explained, which is one of the conveniences of ascribing natural occurrences to a miracle, for a miracle needs no explanation; it must be accepted on faith.

Extremes meet, in morals as well as in physics. It was less due to the tolerance of the men who gathered in Philadelphia, — Puritans, Cavaliers, Quakers, Atheists, all men of strong conviction and signal determination, as the editor of the *North American Review* notes, — and more to their intolerance, that the Constitution contains no mention

¹ *North American Review*, July, 1909.

of God. Each man was so firmly set in his own convictions, each man held so intolerantly to his own religion and would yield nothing to any other, that the only possible compromise was to ignore the whole subject; it was either that or to reach no conclusion. The God of the Puritan was not the God of the Cavalier or the Quaker; the Atheist could cynically watch the believers in a God quarreling about their own God, while denying the God of any other creed. Where there was no supreme authority to enforce obedience and no power of coercion, when the life of a nation hung on a thread and wise men saw that either the Constitution must be adopted or the Confederation would resolve itself into its original elements, and instead of a nation there would be thirteen petty republics to oppose the power of Britain, it was no time to squabble over forms of religion or weigh nationality against creed. Once again accident moulded destiny. Because there were men of many creeds, obstinate in their faith and uncompromising in their beliefs, a people were given a civil and moral code in which morality was kept apart from religion. For a century and more all the world has echoed the praises of the liberality and tolerance of the framers of the Constitution, and it was their intolerance rather than their tolerance, their bigotry rather than their liberality, that taught mankind the meaning of tolerance and set an example in liberality that has influenced the world. What a cynical joke is history

when properly read! How much this has meant to Americans and how great its influence on their character and their institutions, their whole view of life, their development and their psychology, is written on every page of their history.

If we wish to ascribe to Providence certain causes that are as inevitably the consequence of human action as heat is the result of chemical process, and if we believe that an established state religion is more likely to dwarf development than to promote national morality, we may well regard it as providential that the colonies freed themselves from English rule, and that when they came to make their Constitution differences of religion were irreconcilable. Had the colonies remained under English control, the Church of England would have been introduced as the state religion, and Puritanism would have become one of several varieties of nonconformism. The great example of a religionless (but not an irreligious) nation, where religion was a matter of conscience not enforced by the state or governed by law, would not have been given to the world; and the world, perhaps even to this day, would believe that morality could not exist apart from a church establishment, presided over by a bench of bishops, supported out of the public revenues. America has taught the world many things, but no one thing that has tended to greater progress and freedom from intellectual superstition than when she set her feet firmly on the road that leads to morality un-

marked by the milestones of a state-supported church.

It was in a large measure accident that rendered the decision, but the minds of the men who sat in that convention had been prepared by influences other than English, the effects of which are to be found in what may properly be called the metaphysical articles of the Constitution and in a certain metaphysical strain that has survived in the American character.

The metaphysical conceives of a rule or principle of law as existing by virtue of some general rule or principle in the nature of things, and the men who made the Constitution were filled with this spirit. Freedom, political and civil, was the fount from which all virtues flowed, and the morality, wisdom, and justice of a people, they conceived, existed in proportion to their freedom and their political liberty. It served the same end that religion so often has in keeping a people in a straight path; the Constitution was, in fact, the national religion of America at the time when the nation was born. Many men of many faiths could not agree on the same form of worship or the way in which the existence of a supreme power should be recognized, but all could agree in venerating the principle that man could be spiritually exalted by being permitted the unlimited exercise of his own will.¹

Both prior to and after the Revolution, American

¹ Cf. De Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, vol. I, p. 451 *et seq.*

thought was much influenced by the philosophy of the French Encyclopædist,¹ who were in their turn to be influenced in 1789 by the Declaration of Independence and the result of the American struggle;² and in a scarcely lesser degree by the school of Hobbes and Locke. A curious, vague doctrine known as the "social contract," and "natural rights,"³ the *Jus naturale* of the Romans, had taken possession of men's minds and there germinated fantastic delusions. "Laws of nature" were hopelessly and inextricably jumbled up with artificial rights created by society and restrictions imposed by political requirements.⁴ Abstract principles made a greater appeal and were believed to be more efficacious than specific rules. So involved was their philosophy that an eminent legal writer called smuggling a crime against the law of nature. When smuggling is held to be a crime against nature instead of a crime against society or an offense contravening the king's revenues, it is not surprising that the framers of the Declaration of Independence found their justification in "the laws of nature."⁵ Jeffer-

¹ "It was from the ideas of the Parisian Freethinkers whom Burke so detested, that Jefferson, Franklin, and Henry drew those theories of human society that were so soon to find life in American Independence." — Morley: *Burke*, p. 68.

² Buckle: *History of Civilization*, p. 523 *et seq.*

³ "Men never entered into any social contract, as Hobbes and Rousseau supposed." — Spencer: *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. II, p. 449.

⁴ "It is, he says, the business of the legislator to do his best to make up to mankind for the loss of that equality, which was one of the comforts that men surrendered when they gave up the state of nature." — Morley: *Diderot and the Encyclopædist*, vol. I, p. 237.

⁵ "When we find a trained lawyer like Lord Camden, in the debate on the

son, who had more to do with the authorship of the Declaration than any one else, was a firm believer in the doctrine of natural rights. In America, Thomas Paine was its most successful pamphleteer.¹

There are American writers who believe that the Constitution was the beginning of American nationality, "that everything had begun suddenly at the time of the Revolution." An American author ascribes to the publication of Paine's *Common Sense*, the writer of which borrowed many of his ideas from Otis's pamphlet, *A Vindication of the House of Representatives*, the conversion of the majority of American Whigs in favor of independence, who up to that time had resisted the idea of separation from England.² That Paine's not strikingly original and somewhat tawdry mixture of uncertain philosophy and clumsy invective had a great effect on the public mind is well known, but it no more produced the Revolution than the spark causes the

Stamp Act, laying down the doctrine that the union of taxation and representation is a 'law of nature,' we are filled with wonder and despair." — *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 147.

The curious confusion of ideas in the seventeenth century found its counterpart in the nineteenth, when the opponents of protection denounced the "immorality" of a high tariff and really believed that a fiscal system could be attacked on ethical grounds; as if morality and economics were synonymous terms!

¹ This belief in the doctrine of natural rights was a serious obstacle to logical political thinking, and was a subordinate cause to promote friction. On October 29, 1765, the Massachusetts Assembly adopted a set of resolutions, the first of which reads: "That there are certain essential rights of the British constitution of government, which are founded in the law of God and nature, and are the common right of mankind."

² Tyler: *The Literary History of the American Revolution*, vol. i, p. 462.

explosion; the materials to work destruction must be there or else the spark gleams momentarily and strikes no fire. The train had been laid in the events of a hundred years, the American people were mentally a magazine of explosives, and rhetoric was the spark to fire them; they were in a mood more easily to be stirred by high-sounding phrases, by denunciation, by metaphysics, than they were to be converted by sound philosophy or political doctrine.

“The maxims of the French Revolution were in the air, and Jefferson was playing with them, now as idols, now as weapons. Men were swept off their feet by the power of formulas and phrases, and hard, clear thinking on the fundamental principles of politics and government was by no means so common as we are in the habit of supposing it was.”¹

The feeling against England had been gathering cyclonic force for a quarter of a century before Paine spoke; defiance of England and the possible consequences were on every man’s tongue,—over their port men of sober thought gravely discussed it, just as men less restrained told one another of their wrongs over their mug of beer in the alehouse. Those who were most attached to England could not help feeling anxious, for the future was uncertain; men with little or no love for England were concerned lest the political liberty they craved would be denied them. Nor must it be forgotten that one reason Paine and other protagonists found

¹ Butler: *Address at the Unveiling of the Statue of Alexander Hamilton*, p. 6.

such a ready audience was that the Puritan had a very stern, if perverted, sense of justice. British policy as it affected the colonies was unjust; hence it was to be opposed, and when opposition was futile it must be resisted. In the century before, the Puritan had banished and persecuted the "pestilential seducer" whose doctrines were a menace to the theocracy and whose preaching threatened the stability of the Puritan rule. The same spirit survived. The Puritan had come into the wilderness and made himself a new home in the hope that he might grow strong and find favor in the sight of his God. He had succeeded beyond all expectations. Like Jacob of old, the Lord had blessed him, and his herds and flocks had multiplied, and his children had grown up around him. Verily the Lord God of Israel had extended to him his protection and cherished him. Now, after the lapse of a hundred years, the old conflict was forced upon him, and again he must either yield to the tyranny of the oppressor or defend himself. He could not find peace in flight, nor would he. That time had passed. He had become too strong, too self-reliant, too sure of himself tamely to submit and to abandon his possessions. It was easier to resist, to fight if necessary, than to become a wanderer and begin life anew.

Political philosophy, that for ages had recognized as a "natural right" the existence of classes and the inequality of man, now swung to the other extreme and asserted a doctrine of natural rights that made

the existence of classes impossible. Not even the zeal of the reformer could blind itself to the self-evident fact that Nature in her haphazard and reckless way was the most arbitrary, aristocratic, and undemocratic force in existence, who in sheer wantonness created men unequal and had no sympathy with the doctrines of equality, except the equality of birth, suffering, and death. In their effort to defy the one great law of Nature and to make their conclusions square with their premises, the French Encyclopædists found that Man and not Nature was at fault. Inequality was not the result of conditions beyond the power of man to alter, but was the consequence of political enactment, so they wandered into the domain of speculative philosophy and lost themselves in a maze of natural rights, political rights, and civil rights.

To this school the "rights" secured by a constitution created nothing.¹ The Constitution simply put in concrete form certain fundamental rights that existed by nature and were inherent in man as a part of nature; that had their origin before human law was evolved, and of which man could not be robbed by his fellow man. Of obligations as opposed to rights the scholastics were silent; for while men living in a state of savagery may obey the primitive impulse of natural rights, — the law of force and cunning, — the moment society is organized, the rights of men, if not inferior to their obligations,

¹ Judson: *The Essentials of a Written Constitution*, p. 38.

are at least governed by them; they surrender the natural right to live according to their own inclination or instinct for the obligation to live according to the will of society expressed through the code of the majority.¹ The whole theory of the doctrine of natural rights is summed up in a few words of the Declaration of Independence that with rhetorical sonorousness vividly appealed to imaginations ready to be quickened: "That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Men believed this and were influenced by it. A magnificent illustration of the power of a phrase to sweep men into action.

It was fortunate for America, no less fortunate for all the world, that the men who made the Constitution were Americans and not Frenchmen; Americans who thought as Englishmen, whose speculations might be tinctured by French philosophy, but who would not be ruled by it. The Declaration of Independence was not embodied in the Constitution; that Constitution, while not stultifying the rhetoric of the Declaration to the extent of recognizing inequality, admitted the imperfections of human nature by a proper caution and the employment of numerous safeguards. All men were equal, but all men were not to be equally trusted; the peo-

¹ Huxley: *Natural Rights and Political Rights, passim*; *On the Natural Inequality of Men, passim*.

ple were to be protected no less against their rulers than they were against themselves. "Some one has said," Mr. Bryce remarks, "that the American Government and Constitution are based on the theology of Calvin and the philosophy of Hobbes. This at least is true, that there is a hearty Puritanism in the view of human nature which pervades the instrument of 1787. It is the work of men who believed in original sin, and were resolved to leave open for transgressors no door which they could possibly shut. Compare this spirit with the enthusiastic optimism of the Frenchmen of 1789. It is not merely a difference of race temperaments; it is a difference of fundamental ideas."¹

The American Constitution is the epitome of the American character. Americans with all sincerity believe that they are a simple, ingenuous, and almost transparent people; frank, outspoken, little given to suspicion, and so direct in all their mental processes that they are incapable of understanding or practicing subtlety; and that opinion is generally shared by foreigners. Some of the qualities that the American thinks are the characteristics of the race, it is true exist, but as men are often ignorant of their own tricks of speech or mental processes, so the Americans have qualities of which they are unaware. As a race they are frank and outspoken,

¹ Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. I, p. 306.

"Philosophers on the old continent," wrote Madison (*Works*: vol. I, p. 444), "in their zeal against tyranny would rush into anarchy; as the horrors of superstition drive them into atheism."

which is, as I have said before, the effect of early influences that made a careful attention to cultivated politeness appear unnecessary and at times almost impossible; but this surface bluntness has not destroyed a tendency to suspicion that constantly manifests itself; and while frank in expression they are not without subtlety. Their nature, instead of being simple, is contradictory. Easily imposed upon in some ways, as ingenuous as children in following a new idea or a new leader whose panacea appeals to them, which is one reason the demagogue flourishes more in America than in any other country, — and there is no connection between the demagogue and democracy *per se*, — innate suspicion and a skeptical attitude reassert themselves, and the great reform which has swept a majority of the people off their feet in a wave of hysterical emotion is subjected to the close analysis of reason and found to be the nostrum of a quack and not a scientific cure. It has often been said, and with truth, that the Americans, despite their descent, have the emotionalism of the Latin rather than the stolidity of the Saxon, but emotion with them is merely surface ebullition, and the foundation of character is conservatism. That is simply putting in another form what has already been said. It is more convenient and requires less explanation to term this force conservatism, but it is too vague to convey exact information. To say that a people are conservative is a statement of fact, but does

not throw any light on the causes that produced their conservatism; and racial characteristics are the result of causes precisely as those of individuals are the outcome of birth, training, and environment.

In proof of the assertion that the American Constitution is the epitome of the American character, an examination of the charter will show that, while it gave to the people a greater control over their own affairs than up to that time had been entrusted to any people, there is also displayed a very considerable distrust by the rulers in the wisdom of the people, which showed itself by a series of complicated checks and balances that made it impossible for any one department of the Government to obtain a preponderating influence. Thus the preamble recites, "We the People of the United States," a formal recognition that it was the act of the people at large and not of the independent colonies, in which it differed vitally from the Articles of Confederation, which were the prelude to the Constitution. That there should be a national legislature, in which the American *people* instead of the American *states* should be represented, was the political force brought into being by the Constitution.¹

The Articles of Confederation were a league between colonies that assumed to be independent and sovereign, who, in virtue of their sovereignty, adopted the title of states, and whose delegates

¹ Fiske: *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 236.

drew up “Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States”; and in the second article it is declared that “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.” In the Constitution the word “sovereignty” is not once mentioned, nor is the term “sovereign powers” employed. Legislative powers are delegated to the Congress; authority not specifically conferred on the Congress by the terms of the compact is reserved either by the people or the states.

The Articles of Confederation were really a war measure; if the colonies were successfully to resist with arms the military power of Great Britain, it was necessary that they should form a league and take common measures for defense and offense; that they should provide money to raise armies; that power and authority should be lodged in a central body rather than in thirteen scattered governments. It was merely a provisional arrangement, badly conceived and unworkable because the federal principle had not been discovered, — a discovery which belongs to America, — and the old European system of leagues and confederations of sovereign and independent states, the only system then known to political philosophy, was thought to be sufficient. New conditions called for new methods. Instead of at once cutting loose from the old and adopting the new, it was attempted to make a patchwork do service. That such a loosely formed confederacy was bound to create jealousies

and engender friction was inevitable, and envy and suspicion, ambition and treason, threatened more than once to destroy the life of the nascent nation. The experience of the Confederacy was a valuable training for the greater work to be done when the Constitution was to be framed, and it was the lesson taught by the Confederation that led to the perfection of the Constitution.

If the nation was to live, power must be recognized as residing in the people, not the states. Hence the wording of the preamble, "We the People." An American writer on the Constitution explains the peculiar reverence in which it is held by saying: "All vigorous and harmonious national life demands some object of common reverence and devotion. In monarchical countries this object is the Crown, or the person on whose head it rests. In our republic, no living president, accepted or rejected as he is by a varying majority and at frequent intervals, can ever become the object of general and concentrated respect and affection. It is the great Charter bequeathed to us by our Fathers, and that alone, which can give to our whole country its central object of obedience and reverence, — an object which shall rise above all the changing purposes and alliances of the passing hour. It stands supreme, above us all, ruling our rulers and receiving their oath-bound allegiance. . . . To this only Sovereign of our jurisdiction and Lord Protector of our rights and liberties, our allegiance and our devotion

are worthily consecrated.”¹ In other words, the people reverence their own creation, and in doing it homage worship themselves, which is characteristic of a democracy, for in a democracy men rather than institutions are consecrated.

While the framers of the Constitution recognized the people as the source of power, they were always fearful that the representatives of the people would prove false to their trust; hence the numerous precautions taken to curb delegated authority, which Lecky ascribes to the influence of Rousseau.² To the writers of the time this fear was never absent. “It is a misfortune incident to republican government,” Hamilton writes in *The Federalist*, “though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it, may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the Government.”³ You may find in the pages of *The Federalist* a dozen similar expressions and a constant reliance on the “salutary check.” In the constitutional convention that dread of the betrayal of a great trust was ever present; there was no security felt that the House would not yield to bribery, or

¹ Kasson: *The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States of America*, p. 5.

² Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. vi, p. 267.

³ *The Federalist*, p. 469.

the Senate to corruption, or the President to ambition; and the delegates did not disguise their solicitude, and did all that ingenuity could suggest to guard against treason to the people. Randolph, in support of his motion to reserve to the House the sole power to originate money bills, declared that "the Senate will be more likely to be corrupt than the House of Representatives, and should therefore have less to do with money matters."¹ Madison, arguing in support of the resolution to give the Senate power to conclude a treaty of peace without the concurrence of the President, said the President "would necessarily derive so much power and importance from a state of war that he might be tempted to impede a treaty of peace."² Hamilton objected to the proposal to declare the President ineligible for reëlection, because "in this the President was a monster . . . having great powers, in appointments to office, and continually tempted by this constitutional disqualification to abuse them in order to subvert the government. . . . If appointed by the legislature, he would be tempted to make use of corrupt influence to be continued in office."³ Gouverneur Morris, curiously enough, feared that the House of Representatives would subvert free government. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his prin-

¹ *Documentary History of the Constitution*, vol. III, p. 521.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 700.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 688.

cipal objections to the proposed Constitution, he told the convention, was that it threatened the country with an aristocracy. "The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives," he warned. "Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them."¹ Mason "ironically proposed to strike out the whole section [to make members of Congress ineligible to hold other offices], as a more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which might not otherwise thrive so well in the American soil — for completing that aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some among us, and for inviting into the legislative service, those generous and benevolent characters who will do justice to each other's merit, by carving out offices and rewards for it. In the present state of American morals and manners, few friends will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary and depraved ambition."²

That distrust was natural. It was an experiment they were about to make, and they could rely only on themselves for guidance. They had been taught to resist the corruption of a king and to maintain their own liberties against the encroachments of ministers and parliament; were they strong enough to withstand their own weakness now that each man owed no allegiance except to himself? As Washington said, when he took the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 466.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 524.

oath of office for the first time: "I walk on untrod-den ground." It was an unknown country into which they committed themselves, and they might well tremble for the consequences. It has frequently been said that the men who made the Constitution were at heart aristocrats whose love for democracy was more academic than real. This is not true. There were, in fact, men in that conven-tion with aristocratic leanings and who had no ex-cessive love for the people; but the people were an unknown force, who had been given such a limited opportunity to exercise their power that it was un-certain whether they would use it with moderation or in their freedom from control rush to excess. The fear of an unrestrained democracy was a real fear, and with the experience of the Continental Congress, which had shown the danger of popular government without the curb of a central authority, it was not surprising that many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention should seriously question the wisdom of creating a political system that placed the government at the whim of the peo-ple, and that they voiced their apprehension. Thus Sherman, in the debate on the method of the elec-tion of members of the House of Representatives, "opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the state legislatures. The people, he said, should have as little to say as may be about the Government";¹ Gerry declared that "the evils

¹ *Documentary History of the Constitution*, vol. III, p. 26.

we experience flow from the excess of democracy";¹ Mason "admitted that we had been too democratic";² Randolph "observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored, that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy."³

That Americans were suspicious of their own virtue in that day, and feared they might not be proof against corruption, is not surprising, but it is remarkable that the same mistrust has been transmitted to their descendants. The great mass of twentieth-century Americans have little confidence in the integrity and patriotism of their legislators; they are reluctant to intrust them with more power than is absolutely necessary because they are apprehensive it will be abused, and that the men who are in possession of the government for the time being will aggrandize themselves at the expense of the liberties of the people.

A suspicious people are apt to be a conservative people and to view with disfavor any radical change in the system under which they live. To Americans themselves, certainly to Europeans, it will seem incongruous to talk of the Americans as conservative, as the flexibility of their minds, their emotionalism, their frequent electioneering campaigns, with the attendant turmoil and uncertainty, their ceaseless activity, their perpetual striving to improve

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

conditions, their constant political and social experimentation — all these things suggest change, mutability, almost instability; everything, in fact, that is opposed to respect and reverence for customs rooted in the past. But the mistake is made of confusing fickleness with radicalism. So far as their Constitution is concerned the American people have shown themselves the most stable of all people. Their Constitution is to-day the same as when it was created; in the century and a quarter that has elapsed since then, the constitution of England — England, the very type of conservatism — has silently changed; Englishmen have seen disestablishment, the enlargement of the franchise, real parliamentary representation and government, the removal of political disabilities, the last relics of feudal privileges destroyed. To speak of Germany and France, of Italy and Russia, of all Europe and all South America, is to recall constitutions made and unmade, and codes that bear little relation to their originals.

Suspicion and conservatism, these are the two forces that keep the American Constitution intact and that to-day retain unnecessary and archaic provisions. The Electoral College and the meeting of the Congress thirteen months after the election of its members are conspicuous illustrations of attachment to customs sanctioned by the past and an obstinate aversion to change. Because of doubt that the people would exercise their power wisely,

they were not to be permitted to vote for the candidate for President directly, but their ballots must be filtered through the medium of a body of men of high standing and intelligence who would act with patriotic discretion. It was another of those counterpoising devices to insure stability and promote reflection; it was useful at the time it was created, but to-day it is as useless as the two buttons on the back of a man's dress-coat, the survival of a time when the ordinary means of locomotion was a horse, and it was a convenient thing to button back the tails of a coat. Yet the Americans cling to the Electoral College because of their rooted conservatism and reverence for the work of the men who framed the Constitution. In the same way, owing to the difficulties of communication and transportation at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it was necessary that a considerable period should elapse between the election of members of Congress and their assembling at the seat of government, but to-day that necessity no longer exists, and the interval in many instances has been detrimental to the public welfare. A more changeable people would long ago have modified the requirement and brought the new Congress together within a month or so of election; the Americans cannot be induced to accept any alteration, and agitation to that end has proved fruitless.

It is worth while to note that the one element in the political system that ought to be the most con-

servative, that according to popular American belief *is* the most conservative, — the Supreme Court of the United States, — is the one element that, while not radical, has been progressive; that has by construction and interpretation given an elasticity to the Constitution that has prevented it from being a dead hand to stifle progress and has kept it virile and in sympathy with modern conditions; that without wrench or violence to the principles on which the Constitution is based has made it adjustable to the spirit of the age. The Supreme Court has not been swayed by passing gusts of popular emotion or hysteria; it has kept itself serenely aloof from clamor, and has remained uninfluenced by transient agitation; and yet it has not been so far removed from the people that it has not felt their aspirations, nor made it impossible for moral reform or assertion of sovereignty to find expression.¹

The war with Spain demonstrated anew the wonderful flexibility of the Constitution of the United States. When the Philippines fell into the hands

¹ "The Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion. Opinion is stronger in America than anywhere else in the world, the judges are only men. To yield a little may be prudent, for the tree that cannot bend to the blast may be broken. There is, moreover, this ground at least for presuming public opinion to be right, that through it the progressive judgment of the world is expressed. . . . But when the terms of the Constitution admit of more than one construction, and when previous decisions have left the true construction so far open that the point in question may be deemed new, is a court to be blamed if it prefers the construction which the bulk of the people deem suited to the needs of the time?" — Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. I, p. 273.

of America as the prize of war, it was believed by a great many careful students of the Constitution that they could not be retained as an American possession, for the Constitution, it was said, made no provision for the acquisition of territory that was not eventually to be incorporated into the Union as one of the states; and it was agreed by those who favored an "imperial" policy, as well as by those who opposed it, that the natives of the Philippine Islands could never be given American citizenship. Yet the Supreme Court was able to construe the Constitution so as to permit the United States to hold the Philippines and yet not to risk the inclusion in the body politic of an unassimilable race; the United States was dowered with the highest attribute of sovereignty: the power to take or reject territory according as might seem good to it. This decision of far-reaching consequence was rendered without in the slightest changing the letter or form of the Constitution; without enlarging the powers of the President or robbing the people of any of their rights, reserved or guaranteed. No great movement, political or social, has been led by the Supreme Court; as befitting the most conservative and stable element in the scheme of government, the Supreme Court has frequently opposed popular sentiment and has seemed to be a clog on progress; but instead of a bar to advancement it has served to give the people a time for sober reflection, and while the Supreme Court has never been swept off

its feet by the shouting of the mob, it has not been unresponsive to public opinion. Individual members of the Supreme Court may be unprogressive or tied to tradition, and the more there are of such members the more slowly will the Court advance, but the Court as a body changes, and every new appointment brings in a justice who is of the spirit of his time.

There is no mandarin caste from which the justices are drawn. They are men like other men, lawyers who have been engaged in active practice, mixing with the world and a part of it, influenced by the same wave of thought that affects men of lesser degree, their intellectual training making it impossible for them to stand still, although they may be more rooted in their convictions than other men and more certain of the correctness of their own judgment. This, I think, explains why the Supreme Court has kept pace with the spirit of the age. It has often been asked whether the voice of the people can penetrate those thick walls behind which the Court deliberates. To that voice the Court is deaf and scorns to make response, but each member brings to the bench his own individuality, his own reading of progress, his own conscientious belief of what the law permits to be done for the benefit of society. Fundamental facts that have been established, questions that are *res adjudicata*, cannot of course be attacked, but out of the old questions arise many that are new because of new conditions, and

every decade shows an enlargement of the view of the Court. This is especially noticeable in the greater powers granted the federal government, to the subordination of the powers of the states. The early American political theory was that the state was supreme and the central government was invested with limited powers only, which it might exercise so long as they did not infringe the jurisdiction of the state; that the laches of a state, even if it caused injury to a sister commonwealth, could not be remedied by the action of the central government; and it was this impotence of federal power that made it possible for monopoly to go unchecked and the people to become the prey of unscrupulous commercial adventurers. The social legislation of the last few years is the answer to the prayer of the people for relief, which it was impossible to grant until the Supreme Court enlarged the powers and authority of the federal government, and prevented a state, because of its indifference or ignorance, from endangering the security and welfare of the people of all the other states.

The adoption of the Constitution led to another great development in the progress of society, the importance of which we have now generally forgotten. The country that has in our day brought the science of protection to its perfection, or has fastened it upon the world to its injury, according as one may happen to be protectionist or free trader, taught freedom of trade when that doctrine was as

heretical as the equality of man. The political philosophy of the eighteenth century looked upon trade not as mutual benefit, but as involving loss to one side. Opposed to the modern idea, which sees that both buyer and seller profit, that both *must* profit if they are to engage in trade with each other, economists of the eighteenth century were able to comprehend the advantages that accrued to the seller, but were unable to see how equal advantages followed the other side of the action. The whole theory of trade at that day was to make commerce as difficult as possible. Cities imposed duties against each other, nations erected barriers to keep the trader out, because of the belief that the only way by which city or nation could thrive was by destroying the prosperity of a rival. Steeped in the economic fallacies of the day, it was not surprising that the American colonies, with the example set them by England, should put in operation the same economic principles. Under the Confederation, when Congress had no authority to regulate commerce between the states, when they were not a unified people represented in a national legislature, they harassed each other's commerce, animated by the laudable desire to sell as much as possible and to buy as little as need be. Connecticut levied duties upon imports from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania discriminated against Delaware, "and New Jersey, pillaged at once by both her greater neighbors, was compared to a cask tapped at both

ends."¹ New York pushed the doctrine to its extreme and most selfish end, "obliging every Yankee sloop which came down through Hell Gate, and Jersey market-boat which was rowed from Paulus Hook to Cortlandt Street, to pay entrance fees and obtain clearances at the custom-houses, just as was done by ships from London or Hamburg; and not a cartload of Connecticut firewood could be delivered at the back door of a country house in Beekman Street until it should have paid a heavy duty."²

The Constitution swept away all interstate custom-houses, and was the greatest example of free trade the world had known. It was the one thing needed to fuse a people into nationality. Had each state been permitted to hamper commerce by imposing duties upon all the others, the nation could not have lasted; inevitably it would have split into a number of petty confederations, always the prey of more powerful rivals and ambitious foreign powers. Madison saw that danger when he wrote to Jefferson: "The states are every day giving proof that separate regulations are more likely to set them by the ears than to attain the common objects."³

Not only did the system of free trade, put into operation by the Constitution, make the Union

¹ Fiske: *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 145.

² Fiske: *Op. cit.*, p. 146. Cf. Bryant and Gay: *A Popular History of the United States*, vol. iv, p. 91 *et seq.*; McMaster: *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. i, p. 206.

³ Madison: *Works*, vol. i, p. 226.

possible, but it gave that great stimulus to American enterprise and commercial activity that has made the Americans so preëminent in their own field, and has so amazingly developed the wealth and resources of the United States. With the establishment of free trade between the thirteen colonies, commerce, instead of being confined to local limits, became national; with the invader driven out and the American continent in undisputed possession of the American people, their limit to commercial activity was only the limits of the continent. For a long time there were sectional jealousies, because physical conditions in the South were unlike those in the North, which produced dissimilar industrial conditions, but there were no hampering artificial restrictions to check enterprise or to penalize natural advantage. For the first time it was brought home to the world that trade was not a monster to be guarded against, but a good fairy to be made welcome; it was a reversal of that "policy which sprang, in a great degree, from that mercantile theory which denied the possibility of a commerce mutually beneficial to the parties engaged in it."¹

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. II, p. 8.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SECOND EPOCH IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

THERE begins now the Second Epoch in American development. With the end of the Revolution and the signing of the treaty of peace, the weak bond that for more than thirty years had held the colonists to England was broken. A national political life was created. Henceforth Americans owed allegiance to themselves alone. From the English stock had sprung a new race, and the American People took their place before the world.

National independence began in war. The effect of war "is to cause men to become callous, and in proportion as giving pain to others is made a habit during war, it will remain a habit during peace; inevitably producing in the behavior of citizens to one another, antagonisms, crimes of violence, and multitudinous aggressions of minor kinds, tending towards a disorder that calls for coercive government. The civilizing discipline of social life is antagonized by the uncivilizing discipline of the life war involves."¹

The effect of war on the Americans, on those Americans who had, unknown to themselves, ceased to be Englishmen, even though nominally they owed

¹ Spencer: *The Study of Sociology*, p. 179.

allegiance to the British Crown and still called themselves Englishmen, was marked and produced lasting mental consequences. The men who fought in the ranks of the Continental Army; the leaders who captained them, with a few exceptions; the non-combatants who gave their services and money to the cause; the women who suffered uncomplainingly and encouraged men to further resistance, were animated by an ideal. The effect of war, especially the effect of victory on a people who are swayed by an ideal, is momentous. Liberty and equality, says Herodotus, "are brave spirit-stirring things," and they make men "zealous to do the work thoroughly." All history, ancient and modern, is the record of national character influenced by wars carried on in defense of an ideal; which is a very different thing from wars for conquest or revenge, or wars in which the heart of the people does not enter, but they are driven to fight at the command of their rulers. From Marathon to Yorktown, from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Tsushima, always the result is the same; always there follows a feeling of strength, of confidence, of belief in the protection of the gods or the special grace of God; an inspiration to go forward resolutely and to hold steadfast to the ideal.

In America the effect of victory was followed by the same phenomena that have been observed in all other countries, but victory also had other consequences. The power of America had been under-

rated, that of England exaggerated; and Americans, who had humbled the strongest armed power of Europe, of whom all the world stood in fear,¹ with her enormous financial resources, her great military strength, and a population more than three times as large as that of the colonies, felt a confidence in themselves that nothing else could have created. Now they had been tried and proved. They had stood the shock of battle. They had learned the military lesson of the English and improved upon it. They had created their own political system. There was born in them not only supreme confidence in themselves, their strength, and their security, but also that quality which is the American heritage: faith in the future and a profound conviction that they were destined to accomplish their mission; and this almost religious belief in their special protection was to be further strengthened by the result of the War of 1812 and the limited state of war with France. Many men had braved England with fear of the consequences, for the odds were great and the venture seemed rash, and defeat was more probable than victory. Now all doubts were swept away. No man asked if the Union were to endure

¹ Webster, in a speech delivered in the Senate, May 7, 1834, voiced this feeling when he said: "They raised their flag against a power to which, for purposes of foreign conquest and subjugation, Rome, in the height of her glory, is not to be compared; a power which has dotted over the surface of the whole globe with her possessions and military posts, whose morning drum-beat, following the sun, and keeping company with the hours, circles the earth with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial airs of England." — Webster, *Works*, vol. iv, p. 110.

and the Nation to live. The unanswerable proof had been given in the spirit of confidence that filled the whole people and set their pulses to tingling as "Yankee Doodle" had put new life into tired bodies. "It is probable," says Lecky, "that no nation ever started on its career with a larger proportion of strong characters, or a higher level of moral conviction, than the English colonies in America."¹

No one can study the early history of the American people without being tempted to believe that circumstances combined to mark out the colonies as the "predestined seat of a great free nation"; or as an acute American once remarked to me, "Everything that has happened in our history, from the landing of the Pilgrims to the episode of Mrs. O'Leary's cow and the destruction of Chicago, has been accident; which is perhaps one reason why we are such a happy-go-lucky people and believe in our luck, for every accident turns to our advantage." There is undoubtedly much philosophic insight into American character contained in this casual observation.

Nothing has so wasted the energies of man as the futile splitting of hairs over words and the foolish discussions of terminology. Whether one believes in "predestination" or in "luck," the effect is the same; for a people who believe they are predestined to accomplish great things, and that accident

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. II, p. 2.

and opportunity have always been in their favor,¹ will be sustained by the same confidence in themselves that individuals have who trust to their luck to carry them through difficulties from which the more cautious shrink. In both cases certain qualities are destroyed or subordinated and others are developed: caution, exactness, that infinite capacity for taking pains which is said to be genius, give place to audacity, unevenness, a careless disregard of details as well as precise results; a people become empiric rather than scientific. No one who has studied the American character can fail to be impressed by its tremendous buoyancy,—although at times there is reaction which manifests itself in despondency and national despair,—and the American weakness for the “short cut.” The fact that the American is always in a hurry has been so frequently remarked by foreign observers, and admitted by Americans themselves, that it must be accepted as a national trait, and it springs from an unconscious conviction that luck is a more vital element in the affairs of life than calm deliberation and careful preparation. It is clear enough that the American might easily become a fatalist, and it is equally clear that he never will; for he is saved from the enervating fatalism of the Oriental by a stock of physical energy of which the Oriental knows nothing, and by a healthy im-

¹ “Out of the accidents of the time, rather than from forecast or inventive statecraft, did the American colonies get their opportunity for expansion.”—Weeden: *Economic and Social History of New England*, vol. II, p. 870.

agation which makes him grasp the possibilities of another stroke of luck. Furthermore, the American's belief in his luck is purely material, and has no inspiration in the divine or supernatural. He does not, when misfortune falls upon him, regard it as Allah's displeasure, and bow his head until Allah's wrath has been appeased by another victim; rather he searches for the arrows of Philoctetes, so as once again to be armed against his foes. The spirit of eternal youth is in the American, who believes that his luck has deserted him only when he has fought his last fight and Nature claims the victory.

Their government established, the people were now to devote themselves to the grim and sordid work of making a living; to repair the ravages wrought by seven years of war; to solve those problems that confronted a nation emerging from war and the fierce strife of political dispute, for which they were without guidance and must rely solely on their wisdom and courage. War had not softened a pugnacious, determined, unyielding, resolute race. While Americans had confidence in themselves and rejoiced over their victory, they were not entirely at peace. Many Americans, loyal Americans but with a sentimental affection for England, had unwillingly taken up arms against the mother-land; compelled to fight because there was no alternative, yet secretly cherishing the hope that war would stop just short of the one thing they least desired — sep-

aration from England.¹ Many men had fought and were free and rejoiced in their freedom, yet with that joy was a feeling of rancor that the race from whose loins they sprung had made separation necessary. A complex and contradictory mental state this, but arguing neither weakness, nor vacillation, nor fear, and perfectly comprehensible under the circumstances.

Four causes were now powerfully to control American development and create national characteristics. They were: —

First, hatred of England as a result of war;

Second, the contempt in which a people, originally law-abiding and taught to have a veneration for law, came to hold the law;

Third, the sociological and political influence exercised by the immigrant, the Irish especially;

Lastly, the economic, social, and political impulsion of slavery.

These four causes, in their various and complex phases, affected America from the beginning to the close of the nineteenth century.

Hatred of England, for nearly the first fifty years following the formation of the Union, was one of the forces to create mental characteristics. It colored men's thoughts; it created a false impression in the mind of the child; it embittered the relations be-

¹ Cf. Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. vii, "The Loyalists and their Fortunes," *passim*.

tween America and England; it kept alive resentment on the part of Americans, and was met by studied contempt and insolence on the part of Englishmen; it made Americans and Englishmen understand each other less, perhaps, than any other people; it distorted American perspective.

There were Englishmen in America during the Revolution who were Englishmen, not Americans, who had no sympathy with the American cause, who hoped for the defeat of the American arms, who looked forward to the day when the "rebels" would be crushed and the power of the Crown reasserted, never again to be challenged. Some were men of large landed properties, whose training and traditions made it as impossible for them to espouse the cause of rebels as it would have been for them to raise their hands against their sovereign. These men saw their estates threatened and their wealth destroyed. There were merchants engaged in a lucrative trade who "were irritated by the early tentative efforts to prevent the importation of British goods, and by being compelled under threats to sign an agreement to that effect. They found that a keen inquisition was kept over their affairs, while their vessels, books, and warehouses were exposed to search."¹ These men faced ruin. If they went to England, they had no hope of recovering from their debtors; if they remained, they were harassed and under constant suspicion and their profits were

¹ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. vii, p. 186.

destroyed. Their motives were of course selfish, and an American writer finds "that they draw the least on our pity."¹ Nevertheless, "although they may not be entitled to much pity, they are deserving of some sympathy, for they were driven by the force of circumstances into a position which was not of their own seeking and which they would willingly have avoided.

"That the position of an American Loyalist was in itself a perfectly upright one," Lecky says, "will hardly indeed be questioned in England, and will, I should hope, be now admitted, by all reasonable men beyond the Atlantic";² and he makes the further statement that "it is probably below the truth that a full half of the more honorable and respected Americans were either openly or secretly hostile to the Revolution."³ It is of course impossible to give with exactness the number of Loyalists, or to say with any degree of precision whether they were in a majority, and Lecky appears to have relied largely on Jones's *History of New York* for his information, a history more interesting than impartial; but remembering all that had happened, how the spirit of nationality had grown and the feeling of resentment against England gained momentum, it is more than likely that the Loyalists were not in a majority, although they constituted a large, wealthy, and influential element

¹ Winsor: *Op. cit.*

² Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. iv, p. 153.

³ *Op. cit.*

of the people.¹ That the Loyalists exaggerated their own numbers is quite natural, as it would create the impression, which was in their interest, no less than that of the home government, that resistance to the British Crown was the work of a minority and did not have the support of the largest number of the most responsible persons.² It was one of the grievances of the Patriots that the Loyalists always misrepresented the facts to the British Government, and it was their false reports that induced England to continue the war in the hope of ultimate success. John Adams, no mean authority, wrote: "Upon the whole, if we allow two thirds of the people to have been with us in the Revolution, is not the allowance ample?"³ American historians, no less than British, have devoted long and ingenious argument to prove that it was a minority, a rabble, a few discontented spirits, who resisted England and carried through the war to successful conclusion; as if there were respectability and vindication in numbers.

¹ Hamilton, writing to Robert Morris, August 13, 1782, says: "As to the people, in the early periods of the war, near one half of them were avowedly more attached to Great Britain than to their liberty, but the energy of the government has subdued all opposition. The state by different means has been purged of a large part of its malcontents; but there still remains, I dare say, a third, whose secret wishes are on the side of the enemy." — Hamilton: *Works*, vol. IX, p. 277.

² "The American Revolution, like most others, was the work of an energetic minority, who succeeded in committing an undecided and fluctuating majority to a course for which they had little love, and leading them step by step to a position from which it was impossible to recede." — Lecky: *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 443.

³ Adams: *Works*, vol. X, pp. 63, 87, 110.

At the time of the birth of the Republic and for many years to come hatred of England was kept alive; in some quarters men proved their loyalty to their new allegiance by the animosity they displayed to their former sovereign and his subjects. The property of Loyalists was confiscated and its owners were driven into exile;¹ justification was found in the fear that a Tory government would again be set up.² Popular feeling showed itself in the highest degree rancorous toward all who were suspected of Tory opinion,³ and this intense hatred may be seen in the letters and journals of the men who took the leading part in the struggle.⁴

Other causes apart, there was one reason, remembered long after political differences were forgotten, to make Americans cherish bitter resentment against the English, and even as late as the closing years of the last century, it was one of the first things the American schoolboy was taught when he began to study the history of his country. This was the use made by the English of the Indians as allies, who were permitted to wage war according to their own code and not according to the methods of the white man. Unspeakable outrages were committed by these forest denizens, who were lightly attached to the English and somewhat proud to fight in their

¹ Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. vii, p. 185.

² McMaster: *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. i, pp. 110-11.

³ Lecky: *Op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 287.

⁴ Cf. Washington: *Works*, vol. iii, p. 343; John Adams's letter in the *Annual Register* of 1780, in which he thought fining, imprisonment, and hanging were none too good for the Tories.

ranks, but who were more largely influenced by the hope it gave them of gratifying tribal ambitions and satisfying their love of cruelty. Indian warfare was always wanton. The red man tortured and burned his white captives and subjected women to outrage, if not with the direct approval of his British commanders, at least with only slight effort on their part to restrain him; and it was not the bullets of the British or their foreign allies that the Americans dreaded; it was the scalping-knife of the Indian and the haunting fear that from a lurking and stealthy foe, who gloried in his treachery, women and little children might at any time be massacred, or perish miserably, captives of the red man's lust or savagery. But, as was observed in the previous volume, men are to be judged, not by the refinements of any one age, but by the conventional morals and the spirit of the time in which they lived. It would be inconceivable to imagine that in our day a white race would use savages in civilized warfare or that the methods of the savages would be employed; in the eighteenth century conscience was less tender and the moral sense did not revolt from an alliance with barbarism.

It is well worth while comparing 1780 with 1865, when once more the sword was drawn on American soil. In the earlier day the Tories were treated not only with the utmost harshness but unfairly; no friendly hand was held out to them, they were not wanted; the sooner they departed the better it

would be for the country and the greater would be its security. Now, compare this with what happened in the following century, and we see that either the world had made tremendous strides in humanity or the Americans gave an exhibition of magnanimity the like of which was never before known. In those four years of struggle the South had cost the North in blood and treasure and heart desolation an amount so incalculably greater than that England had cost the colonies that there is no basis of comparison; England's prison hulks had their counterpart in the prison pen of Andersonville; property had been ruthlessly destroyed; war had been carried on with horrors unmitigated; the "unreconstructed rebels" of the South were the Loyalists of the earlier day, and yet no man's life was attainted, no estate was confiscated, from "the states lately in rebellion" there was wrung no huge tribute; Grant, with his immortal prayer for peace, sent the Southern men back to their farms with their animals, so that they might go to their ploughing. "When we made our peace with the British," an American writer says, "the native Tories were proscribed, and thousands of Loyalists left the United States to carry into Canada the indurated hatred of the exile. But after Lee's surrender at Appomattox, no body of men, no single man indeed, was driven forth to live an alien for the rest of his days; even though a few might choose to go, none were compelled."¹

¹ Matthews: *American Character*.

If we would find the explanation for the bitter resentment that the Loyalists aroused, we must look for it — in addition to the causes that have already been mentioned — in the state of Europe, of England especially, at the time, and the influence that immigration has always exercised on America, socially and politically. By any one who would understand the forces that have operated to produce the American character, the foreign element must be studied with care, for we see that from the beginning it has been a potent agency to shape the actions of men and parties and disturb international relations. In the infancy of the nation it exerted a stronger force than it does to-day. It reached its zenith in the closing years of the last century. Since then, although still to be reckoned with, it has become weakened, and international politics are no longer a football to be kicked about for domestic political amusement or as a bribe to a foreign element.

Not one but many causes have brought about this change, each of which has interacted on all the others. The change has come from the enlargement of the American view; from the American having become less self-centred and less provincial; from his seeing less parochially and thinking more continentally; from an appreciation that vast as his continent is, self-contained, rich, great, it does not constitute a world by itself, and cannot be selfishly isolated from the cosmic scheme and remain unin-

fluenced by the causes that operate elsewhere, but is part of the macrocosm in which continents, like men, are units and governed by universal laws. Moreover — a fact of extreme importance — the absorptive power of the American people has become stronger, not weaker, with the lapse of time, and the immigrant ceases to remain separate and distinct from the Americans, and becomes incorporated into them and is taken up in the blood, not to transform it but to fortify and temper it.

In the time of the Revolution the foreign element kept to itself and was apart and separate from the native. As late as the middle of the last century the alien, principally the Irish, — for it was from Ireland that the great stream of emigration flowed, — was literally a “foreign element”; foreign in thought, speech, and manners, seemingly incapable of assimilation, always to remain alien, and to arouse the passion and religious bigotry of the people of another faith. There has perhaps never been a more microscopic record of a small community, that reads with the fascination of fiction but has the merit of historical accuracy, than the story of Quincy told by Charles Francis Adams, and there he shows how the Irish remained unassimilated, how as late as 1860 the Irish and their religion were detested and became a political issue.¹ In this respect, as in others, there has been

¹ Adams: *Three Episodes of Massachusetts History*, vol. II, chapter xxi, *passim*.

an enormous change for the better in the American mental attitude.

What made Ireland prior to and at the time of the Revolution a discontented, rebellious, distressful country, and wrote such a savage and shameful page on English history, need not be referred to in detail, for the tyranny, the brutality, and the stupidity on both sides are too well known to every student of history to need explanation. It is sufficient here to say that the Americans, seeing that they would be compelled to fight, anxious to find allies, and knowing that Ireland was only waiting its opportunity to throw off the yoke of the Saxon, naturally sought Irish assistance so as still further to embarrass the home government. Nor were their efforts fruitless. In 1775, the Americans issued a special address to the Irish, urging the identity of their interests; and in the same year Chatham asserted that Ireland on the colonial question was with America "to a man." The Presbyterians of the North were fiercely Americans, and few classes were so largely represented in the American army as Irish emigrants.¹ Furthermore, we are told that "the Irish Presbyterians appear to have been everywhere bitterly anti-English, and outside of New York it is probable that they did more of the real fighting of the Revolution than any other class."²

It has often been represented by the historians of

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. iv, p. 470.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

the Irish in America, that in fighting in the Continental armies they were inspired solely by patriotism and animated by a burning love of liberty. It is, I think, more correct to seek the explanation in the less sublime and more human motive of revenge; in the opportunity they saw offered them to redress age-long grievances. They were not mercenaries in the sense that the Hessians were who fought in the King's ranks, who fought merely because it was part of the day's work, who put no heart in what they did, and cared no more for the English than they did for the Americans. The Irish in the Revolution were never mercenaries; they were zealots; they were less patriots in the sense we generally understand the term than they were avengers; Jehu to smite the house of Ahab, to revenge the blood of the prophets; less moved by the impulse of gratitude which sent the Plateans to hazard their all at Marathon than they were inspired by the same bitter hatred and the memory of wrongs that made the Corinthians form the anti-Athenian alliance. Driven by these motives to take up arms for their adopted country, it is easy enough to understand why the Irish, after the close of the war, opposed any reconciliation with England, and exerted all their strength to keep alive the feeling against England; for Ireland's battle was being fought in America in the eighteenth century as it was again to be waged in the next.

We shall see later that in the following century

the political power of the Irish increased and it was one of the principal causes of friction between England and America.

Once more England, pursuing the same fatuous policy that had incited rebellion, gave her haters reason for their hate. "This spirit of animosity against Great Britain," an English clergyman wrote in 1795, has been "prodigiously increased by the part she is supposed to have taken in fomenting the Indian war, in exciting the hostilities of the Algerians, in seizing the ships and obstructing the commerce of the American merchants, in refusing or neglecting to give up the posts upon the lakes, or to make reparation for stolen negroes."¹

English statesmanship was unable to accept either the new order of things or the fact of the American Nation. Englishmen had no faith in the perpetuation of the republic; nor were they able to see the great opportunities for trade that were open to them. They must continue the old policy of the Navigation and Sugar Acts; trade must be restricted as much as possible to British-built and British-owned ships; the more commerce was hampered, the less danger from American competition. That fear of competition was a spectre that neither statesman nor merchant could banish. Continuing the same selfish, foolish, and short-sighted policy that had governed England since the first planting of Amer-

¹ Winterbotham, in Hart's *American History Told by Contemporaries*, vol. III, p. 297.

ica, Englishmen still hoped to hold the Republic in economic slavery; and it was also beyond their comprehension that competition was advantageous to both sides and enlarged trade.

For issuing the neutrality proclamation of 1793, Washington was scathingly attacked in the *National Gazette* of Philadelphia¹ by "Veritas," — who was supposed at the time to be Jefferson, but this he denied, — in which the President is reminded that had he consulted the *general* sentiments of his fellow citizens, he would have found them, from one extremity of the Union to the other, firmly attached to the cause of France. "It is to be hoped that the practices of aping the absurd and tyrannical systems of Britain, though already carried to an alarming extent in this country, will never proceed so far, as to induce our Executive to try the vain experiment of officially opposing the national will."² In the following year an American ship, on which was an American consul proceeding to his post of duty, was seized *en route* from Philadelphia to Martinique by a British privateer and carried into Montserrat, and the consul wrote to the Secretary of State: "This conduct, arbitrary and unauthorized, on the part of the coalesced despots, in my poor opinion, does not seem to satisfy the avarice and ambitious views of Great Britain; whose privateers and even government vessels have, in frequent instances, seized

¹ June 5.

² Hart: *American History told by Contemporaries*, vol. III, p. 305.

our flag; though cleared from America for neutral and her own ports, or bound from such ports to America."¹

More intense feeling existed against England after the Revolution, and for long years to follow, when America had won her independence, than during the war when America was fighting to free herself from British control.

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¹ Hart: *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 313.

CHAPTER XIV

WHY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A CONTEMPT FOR LAW

WE are now to consider the second cause in the second period of American development — the contempt in which a people, originally law-abiding and taught to have a veneration for law, came to hold the law.

One of the things to distinguish American civilization from that of other countries is the light respect in which law is held by Americans. So marked is this indifference that it has formed the burden of the theme of numerous writers and observers, both domestic and foreign, who accept it as a fact, as a fact it is.¹ Various explanations have been offered.

¹ Merely to mention by title and author the magazine articles written and the addresses delivered by prominent Americans in the last ten or fifteen years, on American disregard of the law, would occupy considerable space. It may be recalled that in 1895, when Mr. Bayard was Ambassador of the United States to the Court of St. James, in the course of an address he spoke of his countrymen as "an unruly people," for which he was censured by vote of the House of Representatives. In June, 1905, President Taft, then Secretary of War, in an address to the graduating class of the Yale Law School, declared that the laxity in the enforcement of law in the United States was a disgrace to the country. Doctor Parkhurst, in *Munsey's Magazine*, January, 1908, writes on "Law and its Contemptuous Disregard"; the *Century Magazine*, June, 1910, discusses "Lawlessness the National Vice"; Governor Hughes, of New York, in his oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Fraternity of Harvard, June, 1910, dwelt on "The Spirit of Lawlessness" and its cure; lawlessness and the American disregard of law has been the theme for editorials in many of the leading American newspapers.

Politics, the immigrant, and the lust for wealth are the convenient excuses offered, yet none of these reveal the whole truth. In the attempt to find the cause, the impression is created that the American disregard for law is of modern growth, which is accepted by certain investigators as proof that democracy is a failure and lowers the moral tone of a people; or the theory is advanced that morally the Americans have deteriorated since they set up a government of their own, and that American institutions, or again, in other words, democracy, is fatal to a high standard of ethical conduct. We must look for the reason, not in the events of to-day or yesterday, but at the beginning of the nation; we must trace back effects to their first causes in the same way that we have seen that mental and political characteristics are the result of physical and social influences; and we shall find that, while democracy *per se* is not to blame, a mistaken political philosophy and the pressure of material expansion implanted in the American that contempt for law which has threatened the welfare of society.

A political philosophy that was foolish, and may without disrespect to its authors and believers be termed childish, made men believe that by substituting the voice of the people for the authority of a king or a governing class, it would be possible to change human nature. The birthday of a new world was at hand, Paine declaimed.¹ Belief in this ideal-

¹ Paine: *Appendix to Common Sense*, p. 77.

ism was shared by hard-headed practical men of affairs as well as by doctrinaires and visionaries, by philosophers no less than by poets, by the educated as well as the unlettered. The search for the philosopher's stone was at last to be rewarded. It was easy to transmute the metals if only the missing element could be discovered. Human nature was to be transformed and the base refined, because democracy and a constitution had been substituted for the kingly power and the uncertain mood of parliament.¹

It had been recognized in the past that government was law and law was force; consequently all government rested on force. To the philosophers who created the American Constitution, force was abhorrent, although they had not hesitated to resort to force to obtain a government that should rest on the consent of the governed. In the past, "laws of Nature and of Nature's God" had less weight than laws of man and of man's sovereign; liberty and the pursuit of happiness man might possess if he could, but they were not "unalienable rights." Democracy had sought to make happiness the end and aim of existence, believing that only conduct of the "ultimate highest good" would produce happiness; and as men desired happiness above everything else, they would so regulate their conduct as to make

¹ "Revolutionary politics have one of their sources in the idea that societies are capable of infinite and immediate modifications, without reference to the deep-rooted conditions that have worked themselves into every part of the social structure." — Morley: *Burke*, p. 53.

them contribute to and share in the general fund of happiness. Theoretically this should have made every man a strict observer of every law and quick to rebuke even the smallest infraction. Pushed to its logical conclusion, a democracy needs no laws.

When government, which is law, rests on force, fear of its violation is the deterrent, for the punishment is swift to follow the transgression; and the law in its infancy knew no mercy; it was believed that the protection of society demanded severe penalties. A government that exists by consent of the governed, and in which every man takes part, excites less reverence, for surrounding the temporary ruler of the people elected by themselves there is no such mystery as envelops chief or high priest or king, who enjoys his power by divine right. Laws may be broken with greater impunity, for they are not deep-rooted in the convictions of man and made venerable by their semi-divine origin and the superstition of tradition; they are simply customs reduced to terms for the convenience of society.

It would be possible to write the psychology and development of the American people traced through their respect for and indifference to the law; and the investigation would show three well-developed phases.

The first would be when America was English and the law held men in its thrall and was a brutal and stupid despot; when the law was worshiped as slavishly and superstitiously as the church; when

the law, like the church, threatened and punished and terrorized, but made no appeal to humanity or the better nature of man; when against the inexorable fiat of the law appeal was as hopeless as from the doom pronounced by the church.¹ Then came the second phase, when man rebelled against the tyranny and cruelty of the law and the church, when he held his body and his soul to be sacred, and was no longer content to be the creature of secular authority, and revolted to gain his freedom.

It was this second phase that was coincident with the adoption of the American Constitution, and laid the foundation for the careless observance of law that has given America such an unenviable reputation. There was, as we have pointed out in the previous volume, a new spirit working in man, who was now for the first time passionately possessed with the belief that he was his own master — his own master spiritually and physically; that all that went to make man — his body, his mind, and his soul — was his to do with as he pleased and to make such use of as he saw fit; and he no longer regarded himself subject to the decree of a spiritual director or a temporal master. It was for man to settle questions of right with his own conscience, and not blindly to obey the command or the dictation of one placed in authority over him.

These things produced in the American that in-

¹ "The state teaching men what they are to do, and the church teaching them what they are to believe." — Buckle : *History of Civilization*, p. 528.

dividualism which began with the first coming of the English to America, which was developed by the peculiar nature of their political and social relations, which grew with the increasing spirit of independence and became stronger the more the British Crown and British Ministers attempted to suppress it, and finally culminated in the dissolution of the ties that bound the colonists to Great Britain and brought about independence and nationality. We have already traced these causes from their beginning, so that here nothing more than reference to them is necessary. These causes made the Americans, as a race, at the time of the Revolution, greater individualists than any other people in all the world; the doctrine of individualism had been carried farther than the world before had deemed possible. This belief in individualism was still further strengthened by the adoption of the Constitution, which embodied in precise terms the national belief, and by the political philosophy which taught men to look, not to a central authority to regulate society or ameliorate conditions, but to rely on local authority. The less they depended on authority representative of the power of the people and the more the people had faith in themselves, the more strictly, they believed, they were following the teachings of that philosophy which would lead them to the end which every man sought to reach — the ultimate good of all and the happiness of the individual.¹

¹ "Individualism, the love of enterprise, and the pride of personal freedom

Virtue pushed to excess can become a vice. Nothing better illustrates this than a study of Americans and their political institutions. Individualism, when America first gave it form and made it a political principle, was a virtue so great that in large measure it changed the whole aspect of political thought, and so enlarged the mind of man that it made possible that great wave of democracy which has overrun the earth, for the world to-day in thought and government is democratic, even though the fiction of kingly rule is maintained. Individualism to-day — that is, the political interpretation given to it by Americans — has become, if not precisely a vice, in some respects at least a clog to progress; it has, by a false theory that the right of the individual is a right more sacred than the protection of the community, made it possible for the individual to take advantage of his fellow, for laws to be broken or evaded, for development to be hampered. Much that Americans complain of — the unlimited power of wealth, the greed of capital, the corruption of politics, the brutality of the relations between labor and its employer — would be impossible, or at least mitigated, if individualism had not been made an idol.

It has been said that there was a time when the law was slavishly worshiped and that man had to

have been deemed by Americans not only their choicest, but their peculiar and exclusive possessions." — Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, p. 539.

revolt against the law to gain freedom; and this was the second phase of American psychology traced through the American respect for and indifference to the law. There followed, as always happens after a social convulsion, reaction — the third phase. The spiritual exaltation that made men rebels against the law and yet strict observers of what they termed the "rational law"; that made men virtuous and law-abiding because each man believed himself by a sort of divine right to be his own law-maker, could not last because of the frailty of man and the limitations of his intellect. Law fell into contempt, and the rule of primitive justice took its place. In a long settled and thickly populated country, with society firmly established, where traditions exercise a dominating influence and class divisions set the lawmaker and the law-enforcer apart from the great mass, the law is an established institution to which every man is brought subject from the time of his birth, the great majority of whom will have no more to do with its making and enforcement than with the selection of the head of the church or the appointment of the commander-in-chief; and this aloofness inspires respect because it creates the belief that the science of government is beyond the capacity of the ordinary mind to grasp. Nor must we forget the influence of the feudal system in Europe, which created not only the class of the hereditary lawmaker but the class for whom laws were made.

In the United States the law excites no such veneration, because to the majority there is little if any mystery about its creation. In America its people are not so far removed from the days of the pioneer and the settler as not to recall the time when the only law the community knew was that of the vigilance committee or self-elected judges. When laws are made on the spot to suit an emergency and decisions must be quickly rendered, each man becomes not only lawgiver but executioner, and the law has been robbed of its sanctity. Courts and judges lose their authority; the people believe in their own wisdom and are convinced of their inerrancy. The law is less an institution than an expedient; it is not the foundation of the social structure, but a convenience that may be changed with passing fashion; it is merely the dictum of men who are lawmakers by accident, just as the members of Judge Lynch's court are brought together by chance. This does not necessarily lead to an unethical view of life, but it causes the law and the lawgiver to be held in light esteem. It begins by stripping the law of all its trappings and making it a "practical question"; it ends, curiously enough, by imposing upon it the "nice sharp quillits of the law" and the technicalities of dishonest ingenuity. Before leaving this branch of the subject, let me add that the things now complained of are simply a phase in the evolution of a complex society, and to the observant it is evident that there is again a reaction, but

it is renitence against the spirit that carried men away from law. There is now to be noticed a pronounced public opinion in favor of respect for the law. The Americans are still profound believers in the cult of the individualistic, but their individualism is becoming tempered with common sense; they see the danger that comes from individualism pushed to extreme limits. The increasing reverence for law is one of the signs that American civilization has outgrown its first stages of unsettled social conditions and is reaching a more permanent state.

Had there been in America a strong central government, the expansion of settlement would have been followed by the expansion of the law; the settler going from the East to the West would have changed his habitation but not his legal code; there would have been the power to enforce law. Side by side on the same continent there have grown up two peoples sprung from the same stock, fundamentally under the same institutions, speaking the same language, as a whole thinking much the same, and whose development, speaking broadly, has been along the same lines. While Canada has adopted the federal system which gives each province control over its local affairs in the same way that the American states are locally sovereign, the power of the Canadian province is much less than that of the American state, and, on the other hand, the central government in Ottawa exercises greater authority than does that in Washington. There is in America,

for instance, no quasi-military national constabulary corresponding to the Canadian Northwest Mounted Police, whose jurisdiction extends from the Atlantic to the Arctic Circle. As the Canadian frontier was flung further west, the advancing line of civilization was always marked by the police barracks and its patrol. To the trapper, the farmer, and the miner; to the adventurer, the speculator, or the criminal, half a dozen privates under the command of a non-commissioned officer were symbolic of the law — its force, its majesty, and its mystery. It was not the carbines and sabres of the police that commanded respect and obedience, — although bullet and steel had frequently to be used to teach the lesson of submission to legally constituted authority, — but what those men and their uniforms represented. From the civilized East, the seat of government and a society with conventions where law and order reigned, the adventurous Canadian pioneer was separated by thousands of miles of unbroken wilderness or frowning mountains, great lakes, and torrential rivers, out of communication with all that he had left behind, but never out of touch with law and justice. The thin chain of posts that stretched across the continent, the policeman whose “beat” covered as much territory as a principality of Europe, the handful of troopers, whose presence gave a sense of protection to the timid and the law-abiding, and was feared by the law-breaker and the criminal, went unmolested, not because of

the bullets they carried, but because they were part of that remorseless thing, Justice, which had neither heart nor compassion when its decrees were to be executed, that was all the more terrifying because it was impersonal, that avenged without passion, and sentenced without revenge. It inspired in the Canadian, the men of all nationalities who went to Canada to seek fortune, a respect for the law; it taught them the impartiality and the precision of the law; it elevated law to its high place as the guardian of society.

Turn to America, and observe there how different the conditions have always been. Each colony, as we have seen, made its own laws; some colonies offered a premium to settlers by a code that was an invitation to the dishonest; when the colonies became states, and the doctrine of the sovereignty of the state was firmly established, the right of each state to make and enforce its own laws went unchallenged. In the days of the pioneer community there was always the antinomy of stern, rude, and swift justice and defiance of law; there were communities made up of outlaws and "bad men," in which the only law was that of force, and justice spoke out of the barrel of a revolver; but that was to be expected, and perhaps did no lasting harm. It marked the first stage of society in the same way that civilization began in force and cunning; it was the evolutionary process through which the community passed. What has done harm, what has

weakened the respect in which law is held and has been an incentive to its violation, is the mass of conflicting statutes which destroy the effect of law.

It is a popular delusion that there is something mystical and almost divine about law. The most difficult mental process to overcome is the unconscious influence of atavism, a force that we commonly speak of as conservatism and habit, which is the age-long survival of inheritance operating automatically, and is as insensible a mental operation as breathing is physical. To the great mass of people, who accept things as they are and have neither the curiosity nor the capacity to determine causes for themselves, theology unconsciously colors their conception of the law. The veneration which the church pays to the lawgiver and the lawmaker, the purpose of religion to inspire respect for law, the hazy knowledge the unthinking have of the prophet, the lawmaker, and the lawgiver in that age of society when laws were divine commandments, have caused men to believe that laws owe their inspiration to a spiritual source. It is of course self-evident to every thinking man that there is no relation between divine and human law; that laws are enacted, not in pursuance of a divine injunction, but because the protection of society makes a formal code necessary; and while a human law may be based on a divine precept, it is to save society from anarchy and not in obedience to a divine precept that the power of the legislature is exerted. Thus, while it is true

that there is a divine prohibition against committing murder and society punishes the murderer, it is done not because men live according to the teachings of Christ, but in recognition of the acknowledged right of every man to the enjoyment of that which he legally possesses, and birth is the patent of the state to the individual, granting him the full and unhampered right to the possession of his own life. No man may take another man's life any more than he may take his goods. There is no divine precept, in precise terms, against forgery, unless we may regard forgery covered by the prohibition against stealing, but society as a protective measure punishes forgery because of the confusion that would follow if forgery went unpunished.

There is another equally common delusion that the law precedes the offense the commission of which it is designed to deter or to punish. The reverse, of course, is true. The development of society is marked by certain social crimes, and when a particular crime is repeated often enough to put it in a category by itself and to create a class, society, again merely as a protective measure, seeks to deter the criminal by saying to him, "You commit that crime at your risk, and if you still think the risk is worth taking, then you know what your punishment will be in case of detection." Thus we shall find no law against forgery at that time in the world's history when writing was so restricted an art that the unauthorized use of a person's signature was not

a menace to society. To come down to a modern illustration of the proof that the law never anticipates an offense, and that the offense must be repeated often enough before society deals with it, we have only to cite the automobile and airship. Twenty years or so ago one might have searched in vain the laws of nations or states, the ordinances and regulations of cities and towns, to find any mention of the automobile. Human ingenuity could have conceived the age of the self-propelled vehicle, and law-makers and philosophers, with their knowledge of the weakness of human nature, could have pictured the menace to society by the unregulated use of this new form of energy. It was only when this menace took precise shape in an excessive rate of speed that threatened life and property, that that which before was lawful because society had not declared it illegal became unlawful, and what heretofore was moral became unmoral. With the increase of the automobile, there grew up around it a special code, each chapter aimed to prevent injury to society or to compensate society in case of an infraction.

To-day the airship has no code of its own. Unlike the chauffeur, the aviator does not require a license, there is no restriction on his speed, his machine does not have to carry lamps or display a number, he is subject to no rules of the road. The regulation of the airship is to-day not a practical question, because its use is too limited to interfere

with the rights or privileges of the individual; its danger is to its operator, not to society as a whole. Until the art of aviation is brought to a much higher state of perfection, the airman will navigate aloft untroubled by thought of laws or municipal regulation, but so soon as airships become one of the recognized adjuncts of social intercourse, their operation will be subject to their own code. These two illustrations show the origin and cause of social law.

What may appear to the reader a digression is important in tracing the causes of the lawless spirit that has so long existed in America, which wise and law-loving Americans sorrowfully feared was the greatest danger to the stability of American institutions.¹ Law can command respect only when it is swiftly and impartially administered and is the formalized expression of the great majority of the people; when, in other words, the act of the law-maker is the concrete expression of public sentiment, and the great force of public opinion is the motive force to energize the legislature. The law will not be weakened, even although there exists a minority opposed to it. In nearly every civilized

¹ "I hope I am not over-wary; but if I am not, there is even now something of ill omen amongst us. I mean the increasing disregard for law which pervades the country — the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions in lieu of the sober judgment of courts, and the worse than savage mobs for the executive ministers of justice. This disposition is awfully fearful in any community, and that it now exists in ours, though grating to our feelings to admit, it would be a violation of truth and an insult to our intelligence to deny." — Lincoln: *Letters and Addresses*, p. 8.

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community, death is the penalty to be paid for murder, yet there are many people conscientiously opposed to capital punishment, and who never cease to agitate for its abolition. This agitation does not cause the law to fall into disrepute, nor does it weaken its efficacy or its deterrent influence, but rather it causes the law to be held in respect, for its shows the influence law exercises when even those who are opposed to it yield their individual opinions in deference to the will of society; so far from causing the law to fall into disrepute an idealistic sentiment is evoked, for the highest plane of civilization is reached when the individual observes a law which he condemns and relies on legal and pacific methods to secure its repeal or modification. The people who believe that society has no right to take the life of a murderer do not attempt to prevent his execution or to interfere with justice; they agitate in the hope that they may bring about the conversion of the majority, but they bow to the will of the majority and hold that a law, even a bad law, must have the respect of all good citizens. "When I so pressingly urge a strict observance of all the laws," Lincoln told his countrymen, "let us not be understood as saying there are no bad laws, or that grievances may not arise for the redress of which no legal provisions have been made. I mean to say no such thing. But I do mean to say that, although bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible, still, while they continue in force, for

the sake of example they should be religiously observed.”¹

American lawlessness begins in the nursery and the schoolroom and ends in the courts and the legislatures. It is indifference and the worship of the fetish of individualism, combined with the national trait of carelessness and the scorn that the American has for artificial conventions rather than corruption, that beget a contempt for law. Only an infinitesimal percentage of American fathers or mothers have been trained strictly to observe home discipline, or to pay that respect to authority which is regarded as essential to the formation of the character of children by Europeans or Orientals, or, in fact, any people except the American.

Not having known discipline in his childhood or youth, the American father is incapable of enforcing family discipline, and questions whether it is beneficial. “Himself confident and resourceful,” an American writer says, “the average American father has been pleased to accord to his son a large freedom for the development of individual quality; and when he has had misgivings as to the tendencies of his children, he has usually been too busy with the material cares of our strenuous style of living to do more than admonish, or to delegate the duties of parenthood.”² Freedom is regarded as essential to the formation of character, to encour-

¹ Lincoln: *Letters and Addresses*, p. 13.

² *The Century Magazine*, June, 1910, p. 312.

age initiative and resource, to lead to the end that every American hopes for in his son — his material success. He must be self-reliant, courageous, able to match his wits against others. Rebellion in the home is a sign of the boy's "spirit"; defiance of schoolmasters is indicative of "pluck." If, says the writer who has been quoted, one doubts the truth of the generalization that there is little or no family discipline in America, "let him inquire of the masters of the private schools of the country. They will tell him, without qualification, that the lack of training in American homes is the bane of the preparatory schools, and the direct cause of the prevalent mediocre levels of discipline and scholarship." The habits of life are formed and character is built in the home and in the schoolroom. With parental discipline lax or non-existent, it is not surprising that the boy grows up with scant respect for law, and that respect does not become stronger as he grows older. "Among undergraduates," says the writer in the *Century*, "the mob spirit frequently holds sway, and is often treated with leniency, on the sentimental principle that a college ruffian differs from other varieties of willful disturbers of the peace. . . . College authorities of late have really curbed the hazing pastimes of undergraduates, which often include disgraceful or inhuman treatment of their fellows; but the cultivation and maintenance of a standard of personal conduct, proper to young men giving their time to the higher objects

of civilization, is either neglected or is largely a failure."

That same spirit of individualism, which makes the American confident that he is able to determine all questions for himself, leads legislators and judges to bring the law into contempt by their open defiance of it. Legislatures frequently pass laws that are meaningless, or endeavor to prevent the passage of laws for which a popular demand exists, not because individual legislators are corrupt, which is too often the popular belief, but because they set their opinions against the public, and are able to convince themselves that their judgment and knowledge are better than that of their constituents. Judges are equally at fault. The Illinois Legislature passed a law prohibiting the marriage of divorced persons within one year from the date of the decree, but a Chicago judge held that the marriage of a divorced woman within the prohibited period was not illegal, as the law was against public policy. "I take it," the judge declared in his opinion, "that in law, marriage is a meritorious and necessary institution. The propagation of the race, the sustaining of the family, and the upbuilding of society rest upon it. It is therefore to be promoted generally."¹ This is not an isolated case. In England there is frequent complaint of "judge-made law," of judges writing into statutes a construction not intended by the legislature, but it is doubtful if

¹ *Springfield Republican*: July 4, 1907.

any English judge in modern times has nullified a statute because he disagreed with the purpose sought to be accomplished by the legislature, while in America judges have frequently defeated the clear intent of the law.

The American contemptuous disregard of the law comes from the multiplicity of laws, which have usually been the design of unscrupulous men to destroy the purpose of law and tend to confusion and corruption; the facility afforded for the making of new laws; the ill-considered and hasty action of law-makers in the enactment of laws; and the belief which has become American second nature that every evil, real or imaginary, can be corrected by the passage of a new law; and that the only rule of conduct is the authority of the law, although it does not lead to the observance of the law. With the exception of the Declaration of Independence there has perhaps been no declaration of political principle so often quoted by Americans, and referred to as a warning and an inspiration, as the preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution adopted in 1780, which, Webster declared, contained the greatest words in any constitutional document: "In the government of this Commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to

the end it may be a government of laws and not of men."

The fear that men will usurp the authority that belongs to law has resulted in there being more laws in the United States and less law than in any other country in the world; the annual output of Congress and the American legislatures is greater, enormously greater, than that of all the combined legislative assemblies of the world. There is a certain solemnity attending the passage of a law in Europe, even the archaic forms that are preserved invest the law with a mystical quality, although to the intelligent man the forms mean nothing and it is the substance that counts. In America the enactment of a law is a rather slapdash thing that excites no particular reverence. It is easy to agitate for the passage of a law or the repeal of a law that is inconvenient; it is almost as easy to secure its enactment or its repeal. Like everything else in this world, whether metaphysical or material, cheapness brings contempt. Theoretically the multiplicity of laws and the facility afforded for their enactment should promote respect for the law and cause the strict observance of the law; as a matter of fact we know that the reverse is true in America.

A Frenchman, a keen analyst of English psychology and its institutions, says, "The French law is always imperative: it orders; it enjoins. The English law is very often optional: it suggests; it recommends a system which the citizens can use or not at

their pleasure.”¹ The American law is frequently tentative: it seems to say, “This is merely an experiment, whose wisdom we ourselves doubt, but we can’t help trying it.”

In a country in which every citizen is subject to the same law, there is no opportunity for evasion, and while the law may be harsh, in some cases even intolerable, its equality enforces respect. In America, state laws not necessarily being uniform, often the laws of one community are in direct conflict with those of another, and the vicious and the criminal will, and do, select those states whose laws are lax or inefficiently administered in which to carry on their nefarious operations; and this is particularly true when society is preyed on under the protection of law. Commercial piracy, the promotion and incorporation of bogus or fraudulent joint-stock companies, the exploiting of the public, the misrepresentations by which the ignorant and the credulous are induced to invest their savings on the promise of large returns, all these things, not unknown to Europe, are easier of accomplishment in America because certain states, in effect, if not in precise terms, offer a bonus to dishonesty while observing legal forms. Commerce must not be hampered, therefore to throw as few restrictions as possible about commercial operations neither supervision nor investigation is considered necessary. A high-sounding company with a “capital” of a million

¹ Boutmy: *The English People*, p. 176.

dollars may be the creation of an adventurer with money just barely sufficient to pay the not excessive incorporation fee demanded by the state, yet the company is a legal entity and the courts of other states must give full faith and credit to its charter.¹

The effect of this, as Lincoln pointed out, is that "the lawless in spirit are encouraged to become lawless in practice," and there grows up a constant effort to evade the law or to take advantage of the law without incurring the risk of punishment. The American people have been corrupted by their laws. When the state is most corrupt, then the laws are most multiplied, says Tacitus. A fine sense of commercial honesty — for it is in trade operations that the baneful effects are most seen — has been blunted.

This multiplicity, this diversity of laws, deprives the law of its greatest quality to inspire respect. The strength of the law is its inerrancy. The law is the concrete wisdom of all the ages or the best brains of the country. The mass may protest against a law, but they are humbly conscious of their ignorance, and accept the law as something superior to themselves and as representing knowledge, experience, and much careful thought. This, the theatrical part of law, the law is stripped of in America. The law is not inerrant; it is merely human ingenuity, and very often not over-ingenuous. When in adjoining states the same crime is pun-

¹ *Constitution of the United States, art. iv, sec. 1.*

ished differently, the effect is not to make men regard one law as more humane than the other, but to bring the lawmaker into contempt as stupid or without experience, even, perhaps, to raise the suspicion of corruption; to bring down the lawgiver to the common level, and to create the impression that the law is an experiment rather than a finality.

Furthermore the law in America has cheapened itself by the method of its interpretation. When in the development of society new conditions are created and new laws are required to deal with them, and in obedience to public demand a law is enacted, the opponents of that law, especially if it attacks existing commercial privileges legally conferred or sanctioned by custom, raise the question of constitutionality and defy the law until the courts have decided that it is competent for the legislature to create the enactment. In England the last word of Parliament is the law of the land; therefore, no one can postpone the execution of the law by asserting that it is repugnant to the constitution; in America a law is the intention of the lawmaking power, but its validity depends upon the approval given to it by the court of final jurisdiction. This, it is evident, has the tendency to cheapen law and to encourage sophiscation. It also enables corrupt legislators to shift their responsibilities, and it is an invitation to carelessness. Yielding to popular demand, or sometimes merely to clamor, a statute is enacted, but it may be nullified by incorporating into it pro-

visions of such doubtful validity that there is at least the chance that it will be held unconstitutional by the courts; when legislators are honest this dependence upon the courts promotes carelessness and "slapdashery." Rather than give an act that careful consideration which its importance demands, the legislature takes chances that it will stand the scrutiny of the court; if it does, "slapdashery" is vindicated; if not, the work can be done over again.

Again, the light esteem in which law is held is to a large extent the consequence of the terrific pace under which a poor, straggling, and sparsely populated country of enormous area has developed into one of the richest and largest in population. American civilization is the product of forced draft, of speeding the engine up to its highest capacity, of driving ahead with almost demoniacal energy, of filling an entire people with the almost insane idea that everything must be done to-day because to-morrow will be too late;¹ and necessity was to some extent responsible for this restless and nervous energy. Great stretches of country must be opened up and the refinements of civilization and modern

¹ "The rush, the fierce day-and-night strain, the tenement homes left desolate — or worse: all this, as in other parts of America's race, is 'all in the game.' The game that grows year by year more vast and intense and inspiring. The huge industrial game of the world, with America far in the lead. America working the swiftest, and straining each nerve to keep up with despotic machines of steel that she herself has created. And laughing at the damage." — *Everybody's Magazine*, August, 1908.

progress brought to the pioneer and the settler. When there were railways to be built, for instance, no one was too particular about the niceties of scrupulous financing; the main thing was to link the outpost with the centre for the benefit of both; and the advantages of railway communication instead of the slow-moving and uncertain wagon or boat were so apparent that a people possessed with the spirit of the gambler were willing to take great chances, to sanction things that prudence knew to be dangerous, and to delude themselves into believing that later the evil could be corrected. The buccaneer, the gentleman adventurer, the pirate, the slave-trader of the seventeenth century—and the one so easily merged in the other that the man who held the King's commission, when not engaged on the King's business, thought it no disgrace to be about his own ventures, which were not too narrowly to be inquired into—pretypified in America the captains of industry who broke the wilderness on a grand scale and taught their countrymen to think in millions. Like their seventeenth-century prototypes, they were men of glowing imagination, fearless, unscrupulous, full of audacity, their finer feelings corrupted by the lust of gold. The Elizabethan adventurers risked money and life to discover unknown continents and become the possessors of their wealth, and in a day when there was no code of international law, and no public opinion to restrain passion or avarice, they were none too scrupu-

pulous in the methods they employed; and the only law they knew was the law they made for themselves.

The American financial buccaneer — who was a splendid type of man in his way, although his ways are no longer to be commended; and who served a purpose, although that same end can now be reached by other and more ethical means — saw the great opportunities that were open to him and was as unrestrained by fear of consequences or morality as Morgan or Kidd; — the one, beginning life as a pirate, received knighthood at the hands of Charles II and the appointment of deputy governor of Jamaica; the other, a merchant of integrity and with a reputation for shrewdness, commissioned by William III to chase the pirates off the sea, turned pirate himself and swung on the gallows.

Just as nations at one time either encouraged piracy or at least countenanced it, and certain ports welcomed the pirate because he was “good for trade,” spent his money freely, and paid double prices for everything without a murmur, so the American *entrepreneur* found few obstacles thrown in his way. He was a benefactor, he made the desert bloom, cities rose under his magic touch, industry flourished; he came with many professions of good faith, he wanted only the fair reward that his enterprise and his money were entitled to. It was the old story of the camel and the shepherd. Coming as suppliant, he ended as master, and the commu-

nity on whom he laid his iron hand was unable to dislodge him.

The chapters dealing with the industrial development of America win admiration and excite disgust. The courage, the skill, the enterprise; the visualization of the future, the indifference with which men gambled with great stakes for a huge prize make magnificent reading; and the sordidness, the cupidity, and the dishonesty cannot be read without a thrill of righteous indignation. Yet the tale is no more sordid than that of corresponding periods in the social development of other nations. These chapters are as brutal, as savage, and as disgraceful as the history of piracy, with which I have compared them, when piracy was winked at because, by the simple ceremony of hauling down the Jolly Roger and running up the national colors, the free-booter was transformed into the privateer, which restored the outlaw to respectability and greatly increased a nation's naval strength. In the golden age of American commercial piracy, as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when desperate men roamed the seas and it was more profitable to rob than it was to labor, force and cunning took the place of law, and the pirates of the sea as well as the pirates of the land were able to escape their just deserts by dividing their plunder with judges and governors. The bringing to America of a ready-made civilization instead of a civilization that developed by slow and painful growth, as has been the

case with every other people; the concentration of the strength of a nation on the taming and subjugation of a continent, which left them neither time nor opportunity for cultural development; the American childish envy of the older and more refined civilizations of other nations; the belief that the surest way for America to win respect in the eyes of the world was to become materially powerful, which turned the energy of every man in the direction of making money and stimulated commercial dishonesty; the ease with which money could be made if one were not overburdened with conscience; the general contentment and prosperity of the people, although they were the victims of dishonesty; and the American attitude of *laissez-faire*, that nothing matters so long as bills are paid and there is a surplus, — these things were some of the causes, in addition to those that have already been mentioned, to bring law into contempt, to make Americans regard law as an inconvenience to be evaded if it could be done with safety, and to make the man who was "smart" enough to break the law without being punished to be held in admiration for his cleverness and audacity. The lawyer, who in the past had defended the innocent or endeavored to secure justice for the unfortunate, was succeeded by the shrewd but tricky attorney, whose principal duty was to advise his client how to juggle with the law or to secure his acquittal by resorting to technicalities. Law became a farce. It no longer in-

spired respect. Justice gave place to chicanery, and cunning was a greater quality than honesty.

Civilization drove the pirate off the sea. When humanity could no longer tolerate the letter of marque, the licensed pirate was no more. Commercial piracy in America has not yet been destroyed, but there are fewer Morgans and Kidds and Blackbeards than there once were, and the day shall as surely come when there are none as that day came when Governor Spotswood's stout cruisers took the head of Blackbeard, the "Last of the Pirates," nearly two centuries ago.

CHAPTER XV

THE INFLUENCE OF IMMIGRATION ON AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

FROM the beginning of national existence the Americans have been a sectional people, with little in common between the North and South. A feeling that began in indifference rapidly developed into contempt and ripened into dislike; from the first the men of the North took a different view of life and morals and economics from those of the South; there developed two antagonistic schools of political and economic thought that for sixty years kept the country in a state of turmoil and fierce political agitation; that aroused passion, and finally culminated in that war which marks the third epoch of American development. This antagonism was made apparent with the adoption of the Constitution, when the infant nation was in its swaddling clothes.¹ It was as bitter then as it was half a century later, when bitterness could only be appeased by blood. Then, as in the next century, it should have rent the Union and broken the Confederation into detached states. Yet the marvel is — and the

¹ Cf. Winsor: *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. vii, chaps. 3 and 4, *passim*.

whole history of this people is almost fabulous — that jealousy and dislike only served to increase the strength of the country as a whole, to make it richer and more prosperous and more unassailable from external attack. The growth of the strength and power of the United States has not been observed by rivals without envy, and they have hoped the day was to come when they might turn sectional jealousies to their profit. Such hopes have been in vain. Since the day when the Americans emancipated themselves from the power of England they have never been in danger of losing their independence by foreign intrigue, nor of seeing the Union dismembered by parts of it seeking the protection of a foreign flag. Antipathy was never so violent that it was not forgotten when a common danger threatened; and yet, while it was quieted in the face of peril, it was never silenced.

In all that goes to make character, in customs and social conventions, in education and training, in the manner of living, in physical environment, which is one of the great influences on character; in the products of the soil and the industries of the two sections, the people of the South have always been unlike those of the North.¹ In the first place, Southern

¹ "In the American states slavery speedily gravitated to the South. The climate of the Southern provinces was eminently favorable to the negroes; and the crops, and especially the rice crops, — which had been introduced into South Carolina from Madagascar in 1698, — could hardly be cultivated by whites. In the Northern provinces the conditions were exactly reversed. We can scarcely have a better illustration of the controlling action of the physical on the moral world than is furnished by this fact. The conditions of cli-

labor was slave labor, while that of the North was free; and society resting on an enslaved class has a social and moral viewpoint different from that in which free labor exists. We have seen in the previous volume how Virginia and the Carolinas were influenced by the introduction of slave labor and the concentration of that labor on the production of tobacco, rice, and indigo; and with the increase of population and the expansion of trade, which created a greater demand for the products of the South, the early influence of slavery and the narrowing effect of agriculture became more marked on character. In New England and the Middle Colonies there was a large agricultural population, but their wealth was not in the soil. The North was growing rich on its manufactures and commerce, its carrying trade and its fisheries; its exports and its imports were the real source of its prosperity. The diversity of the industries and interests of the North, the fact that all activity was based on voluntary service, that made every man, within limits, his own master and inspired him with a feeling of independence, gave the Northern man a wider, a more generous view of life than the Southern man, morally debased by contact with slavery and en-

mate, which made the Northern provinces free states and the Southern provinces slave states, established between them an intense social and moral repulsion, kindled mutual feelings of the bitterest hatred and contempt, and in our own day produced a war which threatened the whole future of American civilization." — Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. II, p. 19.

grossed in only one thing—and that the least stimulating to intellectual effort.¹

The difference between the Northern business man of that day and the Southern planter is the difference in our day between the exporter who sends his wares to all parts of the globe,—who sells pins or buys elephant tusks, to whom a revolution in South America or an earthquake in Java is of direct personal interest as affecting his ventures,—and the village shopkeeper who is untouched by revolutions or earthquakes and has no horizon beyond the limits of his little community.

The North was prosperous; the prosperity of the South, in some respects, was even greater. Its rice and indigo fields gave enormous and profitable yields that made the planters rich and enabled them to live a luxurious and indolent life, but it was a life that destroyed the feeling of community with the labor that produced wealth. No matter how hard a taskmaster a man may be, free white labor is of his own flesh and blood; men like himself, even although of a lower order; men, in fact, and not things. Enslaved labor is a chattel, property like a horse or a hoe, to be taken care of because it has a

¹ Oldmixon wrote that Virginia was able to compete with New England and New York in certain manufactures; they might make brandy and "have sugar from their sugar tree," "yet they are so lazy that they will be at no pains to provide themselves with anything which they can fetch elsewhere for tobacco. . . . But all their thoughts run upon tobacco and they make nothing of those advantages which would enrich an industrious people."—*The British Empire in America*, vol. I, pp. 320-21.

money value, but subject to no other consideration. Because of the great gulf separating the master from the slave, and the contrast between a governing aristocracy and an enslaved lower order,¹ "nowhere else was good blood and noble descent held in such high esteem. Nowhere else was social rank so clearly defined. Toil was the only thing from which the rich planter abstained. Horse-racing by day and deer-hunting by night, dueling and gambling, made up, with the social festivities of the class to which he belonged, his sole occupation and pleasure."²

When the New Englander, the New Yorker, or the Pennsylvanian went South, he came to a land unlike his own and a people foreign to those among whom he lived; whose manner of speech even was different. He saw trees "whose foliage bore no resemblance to that of the elms and chestnuts that grew along the streets of his native village. He rode for days through an endless succession of tobacco fields. The rank vegetation of the Dismal Swamp; the rice fields covered with water; the sugar cane growing higher than he could reach; the great forests of pine yielding an inexhaustible supply of pitch and tar; the indigo plant; the fruits, the very

¹ "The large plantation, by giving birth to a class of great landowners, increased the importance of leaders in the community. It promoted the aristocratic spirit not the less strongly because there were no legally defined ranks in society. It created a rural gentry as proud as that of England." — Bruce: *Economic History of Virginia*, vol. II, p. 569.

² McMaster: *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. I, p. 70.

birds, filled him with astonishment; nor did the people seem less strange to him than the country.”¹ The Northern man at the time of the Revolution had little veneration for blood or birth, and the absurd pretensions of the Southerners, the great stress they laid upon their aristocratic lineage, seemed to these ardent democrats, who were almost *sans-culottes* in their fierce republicanism, as ridiculous as the claims of tattered Irish peasantry to their descent from kings. “Their pride, their arrogance, their keen sense of what they were pleased to term personal honor, inspired him with disgust.”² The way in which the Southerner lived, his openhanded hospitality, his great house and his lavish table were enjoyed by the Northerner; but he did not like the quickness with which the Southerner picked a quarrel and the readiness with which he exchanged a cartel, for while duels were fought in the North, they were less frequent than on the other side of the Potomac. While the visitor from New England or New York lived in constant surprise, he was equally an object of interest to his Southern hosts. He walked with a more energetic step than the native, who was used to taking things leisurely because the great heat negatived unnecessary physical exertion; he wore clothes of a different cut and texture; he was mentally more alert and full of curious questions, especially if he was a “Connecticut Yankee,”

¹ McMaster: *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. i, p. 71.

² McMaster: *Op. cit.*

which he asked in a strange tongue. "The way he compacted his vowel sounds and clipped his words; the long sound which he gave to *a*; the broad sound with which he pronounced *e*; the boldness with which he substituted that letter for *u*, and *u* for *e* — excited many a good-natured laugh at his expense."¹

The South had taken up arms against England, the South had known fully as much of the horrors of war as the North, and in the South the conflict assumed more the character of civil war than rebellion, but after the Revolution the South had a greater attachment for England than it had for the North, or than the North had for the mother-country. Nor is it difficult to understand the reason. The great planters and landowners of the South gloried in their English descent and in the fact that they were branches of noble or aristocratic English families; and many who were neither noble nor aristocratic and who boasted of their republicanism, to magnify their own importance, asserted their connection with the English peerage and squirearchy; and to the Virginian, England was always "home."² Moreover, the material welfare of the South was bound up with that of England. The planters sent their tobacco and rice and indigo to England, and with the proceeds they bought English goods or wares that had passed through English hands. The

¹ McMaster: *Op. cit.*

² Bruce: *Economic History of Virginia*, vol. II, p. 182.

fine raiment that the Southern planter wore,¹ and he was very much of a dandy; the books that it was fashionable to have, the Madeira and port, very often horses and cattle, were brought across the Atlantic. Everything that could facilitate this commerce was to the advantage of the South, anything that imposed a burden upon it diminished the profits of the plantation and increased the cost of the goods that the products of the plantation bought in the foreign market. Here was laid the foundation for the devotion of the South to free trade, and was the beginning of the economic divergence between the two sections. There was never a moral question involved over an impost. There was no abstract principle at stake. It was simply expediency and selfishness. So long as the South bought in a foreign market, it was naturally interested in being able to lay down its importations without the payment of taxes or duties; with the North, manufacturing on its own account and beginning to compete with England, protective duties that should make that competition more difficult were looked upon as desirable and essential for the welfare of the country. So long as the South remained purely an agriculture section its belief in the wisdom of free trade remained unshaken; it was only when

¹ "Their cloaths are brought from England for [Virginia] Persons of Distinction, and are as much in the Mode as art and cost can make them." — Oldmixon: *The British Empire in America*, vol. I, p. 293. Of the women Oldmixon says: "They have almost all their Necessaries, as to dress, from England." Cf. Bruce: *Economic History of Virginia*, vol. II, p. 133 *et seq.*

manufacturing began to compete with agriculture in demands upon the energies of its people and the Southerner saw that the wealth under the surface might in time become even more valuable than that upon it, that he modified his views and regarded protection as a doctrine less vicious than it had seemed to his fathers.

Beginning, then, with a continent so vast that it was great enough to form two independent kingdoms according to the thought of the time, with a people temperamentally unlike, with a social institution in one section condemned by the other, with commercial and economic interests antagonistic, the two sections, despite all the influences that should have severed them, remained united. This seeming paradox is to be traced to something more than chance.

Whether an American was a Virginian or a New Englander, a New Yorker or a Carolinian, a Quaker from Pennsylvania or a Catholic from Maryland; whether he raised corn or grew rice; whether he regarded slavery as a proper institution of society or looked upon it with abhorrence; whether he made his confession or abominated all priests; in short, no matter how unlike Americans were in their attitude toward life or their moral standard or the social conventions they had framed for themselves, in one thing they were agreed as no people ever had been before. The Southerner could without wrench to his moral or political conscience justify the en-

slaving of the black,¹ but the Southerner was no less fiercely zealous in upholding the untrammeled freedom of men of his own race than the Northerner. In everything that touched this great question of freedom, in the right of man to exercise without restriction his own will, and to be free of the interference of sovereigns or a self-constituted ruling class that was the social system under which all the world had lived before the American Republic was born, Americans were as one. Physical and other causes created sectionalism, this — a common political belief that had been exalted into moral faith — was more powerful than the forces of nature or the effect of temperament. The same spirit animated men North and South. The same god of freedom was worshiped at the altars in the towns of New England and on the plantations of the South.

The passionate exaltation inspired by freedom, the concept men had of the right of the individual, was to the world unknown until it was translated into precise terms through the medium of the American Constitution. I do not mean that there suddenly sprung into life on the American continent

¹ "Equality is no thought nor creation of God. Slavery, under one name or another, will exist as long as man exists; and abolition is a dream whose execution is an impossibility. Intellect is the only divine right. Intellect seeks freedom from its own proper impulses, and attains it by its own proper power. The negro cannot be schooled, nor argued, nor driven into a love of freedom. His intellect cannot grasp it, nor can he love an abstraction which it is beyond his intellect to understand. The apostle of freedom can to the negro be nothing more than the apostle of temporary license and permanent savageism. 'Heaven's laws are not repealable by earth, however earth may try.'" — De Bow: *Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States*, vol. II, p. 204.

a moral consciousness to which all the rest of the world was dead. America made no discovery. I have so repeatedly given expression to the conviction I hold that all mankind is part of one grand intellectual scheme, and that the same impulses move men in all climes and under all conditions of society, that I shall not now attempt to find any mysterious or supernatural reason to explain how it came about that there was born on the soil of America a political code that had far-reaching moral effects and set up a new social system. Ideas and thoughts that men had taken up, examined, rejected, returned to, became a part of themselves the more they were studied, and it was seen that they were founded on truth and promised to correct a system that, begun in force and cunning, made the mass subject to the dominion of a few. It is, I think, no violent wrench of the imagination to believe that if democracy had not been born in America under the circumstances and at the time when it was given life, its birth would have taken place elsewhere. The place of birth was to a certain extent accident, but the whole world was pregnant with an aspiration, and it was accident only whether the child of thought was born in a hovel or a palace. It was in America that the birth took place, and it was that accident of birth which made America regard itself as the mother of freedom.

It is extremely probable that the attempted disruption of 1861 would have taken place two or

three decades earlier if it had not been for the cementing influence of the immigrant, to whom the American people owe a double debt of gratitude. The immigrant has stimulated liberty and asserted freedom; the immigrant has lessened the danger of sectionalism; the immigrant has been the diastatic ferment in the American character.

It was said in the previous volume that the immigrant has always been drawn from the two extremes of the social and moral scale, that he has been Devil-loving or God-fearing, that he was either of resolute courage and full of resource, who made a success of life but was prepared to take chances so as still to better his condition, or he was weak and incompetent and unstable, who, having nothing to lose, drifted across the sea in the always delusive belief that conditions and not he were responsible for his failure. It is well to bear these truths in mind, for it is a common belief that the immigrant at one time was the best element of the population and never its least desirable; and it is one of the historical myths that in the early days immigrants were men and women of extraordinary courage, strength, and intelligence.¹ We have seen that while many measured up to this standard, mixed with them were the dissolute, the idle, and the criminal; that there was no colony that did not con-

¹ "It would appear, therefore, that there has been no appreciable deterioration in the quality of immigration, judged from the standpoint of occupation. What it is to-day it has always been." — Falkner: *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xix, p. 49.

tain its share of the class that gave to it neither strength nor character. The nativity of immigration has changed from time to time, but the morality and psychology of immigration has remained much the same.¹

The effect of immigration is either to submerge or to stimulate the native stock; either the native stock will be absorbed and lose its identity in that of the alien, or, conversely, the immigrant will become incorporated into the native stock. There is, scientifically generalizing, no middle ground. Here and there we may find in a race an unincorporated element still bearing traces of its descent and alien to the people of which it has become a part, just as some individuals always remain foreign to their surroundings; but these exceptions are not important enough to affect the general principle that a dominant race absorbs the less virile.

As a rule it is the result of conquest when a race implants itself on another and absorbs it, and those results are easily seen. When a race is stimulated by immigration the reasons and the causes are more subtle, and a more searching inquiry must be made to ascertain the explanation.

¹ "The thirteen original colonies had godly and upright leaders, but under the avowals of their lofty purposes, which have since been shaped into history, a large proportion of the dregs and outcasts of Europe found convenient shelter. Time and fortunate circumstances consecrate the obscure beginnings of rank and family. The Irish of a generation ago are now our senators and our judges. The opportunities of a country blessed with great natural wealth are potent to-day for the salvation and the exaltation of great numbers of human beings who are unable to make headway in overcrowded Europe." — *New York Times*, August 16, 1907.

All the great movements of history have been the effects of race migration and conquest. The Tartar tide that swept over Europe, the continually widening power of Rome, the decline of the Roman Empire before the Germanic legions, the Norman conquest of Britain tell the same story of colonization and conquest. The conquering nation, mentally and physically more vigorous, has been able to impress its own mentality and strength upon the conquered, it has forced its own customs and language, it has bred from among the women or enslaved them, it has crushed out nationality or brought the knowledge of a new civilization. In time, if the conquering element is strong enough,—and it always must be stronger than its adversary or it would be conquered instead of conqueror,—the same “sympodial development,” to use Professor Lester Ward’s term,¹ is seen. There is a new growth, which becomes more important than the old, the vigor of the old organism dies out and there has been propagated a new species. This has been the history of race conquest.

Examining now the reverse of this evolutionary movement, we see how the immigrant has stimulated the dominant race to which he has attached himself, not parasitically but as a commensal. No matter what sterling qualities we may ascribe to the immigrant, the fact is that even when he appears to have been successful in his own country he has

¹ Ward: *Pure Sociology*, p. 71 *et seq.*

never been quite as fortunate as he hoped, or he is admittedly a failure, for no man will pull up stakes and go across the seas and take the risks involved if he is prosperous and contented at home; but the great majority leave because they have failed and they look to better things elsewhere, and they are willing to turn their hand to anything that may offer.

The immigrant, therefore, cannot pick or choose, but must take what is given him, and usually it is the coarsest and least remunerated employment. There is, of course, the exception when skilled artisans migrate because their industry is to be newly established in a foreign country and the scarcity of skilled labor insures them work at wages higher than the ruling rates at home, which was the inducement to spinners and weavers to cross the Atlantic in the early days of the cotton industry in America; but the great mass of immigrants have been unskilled laborers without money, who must find immediate employment, or throw themselves on charity, or starve.

Now for three quarters of a century we have been watching the effects of immigration on America, and yet one of its most important consequences has been overlooked. It has been repeated with monotonous iteration that immigration, by introducing a lower standard, "must result in injury to the working classes when it embraces a number of persons large enough to be a factor in the labor

market";¹ that it checks the native birth-rate;² that "immigration into this country has, from the time it assumed large proportions, amounted, not to a reinforcement of our population, but to a replacement of native by foreign stock";³ that "immigration tends to promote competition and so far tends to check the rise of wages";⁴ that immigration is largely the cause of unemployment; that "foreign labor stands as a constant menace to the progress of the American laborer and a check to his advancement,"⁵ and that "the lower classes of Europe crowd into the factories of America, driving out labor that was intelligent if not actually skilled";⁶ but the influence exercised by immigration, in raising the standard of the native stock, has either been willfully ignored or has not been understood.

The social and economic effects of immigration are thus described by a writer who uses the argument in support of his thesis that immigration has been detrimental. The earlier Irish and German immigrants, he says, who came in the forties to escape famine and political oppression, were, for the most part, unskilled and incapable of any but the simpler kinds of manual labor. Poor, they lived in the cheapest and most frugal way. Gradually the natives withdrew from social con-

¹ Falkner: *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xix, p. 42.

² Walker: *Discussions in Economics and Statistics*, vol. ii, pp. 440-41.

³ Walker: *Op. cit.*, p. 425. ⁴ Hall: *Immigration*, p. 123.

⁵ Hall: *Op. cit.*, p. 136. ⁶ Smith: *Emigration and Immigration*, p. 126.

tact with them; the girls disliked to compete with them for employment in the factory or in domestic service, and the boys were unwilling to work with them in the fields and the mills. The result of this dislike was, necessarily, that the natives and their children wished to confine themselves to occupations which the immigrants had not yet invaded; and these occupations were, of course, those requiring more capital either in money or in education. "Girls no longer went out to service, but took up bookkeeping or work in certain kinds of stores; the boys were sent to high school, or if possible, to college." To do this required some capital, and "the result was that the natives did not marry, or married later; and in case of marriage, voluntarily limited the size of their families."¹

Quite unconsciously, Mr. Hall has proved the fallacy of the argument of his school and revealed at a glance the enormous force exerted by the immigrant in raising the social and intellectual standard of the native; and it is within conservative bounds to assert that nothing has done so much to bring about that high level of mental and material prosperity in the United States as these continuous accessions of an unintellectual and poverty-stricken foreign element; a paradox, seemingly, but susceptible of precise proof.

We have seen that the effect of the Irish and German immigration was to make the native have a

¹ Hall: *Immigration*, pp. 110-11.

distaste for work regarded as fit only for the uneducated foreigner; and to escape from contact with the alien and his lowering influence the native aspired to higher forms of employment. Girls, instead of going into domestic service, which required no education or training, and offered no opportunity of social or intellectual advancement, "took up bookkeeping or work in certain kinds of stores," and while work of that character does not demand a high level of intelligence, it sharpens the faculties and imposes a mental discipline superior to that sufficient in a farmhouse "help" or a kitchen drudge in a village or small town. Boys, who in their earlier days were content to work in the mills or on the farms, had their ambition fired by the degradation of illiteracy, and were given a striking object-lesson of the financial value of education and the cultivation of proper habits. If the native boy was content to match his muscle against that of the foreigner, to live as he lived, to be satisfied with a bare existence with neither refinement nor enjoyment, to live with only death to look forward to and to die as a relief for having lived, he could imitate the foreigner's example and make no effort to acquire even the rudiments of an education; but the innate ambition that is part of the fibre of men of English blood, that is an unconscious inheritance and an unconscious influence, made the great majority of American boys desire something better. The boys, we are told, went to school, some of them

to college. When the books were put in their hands, they had forever turned their backs on the coarse work of the farm and the mill; they were fitting themselves to play a larger part.

Between 1830 and 1840, when the immigration tide was running full, Mr. Adams notes the changes in Quincy; and Quincy was simply typical of the rest of the country. Before 1830, farm-hands were mainly Americans; but the Irish now took their places in the fields, and the new generation of Americans either found employment in shops and mechanical pursuits, or became shoemakers. The more adventurous and enterprising went to the cities, or sought their fortunes in the West.¹

It is always the same story. Every historian, every writer on social movements, tells us of the pressure exerted by the immigrant; they observe the phenomenon and are impressed by it, but its significance they do not grasp. The process goes on automatically. The native is "driven out" of the fields into the shops, from the village to the city, from the overcrowded East to the newer West; his wits sharpened and his social level raised, not through a deliberate effort to reach a higher plane, but because the force exerted by the immigrant cannot be resisted; a force all the more powerful that it is unrecognized and unknown, and, similar to nature's law, does its work indifferent to theorist or *doctrinaire*.

¹ Adams: *Three Episodes of Massachusetts History*, vol. II, p. 949.

The effect of immigration always has been, and is to-day fully as much as it ever was, in one word, social. It made sport of idealists; it mocked the beautiful doctrine of equality; it showed the fallacy of fine-spun theories. The immigrant constituted the lowest order, on which was superimposed the social structure. An inert mass, its weight made it sink to the bottom, and yet it forced up all above it. To the immigrant fell the lowest and hardest tasks, the most degraded labor paid at starvation wages and held in contempt by the "native." "The American shrank from the industrial competition thus thrust upon him. He was unwilling himself to engage in the lowest kind of day labor with these new elements of the population; he was even more unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the world to enter into that competition."¹ Every one with the smallest spark of ambition had to liberate himself from that class so as to escape the ignominy of being no better than the despised foreigner. The immigrant did not destroy the labor market, but he modified its conditions. He came, he must live, and he took the only work for which he was fitted; and by taking it he fixed a social stigma on that work. The native, the American, could remain in that class or raise himself. The great mass was forced upward.

The immigrant has in turn been subject to the same law as the "native," and no more striking

¹ Walker: *Discussions in Economics and Statistics*, vol. II, p. 424.

illustration is afforded of the influence exercised by a lower civilization in forcing up a higher than a study of the Irish who have settled in America. We have seen what they were in the beginning; we know what they were for many years to come. The railways of America, its roads, its sewers, its cities have been built by the sweat that dropped from the backs of Irish laborers; wherever there was hard and rough and poorly paid work to be done, so that the way for Americans might be made easier, Irish labor did it. On the farms, in the family, in the factory, Irish men and Irish women, Irish boys and Irish girls, were ever at work, laboring at those things that the American scorned; the American "driven out"¹ by the Irish willing to work for lower wages and content with a lower standard of living; the American "driven out" because it was uneconomical to employ the superior intelligence and skill of the American. For years the Irishman was regarded as without the capacity to do anything more than the rough and menial work of the nation; but we have seen how the Irish have risen in the social scale, how with their social rise has come their intellectual advancement; or—it would be more correct to put it conversely—they have risen socially because they have advanced intellectually, until to-day the Irish in America are ex-

¹ "The Irish drove the New England girls out of the cotton factories of Massachusetts, and now the French Canadians are driving out the Irish." — Smith: *Emigration and Immigration*, p. 126.

actly like the English in England or the French in France, or any other people in the country of which they are a part; that is, there are Irish in America, some of them the sons and grandsons of immigrants, rich and poor, wise and foolish, distinguished in all that make men famous, or obscure and unknown.¹

The first stage of Irish development was the rise from manual labor to the proprietorship of a small groggeries. Later, the Irishman became a boarding-house keeper or kept a petty store, always with the hope that he might have the good fortune to be the owner of a "saloon," with much shining glass and polished mahogany on a main traveled street in a populous city, for saloon-keeping was then the ambition of the Irishman; and neither the professions nor commerce on a large scale was open to him. We have seen how the Irishman's view of life has completely changed in the last twenty-five years or so. There are still Irish navvies and Irish saloon-keepers, just as there are Americans working on the roadbeds of railways and selling liquor to whoever may care to buy; just the same as there are Englishmen in England working for a few pennies an hour

¹ "There is a real amalgamation going on which renders the descendant of the immigrant in many cases practically identical with the native American in capacity, feeling, and national characteristics. It would be absurd to treat the whole twenty or twenty-five millions whom we have reckoned to be of foreign descent as alien elements in our civilization. Many of these persons have been born on our soil, and know no other country and no other language or institutions than ours. They are as truly Americans in thought and feeling as any descendants of the Puritan fathers." — Smith: *Emigration and Immigration*, pp. 65-66.

loading vessels at the docks, or, a trifle higher in the social scale, the proprietors of public-houses; but to-day the Irish American, the American of Irish descent, even the Irishman who has not yet become an American because he is too new to the soil, is in no class by himself and finds no door closed. He may do or become whatever his capacity or abilities fit him for; and it is superfluous to add that in every walk of life, in politics, the professions, and business, the Irish-American is an important element. All that has been said in regard to the Irish applies with equal truth to the Germans, who, beginning on the same level socially and industrially as the Irish; passed through the same refining process and have reached the same end.¹

The rise of the Irish from degradation and poverty to culture and wealth forced up the so-called "native" element in the process, and the Irish have been subject to the same influence by the incursion of the Italians. Whereas immigration from Ireland began as early as 1820 and was steadily maintained for the next sixty years, the Irish largely exceeding all other aliens, it was not until after 1869 that Italian immigration began in any appreciable amount, and now with the change in

¹ "As for Marshall Haney, as he went about New York and Brooklyn in search of his relations, he was astounded at the translation of the Irish laborer into something else. 'In my time — when I left Troy — all the work in the streets was done by "Micks," as they called 'em — now they 're gone, whisked away as ye 'd sweep away a swarm of rodents, and here 's the black dagoes in their places. Where 's the Irishman — up or down? 'T is a mysterious dispensation and troubles me much.' ". — Hamlin Garland: *Money Magic*.

industrial and political conditions in their respective countries, the Italian immigration has for some years heavily outnumbered the Irish. In 1869, the entire immigration from Austria-Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Russia was only nine tenths of one per cent of the total immigration. During the fiscal year 1899, 76,489 Italians landed at the port of New York, constituting nearly a quarter of the total immigration of that year;¹ ten years later, the total rose to 190,398,² or a fraction more than twenty-five per cent of the gross immigration.

The recurrence of any social phenomenon justifies the assertion that it is the result of a sociological law. If the conclusion reached is correct, and the evidence is so ample that there is no reason to doubt its correctness, theories entertained for many years are proved to be fallacious, and the effect of immigration is not to lower the "native" element (using that term to mean not only the people native to the soil by birth, but including also those who have become absorbed into nationality by long residence and adaptation to language, customs, and habits of the people among whom they live), but to raise it; always, of course, bearing in mind that the "native" population must be virile enough and obstinate enough to adhere to its own mode of life and to remain uninfluenced by alien customs.

¹ *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xv, p. 67.

² United States Department of Commerce and Labor, *Immigration Bulletin*, September, 1909.

That there would be a break in the law, if the alien strain was mentally and physically more robust and of a coarser fibre than the native element, is admitted.¹ The United States more than any other country has been the laboratory to test the influence of immigration on social development, and the large scale on which the experiment has been carried on, and the definite results obtained, leave the result no longer in doubt. Experiments extending over a series of years always producing the same results cannot be explained as coincidences nor accidental; they must be regarded as the proof of an exact law.

It is proper to point out here that the effect of immigration in America has been different from what it has been in Europe, and that the sociological law to which reference has been made might not be operative in Europe. Difference in conditions, social, moral, and political, difference in natural resources, difference in opportunity due to an undeveloped and sparsely populated country as compared with countries highly developed and thickly settled, produce their own requirements, and what has been for the advantage of America might not, and in all probability would not, be equally advan-

¹ The most remarkable historical illustration of a more virile alien race changing the social life of a people is the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty by the Manchu Tartars, who not only have dominated China but made the Chinese adopt the Manchu custom of shaving their heads and wearing a queue, which now hangs down every Chinaman's back and is the token of national submission.

tageous for Europe. It is to be remembered that I am dealing with American and not European development.

Just as the Irish and the Germans drove out the native Americans in the earlier decades of the last century, so the Italians, since they began to come in large numbers, have driven out the Irish and the Germans. In his testimony before the United States Industrial Commission, Mr. Joseph H. Senner, for four years United States Commissioner of Immigration at the port of New York, said the Italians "are certainly very much more welcome than the Chinese, whose places they have taken in building railroads and waterworks, and doing other labor which the native American and the immigrants from the English-speaking countries have long since ceased to undertake."¹ In its *Report* the Commission shows that whereas the Irish and Germans in New York City formerly lived in what were strictly Irish or German settlements, now "the Irish element are also distributed quite evenly throughout the city"; that in certain districts, at one time almost exclusively Irish, the Italians are more numerous than the Irish, and as a result of these facts this deduction is made: "Both Irish and Germans, in fact, show the results of the pressure by newer people."² It is a matter of common observation that work formerly done by the Irish is now

¹ *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xv, p. 171.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 471.

performed by the Italians; the men laying track on the railways, or grading streets or building sewers, hodcarriers and mortar mixers, are not, as they used to be, the red-haired men who spoke with a brogue and smoked a short clay pipe, but swarthy and more sinewy men who speak a tongue unfamiliar to Americans and roll cigarettes.¹ When the Irish formed the railway construction gangs, it was natural that Irishmen should keep the boarding-houses; now that the nationality of the workers has changed, it is the Italians who board the laborers, and the transition is easy from boarding-house keeper to the proprietorship of a small grocery; from the rough bar, where the cheapest and vilest liquor is sold, to the saloon in the Italian quarter of the city with its large Italian population; thence into more legitimate enterprise. The Italians, taking them in the aggregate, have not yet reached the same social status as the Irish, but there is no reason to believe that they will not in due time make exactly the same progress as have the immigrants of other races.

Pressing the Italians close are the Jews, probably to go through the same evolutionary process as the other races, but more slowly because of inherited

¹ "In Maine, the American labor in construction of large works was displaced by the Irish, then by the French Canadian, and now the Italians, brought from New York and Boston, have displaced all others and work for \$1.25 per day, which is 25 cents less than the wages paid to other nationalities. . . . It certainly would be a difficult thing at the present time to build a railroad of any considerable length without Italian labor." — *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xv, p. 441.

characteristics. Physically, and as the result of hereditary influences, the Jews do not take kindly to outdoor manual labor and have no liking for farm work; the consequence is they are thrust into the great cities of the seaboard, where they remain, increasing the congestion, pauperism, and degradation of the large centres of population, seeking the lowest forms of employment and accepting the starvation wages of the parasitic trades. The Irish and Germans, with physical strength as their weapon, were able to drive out the Americans; the Italians, with brawn and muscle as their capital, were able to displace the Celt and the Teuton; but the Jew is at the bottom of the scale, and so far there has been no immigration accustomed to a lower standard of living to drive out the Jew by underbidding him. It seems hardly necessary to explain that these observations apply, not to the Jew who has become Americanized, not to Jewish bankers, merchants, manufacturers, shopkeepers, doctors, scientists, and men of letters, who, although Jews in religion, and many of them orthodox Jews in custom, have become Americans in looking at life through the American mind and believing in the political and social doctrine that America teaches, but to the nearly 600,000 Jews who arrived in the United States between 1905 and 1909;¹

¹ According to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization of the Department of Commerce and Labor (*Immigration Bulletin*, 1909), in 1905 there were 129,910 Hebrews admitted; in 1906, 153,748; in 1907, 149,182; in 1908, 103,387; and in 1909, 57,551.

the great majority of whom were landed in New York and helped to increase the density of the East Side Ghetto, and who were forced by their extreme poverty to submit to be sweated by the manufacturers of cheap ready-made clothing and other articles the product of the sweatshop. The adult Jew, unfamiliar with English, without capital, broken by adversity and with no spirit of adventure, remains where he is set down, and has little to hope for in the way of improved social condition. His children, similar to the children of other immigrant races, will rise as the children of those who came before them have risen; for them it is a slower and more difficult ascent. In an interview, Mr. Oscar S. Straus, formerly Secretary of Commerce and Labor and later Ambassador to Turkey, said: "Years ago Americans did the rough and heavy work of the nation. Then came the Irish, and the Americans moved up. By and by the Italians swarmed in, and the Irish graduated from the trenches. When Broadway was much shorter than it is now, all of the names on the signs were American. But those old-time merchants became opulent, they no longer desired to be small shopkeepers, and so they went into the banks and manufactories. Now the Jews have their stores. In a generation the signs which hang and swing to-day in Broadway will be down and others will be up. Perhaps the names will be Italian. No race goes back in this country, but each, being pru-

dent, industrious, and ambitious, goes onward to better conditions.”¹

The persistent belief in the power of a lower race to “drive out” a superior race seems ineradicable, although the slightest reflection will show that it is fallacious, opposes all the teachings of history, and is violative of natural and physical laws. When did an inferior race, human or animal, drive out or subjugate a superior race; superior in strength, numbers, cunning, or skill? I have been unable to find any proof to support the theory that a dominant race, or a race superior in the scale of civilization, is in danger from a race of less vitality or of a lower order. Yet Mr. S. S. McClure, himself an Irishman by birth, although now a very good American, in a lecture uttered the familiar cry against immigration. “We in this country,” he said, “seek men as immigrants solely with a view to their value as laborers, not to their value as citizens. Yearly hundreds of thousands of immigrants come into this country who are of such a low breed that they will degrade the average of the breed in this country. For the first time in history an inferior is driving out or down a superior people. This seems to me a problem deserving a serious examination by serious men.”²

One reason why the immigrant has not driven out — in the sense that the term is usually em-

¹ *New York Times*, September 4, 1906.

² *New York Sun*, November 28, 1909.

ployed — the American, or reduced him to his own level, has generally been overlooked by the men who fear that the effect of immigration is to devitalize the native stock. Almost invariably the immigrant is not the physical equal of the American, and the foreigner, to stand the strain imposed by American requirements, must first be improved and brought up to the American standard. Witnesses testifying before the Industrial Commission repeatedly affirmed this. "When I get a new man who comes over here, he is green," one witness asserted, "and it takes him some time to get worked in, but after he has been here five or ten years he is just as good as any of them, and he will turn out in our factory in Paterson one third more work than when he first came." Another witness said, "I have known men to come to this country and start to work, and found the pace so rapid they have retired and gone back."¹ The immigrant with a lowered vitality cannot immediately displace the better nurtured American, although he can, and does, compete with the men of his own race. The result is that when the alien has been brought up to the required standard, he has in a measure become Americanized, and must have better and more expensive food to repair the waste made by excessive toil, which in turn is one of the means to force him up in the scale. The menace of immigration is the

¹ Cf. Low: *Protection in the United States*, p. 97 *et seq.*; *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xiv, pp. 202, 647, 704; vol. xiii, p. 538.

competition of the newest arrivals, not with Americans, but with people of their own nationality; Hungarians with Hungarian laborers in the coal mines of Pennsylvania or Illinois; Jews with Jews in the sweatshops of East Side New York, for example. This danger, it has always seemed to me, might be obviated by a scientific distribution of immigration; if, for instance, instead of permitting immigrants to land where they pleased and to remain where they landed, only that class of labor should be allowed entry for which a demand existed in certain specified places. When Kansas requires farm laborers or California house servants, a useful purpose is served by immigrants qualified to do the work where their labor is needed; but if the farm laborer looks for a job on the streets of New York, he is simply laying a burden on the community and forcing down the wage scale through being driven by necessity to take any work that may be offered him without regard to the standard wage.

The earlier Italian immigrants were unmarried men of the itinerant class, — ragpickers, organ-grinders, and the like, — who were later replaced by another class, the steady, industrious peasantry, whose extreme poverty forced them to break the bonds of their native land.¹ The industrial expansion of the country after the Civil War created a tremendous demand for unskilled labor, and thus afforded an opportunity for the Italian to compete

¹ Cf. *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xv, p. 473.

with the Irishman, and later to supplant him, as the years in which the Irishman had lived in America created and raised his standard, while the Italian, fresh from a country where an inferior standard prevailed, was content with lower wages and a cheaper scale of living.

Since immigration has been a peaceful and not a military conquest, the movement of individuals rather than the migration of races or tribes as it was in the past, similar phenomena have been observed in all countries. The first immigrants have played the same part socially that military pioneers do for an advancing army. They have been thrown forward to clear the ground, to fell trees and level roads and build bridges so as to make it easier for the advancing host; the military pioneer is simply a day laborer in uniform. The first immigrants in America, in Australia, in Canada, in whatever country they have settled or from whatever race they have come, have been men of this class, the men whose strength was their capital and who used their muscle and not their brains to make a living. They cleared the ground. They made the way easier for men of more refinement and greater skill to follow. As a matter of course the first immigration movement was almost entirely male; poverty and the uncertainty of what they were to encounter made the men leave their wives and children at home until they could establish themselves; and in tracing the social rise of an immigrant race it is easy enough to

determine when the immigrant felt he was assured of more stable conditions by noting, first, that the preponderance of males no longer continued, and, secondly, the improved character of the immigrant.

One extraordinary effect of the preponderance of males has been to stimulate intermarriage. The natural inclination of the immigrant was to marry a woman of his own race, but when the women were in a minority he was forced to go outside; and one step upward in the social scale was to marry an American-born wife.¹ The frequent intermarriage of Italians and Americans, Italians and Irish, Germans and Irish, is due partly to social ambition and partly to the excess of one sex over the other in communities or colonies. This merging of race and blending of blood beat down racial prejudices by the common allegiance to the new country; age-long rivalries disappear; the old nationalities are submerged in the new.

It is pointed out in the *Report of the Industrial Commission* that the earlier Italian immigrants were "mainly men without families, either unmarried or having left their families at home," many of whom returned to Italy in the dull season with the money they earned in America, but after a few years the family is either brought over or the man marries and settles down and becomes a permanent member of the community. "The increasing number of

¹ Ripley: "Races in the United States," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1908.

women in the immigration record, everyday observations as to the increase of women and children in the Italian districts, the personal acquaintance of charitable workers with many family histories, observations by social students in Italy itself — all these produce the strongest impression that the Italian day laborer, after a few years of taking himself most considerately off the hands of the city when he has no work to do, settles down here, when he has enough money to carry him through the year, with wife and family.”¹ Following the pioneers came “another class of Italian immigration, not so numerous as the former, but still of considerable importance,” — barbers, bootblacks, fruiterers, and shoemakers, generally from the cities and the small towns of Italy, who had been engaged in some sort of commercial pursuit. “Their business success is notable, and they have brought their trades generally to a higher level than that in which they found them. The Italian fruit peddler bestows a considerable amount of his inherited racial art sense in ‘composing’ his wares to form an attractive picture; the Italian barber pays considerable attention to the attractiveness of his place; the Italian bootblack is not the little ragged urchin of yesterday, with battered box and shrill velocity of motion, but a well-kept looking individual anywhere from fifteen to thirty years of age, with a regularly established place of business, ranging

¹ *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xv, p. 473.

from the thronelike armchair and umbrella to the regular shop as well kept as the barber's. There are bootblacks who make from ten to fifteen dollars a day. The Italian shoemaker lags behind in the list, being of the old-fashioned cobbler type.”¹

Still the tide increases and it bears a more valuable freight. After the day laborer and the petty *entrepreneur* come the men of skilled trades, the small shopkeeper, the merchant, and the banker, for the pioneer has done his work and the way is now open for them. “There are besides,” the *Report* notes, “Italian watchmakers, bakers, confectioners, keepers of *cafés* and ice-cream saloons, wine dealers, grocers, dry goods dealers, and many in other businesses.”² There are men in the macaroni, cigar and cigarette factories; there are skilled marble-cutters and tile-workers; cabinet-makers in the piano shops. “The tradespeople prosper rapidly. The Italian barber enlarges his shop,— perhaps finally sells out and becomes a banker; the fruit peddler buys a little shop, then a big one, and may finally become a wealthy importer; and in like manner with the other shopkeepers.”³

The *obiter dicta* of an investigator, no matter how well qualified he may be for his task or how great his opportunities for investigation, are to be accepted with caution, as he may be unconsciously influenced by personal bias or betrayed by his zeal

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 473.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 474.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 474.

into squaring conclusions with his theories. I have stated as a fact the steady social and mental advancement of the immigrant, and I do not believe that any one who has carefully studied the influence of Americanization on the immigrant can question the accuracy of the statement, but it is gratifying to note that impersonal government commissions and investigators, appointed to ascertain facts and not to develop theories or ventilate opinions, sustain this view. Report after report bears testimony to the rise of the immigrant. "In the second generation," the *Report of the Industrial Commission* says, "encouraging signs of social progress are seen. Italian children are brought under the Americanizing influence of the public schools within a brief period after their landing here and before they learn the language, partly through the workings of the compulsory education laws, partly through the double desire of the parents, first to have the children learn English so as to serve as family interpreters, next to get them out of the way in the narrow-tenement-house quarters they call home."¹ The boy, we are told, who has passed from the lower primary classes of the public schools to the higher grades, "has acquired a desire for something better," his ambition is to graduate from the grammar school, or to secure a year or two at high school or college, to become a teacher or lawyer or doctor. "Italian children who have gone a considerable way

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 475.

through the public schools acquire a very definite idea of social advancement. They begin to be ashamed of the habits and customs of their parents, and bring all the pressure to bear that they can to change these. The child thus becomes an important influence in Americanizing the parents, who are allowed no peace until the peculiar 'old country' customs that mark them off, in the child's mind, as a class apart from the dominant race, the American, are cast aside.”¹

A careful study of an Italian colony in New Jersey was made by Mrs. Emily Fogg Meade for the United States Bureau of Labor.² Noting, as has every other sociologist, how race after race in America had moved up in the scale of living and been succeeded by one lower, Mrs. Meade traces the development of the Italian in “a typical rural settlement” in Hammonton, New Jersey. “Among the Italian residents of Hammonton different stages of development may be noted,” Mrs. Meade writes. “There is a class of new comers who are unspeakably filthy. These people have no knowledge of the physical care of children, and allow their houses to be overrun with dogs and chickens. On the other hand, there are homes, especially of the second generation, that are neat and clean.” The absence of real comfort in the houses is commented on. “The furnishings are meagre and not well arranged.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 475.

² *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor*, No. 70, May, 1907.

There are few cooking-utensils, the dishes are of the most ordinary white ware, and the table is without a cover until the Italian learns about oilcloth. Mosquito nettings, screens, and cheap white sash curtains, such as are seen everywhere in American houses, mark the first advance toward comfort and decoration in furnishing." These people are influenced by the example set by their American neighbors and the more progressive of their own race. "When an American housewife went to the city and purchased a new stove to accommodate a hot-water boiler, the stove was duly inspected and similar purchases were made by the Italian neighbors. Hammonton has recently put in a water system; a number of Italians have had water put into their houses, and on one street, where Italians and Americans live in close proximity, several Italian families, when they heard that a family of Americans was going to put in a bathroom, immediately decided on securing the same convenience. Some ideas of bathing have been acquired by the young Italians, and the fresh-water lake at Hammonton makes a pleasant bathing-place for the young people of the town. When some Italian boys wanted to try the bathing, they were told by the older Italians that they would die from its effects; but Americans suggested a trial, and since then the boys of both nationalities frequent the lake in summer-time."

It has often been asked what there is about America or her institutions to bring about this rapid

assimilation of the immigrant, and, as usual, the real reason close at hand is ignored and recourse is had to a fantastic explanation. Thus a distinguished French cleric, making a profound study of a country and its people from the vantage-ground of a few weeks spent in half a dozen cities, finds the power of assimilation in religion,¹ which is amusing to any student of America, who knows how severely things spiritual and things temporal are kept apart. The reason to explain the assimilation of the immigrant is twofold. In the first place, he wants to be assimilated; he wants to be made an American as soon as possible. He does not resist it; on the contrary, he helps it all he can. It is not a matter of pride with him to retain his nationality, to have a sentimental affection for his own country, to glory in his traditions of race. He has left his country either with intense bitterness in his heart or at least with a feeling of dissatisfaction and unjust treatment. Life has dealt harshly with him, and the new country is the hope of better things.

The second reason is equally potent in stimulating the process of assimilation. Every material consideration induces him to throw off his garb of nationality and to clothe himself in that of Americanism. Illiterate and intellectually deficient as the immigrant may be, and very often is, he possesses intelligence enough to see that the foreigner is lower in the scale than the American, and that if he would

¹ Klein: *In the Land of the Strenuous Life*, p. 36.

rise he must cease to be a foreigner and become an American. If he rises, even if the ascent is very slight, so slight in fact that we, accustomed to other standards, do not recognize it, a feeling of gratitude is born; he may be dissatisfied because he has not done better, but he knows even so that his lot is more fortunate than it would have been had he remained at home. In a way he becomes attached to America.

We talk of the "attachment" that men have for the country of their birth or adoption; it is poetic fancy to picture the passionate love that country inspires, but it is the idealism of the poet rather than fact. Few men are ever perfectly satisfied with their lot, few men but feel they are justly entitled to more than has been given them. Tradition and habit make them patriotic in the sense in which the word is generally understood; ignorance of conditions elsewhere leads them to believe that, while they have much to complain of, other people in other lands have even greater cause for dissatisfaction.

It would be absurd to contend that the Italian or Russian who has lived only a few years in America, who is still struggling with the language, who has not got over his nostalgia, who has not yet adjusted himself to a life so different from that to which he was accustomed, can have for the new land deep affection; and yet we have been given the strongest proof how soon this affection — now

translated into patriotism — becomes a part of his nature. Greater love can no man show than to die for country; not to die for glory, but to die for duty. It has been made clear why the foreigner — the Irish and the German — should fight in the Revolutionary ranks against England; the meaner spirit of revenge, rather than the more sublime sentiment of devotion and gratitude, was the impulse. No such motive impelled Irish and Germans, English and Scotch, to save the Union. There were no century-long wrongs to be redressed; against the South there was no feeling of rancor. The foreigner in America had no bitterness toward Spain. He enlisted, — he was ready to offer his life, — not to pay a debt of vengeance, but to requite what he owed to the country in which he was a foreigner no longer.

We are constantly told that the immigrant looks forward to returning to his own country and spending his old age in leisure on his savings. This is true to a limited extent, and the immigrant who comes here with that set purpose is not of value to the country, but the second generation foreigner, especially if he is born in America, who returns to the land of his fathers is so rare as to be almost negligible. It has been said before that it is a more tedious and difficult process to assimilate the adult non-English-speaking immigrant, but the children are rapidly absorbed and merged into the American. The child is taught by English school-teachers in

English,¹ he must, to obtain employment, speak and understand English, and necessity forces the child to go to work at as early an age as lax laws insufficiently administered permit; his ideas, his thoughts, his life run in the channels of the New and not the Old World; the real thing to him, that which he can grasp and understand, which he must grapple with or by it be thrown, is that complex thing American civilization; not the civilization, or language, or customs of his father.

People who see a menace in immigration use a threefold argument. They assert that the immigrant vitiates the blood of the native stock and engrafts on it alien customs and an alien life and degrades the general standard; that in place of a sturdy peasantry or a working-class satisfied to render an honest day's labor well performed, there is a dissatisfied class with education just sufficient to fill it with unrest and make inferior workmen, who are incapable of higher intellectual pursuits; and that the effect of immigration, because of the competition it produces and the stress of life, is first to reduce the native birth-rate and afterwards to reduce the birth-rate of the immigrant; so that, although nominally the country may profit by the

¹ "Another great fusing force has been the dominance of one language, — the English. In the great mass of cases the immigrant has found it necessary or desirable to adopt that language. Where he has not done it himself, his children have; and in many cases it has become the mother-tongue if not the only tongue of the descendants. As soon as that happens, the man of foreign descent is irreparably separated from his former home." — Smith: *Emigration and Immigration*, p. 74.

great influx of immigration and the seeming increase of population, as a matter of fact, immigration checks population and is harmful.

That immigration vitiates the blood of the native stock and lowers the general standard of living has, I think, been disposed of and need not be further discussed. No argument will convince to the contrary that school which believes in the theological precept that men and women are born in a class and are required to do their duty in the station of life in which it has pleased God to call them, and that the white man can no more escape from his class than the Asiatic can liberate himself from his caste, or that a people or a country is injured by education. Those who believe, as I do, that men and races have been made by "divine discontent," that satisfaction is stagnation and decay, that ambition is only another name for progress, that the men who have advanced the world have been the men who have been unhappy and striving for something better — those of us whose philosophy is thus summed up cannot subscribe to the belief that injury has been done because the son of the Italian immigrant is not content to follow in the footsteps of his father and dig a sewer, but aspires to be a clerk and cherishes the ambition that his son may be a "gentleman." A good sewer-digger, it is true, may have been spoiled in the making of a poor clerk, but civilization begins when man develops a weakness for soap; the man who can think, even if he

thinks badly and has crude and vague ideas, is doing his small share to help upward the general level of intelligence, and he is better and socially a more useful man than he who never thinks and whose life differs in no way from that of the animal or the machine.¹

That the effect of immigration is to lower the birth-rate, both native and foreign, is undoubtedly true, as verified by the careful researches of statisticians,² and it is one of the surest signs of progress. Men are always more governed by their emotions than their reason, and a seductive catch phrase will make a greater appeal than the soundest philosophy. During the last few years two words on the lips of the unthinking have been elevated to the dignity of a profound discovery, and the teachings of centuries have been sneered at. "Race suicide" has a ring that is alluring to the lovers of the sensational and the lewd, for it suggests impurity; it has been proclaimed that the highest function of man and woman is the function of the animal; just as the value of an animal is to be determined by the size of its brood, so men and women are to be evaluated by

¹ The following were the honor men graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1909:—

No. 1, Theodore S. Wilkinson, Jr.; No. 2, Ralph D. Weyerbacher; No. 3, William W. Smith; No. 4, Luther Welsh; No. 5, Carl P. Jungling; No. 6, Eric L. Ellington; No. 7, David I. Hedrick; No. 8, Olad M. Hustvedt; No. 9, Gaylord Church; No. 10, Harold T. Smith. — *New York Tribune*, June 2, 1909. The reader will not fail to notice the graduates whose foreign parentage is clearly indicated by their names.

² Cf. The Immigration Commission: *Report on Fecundity of Immigrant Women.*

the number of children they propagate; children are to be born, not bred; quantity is of more importance than quality. The economic factor is brushed aside. Six children born, five of whom die before they have attained a productive capacity, are a greater asset to the state than two children who live to have an earning power. This is the new doctrine pushed to its logical conclusion.

In the New York *Tribune*,¹ Dr. Edward E. Cornwall shows that while the prolificness of the foreign stock may be greater than the native, the net result is in favor of the latter. "The average annual excess of births over deaths during the ten years following 1890 for those born here of Irish mothers," he says, "was 11.2 per 1000; for those born of native American mothers it was 16. The death-rate in 1900 for those born here of Irish mothers was 22.2 per 1000, and for those born of American mothers 15.2." He makes the further surprising statement that "the average age at death of native whites born of native American mothers was, in 1900, thirty-six years, and of native whites born of foreign mothers, fifteen years"; so that the economic value of the average child of foreign parentage was practically *nil*; the child had been born and reared simply to die; an economic burden instead of an economic gain to the state.

It is not necessary to cite in support of my position the words of the great authorities. It is known

¹ March 30, 1903.

to even the casual student of race development that almost invariably the birth-rate is in inverse ratio to the development of a people; that the lower the scale of civilization the larger the percentage of births; that the size of the average family among the poor is larger than that of the moderately well off or the rich, who are better able to support a large family than the indigent. Lecky, writing of Ireland in the closing years of the eighteenth century, says, "Reckless marriages, and the consequent rapid increase of population, were then, as always, most conspicuous among the most wretched, the most ignorant, and the most improvident."¹ It is surely not necessary to go into the causes, familiar to every student of sociology, or to explain that unrestrained passion, weakened will power, unsanitary surroundings, and a low order of intelligence are the reasons; it is sufficient to state the facts. It may be further stated as a fact that the advance of civilization has ever been marked by a decreasing birth-rate.

Nor may it be out of place to point out what is known to every student of biology, that as the organism becomes more complex the process of reproduction is more complicated. In the lowest forms of life multiplication is by fission, and, as has been well said, "the baby bacteria are their subdivided parent." The size of the litter of an animal is in inverse ratio to its importance in the economy of nature and its value to man. A single pair of rats

¹ Lecky: *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. vii, p. 167.

will breed three, four, or even more, times a year and produce from six to seventeen young in a litter,¹ as compared with the limited progeny of the domesticated animals most essential to man's convenience and sustenance; but, as Spencer points out, "in every species there establishes itself an equilibrium of an involved kind between the total race-destroying forces and the total race-preserving forces; so that where the ability to maintain individual life is small, the ability to propagate must be great, and *vice versa.*"²

This universal law is seen to operate among the immigrants who have settled in America. It is stated in the *Report of the Industrial Commission* that "a probable result of the spread of education among Italian girls will be to lower the birth-rate of the Italian population in the city by postponing marriage. The Italian woman in Italy, of the lower classes, marries very young and bears very many children. The Italian woman of the first generation in this country does the same; but the Italian girl of the second generation, seeing other openings before her than matrimony, will marry later, make a better marriage when it is finally made, bear fewer children, and be able to provide for them better. This tendency, indeed, has already been remarked."³ In the latest American government

¹ United States Department of Agriculture, *Bulletin*, p. 369.

² Spencer: *The Principles of Biology*, vol. II, p. 507.

³ *Report of the Industrial Commission*, vol. xv, p. 476.

report on the immigrant the reduction of the family and its beneficial effects are again noted. "It has been observed," the Report states, "that, while immigrants have large families, the size of the family is very materially reduced in the second generation. An inquiry into our material has shown that the reduction in the size of the family goes hand in hand with the improvement of the physical development of the individual. This is demonstrated by the fact that children belonging to small families are considerably taller than children belonging to large families.¹

It is curious how instinct and philosophy often lead to the same end. Malthus feared that population if unrestricted would increase faster than the means of subsistence, and to lower the birth-rate he advised that marriage be postponed, so as to lessen the number of children. The Italian women of the second generation in America, who have never heard of Malthus and know nothing of his teachings, governed solely by instinct and rational motives, are Malthusians. They marry later and bear fewer children than their mothers and grandmothers; they accept the sensible advice of Malthus that "the abstaining from marriage until we are in a condition to support a family" is "the strict line of duty."² A race lower in the scale than the Ital-

¹ The Immigration Commission: *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants*, p. 28.

² Malthus: *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, p. 456.

ians are the Slavs, whose rise is more difficult and more painful, but they are subject to the same law. "In the second and third generations, indeed, many of the Slavs desire the concentration of advantages, and consequently their birth-rate is falling and their standard of living is rising."¹ That the birth-rate among the foreign element falls the longer the alien has lived in the United States and has been assimilated is borne out by the census reports.

Professor Walter F. Willcox, of Cornell, who has written much on the native and foreign birth-rate, has frequently lamented that the number of children born to native Americans is smaller than to those of foreign birth. In a lecture delivered in Ithaca in November, 1909, he is reported to have said: "It is not the decrease in the birth-rate that is disturbing, but rather the fact that the decrease is greater among the classes whose children would probably inherit most social worth and capacity for leadership. Thus, figures from Harvard indicate that each one hundred graduates produce in the next generation seventy-three sons. The native American population, at least in New England and New York, loses more by deaths than it gains by births. These changes are due mainly to direct volitional control of the birth-rate, a phenomenon of the last half-century. It calls for an adjustment of our ethical standards to the new condition, and more social approval and support of those who serve society by

¹ Hall: *Immigration*, p. 64.

contributing to the numbers and quality of the next generation.”¹

Professor Willcox, here as elsewhere, falls into the common error of coupling “numbers and quality,” which have no relation. It is not the number of children born that count, but the quality; not the number of children brought into the world, but the number that survive the perils of infancy and early manhood, who add to the strength and wealth of a nation by increasing its productive power or raising its intellectual level.

A little less than a half a century ago Herbert Spencer discovered that the birth-rate was not due so much to “volitional control” as that man’s further evolution necessitates a decline in his fertility.² He has shown that as the nervous system becomes more developed, and the intensity, completeness, and length of the individual life increases, there is necessarily a decrease of the reserve applicable to the setting-up of new lives — no longer required to be so numerous.³ Contrary to Professor Willcox and other persons who regard a declining birth-rate as an indication of retrogression, Spencer shows that “the necessary antagonism of Individuation and Genesis, not only, then, fulfills with precision the *a priori* law of maintenance of race, from the Monad up to Man, but insures final attainment of the highest form of this maintenance — a form

¹ *Washington Post*, November 19, 1909.

² Spencer: *The Principles of Biology*, vol. II, p. 501. ³ *Op. cit.*, p. 508.

in which the amount of life shall be the greatest possible, and the births and deaths the fewest possible.”¹ Surely that is a finer end to strive for — the greatest possible amount of life and the fewest possible deaths, rather than promiscuous birth and an excessively high death-rate among the young.

Certain of the material and physical effects of immigration are palpable, but the effect of immigration on the mentality of a people with whom the alien is incorporated is more subtle and requires more careful study if the influence of the immigrant for good or evil is to be correctly appraised.

The immigrant, it has already been pointed out, has always come from one of two classes — the courageous, resolute, enterprising man who has succeeded moderately well at home, but believes there is a greater chance for success if his small capital and his great stock of determination are invested in a new country; and the man who has none of these qualities, who has at home “drifted” through life and made of it a failure, and who having nothing to lose is allured by the thought of making a sudden fortune by a lucky *coup*. I cannot too strongly emphasize this historical and social fact, for it is an almost universal belief that there has been a great change in the quality of immigration in the last half-century or so; that in the earlier days only the men who had proved their worth at home came across the seas, and that of recent years the bulk of immi-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 506.

gration has been mentally, morally, and physically undesirable. This is not sustained by the facts.¹

We are to consider the twofold effect of immigration; first mentally, and again politically.

Whether the immigrant was of the superior class, the man who has succeeded fairly well and was determined to achieve even greater success, or was a "drifter," by the nature of circumstances he was always more or less dissatisfied, filled with a restless spirit, unsobered by the traditions of attachment to the soil and the history of the people of which he was a part; without local preferences. New York meant no more to the newly landed fortune-seeker than the West; with pick and shovel he was willing to go anywhere that offered a chance of employment; if that employment was not immediately found, or was less well paid than lying promises had represented, he abused the country and those in authority and felt himself badly treated and the victim of injustice; too ignorant to be able properly to discriminate, unfamiliar with customs and very frequently language, finding everything unlike that

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu falls into this common error. "Only the boldest, the most enterprising of men," he says (totally ignoring the human derelicts and the "assisted" who are shipped by families and friends to rid themselves of an incumbrance), "have the courage to traverse the sea for the purpose of carving out a new life in an unknown and distant land. Then, having arrived, only the most energetic, the wisest and the most gifted in the spirit of organization succeed in a struggle which is more severe, more merciless to the feeble, in new countries than in old ones. Thus America, so to speak, has secured the cream of Old World society. That is why the human standard is higher than in other countries." — Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu: *The United States in the Twentieth Century*, preface, p. xvii.

to which he had been accustomed, he believed that he was robbed or discriminated against. Temperamentally the immigrant was a radical, always more radical than the native, to whom certain things were sacred because they were endeared by custom or age, but to the foreigner neither custom nor age meant anything. He was, to use an expressive colloquial phrase, "against the Government"; if not an anarchist in action, he was in thought at least anarchical; not necessarily the doer of violent deeds, but passionate with the speech of ill-considered thought that demanded abrupt reforms. In the beginning of the migratory movement to America the reasons that caused emigration resulted in the immigrant's intense radicalism and extreme republicanism. The Irish and Germans fled their own countries to gain their freedom from governments that had persecuted them, to escape starvation that they believed was the fault of a vicious social system, or to avoid military service. They left their country with a heart full of bitterness against that intangible thing "the Government," and came to a country in which they were told that there was no government, or at least a government that did not interfere with individual rights or actions. With this hatred of monarchy and the existing social order they became fiercely republican and *sans-culotte*, more passionately resentful of any infringement of republicanism than the republican to the manner born, more scornful of what was "un-American" than the American

native to the soil, fiercer haters of kings and aristocracy and class than the men whose genius had made it possible for them to find a haven from persecution and poverty and begin a new life. The immigrant had all the unrestrained and undisciplined zeal of the convert, who historically has always shown his devotion to his new faith by extreme fanaticism.

Proud of his new possession, that liberty which for the first time he enjoyed and that independence which was his by the right of republican institutions, the immigrant was unconsciously inspired to prove himself worthy, to defend his gift, to talk much about it, even if he understood what it really meant very imperfectly; to do foolish things in the name of democracy. As he became merged into the people and stood no longer outside of them, as he felt that he was an "American" and had ceased to be a "foreigner," his political code, like that of the religion of the convert, fitted him more naturally, and he was not required continually to give proof of his faith. He took his politics more rationally and adjusted himself to the social conditions under which he lived; in a word, he became more sensible and had himself under better control. Any one who has had opportunities of coming in contact with the foreigner in the United States cannot fail to have noticed that the newly arrived immigrant, or the man who has been in America only a short time, is an intense and violent republican with a positive ha-

tred of monarchy; that his children, those who have come with him when they were young or who have been born in America, are less extreme in their views; but he will also notice that these Americans of the second generation, especially among the Jews, the Italians, and the Slavs, — those races against whom a prejudice exists in the United States and about whom there is doubt as to their value as citizens, — are more fiercely assertive of their republicanism and more extreme in their democracy than the American descended from the English-speaking races; perhaps because the Latins of Southern Europe, the Slavs, and the Jews, knowing the feeling that exists against them, feel that they must give proof of their “Americanism.” But whatever the reason, the truth of the statement will be confirmed by the careful investigator.

The desire to attract population in the early days led to the enactment of laws that made naturalization easy, and of recent years legislators and publicists have devoted much time in an endeavor to make naturalization more difficult and yet not bar immigration, which is still necessary for the development of the country. It has often seemed to me that a simple remedy would be to deny the privilege of naturalization to adults until they had lived in the country at least ten years, which period might be diminished if the intending applicant for naturalization was able to pass a stiff and not merely a perfunctory examination, to show that his knowledge

of English was more comprehensive than the few parrot-like phrases in which he had been carefully coached; children, on obtaining their majority, to be eligible for naturalization, provided their knowledge of English is adequate. I do not advance this as a solution for what is known as the "immigration problem"; it is merely a contributory suggestion.

The material effect of immigration, we have seen, is the pressure exerted by the race inferior or lower in the scale of civilization forcing up other races to a higher social level, and we shall see that the same process operates psychologically. It has long been a popular delusion that the immigrant has destroyed the texture of the American mind, that, because of the great mass of ignorant and only partially civilized men and women who are dumped on the shores of America and the admixture of foreign blood, mentally the American has retrograded, and that the American of the twentieth century is the intellectual inferior of the American of the eighteenth century; yet such a keen critic of his countrymen as Mr. W. D. Howells does not share this apprehension. "I believe," he writes, "we have been the better, we have really been the more American, for each successive assimilation in the past, and I believe we shall be the better, the more American for that which seems the next in order."¹

As I have already pointed out,—and I repeat it, because it is a fact of the first importance in Amer-

¹ *Harper's Weekly*, April 10, 1909.

ican development, — the immigrant has been one of the great influences mentally to stimulate the American, unconscious although that impulse has been. The American — that is, the man who was American by birth or who had lived long enough in America to feel himself an American — came to look down upon the foreigner, whom he held in contempt as belonging to a lower civilization, and it was this feeling that made him determined to be better than the foreigner. It was natural that the American should have this belief in his own superiority. Americans did not emigrate and seek a living elsewhere, foreigners did; Americans were more prosperous, better fed, better clothed, better educated than the men and women who were brought over in the steerage; and the Americans came to believe that the English and Irish and Germans, with their outlandish speech and clothes and customs, who were content to accept low wages and do the menial work that Americans despised, were representative of their races. For the Englishman the American entertained respect not unmixed with envy, for the strength and importance of England was easily understood, but with that envy was a feeling that even the Englishman was not quite the equal of the American; that “an effete monarchy” was inferior to a free republic, and the “pauper labor of Europe” could not compete with the well-paid and well-fed labor of America.¹

¹ The far-reaching effect of the immigrant in stimulating the native Amer-

With this mental attitude of the American understood, it is easy enough to see why the immigrant was absorbed into the American instead of the immigrant absorbing the American. The customs that the immigrant brought with him were not to be imitated by the American; the fact that they were the foreigner's customs was sufficient reason to disparage them in American eyes; no American would accept them as a model any more than he would take the immigrant's clothing as the pattern for his own garments. It was a matter of pride with the American to make the immigrant conform to American ideas, to teach the foreigner the ways of the new country — which were better ways because they were new — than to accept those which the foreigner brought with him. Irish laborers working on the roads, Irish girls working in the factories or in homes, must use their tools and their machines and their pots and pans, not as they were taught to do at home, but as American ingenuity devised. The foreigner was not brought over to teach, but to learn; not to show Americans how to do things, but to follow the instructions of the new masters. The

ican is seen in the difference between the North and the South. The South received almost none of the immigration of the first three quarters of the nineteenth century; and the South, mentally and industrially, lagged far behind the North. I do not, of course, overlook the destructive effects of slavery on the South, a subject dealt with in subsequent chapters; yet the absence of the stimulating influence of immigration must, in a measure at least, explain the difference in the people of the two sections. It is perhaps more than coincidence that the progress of the South has been marked by a well-defined movement to attract foreign labor.

Americans — and I again use that term as meaning not only the man or woman born in America, but those who had lived there long enough to be American in thought and action — felt themselves a superior race and were resolved to maintain their race superiority, and they could only do this by regarding as inferior the habits and customs of aliens whose labor was necessary, but whose social development was below their own. For three hundred years the Englishman has lived in India, but the native has not corrupted his civilization, nor have native customs or manners been accepted by the Englishman in preference to his own; nothing more than the fact that they are native is sufficient to make the Englishman reject them.

Because the English have no gift of tongues and can only with great difficulty learn a foreign language; because they have little desire to learn a language other than their own; because the English do not readily adapt themselves to the ways of the foreigner, but stubbornly cling to their own ways and believe that they are the best; because in the English character there is a peculiarly hard and unyielding fibre, of all people they are the most difficult to be assimilated or merged in another race. If the English were a softer, more pliant, more accommodating people, the Americans would have made it easier for the foreigner by learning his language instead of forcing him to learn theirs; and the process of absorption would have been much slower

and far less thorough. The Americans, in whom are reproduced that English hardness of fibre and that unyielding intolerance, — ungracious qualities, it is true, but which have made them the vigorous and powerful race they are, — see no reason why they should put themselves to the trouble to acquire a foreign language when it is so much easier, as it seems to them, for the immigrant to learn English.¹ It is therefore forced upon the alien either to learn English as the first step to becoming an American, which is the road to advancement, or remain among his own people an alien. The result is that the foreigner, *nolens volens*, has been compelled to learn English, unconsciously to translate his thoughts into

¹ In the New York *Sun* of January 30, 1910, there is a humorous and semi-satirical leader on the word "Spigotty," a locution, it is explained, coined on the Isthmus of Panama. "A Spigotty is a Latin American. Spigotty ways are Spanish manners. Spigotty money is Central American currency. . . . Arrived at Panama to make the dirt fly in the Canal Zone, our hustling fellow citizens addressed the natives of the narrow neck of land in their only speech. . . . Politely the Latin Americans recorded their inability to comprehend this active and dominant speech. 'No speaka de English,' even that poor phrase painfully acquired in the foreign tongue. 'No spigotty English,' will you listen to that? At once arises the fine scorn that the English language has ever had for all speech that is not English, mere jargons all. What ridiculous people to say 'spigotty'! It promptly became a good enough word for the canal operators, whether ditchers or overseers, and has rapidly spread. The Panamans might have had a revenge if uncomprehending Americans had been mannerly enough to say, 'No habla español.' But the wildest flight of the imagination cannot picture an American on the job in Latin America acquiring even three Spanish words. His answer would surely be, 'You something or other Spigotty'! . . .

"The only hope of retiring spigotty from circulation lies in the removal of the cause. Only when all Latin Americans have acquired the art of speaking American will the stigma fade. Really it is too absurd that these foolish little people keep on speaking a language that nobody can understand, just spigotty."

English, and gradually to become absorbed into the American people. There is no mystery in the transformation. The foreigner who does not become an American remains a foreigner; and the foreign colonies of the large American cities are in every sense foreign; New York and Chicago reproduce Warsaw and Prague. The unassimilated foreigners do not influence American thought, they do not set a fashion in literature or art: how ridiculous it is to imagine that they could! as fanciful as to believe that the ragpicker of Whitechapel and not the Oxford professor governs the intellectual thought of England; and the speech and customs and ways of living of the former are as "foreign" to the latter as are those of the newly arrived Bohemian to the great mass of Americans.

For the same reason that the immigrant has been unable to make any lasting impression upon the customs of America, so he has been unable to influence the fundamental thought of America or vitally to affect American mentality, although he has modified it. He has brought a new strain into the American blood which is reflected in the American mind. Immigration has tempered the Puritan, it has saved America from becoming rigidly Puritan and made it more human, but it has not destroyed the foundation on which Puritanism rests or overlaid the influence of Puritanism. North and South, East and West, the old spirit of the old Puritan lives, tempered, softened, refined by changed con-

ditions and the foreign blood that is in the veins of America; the spirit perhaps at times sleeping, but quick to answer the call of duty or humanity.

It might be assumed that the Italians and the Jews, who have so largely contributed to the sum of American population,—races in which there is an inborn love of color and music, to whom poetry and romance appeal, in the one case a superstitious people and in the other a people made mystical from their Biblical lore and their inheritance,—who have so freely intermarried with Americans, would have made an impress upon American mentality, which would find its expression in the literature or art of America; but thus far we can find no trace of this influence. American literature—and there is a distinct American school of letters—partakes of its environment and its own psychology, colored not infrequently by English and French influences, but showing no impression of Italian or Hebrew inspiration. It is the same in art, painting, sculpture, and music, for, although Americans study in Paris and Rome, and naturally absorb the methods of their foreign masters, their art remains American. It is also curious to note in this connection that the Americanized Italian or Jew has as yet produced no great work either in literature or art; that is, nothing that sets him distinctly apart from other Americans or has made him take front rank. If there is in him the spirit of the artist, it seems to be stifled or at least held in check by the commer-

cialism of America and the fierce stress of life; in art as well as in other things the foreigner has become an American instead of the American having been brought under foreign influence. There are Americans who believe that the future of art in their country lies in the hands of the American of foreign birth, that the foreign blood will give imagination, color, sentiment; the spirit of America will furnish that vigor and buoyancy, that priceless quality of youth and optimism that is the American inheritance. That of course is speculation; for the present the hope has not been realized.

A new nation, according to an American writer on immigration who fears the danger of immigration, derives its whole character and has its whole future determined by its first settlers,¹ a proposition with which I agree, as it confirms the result of my investigations that the character of America has been determined by its Puritan ancestry; but the corollary of his proposition — when subsequent immigration takes place on a scale large in relation to the total population, equally far-reaching changes may be made in the nation's institutions and ideals — is an assertion too dogmatic and not sufficiently sustained by the facts, so far at least as the United States is concerned, to be accepted without qualification. The institutions and ideals of a nation, the character and speech of a people, their morals and their customs, may be corrupted or improved by

¹ Hall: *Immigration*, p. 100.

contact with or by being brought under subjection to a more virile or aggressive race, but mere numbers are not the determining factor.¹ We have seen that the institutions and ideals of America are English, and although there was a simultaneous colonization of America by the English, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch, and the Swedes, it is only English speech and English customs and English ideals that have survived; we search in vain for any lasting impression that has been made on the speech of America, on its legal or political systems, on its concept of morality, on its literature or its customs by colonizers other than English; it is as if they had not existed; as if, similar to the Indians, they could not be assimilated, nor were they virile enough to impose their civilization upon the conquering white "immigrant." So far as the later immigration is concerned, that which began in the first decades of the nineteenth century and has continued, we are unable to find that it has changed either the nation's

¹ "It seems to me that a great part of the incontestable superiority of America over Australia has resulted from the slower movement of emigration to the United States. American society has had much more time to digest and assimilate the elements received from abroad. In addition to this, it should be noted that emigration to the United States did not set in in earnest until about 1830, by which time there was already a solid substratum of ten million whites, with institutions and traditions of their own and with the ability to impregnate the new comers with a spirit of sturdy self-respect. The new comers, it should be added, were generally of a quality superior to the avalanche of mere fortune-hunters which about 1850 submerged the youthful Australian society, too feeble to react upon it successfully. As opposed to this, the essential traits of the American people were developed by 1830, and although somewhat modified, survive to-day." — Leroy-Beaulieu: *The United States in the Twentieth Century*, p. 16.

institutions or ideals or that it has had the slightest effect upon its political system. The millions of foreigners who have settled in America and have become Americans have not modified by a hair's breadth the fundamental code that was given to the people by its first lawgivers.

It required a great many years before the world would admit the truth of the seemingly paradoxical discovery made by Gresham that bad money drives out good, because to the ignorant it appeared that the reverse must be true; but now the law stands unchallenged. In the same way the world has for a long period of years believed that the socially lower immigrant debases the more highly civilized native-born; but this is a fallacy.

The law of immigration — a law as exact in its operation as the law of Gresham in finance or of Newton in gravitation — can thus be briefly summarized: —

Where people of a lower order of civilization are brought in contact with a more numerous people, possessed of an advanced civilization, firmly planted in its own traditions, customs, and institutions, with a political system that permits the immigrant to enjoy equal political and social rights with the native-born, the effect is not to degrade the higher civilization but eventually to raise the lower.

The effect of immigration, therefore, is not to drag down the native-born to the level of the immigrant, but to raise the immigrant to the level of the native-born.

The ambition of the male immigrant is to marry the native-born, for that is one of the means to advance in the social scale. Before he can gratify his ambition, however, he must have raised himself out of his immediate surroundings and have something to offer the woman he would marry. He is the exceptional member of his class. He has physical or mental qualities that distinguish him from his fellow-immigrants. There is little if any desire on the part of the native-born to marry the immigrant, for that is a step downward in the social scale. Such marriages are marriages of passion and are rare.

The effect of immigration, therefore, is to replenish and fortify the native stock by the process of selection on the male side.

A high birth-rate is an indication of a low order of civilization. As a consequence of immigration the birth-rate of the immigrant is reduced until finally it falls to the normal level of the more civilized people into which the immigrant has been absorbed.

The effect of immigration, therefore, is not to destroy civilization by an abnormal and harmful birth-rate, but to restrict both native and foreign births to the ratio that Nature has determined will best conduce to the physical, intellectual, and social development of the race.

The causes of immigration are poverty, denial of opportunity, and the hope of wealth; and the latter must be regarded as a relative term purely. It is

early impressed on the immigrant that to succeed he must become a part of the people among whom he lives: he must speak their tongue, for they will not speak his; he must imitate their habits; he must follow their customs. The sooner he ceases to be an immigrant, that is, a foreigner and a stranger, the sooner he reaches his goal.

The effect of immigration, therefore, is not to engraft foreign speech, customs, and manners upon a people possessed of their own language, customs, and manners, nor to bastardize the language, customs, and manners of a superior civilization.

The native-born children of immigrants learn more rapidly the language of their nativity than they acquire that of their parents. Thrown from an early age in contact with the native-born, working for them in menial and subordinate positions, realizing the gulf that separates the native-born from the immigrant and that the native-born dominate, the child of the immigrant is unconsciously brought under native influences and is impelled to speak, to look, to dress, and in every way to imitate his superior. The ambition of the immigrant's child is to be absorbed into the people of whom he is one by birth, for his "foreignness" is not a source of pride, but a handicap to success and a career. He has no repugnance to this merging of his nationality, he does not attempt to resist it, but, on the contrary, he facilitates it by every means in his power.

The effect of immigration, therefore, is not to perpetuate and increase the foreign element by the immigrant transmitting his speech and customs to his posterity, but is to merge the native-born children of immigrants into the native population.

The immigrant is compelled to accept the least desirable and lowest remunerated employment, thus displacing the native-born, who are forced to seek work demanding more skill and commanding higher wages.

The effect of immigration, therefore, is not to lower wages and create unemployment, but is to raise the social and industrial status of the native wage-earner.

It is a curious and striking fact, one of those amazing and seemingly fantastic things which have in all ages marked historical development and the progress of civilization, that the only "immigration" that has affected the institutions of America and exercised an influence on American civilization, customs, commerce, and habits, is an unassimilable race sprung from a stock in all things alien to the Caucasian race, far below it in the scale of civilization, vastly its inferior mentally. Yet it is a fact that while the highly cultivated Dutch and French and Spanish, the intellectual equals of the English, were unable to modify the character of the English or displace English institutions, or permanently establish social customs that were foreign to English ideas, the inclusion of the negro in the Ameri-

can body politic has worked these changes. Character, commerce, politics have been influenced by the negro. Later and more in detail we shall study the effect of the negro on American psychology.

CHAPTER XVI

MANNERS AND THE IMMIGRANT

IN the study of the immigrant and the effect of immigration on the American people much has been written of the apprehended danger of the inclusion of a great mass of foreign blood in the American body politic. The danger feared has been twofold; first, that the immigrant will "devitalize" the American; second, that he will corrupt the American and reduce him to his own lower moral standard. We have already dealt with those two phases of immigration, but the effect of the immigrant on the manners of a people, curiously enough, appears to have been ignored by the American commentator. It is solely as a psychological influence that we consider the manners of the American people.

It may not appear at first glance that the social intercourse of a people can have any relation to character. We are apt to regard behavior, politeness, conventions, and the forms of society as the pleasant things of life, the oil to make the wheels turn smoothly and eliminate friction, but seldom as part of life itself; although we learned in our youth that "manners maketh man," and in our adolescence imbibed the pleasing philosophy that rank was but the guinea's stamp and did not really count, as

“a man’s a man for a’ that.” Seemingly, then, manners are good things to have but not essential; yet a more minute examination will show that manners are an index to character,¹ and that the character of a people is influenced by their manners; that is, the method of their social intercourse. “Many causes go to the making of manners,” says that profound observer of America, Mr. Bryce, “as one may see by noting how much better they are in some parts of Europe than in other parts, where, nevertheless, the structure of society is equally aristocratic or democratic, as the case may be;”² and he cites Roscher: “It was a reproach in Europe against republics that their citizens were rude: witness the phrases, ‘manières d’un Suisse,’ ‘civilisé en Hollande.’”

Mr. Bryce thinks that this reproach will not lie against the Americans. “On the whole,” he says, “bearing in mind that the English race has less than some other races of that quickness of perception and sympathy which goes far to make manners good, the Americans have gained more than they have lost by equality. I do not think that the upper class loses in grace, I am sure that the humbler class gains in independence.”³ He makes this fur-

¹ “Manners are, generally, the product of the very basis of the character of a people, but they are also sometimes the result of an arbitrary convention between certain men; thus they are at once natural and acquired.” — De Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, vol. II, p. 230.

² Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, p. 755.

³ Bryce: *Op. cit.* p. 755.

ther observation: "Equality improves manners, for it strengthens the basis of all good manners, respect for other men and women simply as men and women, irrespective of their station in life."¹ Anticipating Mr. Bryce by half a century, De Tocqueville ascribed to equality the same influence of manners. "Several causes," he says, "may concur to render the manners of a people less rude; but of all these causes, the most powerful appears to me to be the equality of conditions. Equality of conditions and growing civility in manners, are, then, in my eyes, not only contemporaneous occurrences, but correlative facts."² Yet this acute critic and philosopher contradicts himself later, when he says: "In democracies all stations appear doubtful; hence it is that the manners of democracies, though often full of arrogance, are commonly wanting in dignity, and, moreover, they are never either well disciplined or accomplished."³ After a democracy rises on the ruins of an aristocracy, he observes, men have lost "the common law of manners," and they have not yet made up their minds to do without it. "Thus it may be said, in one sense, that the effect of democracy is not exactly to give men any particular manners, but to prevent them from having manners at all."⁴ The most evanescent thing, he adds, is manners. "The feelings, the passions, the

¹ Bryce: *Op. cit.*, p. 810.

² De Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, vol. II, p. 173.

³ *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 230.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

virtues, and the vices of an aristocracy may sometimes reappear in a democracy, but not its manners; they are lost and vanish forever, as soon as the democratic revolution is completed.”¹ The light and exquisite touches of manners are effaced from men’s memories almost immediately after the fall of an aristocracy. “Men can no longer conceive what those manners were when they have ceased to witness them; they are gone, and their departure was unseen, unfelt; for in order to feel that refined enjoyment which is derived from choice and distinguished manners, habit and education must have prepared the heart, and the taste for them is almost as easily lost as the practice of them. Thus not only a democratic people cannot have aristocratic manners, but they neither comprehend nor desire them; and as they never have thought of them, it is to their minds as if such things had never been.”²

What the manners of the Americans are may be learned from the Americans themselves. It is the fashion to sneer at the inexactness of the press and its carelessness of statement, which is not entirely unwarranted, — and future historians who shall attempt to reconstruct history through the medium of the daily newspapers will find themselves involved in endless confusion, — but the newspaper and the magazine with approximate accuracy reflect the state of society, the vices, the faults and the foibles of a people; and where writers, widely

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

separated and of different temperaments, agree on the main facts, we may accept their conclusions as representative. We no longer have a Pliny, a Plutarch, or a Herodotus to write the times or lives of a people; an Evelyn, a Pepys, or a Swift to picture for us society and its morals; but we have a fairly good substitute in the newspaper and the magazine.

Let us see what Americans say about their own manners. "I should like to urge the Italian," Mr. W. D. Howells writes, "to ignore our bad manners and our harsh voices. I would entreat him to remember for our sakes the instinctive courtesy of his race, and transmit its politeness and its sweetness to the American of his making over."¹

The fear that the immigrant will be corrupted by the bad manners of America is expressed by a writer in the *Century Magazine*.²

At the Gate of the New World [he says], what is the first lesson the immigrants learn? Is it the fundamental one of respect for the larger rights of others, of which we boast? Is it not rather the one of disrespect for the minor rights of courtesy and politeness? Do not false notions of equality very soon rob their respectful demeanor and speech of its bloom? This being the case, how can we expect them to discriminate in the scope of their indifference between minor and major rights? . . . An Italian from the Basilicata may know little — and may be qualified to learn little more — of the American system of government, but he knows instinctively the part that

¹ *Harper's Weekly*, April 10, 1909.

² *Manners and the Immigrant*, February, 1910, p. 639.

manners play in life, and usually on arriving affords a better example of respect for others than his American neighbor. To establish respectful intercourse among all — respect toward the humble as well as from the humble — is to take the first important step toward making the immigrant a valuable American citizen.

The first thing that foreigners who come to this country notice [says a writer in the *Washington Herald*¹] is the lack of the small courtesies which are a part of every European child's training. They are taught in the home, in the public schools, in the factories, in the counting-house; everywhere the little points of etiquette are made much of. In America, on the contrary, we rather pride ourselves on overlooking small things, in our ability to view things *en grande*. And then we are in too much of a hurry in this great land of the free, where, after all our boasting of freedom and liberty, personal rights are but little respected. We are in too much of a hurry to bother about small courtesies, in too much of a hurry to say "Please" and "Thank you," in too much of a hurry to stop to apologize when in our mad rush we knock the weaker ones down. And, then, what does it matter so long as we make our train, or are in time for our engagement? The proud boast is often made that an American always "gets there." An excellent thing, perhaps, but is it worth while to "always get there" when one considers the cost? . . .

Little courtesies are not generally insisted upon in this country for many reasons, too many almost to enumerate. Mothers are too lax, too indifferent, or too fond to demand from their children the consideration and po-

liteness which is their due and their duty. . . . Teachers are sometimes not sufficiently well-bred themselves to notice the lack of breeding in their scholars, and if a pupil does good work it does not matter, they think, if the child does not take his hat off, stand when he should, and show the consideration that is due from pupil to teacher; or they feel, perhaps, as a modern pedagogue felt when he said in answer to a parent who complained to him that her son's manners were being corrupted at school, "Madam, I have to do with your son's mind, not his manners. Manners should be taught at home." In the working world a director or superintendent will affirm that he does not give a dash for a man's manners as long as his work is creditable, as long as he "gets there," and so the younger generation grows up into boors, because there is no one to set them right.

In the *New York Times*¹ a writer discusses the bad traveling-manners of his countrymen and countrywomen, for women are accused by Americans of even worse manners than men when away from home.

As my travels about Europe expanded [he says], I became conscious of a painful and ever-increasing shrinkage of my self-complacency, for the consensus of foreign opinion was everywhere the same — that we are a nation of pigs in the assertive sense — happily not in the physical. We monopolize everything within our reach, regardless of other people's comfort, buying over the heads of less ambitious but more courteous travelers, making ourselves conspicuous, and forcing ourselves

¹ September 23, 1906.

into undue dominance at the cost of personal dignity and public convenience. The only good thing to be said for us seems to be covered by that oft-repeated phrase, "They pay well." . . .

While visiting the royal palace at Athens, which the King had graciously thrown open for inspection, a throng of touring Americans happened to enter the throne room while I was there. One of the young men who made loud remarks about the lack of magnificence, handled the purple velvet canopy with a familiar air till he was politely requested to desist.

"I wonder what it feels like to sit on a throne," he remarked jauntily, and the next moment he had set foot on the royal velvet of the dais and seated himself upon the throne. The look of outraged astonishment on the faces of the guards would have shamed any one but this "independent American," who smiled down at them with an "I'm-as-good-as-any-King" expression until an officer hurried up and begged him to rise. "The King is in the adjoining room, sir," he said in great trepidation. "Indeed," said the American. "Well, I'm not afraid of any King." When he had finally been persuaded to vacate his position, the guards knelt down and wiped the dust marks of his feet from the velvet with their handkerchiefs, while we withdrew — some of us in deep disgust and humiliation.

The decadence of good manners in American life is becoming a common plaint [declares a writer in the *Washington Post*¹]. The little courtesies that are the hallmark of good-breeding are becoming rarer and rarer — so scarce, in fact, as to class as old-fashioned those

¹ April 12, 1909.

who use them. The gentle art of politeness is fast becoming a lost accomplishment, or at best to be brought into action only upon special occasions. But it is a significant indictment that women are the greatest offenders against the accepted canons of good-breeding; they rush in where mere man fears to tread; and as the adoration of women is a cult in America, they unfortunately set the average of manners at a very low level. Marion Harland, in a recent article, comes to the conclusion that of the two sexes woman takes the palm for rudeness and other forms of ill-breeding.

In the *Saturday Evening Post*¹ Lillian Bell agrees with the writer last quoted that the manners of women are worse than those of men.

Men are bad enough [she says], but they are incapable of the petty and persistent meanness of women, especially when traveling. A man has more sense of shame. . . . For selfishness and inconsideration, commend me to a woman traveling. She will deliberately occupy two seats in a street car; see other women stand, laden with bundles, without offering to move up, and otherwise try to prove to everybody with eyes in their heads that they, these women, have no manners at all. . . . Far from displaying good manners themselves, many women are incapable of appreciating good manners in others. If a well-bred woman does move up to make room for a standing woman, how often is the first woman thanked? Sometimes not even a bow or a glance is given! . . .

I wonder more than all what is to become of the courteous, law-abiding, considerate portion of the American

¹ December 22, 1906.

or any other nation, when, with every dollar that is added to our wealth, every atom of culture and wisdom we acquire, every year of progress in civilization that passes over our heads, our manners in public grow worse. If you buy a seat in a theatre, do you also buy the right to annoy your neighbors by coughing, kicking the seat in front, shuffling your feet, whispering, laughing in the wrong place, viciously disturbing the quiet because you are not pleased by the piece?

Manners, like history, repeat themselves. I have quoted a modern writer condemning the traveling manners of women, and the same criticism is made by an American writer half a century earlier: —

Once, to-day, seeing a lady entering the car at a way station, with a family behind her, and that she was looking about to find a place where they could be seated together, I rose and offered her my seat, which had several vacancies around it. She accepted it without thanking me, and immediately installed in it a stout negro woman; took the adjoining seat herself, and seated the rest of her party before her. It consisted of a white girl, probably her daughter, and a bright and very pretty mulatto girl.¹

If ever a lost art was represented by a people, it is the art of courtesy among those who serve the public in New York City [says a writer in the *Ladies' Home Journal*²]. A policeman put it well to me only the other evening. I had hailed him a "good-night" as he stood on the corner.

¹ Olmsted: *Journey in the Seaboard Slave States*, vol. I, p. 19.

² Quoted in the *New York Times*, November 10, 1906.

“Thank you, sir; same to you,” he replied; and as I caught his eye and stopped he said: —

“Just a bit unusual, sir!”

“Unusual?” I asked.

“Yes, sir,” he replied; “there is n’t much politeness in this town.”

“But you have n’t forgotten to be polite!” I said.

“Well, I’m new on the force — just six months. I’ll lose it all right, sir. It is n’t in the air here.”

A great congested city is the most general excuse advanced. But so is London, greater and even more congested. Yet incivility is the exception there and not the rule. Get into a wagon jam in London, and jokes begin to fly among the drivers. But get into a similar jam in New York, and instead there is a series of ear-splitting oaths and obscene language that is anything but agreeable to women who happen to be near.

The oracle is no longer consulted, but the newspaper is appealed to to bring about a reform. The letters to the press show that bad manners are a national vice. In the *New York Sun*¹ “Mrs. V. T. K.” writes: —

I arrived on the *Cedric* last Sunday, after one year and a half’s residence in London. The custom-house officials boarded our vessel at Quarantine, and the declaration papers were presented with the same sort of politeness that one might use to a convict about to be hanged. . . .

The American colonies are increasing in foreign cities, especially among people of moderate means; and why? Because they can get more ease and comfort, more inde-

¹ June 22, 1903.

pendence and repose, than in their own country. Every traveler in England, especially, will acknowledge that the civility of officials, of tradespeople, and employees of all kinds puts to shame the rough and indecorous behavior of the same class with us.

In the same paper¹ Peter Moon indulges in these reflections: —

My countrymen inspire me with pride by their good taste, good sense, and good manners. Just at present two Americans of conspicuous prominence in the community are preparing to be married, and their personal and official friends are selecting the gifts that are to be offered to them. I find the great mass of the public busy putting the acid test on the gifts, speculating as to the price they would fetch in the market.

It is a splendid exhibition of those virtues that make our public life and commercial practices the wonder of all civilization.

A correspondent, signing himself "A Foreigner," writes to the *New York Times*:² —

I am a Foreigner and have not the use of English very well. I have, however, notice in your paper this morning a column headed "Roosevelt Has Cold Swim."

By the read matter I see you mean the President of your United States. In my country we would not so address familiarly thus our Friends, or any but our servant, unless we have contempt.

I have been in Country but short time and have met with much impoliteness. Is it a characteristic of America

¹ January 30, 1906.

² October 19, 1907.

and do big American Journal have so little respect for the Chief Executive of your Country and not place before the heading mentioning his name even the courteous prefix of Mister?

I hope maybe my fellow countryman who has aid me has made my letter to you right.

“B. L. I.” writes to the New York *Herald*¹ that he lives in a Long Island village. His wife ordered a carriage from the livery stable. While the carriage was waiting at her door a trap from the same stable came down the road containing two women, who coolly appropriated the carriage and left the trap in its place. “Of course,” B. L. I. adds, “my driver was partly at fault; but he is a country lad and did not know better. What, however, of the unparalleled presumption of the two women and of their incredible rudeness toward my wife, for which neither explanation nor apology has been forthcoming? This incident, I think, is of a kind that sometimes leads foreigners to wonder in what school of manners Americans are educated.”

One of the world’s most noted naval commanders held that the expression “if you please” was eminently proper to be used on the seas, but it is barred in the American telephone service, as we learn from a special dispatch to the *Washington Post* from Philadelphia.²

Hereafter the four hundred and fifty girl operators of the Keystone Telephone Company, of this city, will not

¹ July 5, 1907.

² September 6, 1907.

say "please" to the subscriber, and the subscribers have been requested not to say "please" to the operator.

A. J. Ulrich, traffic manager of the company, has issued the order, and both girls and the subscribers are happy with the new arrangement. According to Mr. Ulrich, the girls in answering calls and the patrons making them used the word "please" 900,000 times every twenty-four hours, which is equal to 125 hours lost every year by the use of the word.

So-called patriotism is frequently only another excuse for bad manners. A telegram to the *New York Times* from Boston¹ says: —

The jeers of a crowd on School Street to-day, standing beneath a British flag flying over the doorway of a hotel where guests of the Canadian Club were being entertained, caused the hauling down of the flag temporarily.

It was soon replaced, but above it floated the Stars and Stripes.

An ambassador of one of the great powers relates an amusing incident. Extremely dignified but equally democratic, he was one morning leisurely pursuing his way to keep an appointment with the Secretary of State, when he was accosted by an American workingman equipped with the tools of his trade, who brusquely asked: "Mister, what's the time?"

The ambassador stopped, took out his watch, and told him.

With the curtest sort of a nod, and without

¹ March 27, 1909.

thanking the ambassador for his courtesy, the man moved away.

The ambassador was not without a sense of humor. "Thank you," he quietly remarked.

The workingman paused, looked at the ambassador, remarked "Hell," not explosively or vindictively, but rather as if his sense of the ridiculous had been touched, and passed on.

The ambassador related the incident with a chuckle — and sundry philosophical observations on national manners.

Having shown by the evidence of Americans the prevalence of bad manners, it is pleasing to note that there is improvement in at least one direction. In the course of some remarks made in the House of Representatives, Mr. Foster of Vermont said: —

We have greatly improved our manners as a legislative body during the past twenty-five or thirty years. We are frequently told of the conditions that formerly existed. It is said that twenty-five years ago the principal use to which these desks were put was as a resting-place for the feet of members; that members thought nothing of coming in, taking off their coats, lighting their cigars, and sticking their feet upon the desks in front of them while the business of the House was being proceeded with. And the membership of the House has greatly improved in many other respects. This ancient gentleman [referring to Mr. Chauncy], who has been an employee of the House for over half a century, "an heirloom," as our friend here suggests, has frequently re-

lated instances of the old days, when it was not uncommon for members to come into the House so badly under the influence of intoxicating liquor that they had to be assisted home.

We have changed all these things. To-day no member would be tolerated here for a moment whose wits were befuddled. To-day it would be bad form for a man to come here and attempt to smoke his cigar or take off his coat or rest his feet upon the desk in front of him.¹

That bad manners are ever obtrusively present no one can deny. To what may we attribute their cause?

We have already pointed out that the conditions under which American development took place left little inclination or opportunity for the cultivation of social *nuances*, but this would not have caused the deterioration of manners if it had not been for the immigrant, for the change in American manners is almost coincident with the great influx of aliens. The manners of Americans in the colonial period and in the pre-immigration era were not only as good as those of Europe, but evoked the admiration and amazement of high-bred Europeans. In 1668, Governor Lovelace wrote, in a letter to Charles II, "I find some of these people have the breeding of courts, and I cannot conceive how such is acquired." The explanation was simple enough; "the manners of an old and refined civilization had been brought from Europe and retained under the new conditions.

¹ *New York Sun*, March 3, 1909.

Among the settlers who came from the Netherlands there were so many of excellent character, with advantages of education and social position, as to set the standard for the community. The English and French immigrations brought many persons of similar character."¹ In New England, as we have seen, education was universal, and the country squire was a much more cultivated person than his contemporary in England, as the country minister was more learned.² There was as wide a social gulf between Dutch patroons and their peasantry as there was between English governors and the people in New England, despite the democracy which was the offspring of Calvinism; and between the great landowners of Virginia and Maryland and their servants and redemptioners.

An aristocratic state of society has some advantages, even if it also has its disadvantages. It imposes the obligation of *noblesse oblige*, in manners as well as in morals. It is true that great noblemen have often been men of very bad manners, just as they have been men of loose morals; but an aristocracy must justify itself by posing as an example for the less favored, and while its immorality may be hidden, its manners are public knowledge. Good manners, courtesy, self-restraint become the distinguishing characteristics of an aristocracy and are the standard for the less fortunate to emulate.

¹ Fiske: *The Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America*, vol. II, p. 282.

² Fiske: *Op. cit.*, p. 264.

There is a uniformity in manners and conventions that makes class and gives that class a distinction of its own. Mr. Bryce thinks that the Americans have gained more than they have lost by equality, for equality, he says, improves manners and inspires respect for other men and women. My own observation and experience cause me to take the contrary view. In a country in which civilization is still rudimentary and the feudal system exists in fact if not in name,—Russia, for example,—class divisions and the absence of all equality make the upper classes regard the lower as inferior to them in everything, although this is in a measure compensated by the almost patriarchal relation that exists between the nobleman and landowner and the peasants on his estate. There is no more haughty and proud aristocracy than the great Magyar nobles, who insist on the deference due to a long line of mouldering ancestors, and yet are simple and unaffected on their estates and almost the comrades of their tenants and retainers. In an aristocratic but democratic country like England, where society is founded on class distinctions, the obligation is imposed on the upper class to treat the lower with courtesy, and on the lower to show respect to the upper. The parvenu is the same in all countries and under all social systems, but the parvenu does not constitute a class. In democracies, De Tocqueville observes, “all stations appear doubtful”; and it is that insecurity of position that

makes men insistent to have the world recognize their claim to deference and arrogantly assert themselves to maintain their superiority; far from legal and political equality improving manners and inspiring respect for others, it has, I am forced to observe, precisely the contrary result. An English duke traveling in a third-class carriage would be rather amused to be taken by his fellow travelers as one of them, for his position is too assured to suffer any loss of dignity or reputation because he borrowed a screw of tobacco from a costermonger or discussed the Derby winner with a petty shopkeeper; an American, forced against his will into such promiscuous and undesirable company, would more likely be afraid that the association might hurt him socially, and would, in all probability, let his chance companions know that to travel third class was a novel experience which he was not anxious to repeat.

In America a people whose manners were beginning to deteriorate because the example of perfect breeding and courtesy was no longer before them to serve as a model, whose conquest of an unbroken country and its development deprived them of the opportunity to practice social conventions even if they were so disposed, had their manners destroyed by the incoming of a great mass of rude and uncultured aliens, often intellectually of a low order, appearing dull-witted because of their ignorance of the language, and their unfamiliarity with the coun-

try and the customs of its people. The American, nervous, high-strung, easily irascible, and always in a hurry, had neither the patience nor the inclination to show courtesy to his "help" nor to waste unnecessary time. Partly because of the alien's scant knowledge of English, partly because of the American's temperament, orders were given in the shortest number of words and always in the imperative form. It was easier to say "Do this" than "I should like to have this done"; "I want," in a curt, sharp tone, the American believed, would be more quickly understood by the alien as a command than "Will you?" — which was equally a command although couched in the form of a request.

This was the influence on the daily life of the American in the home, in the office, in the factory, on the street. He was under no law, legal or social, to be courteous to his "equal"; he would have regarded it as absurd even if it had occurred to him, and it never did. He was too busy "bossing" gangs, trying to hammer some sense into their heads, swearing at them when other resources failed, pushing ahead and intent only on the completion of the job, to think that equality required him to treat his fellow man with respect or to set him an example in politeness. Besides, there was no personal element in the relations between master and man, mistress and maid. The laborer, the factory hand, the servant, came and went, not na-

tive to the soil and a part of the community, not, even in a humble way, a part of its traditions and its life, without bond of attachment; simply an alien, an outsider, very frequently a number and not a name. They drifted in and drifted out, valued exactly as a shovel or a pick are valued, because they serve a useful purpose, but inspiring no more sentiment in their employer than the laborer has for his shovel or pick. It was only when they got drunk or deserted for a more profitable or more attractive job that their employer showed sentiment, — of a kind; just as the laborer, who without emotion regards his spade as a purely inanimate object and the demon of his toil, invests it with a semi-personal quality when he finds it stolen.

It is idle to pretend that men can have two sets of manners, one for their equals and another for their inferiors, and not deteriorate; or that men and women are not detrimentally influenced by constant and intimate contact with inferiors. Even the strongest are affected by this association, and the weak, after a faint struggle, yield. It is a law of development that when two civilizations or social systems exist side by side, a higher and a lower, either the higher raises the lower or the lower drags down the higher to its own level; but neither can remain uninfluenced by the other. It does not necessarily follow that the superior civilization will raise the lower; in fact, there are repeated instances of a higher corrupted by the vices of the lower and

reduced to its level. Men and women who were naturally polite and courteous and to whom bad manners were repulsive lost their delicate appreciation of the elegance of manners through their daily associations. The manners of the factory were brought into the home, the manners of the kitchen were used in the "parlor." The vicious circle was complete. Children were corrupted by the "help" and undisciplined by their parents, whose ideas of family government were the same curt commands and punishment enforced in the factory; master and mistress treated servants without consideration; and servants saw that obedience and hard work were remunerated, but that courtesy was a useless waste of effort. Personal loyalty was ignored on both sides. It was too intangible a thing. The master demanded a full return for his wages; the servant looked for nothing more than the strict observance of the contract, and was always suspicious that advantage would be taken of him, which made him insistent upon his "rights."

It is not humanity or consideration that makes the upper classes in an aristocratic country treat the lower with consideration; it is the respect a man owes to himself and the observance of the traditions and the habits that have become second nature. The respect of the lower class is likewise tradition and habit; this respect is often termed servility, and while at times it is servility and the hope of reward, in the main it is the unconscious recognition of the

inequality of man, which is a fact, while equality is the theoretic aspiration of philosophers.¹ In a country in which classes exist, the line of demarcation is precisely drawn and no one oversteps it; a master treats his servant with consideration but without familiarity; in a democracy there is either too much familiarity, which breaks down discipline, or too little consideration, which is the means the master employs to make the servant understand that he is not of his class, even although by law he is his equal. In aristocracies the great mass has no hope of rising from its class, and the lower class does not presume to regard itself as the equal of the class above; in democracies there is a constant flux of classes, and the man in a lower class to-day may be in the upper class to-morrow, or at least he can have that hope. There is no insuperable obstacle to be surmounted, no artificial distinction to be overcome, no consciousness ground into his soul that the door is closed to him; consequently he need treat no man with deference, he need not trouble himself to cultivate respect, for to-morrow he will be as good as any man and his manners will pass.

“The fact that your shoemaker or your factory hand addresses you as an equal,” Mr. Bryce notes,

¹ I am quite aware that this remark may subject me to the charge of being “aristocratic” and out of sympathy with democracy, but I have so repeatedly shown my belief in and sympathy with democracy that I am not afraid of being misunderstood. One can believe in democracy and bear testimony to all that it has done to advance mankind, and yet see the folly of so-called “equality.”

“does not prevent him from respecting, and showing his respect for, all such superiority as your birth or education or eminence in any line of life may entitle you to receive,”¹ but this needs explanation and qualification. A foreigner of distinguished name or high title, for instance, will be treated with respect because of the glamour that surrounds him; if his eminence is the result of his attainments or the position he has made for himself, that will be reason for consideration; and an inquisitive people, always searching for the secret of success, will treat him with deference in the hope that he may enlighten them on the great riddle of life, how to succeed. Furthermore, even in a land of equality, men have a natural weakness for knowing their betters and are flattered by the graciousness of the great, which they repay by the only means in their power, cordiality and a respectful demeanor. But this respect and deference are shown only when the great or distinguished man has been well advertised; unknown, he would be treated with the same rudeness or absence of civility that is the common lot. In fact, the effect of equality is not to inspire respect between man and man, but to promote snobbishness; but I shall deal with that phase of the American character in a subsequent chapter.²

¹ Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, vol. II, p. 811.

² Half a century ago George W. Curtis thus satirized the equality of his countrymen: “They acknowledge the equal dignity of all kinds of labor, and do not presume upon any social differences between their baker and themselves.” — *The Potiphar Papers*, p. 205.

The more the country grew and expanded, the greater the ever-increasing stream of immigration, the more men felt the pressure of achievement, the less thought they were able to give to manners, to forms, or to conventions; and indifference to manners had now become habitual. As the pioneers and the immigrants swarmed over the mountains and across the plains and down the rivers, building settlements and cities, pushing into the fastnesses, their advance contested by the Indians; laying the iron highways, seeking for gold, delving under the earth and making the soil yield to them her riches, like the first settlers, they were again face to face with Nature, they were forced to be ever vigilant, they lived a hard life that was a never-ending struggle, and manners were crushed out. The relation of man to man was regulated by a certain understood line of conduct, they brought with them a rough-and-ready social code, but the mass was too fluctuating and too little under control for any self-appointed leaders to set an example in manners, nor did there seem to be any necessity for it. In this phase of American development the fibre hardened, the spiritual became submerged in the material, the finer things of life had no place; manners, which are merely a convention, when ignored lead to an indifference of those qualities that make for refinement and the cultivation of the æsthetic. The absence of manners made men material; men were material because they had ceased to cultivate manners.

Always the immigrant was there to make men indifferent, callous, brutal; to be bullied, to be sworn at, to prevent by his presence the cultivation of manners.

Elsewhere we have dealt with the political effect of Irish and German immigration; here we consider it, the Irish especially, in its influence on manners. The intense and almost universal dislike of England, which took form at the beginning of the nineteenth century and lasted until almost its close, led to an aversion no less pronounced for all that was associated with England, and for everything that savored of form or ceremony; for any one to be accused of being "aristocratic" was as politically dangerous as it was to be suspect in the days of the Terror. Such an eminently sensible and ordinarily conventional thing as putting a servant in livery or a tramway conductor in uniform was long resisted and later resented because it was "aristocratic," and the American people would not tolerate "aristocracy"; to cultivate form or to adopt the manners of an older civilization was to be "English," and to be avoided if one wished to escape unfavorable comment. The natural result was an extreme tendency in the other direction. To be rough-and-ready, to care nothing for social *convenances*, to see nothing objectionable in sitting down to a meal in shirt-sleeves, to regard servants as an affectation and deference as a sign of servility, was to show one's detestation of aristocracy and

classes, and one's love of democracy and the rule of "the people."

Stress has been laid upon the influence of the physical in the formation of the character and the minds of a people, and a hundred little things, the importance of which we overlook, all play their part in making a people what they are. It is matter of common knowledge that the American, in ordinary intercourse, speaks in a louder tone than the Englishman, and that the soft and carefully modulated voice, both in man and woman, is rare enough in America to be noticed. Why should the vocal range of the American be some notes higher than that of the European? I think the explanation can be found in the law of heredity. The open life of the pioneer, in the beginning, made men and women raise their voices, for they had to carry over long distances and it was necessary to shout. Later, when the immigrant came, he was addressed in loud and commanding tones, since it is universal that a person addressing a foreigner whose knowledge of the language is limited, raises his voice in the hope that if he talks loud enough he can make himself understood. These things became endemic, children were accustomed to loud speaking at home and in the school, the habit thus formed in childhood was carried through in life, and the voice of America was pitched higher. People who habitually speak in a loud tone do not have an acute sense of hearing. It would be interesting to know

if the American ear is less sensitive than that of the European.

I have already referred to the effect of slavery on the institutions of the South, and I shall later show how vitally slavery affected the whole thought of a people and its political development; here I consider slavery and its consequences in relation to the manners of the people.

One may now discuss slavery without offending the prejudices of Americans. There are still Southerners, the descendants of the former great landed proprietors in Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, who like to think that slavery was a benevolent institution and that the negro was never so well off, materially and morally, as when he was property; but these are now the exception, and the great mass of Southerners agree with Jefferson that "the whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other. Our children see this, and learn to imitate it. . . . The man must be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals undepraved by such circumstances. . . . With the morals of the people, their industry also is destroyed."¹ Jefferson himself was a slave-owner; he was familiar with slavery as it existed in Virginia, where, as a rule, the slaves were treated with humanity; but he could not blind him-

¹ Jefferson: *Notes on Virginia*, p. 240.

self to the demoralizing effect of the traffic in human lives.

That slavery made men "vain and imperious, and entire strangers to that elegance of sentiment, which is so peculiarly characteristic of refined and polished nations,"¹ can well be understood; and it is certain that Jefferson uttered an unimpeachable truth when he asserted that slavery was more harmful to the white race than to the black. Apart from the deteriorating influence exercised upon the white race by an institution so morally debasing as slavery and so foreign to the natural impulses of man in a civilized state of society, the intercourse between owner and slave was governed by no restraint and not even the humanity that a man showed to his horse or his dog; in fact, he frequently had an affection for his horse or his dog, but rarely if ever for his slaves, who were the means of adding to his wealth, who were to be valued for the profits they produced, but for no other reason. Where the master showed an attachment for his slave, it took the form of illicit sexual relations, — and the women were always at the mercy of their masters. Mulattoes and quadroons reveal the extent to which this intercourse prevailed; and a traveler in Richmond in 1853 noticed that a quarter of the negro women had lost "all distinguishingly African peculiarity of feature, and had acquired, in place of it, a good deal of that volup-

¹ Burnaby: *Travels into North America*, p. 18.

tuousness of expression which characterizes many of the women of the south of Europe. I was especially surprised to notice the frequency of thin, aquiline noses.”¹ The numerous statutes enacted in the Southern Colonies in an attempt to put an end to these illegal unions prove that they were not confined to a few of the dissolute, but were numerous enough to be looked upon as a menace to society. Yet, despite heavy fines and the discipline of the church, the evil not only went on unchecked but grew, until its familiarity corrupted society, which became indifferent. The children of slaves took the legal status of their mothers, and were the property of their owners, so that a master could indulge his desire and profit by the labor of his own child; in fact, we are told that “the gain from the African labor outweighed all fears of evil from the intermixture.”²

Slavery, one would imagine, if it did nothing else, should have made the slave extremely respectful in his demeanor to the whites, and that fear of punishment, if no other reason, would have prevented any overstepping of the boundary that separated the slave from the ruling class; yet it was the experience of close observers that the black man was frequently uncivil and often impertinent. A Northern traveler, who had ordered a fire made in his room in a Washington hotel, thus describes his experience:

¹ Olmsted: *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States*, vol. 1, p. 81.

² Foote: *Sketches of Virginia*, p. 23.

“I was writing, shiveringly, a full hour before the fireman came. Now he has entered, bearing on his head a hod of coal and kindling wood, without knocking. An aged negro, more familiar and more indifferent to forms of subserviency than the Irish lads, very much bent, seemingly with infirmity, an expression of impotent anger in his face, and a look of weakness, like a drunkard’s. He does not look at me, but mutters unintelligibly.”¹

The effect of the contact of white masters and mistresses with black field hands and house servants, was to lower the whole moral tone of the South. In this connection I use “moral” not in its conventional narrow sense, implying chastity, but in the wider meaning of all that goes to make man moral—self-restraint, consideration, exact justice, reluctance to inflict suffering, a feeling that even the humblest is still a fellow human being.² There were of course to be found in the South slave-owners who were humane and moral and who

¹ Olmsted: *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States*, vol. I, p. 4.

² “I have already explained the influence which slavery has exercised upon the commercial ability of the Americans in the South; and this same influence equally extends to their manners. The slave is a servant who never remonstrates, and who submits to everything without complaint. He may sometimes assassinate, but he never withstands, his master. In the South there are no families so poor as not to have slaves. The citizen of the Southern States of the Union is invested with a sort of domestic dictatorship from his earliest years; the first notion he acquires in life is, that he is born to command, and the first habit he contracts is that of being obeyed without resistance. His education tends, then, to give him the character of a supercilious and hasty man, irascible, violent, and ardent in his desires, impatient of obstacles, but easily discouraged if he cannot succeed upon his attempt.” — De Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, vol. I, p. 426.

treated their slaves with kindness, but they were the exceptions, and their influence did not counteract the devastating effects wrought by slavery.

An unmoral institution, — and no one now contends that it was anything else but unmoral, — it made a whole people brutal and cowardly; it destroyed their sense of justice and compassion; it taught no virtue of self-control. Men and women worked under the lash, which was not sparingly applied;¹ infractions of the farm or field code were punished by the lash; women, who prided themselves on their birth, their breeding, and their refinement, had as little compunction in ordering the backs of servants scarred at the whipping-post as the women of Rome, in a fit of mad jealousy or a drunken whim, sent their female slaves to be crucified.² Every institution, whether beneficent or despotic, every habit, whether good or bad, is cumulative in its effects upon the character of a race in precisely the same way that the individual is strengthened or loses his power of resistance the more he exercises his will or yields to temptation. The policy of the line of least resistance never made a nation great, any more than it can make man courageous or self-reliant.

¹ Cf. Olmsted: *Journeys and Explorations in the Cotton Kingdom*, vol. I, p. 124.

² Cf. Frederick Douglass's *Life*, p. 78, in which he tells of the murder of a slave girl by her mistress. Harriet Martineau (*Society in America*, vol. II, p. 332) tells of a woman guilty of the most fiendish cruelty to her slaves, but who was described as "very pleasant to whites." A peculiarly atrocious incident is related by Fanny Kemble in her *Journal*, p. 227.

Slavery, in the South, was no mere social excre-
cence, as it was in the North, where it was not woven
into the fabric of society and did not color the
thoughts, the political institutions, the daily life,
and the commerce of a people. It existed in all the
Northern Colonies, it worked its harm there as it
has done everywhere throughout history, it made
men brutal and indifferent to the feelings of others,
it encouraged class distinction, it demoralized man-
ners; but as there were fewer slaves in the North
than in the South, the evils of slavery were pro-
portionately reduced. In the South slavery was an
institution almost coincident with the first swarm-
ing of the English, and it lasted until after the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century. It was in 1619 that
the first cargo of slaves was landed at Jamestown,
and from then until 1861 slavery was so interwoven
in the life of the South that it could not be sepa-
rated from it. Thus for nearly two hundred and fifty
years the black man worked corruption. He cor-
rupted the morals, the manners, the character of
his white master; as the black "mammy" crooned
over the cradle of her white mistress's child, her
malign influence began; it grew with the child's
growth as he was thrown into constant association
with slaves and was taught to regard them as little,
if any, better than animals;¹ his sense of compas-
sion and justice was destroyed; his ideal of equality

¹ Cf. Olmsted: *Journeys and Explorations in the Cotton Kingdom*, vol. I,
p. 222.

distorted. Terrible as were the wrongs inflicted by the white man on the black, far more terrible was the revenge of the black on the white. History does not record any similar case of a dominant race so vitally and disastrously affected by their slaves as were the Southerners. In all that went to make character, the view of life, the moral perceptions, they bore little if any resemblance to the Northerners, yet they were, as we have already traced, of the same stock. We have seen that great immigration of the Scotch-Irish, and how they first went to Pennsylvania and thence spread over the mountains and colonized the South. Those Scotch-Irish who settled in Pennsylvania acquired the characteristics of their environment, while those who went South became in all things Southern. Diligent and minute investigation offers no explanation for this marked divergence other than the effect of slavery on the psychology of the people who accepted it as a proper social institution. Slavery, De Tocqueville saw, modified the character and changed the habits of the natives of the South.¹

The negro fastened his own weaknesses, his shiftlessness and his slackness, upon the Southerner. The utter want of system, standards made low, the false, unsound workmanship, vagueness of cost and ideas, injudicious and unnecessary expenditure of labor, "indifference to fractions," and the "indolence, carelessness, indifference to the results of skill,

¹ De Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, vol. I, p. 426.

heedlessness, inconstancy of purpose, improvidence, and extravagance,"¹ forced themselves upon every Northern traveler.

Before leaving the study of the negro in his relations to manners, it is necessary to notice that the negro has aided the immigrant in vitiating Northern courtesy. When the victory of the North gave the black man his freedom, and he was free to go and come as he pleased, he naturally drifted to Northern cities to find such employment as he was suited for. At that time and for many years to come the negro was unmoral, lazy, shiftless; his intelligence only rudimentary. Driven to seek sordid and menial occupations, and employed simply because he was strong and satisfied with lower wages than white labor, he was looked upon as only half human. His ways were often repulsive, he was uncouth, sullen, revengeful. In their relations with him the Americans made no pretence of equality and made no effort to teach him manners; and field labor and the conditions under which he had lived in slavery were not conducive to the cultivation of courtesy or those manners which come from imitation and contact with a highly cultivated or intellectual body of masters or employers. The newly emancipated slave soon imbibed the doctrine of equality and showed it by the disrespect with which he treated the whites, who, to assert their superiority, were rough and domineering in their

¹ Olmsted: *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States*, vol. I, p. 163 *et seq.*

intercourse with the "moke."¹ The advancement of the negro was made painfully slow, and in his ascent he helped the immigrant to pull down the manners of the whites.

¹ It is curious to note the different meanings given to slang in the two English-speaking countries. In America a negro is a "moke," which is the only meaning the word has there. In England a "moke" is a costermonger's donkey.

CHAPTER XVII

SLAVERY

REFERENCE has already been made to the effect of slavery on the development of the American people, but it is necessary to give the subject further consideration, for slavery was one of the causes to influence American psychology. As we have seen, it was slavery that gave the American of the South a view of life different from that of the American of the North, and brought into being in the Southern states an Englishman, or the descendant of an Englishman, who was unlike the stock from which he sprung.

The destructive effects of slavery, moral, physical, and intellectual, were not seen in the early days of the Republic; in fact, slavery appeared to have vindicated itself, and it almost seemed as if the strength of the South was the consequence of that institution. In everything the South was dissimilar to the North. There was no landed leisure class in the North as there was in the South, the North knew no ruling class as the South did. Masters of great estates and many slaves, the men of the South were filled with that pride "which is not wholly private, a pride which makes of them a planning and governing order."¹ There grew up in the South

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 407.

a governing class very closely corresponding to that in England, the existence of which was unknown in the North. The South had leaders whose domination rested on birth and social prominence as well as intellectual attainments. "It was this advantage, of always knowing her leaders, and of keeping them always thus in a school of privilege and authority, that had given the South from the first her marked preëminence in affairs."¹ In the first forty-eight years of the Union there were seven Presidents, four of whom were from Virginia, one from Tennessee, and only two from Massachusetts. The genius of Southern men was seen in the Constitution, the advisers of Presidents were Southern men, it was largely their planning and their making that shaped the political trend of the infant nation. In the South statesmanship was one of the serious affairs of life and a duty imposed upon men of wealth and high social station, who did not shirk their responsibilities. In the North statesmanship was largely incidental. In the South there was created a compact, self-perpetuating oligarchy; in the North the democracy that was the very life of the people made an oligarchy impossible.

Everything tended to magnify the political importance of the South and to minimize that of the North. A cultivated class, united by blood ties and a common purpose, is, as a rule, better fitted for the business of governing than men drawn from

¹ *Op. cit.*

the people. The spread of population from the older established states of the East and the original Southern States to the new territory of the West gave a tremendous impetus to democracy and was the first blow aimed at the Southern oligarchy; for "in a society dependent upon itself for the food it eats, the clothes it wears, and the implements and utensils its civilization demands, there was small chance for the development of sharply marked classes, or for social and political distinctions;"¹ Jackson still further weakened Southern dominance when he substituted the Convention for the Congressional Committee. Ambitious politicians, men fluent of speech who possessed the art of tickling the ears of groundlings, demagogues with specious panaceas, agitators who encouraged unrest, reformers with unsubstantial plans for correcting real or imaginary evils, were now to contest with the old leaders for supremacy. But while the power of the South was weakened, it was not destroyed. The influence of a class depends not so much upon its numbers as its cohesiveness and discipline, its pride and traditions, its intellect and courage. The South, that had come to look upon power as its right and to meet little challenge from the North, was now to struggle with the growing forces of democracy to retain its hold.

The history of the American people for the first sixty years of the nineteenth century is, in one re-

¹ Elliott: *Biographical Story of the Constitution*, p. 154.

spect, the most remarkable the world has known. Everything that was done or happened can be traced back to a single cause. That cause was economic.¹ In those sixty years there is apparently a mighty struggle of men and parties, principles seem at stake, the issues are confused by many great political questions; war is made on a foreign power. Yet everything began and ended in economics. The struggle of parties was the struggle of two economic schools; the choice of Presidents was the effort of those two schools to secure leadership. And when we come to examine the differences between these economic beliefs, we find that they were the result of the institution of slavery. Reduced, then, to its simplest terms, we have the life and character of a people in the formative period of their national existence moulded by slavery. Slavery in Greece and Rome partially made their history and had far-reaching social effects, but never to the extent it did in America.

The beginning of this economic divergence began with the creation of the Union, when the first Secretary of the Treasury, with the exception of Franklin the most brilliant and constructive mind America has known, made his report on manufactures; it grew with the growth of years, it continued with increasing bitterness until slavery dragged the country into civil war. The American people entered into the shadow of the Civil War before

¹ Cf. Rhodes: *History of the United States*, vol. I, p. 27.

they had fairly emerged from that of the Revolution.¹

It was the tariff that first threatened secession, when Calhoun preached the doctrine of nullification. It was to protect the economic system of the South, so inseparably interwoven with slavery, so impossible of existence (as the South imagined) unless the labor of the South was enslaved, that the South drew the sword. Other people have fought men of their own blood to preserve their liberties or in defense of their religion or to secure their possessions. The political rights of the South were not menaced, its religion was unvexed, its hearthstones were not violated. Slavery, without which they could hope neither for prosperity nor power (as Southern men foolishly believed), was in danger, and they fought to retain it. The unconscious tribute that vice pays to virtue makes men find an ennobling motive for every base action. Historians have represented the South as taking up arms in defense of an ideal — a mistaken ideal they are willing to admit — and inspired by reverence for the Constitution. Idealism no more drove them into war than love of the Constitution made them seek to destroy it.

The South was compelled to justify slavery, especially in the decade or so immediately preceding the Civil War, and it found its justification in "laws of nature," the "positive good," — in the words

¹ Fiske: *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 256.

of Calhoun,¹ in the relation between the two races, and the advancement of civilization. It was the same sophistry used by a respectable New England slave-dealing church elder, who publicly gave thanks that Providence had been gracious enough to bring to the land of freedom the benighted heathen to enjoy the blessing of a gospel dispensation.² The institution of slavery, one of its Southern champions wrote, "is a principal cause of civilization. Perhaps nothing can be more evident than that it is the sole cause. If anything can be predicated as universally true of uncultivated man, it is, that he will not labor beyond what is absolutely necessary to maintain his existence. Labor is pain to those who are unaccustomed to it, and the nature of man is averse to pain. Even with all the training, the helps and motives of civilization, we find that this aversion cannot be overcome in many individuals of the most cultivated societies. The coercion of slavery alone is adequate to form man to habits of labor. Without it there can be no accumulation of property, no providence for the future, no taste for comforts or elegancies, which are the characteristics and essentials of civilization. He who has obtained the command of another's labor, first begins to accumulate and provide for the future, and the foundations of civilization are laid. We find con-

¹ Von Holst: *John C. Calhoun*, p. 172.

² Earle: *Customs and Fashions in Old New England*, pp. 88-93. Cf. Wilson: *History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America*, vol. III, p. 704 *et seq.*

firmed by experience that which is so evident in theory. Since the existence of man upon the earth, with no exception whatever, either of ancient or modern times, every society which has attained civilization has advanced to it through this process.”¹

“Is the negro made for slavery?” a Southerner asks. “God in Heaven!” he declaims, “what are we, that because we cannot understand the mystery of this thy will, we should dare rise in rebellion and call it wrong, unjust, and cruel?” Slavery is a system “evidently marked out by the finger of God”; it is “sanctified by the laws of nature,” and it “needs but the fair operation of those laws to be like every other result of God’s thought, beautiful in the un-deviating order of creation. Beautiful it is in its fulfillment; hideous only in the unnatural struggle which, opposing man’s law to God’s law, rouses the evil passions of men in a vain effort to correct the works of Omnipotence.”²

Beginning as a question of economics, the abolition or perpetuation of slavery became, as the climax approached, a moral question on the part of the North, which gave the movement its great strength. This compelled the South to shift its ground and likewise to rely on the moral argument. A principle much more vital than African slavery, the South

¹ De Bow: *The Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States*, vol. II, p. 206; *Memoir on Negro Slavery*, read by Chancellor Harper before the South Carolina Society for the Advancement of learning.

² De Bow: *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

contended, was involved. Could free men who had voluntarily entered into a compact submit to the coercion of their associates? Their property was now at stake; if they offered no resistance soon their liberties would be threatened and free government subverted. In the years immediately preceding the war, the moral issue was given such prominence by both sides that the original cause of the disagreement was forgotten, and as the last word in an argument is usually the one to be longest remembered, the world came to believe that slavery was a question of morality solely. Yet it must never be forgotten that a false economic system was the beginning of the South's belief in the necessity of enslaved labor.

Finally, when further evasion was useless, when the South must either fight for slavery or yield to the North, South Carolina, in 1860, adopted a "Declaration of Independence" and arraigned the non-slaveholding states for having "assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions"; for having "denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the states and recognized by the Constitution"; and for having "denounced as sinful the institution of slavery."¹

It would be foreign to the purpose of this work to describe in detail the history of that long struggle which began when Hamilton submitted his "Report" to Congress and continued without pause

¹ Elliott: *Biographical Story of the Constitution*, p. 372.

until Sumter called a nation into arms, and I shall merely touch upon the salient features to show the causes that contributed to make and develop the American character.

Hamilton's report laid the foundation for the American fiscal system of fostering domestic industry by levying import duties to protect home manufactures from foreign competition. Even at that early day the interests of the South were opposed to those of the North. In the colonial era, as we have already shown, New England carried on extensive manufactures and successfully competed with England in certain lines; the South relied for its wealth on natural products and could see no advantage in protection; in fact, it believed that protection was a burden imposed upon the South for the benefit of the industries of the North, and this was the view at one time held by the West,¹ as population slowly pressed forward to the Pacific. Subsequently, the West modified that view when it came to see that the perpetuation and extension of the "peculiar institution" would bring about the same conditions in the West that existed in the South; that the same system of agriculture would be fastened on the West; that the West would be the breeding-ground for slaves, and that the industrious, enterprising man with little capital would be at the mercy of rich planters. The slavery struggle, to repeat, was an economic rather than a moral

¹ Cf. Jackson's *Proclamation on the South Carolina Nullification Ordinance*.

question, and the West, largely settled by the descendants of the Puritans, was alive to the economic danger that threatened its welfare. The New England Abolitionists were the zealots without which no great cause can live; for the idealism and violence and fanaticism of the zealot put courage in the timid and sustain the despairing; the men of the West, not less moral, were more practical.

The South found its market in Europe and purchased largely in Europe;¹ every dollar laid on importations lessened by that much the value of the Southerner's crop;² the North, selling to itself and the rest of the country, profited to the extent to which protective duties narrowed foreign competition. The invention by Whitney of the cotton gin made cotton-planting profitable; the inventions of Hargreaves, Compton, and Arkwright stimulated the demand for cotton;³ and the existence of a market that could be supplied with comparatively little labor made cotton the chief economic factor of the South. All the hands on the plantation — able-bodied men and the aged, women and young children — were employed in hoeing and picking, and the cost of maintenance was estimated not to exceed on the average fifteen dollars a year for each man, woman, and child, as the rations — corn,

¹ "Of the 600,000 bales of cotton sold annually (*circa* 1827), two thirds were sent to foreign countries, which sent in return almost every manufactured article used in the South." — *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 376.

² Cf. Morse: *Life of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. i, p. 393 *et seq.*

³ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 374.

pork, and sweet potatoes — were grown on the place. The demand for slaves steadily increased, and Virginia and Maryland found it more profitable to breed blacks for sale than to work them. In 1790, the best field hand could be bought for \$200; in 1815, the price was \$250; it rose to \$500 in 1840, to \$1000 in 1850, and from \$1400 to \$2000 in 1860.¹

It will be recalled that in the early history of Maryland the thoughts of an entire people centred in tobacco.² Cotton now took the place of tobacco. Values were measured in cotton, wealth was estimated in the number of acres of cotton plantations and the slaves to work them, for the plantations were useless without slaves, and the negro was useful only for field labor. The cotton states, in size an imperial domain, devoted all their labor and their capital to the production of the staple and neglected everything else. While the North was building mills and factories, uncovering iron and coal, constructing canals and roads, diversifying its industries, creating wealth, spinning and weaving Southern cotton into cloth, the Southern planter, with inconceivable folly, was fatuously content to produce the raw material and to leave to the North the profits of manufacturing. "Slavery early disappeared in the North, manufactures and free labor flourished, while in the South, cotton and slavery seemed linked in perpetual bonds, to

¹ Coman: *The Industrial History of the United States*, pp. 215-16.

² *Vide* vol. I, p. 290.

the exclusion of practically all industries save agriculture.”¹ And as has always happened, manufactures stimulated enterprise and intellectual faculties, while agriculture deadened them. “Wherever slavery was established, society took and kept a single and invariable form; industry had its fixed variety and pattern; life held to unalterable standards.”²

The Southern planter saw nothing beyond the blacks working in his fields. The Northern manufacturer had a wider horizon; he had a hundred problems to contend with where the Southerner had one; his intellect was keener and his view of life larger. The North was a more fluid community than the South; in the South only men of large capital could profitably raise cotton, in the North any enterprising man with a few dollars could start in business for himself and succeed if he had the requisite ability. Relatively speaking, the North offered as many advantages to shrewdness and power to grasp opportunities as the United States as a whole does to-day; and then as now the constant increase of wealth and the lucky chance by which fortune might be acquired, the quick transition from poverty to riches, created desires and an insistent demand for something better; better food and clothing and houses, greater luxuries and refinement; desires that existed must be gratified and the

¹ Elliott: *Biographical Story of the Constitution*, p. 173.

² *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. II, p. 413.

means were found to satisfy them. In the South opportunity was denied the poor man to become rich, so that he had no incentive to desires that could never be indulged.¹

Society in the South was narrowly divided into two classes, the great planters who lived in luxury, whose habits of life were fixed; and the small farmers who, with the aid of a slave or two hired from a large slave-owner, cultivated a small patch and eked out a precarious existence,² and the "poor-whites," crackers and sandlappers, who in their habits and aversion to work compared with the most brutal and degraded of the professional tramps of to-day. On the eve of the Civil War, 350,000 planters made up the slaveholding class, constituting rather less than six per cent of the white population of the slave states.³ It was impossible for the small farmer to hope to become a planter and the master of slaves or to raise himself in the social scale.

In a previous chapter we have shown the effect of immigration in forcing up the general level of intelligence and culture, and the extremely important part foreign blood has played in American development. We have proof of the correctness of the proposition in the retardation of the South as contrasted with the progress of the North.

¹ Cf. Von Holst: *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, vol. I, p. 343 *et seq.*

² Cf. Cairnes: *The Slave Power*, pp. 74-75.

³ Coman: *The Industrial History of the United States*, p. 214.

It was for many years the pride of the South that its blood was "purer" than that of any other part of the country, and while the East and the West were swamped by the immigrant, and the blood of the original English settlers was vitiated by this admixture, in the South the blood of the first English settlers flowed through the veins of their descendants undiluted. This is true. After that first Scotch-Irish immigration ceased, there was, speaking in broad terms, practically no foreign accession to the population of the South, excluding of course always the negro. Just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War the foreign-born in the Southern States constituted only one twenty-fourth of the total population of the South.¹ The Irish and the Germans at first, later the Scandinavians, still later, the Jews and the Italians, filled up the East or found homes and employment in the ever-expanding West, but the South held out to them no inducements. The reason is self-evident. Slave labor destroyed free labor by degrading all labor.² It is impossible for slave labor and free labor to exist side by side, for the free man soon falls to the level of the slave, and is regarded by the master as little better in the social scale than the slave. Slavery destroys the relation between master and servant. One of the strongest motives to make the immigrant seek a new home was his desire to escape from the slav-

¹ Coman: *Op. cit.*

² Cf. Brown: *The Lower South in American History*, p. 29.

ery of social coercion, and naturally he refused to go to a section of the country where slavery was part of the social system.¹

The backwardness of the South has been attributed to the presence of the negro rather than to the absence of the immigrant, but if there had been in the South the same propulsive force of the immigrant as there was in the North, the progress of the South would have been greatly accelerated. It was the immigrant who was ever driving forward the "native," enlarging his desires and creating the means to gratify them. The South was denied this advantage, and the progress of the North, which has been the wonder of the world, finds no counterpart in Southern development.

It is the fashion of the ignorant, the incapable, and the demagogic to decry wealth and to pretend sorrow over "extravagance"—the ignorant because of their ignorance, the incapable to justify their failure, the demagogue because envy is the weapon of the dishonest. Yet one of the great forces—I am almost inclined to think that I shall be guilty of no extravagance if I say the greatest—in the progress of man and his development from barbarism to civilization has been his love of money and the gratification of his extravagance;² that is, the cultivation of the æsthetic side of his nature, which is

¹ Cf. Rhodes: *History of the United States*, vol. I, p. 355.

² Cf. Buckle: *History of Civilization in England*, vol. II, p. 318: "There is no one passion which has done so much good to mankind as the love of money."

the motive for perhaps nine tenths of all so-called extravagance. Foolish persons, mostly young, who have never known discipline, or older persons who have lived sordid lives that crushed out of them all sense of the æsthetic, on sudden accession to fortune throw money away for the mere love of display and because they are too dull-witted to see that money can be made to produce keener sensations and more lasting pleasures; but most extravagance has a different meaning. The man who buys his wife jewels, or fills his house with rare pictures, or gives great entertainments is deriving not only pleasure but is satisfying a certain emotional demand by the gratification of his extravagance. A man may pay too great a price for his pleasures; but it is certain that he who has desires and a longing to indulge his extravagances, is stimulated by that longing to be industrious and resourceful and is made dissatisfied with present conditions; and he has done a great deal more to advance the world than the man who wants nothing and therefore has no inducement to make an effort.

The application of the foregoing remarks is found in that striking contrast between North and South that has ever marked the difference between the two sections. The contentment of the planter was his undoing. The fact that life ran in a fixed channel destroyed all desires. Viewed from the outside, he was the man to be envied. He lived in good style, his pleasures were simple and easily procured; he

had sufficient time for recreation; life pursued its course without much friction. Yet it was the very ease of life that weakened him.¹ Had the Southerner been filled with the money-getting spirit of the Northerner, had there been a great "middle class" as in the North, always pressing on the upper class and forcing it to show enterprise, the planter would have realized that his so-called cheap black labor was the most expensive and wasteful labor the world has known; he would have seen that his economic system was founded on false principles and therefore could not endure; he would have appreciated the value of manufactures, and the great wealth of the South would not have lain untouched for generations. There was no stimulus to exertion. The Southerner was satisfied with his life and resisted change.

In Scotland at the end of the seventeenth century, conditions were almost precisely analogous to those existing in America when the political aristocracy of the South was losing its power. In a very striking passage — a passage in which if you substitute the South for Scotland scarcely a word need be changed — Buckle shows the effect on the progress of society of the rise of the trading and manufacturing interests.

A mercantile and money-making spirit [he says] was diffused to an extent formerly unknown; and men be-

¹ Cf. Brown: *The Lower South in American History*, pp. 25-49.

coming valued for their wealth as well as for their birth, a new standard of excellence was introduced, and new actors appeared on the scene. Heretofore, persons were respected solely for their parentage; now they were also respected for their riches. The old aristocracy, made uneasy by the change, did everything they could to thwart and discourage these young and dangerous rivals. Nor can we wonder at their feeling somewhat sore. The tendency which was exhibited, was, indeed, fatal to their pretensions. Instead of asking who was a man's father, the question became, how much he had got. And certainly, if either question is to be put, the latter is the more rational. Wealth is a real and substantial thing, which ministers to our pleasures, increases our comfort, multiplies our resources, and not unfrequently alleviates our pains. But birth is a dream and a shadow, which, so far from benefiting either body or mind, only puffs up its possessor with an imaginary excellence, and teaches him to despise those whom Nature has made his superiors, and who, whether engaged in adding to our knowledge or to our wealth, are, in either class, ameliorating the condition of society, and rendering to it true and valuable service. This antagonism, between the aristocratic and trading spirit, lies in the nature of things, and is essential, however it may be disguised at particular periods. Therefore it is, that the history of trade has a philosophic importance in reference to the progress of society, quite independent of practical considerations.¹

Every dollar added to the wealth of the North, every new mill and factory built, every man who

¹ Buckle: *History of Civilization in England*, vol. II, pp. 244-45.

made his living out of industrial occupation — and in 1825 the capital invested in manufactures amounted to \$160,000,000 and gave employment to 2,000,000 persons¹ — increased the demand for protection and intensified the bitterness of the planters against a policy that they believed was selfishly sucking the heart's blood out of the South for the enrichment of the North.

It is worth noting that while Calhoun defended the Tariff Act of 1816, the Southern leaders opposed the Act of 1820, as did Massachusetts, while Connecticut and Rhode Island supported it. Up to this time the tariff was not a sectional question, but a few years later, when Massachusetts advocated protection, the sectional lines were drawn and remained unchanged until after the war.²

I shall not follow in detail the efforts in and out of Congress, on the one side to plant protection firmly on the country as a cardinal principle of the national policy and on the other to resist it, or the arguments used by advocates and opponents. It is sufficient to say that protection won, and the passage of the bill that caused the greatest rejoicing in the North saw a sullen, angry, and defiant South; defiant almost to the point of rebellion, and sharply warning Congress that it would submit to no usurpation of legislative powers. The South contented itself with protest and denunciation for the next

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, p. 375.

² Cf. Taussig: *The Tariff History of the United States*.

few years, but in 1832 it took more forcible means to show its displeasure. In that year South Carolina enacted an ordinance nullifying an Act of Congress. No man could see it then, but the hand of the South was on the sword to protect its slaves.

CHAPTER XVIII

AGAIN THE SWORD IS DRAWN

THE great politico-economic struggle that divided the country from the beginning of the nineteenth century until 1860 falls naturally into three periods. The first begins with the adoption of the Constitution, — when the North endeavored to prevent the recognition of slavery and the Southern States made the legality of slavery their condition of the acceptance of the Constitution, — and ended in 1820, the year of the adoption of the Missouri Compromise. The second period is covered in the thirty years from 1820 to 1850, which witnessed the Wilmot Proviso, the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Law, and, finally, the adoption of that other cowardly compromise fathered by Clay. The third period runs from 1850 to 1860. For nearly three quarters of a century there had been a series of compromises and arrangements, and an effort was made to postpone the day of reckoning by temporizing. Slave state had been set off by free state, the balance of power between North and South was supposed to be so accurately adjusted that the danger of one section dominating the other was effectually guarded against. Finally there came the day when, as Lincoln said, the government could not

endure permanently half slave and half free.¹ It was in 1850 that the decision was made, although another ten years must elapse before men had the courage to back their beliefs with the sword. Up to 1850 a settlement was always possible, after that year nothing was possible except the settlement that Lincoln wrote in Washington and Grant executed at Appomattox.

It is perhaps not out of place for the author to repeat what he has said before: that he assumes the reader to be conversant with the main facts of American history, and that his purpose is not to write a history of the American people, but to trace their psychology through historical development. It is therefore unnecessary that more shall be done here than to sketch in the fewest words the history of the United States from 1800 to the Civil War; but it is important that the bearing of historical events on character shall be correctly understood.

The long slavery struggle was in the beginning, as we have already pointed out, economic, and economics were inextricably involved in politics; for the political préeminence of the South rested on its social system, which in turn rested on slavery. Without slaves there could be no great landowners, whose wealth and position made them the ruling class. Free labor, the South saw, would destroy its industrial system, and under its ruins would lie buried its political power. "The relation which now

¹ Lincoln: *Letters and Addresses*, p. 105.

exists between the two races in the slaveholding States," Calhoun declared, "has existed for two centuries. It has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. It has entered into and modified all our institutions, civil and political. None other can be substituted."¹

Slave or free? — that was the question on every man's lips, it was about that the thoughts of all men turned. It was not a question that came to the front at stated times, or was so remote that the average man felt it was beyond his power to form an opinion. It entered into the life of a people. Their newspapers, their statesmen, their preachers defended or attacked; it was the burden of all discussion. Everything shaped itself to one end. Every assault made by Abolitionists only encouraged slave-owners to greater resistance.

Between the people of the two sections grew up a bitter antagonism. The South, proud of its birth and blood, came to look with contempt upon the North and to believe that the North was inferior to the South in culture and intellect. The commerce of the North and the keen trading spirit that its people developed were not only obnoxious to the South, but proof that the Northerners were lower in the social scale; for the South clung to the tradition that the landowner is superior to the trader, and that trade is vulgar. To grow cotton by black labor on a large scale did not lower the dignity of a

¹ Von Holst: *John C. Calhoun*, p. 133.

gentleman; to turn that cotton into cloth with American and Irish mill-hands was work no gentleman could engage in without losing caste. Passion and resentment made both sides exaggerate those qualities that the other found most objectionable. The Southerner continually asserted that his system was the only proper one; the Northerner boasted of the superiority of a manufacturing people over an agricultural, and sneered at the "slave-driver," whose intelligence was limited to growing cotton instead of making cloth. The war made by the Abolitionists, Calhoun declared in a speech in the Senate,¹ "is a war of religious and political fanaticism, mingled, on the part of the leaders, with ambition and the love of notoriety, and waged, not against our lives, but our character. The object is to humble and debase us in our own estimation, and that of the world in general; to blast our reputation, while they overthrow our institutions." The South believed that the North was jealous of its wealth and envious of its political importance. The only way to strike at the South, to humiliate it, and to destroy that rivalry which the North so feared, was to crush the one institution that gave vitality to Southern life.

In this antagonism between the people of the North and of the South in the first half of the nineteenth century the foundation was laid for some of the characteristics and the distinctive political

principles that have given the American people their individuality. At a time when all the people of the newly born Republic ought to have pulled together, — for the most critical period of American history was that immediately following the adoption of the Constitution, and there was greater danger of dismemberment of the Union then than there was even during the Civil War, — there began this sectional antagonism that became intensified with the years. Slavery more than anything else riveted upon the United States the pernicious doctrine of state rights and made the South assert the sovereignty of the state. To concede the right of the general government to interfere in the domestic institutions of a state was to sign the death-warrant for slavery; to prevent that interference, the South must maintain as a cardinal principle of the American political system the absolute supremacy of the state in its domestic affairs. Until South Carolina forced the issue, no Northern man had that audacity which is genius, to assert that the Nation could suppress slavery because it was a national injury. The impotence of the government was admitted, — Lincoln, the foremost of all the champions of the slave, agreed with Jefferson Davis that the federal government possessed no power of emancipation;¹ and he repeatedly affirmed that the people of the free states had no right and they ought to have no inclination to enter into the

¹ Lincoln: *Letters and Addresses*, p. 162.

slave states and interfere with the question of slavery.¹ "I have said that always," Lincoln declared in one of his addresses, "if not quite a hundred times, at least as good as a hundred times." State rights was the bulwark that the South threw up against slavery, and it was always vigilant to keep out the ever-advancing tide of abolition that was finally to engulf it. Those great constitutional questions that occupied so much of the attention of courts and legislators were the weapons employed by the South to repel the assaults on its citadel. Once the walls were breached, the South was at the mercy of its foe. Questions that seemed innocent, that had not even a remote bearing on slavery or the exercise of federal power, must be negatived for fear that the door was being opened to federal encroachment. The dread of the Trojan horse was constantly before the Southerner. Calhoun argued that Congress had no constitutional power to receive petitions touching slavery in the District of Columbia, for if Congress could properly receive those petitions, then it was legal to present petitions affecting slavery in any of the slave states. There was only one way to meet the attack, Calhoun declared. "We must meet the enemy on the frontier,— on the question of receiving; we must secure that important pass. . . . It is our Thermopylae."²

¹ Lincoln: *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

² Speech in the Senate, March 9, 1836.

The devotion of the South to decentralization naturally made the North take opposing ground. The more stubbornly the South clung to the doctrine of state rights, the less merit it seemed to possess in the eyes of the North; the more the South magnified the state at the expense of the Nation, the more the North attempted to subordinate the state to national supremacy. The North saw the menace of state sovereignty, and it was inevitable that Northern statesmen should endeavor to enlarge the federal powers to minimize that danger.

What contributed in no small degree to the growing sectionalism was the settlement of the West. Before the adoption of the Constitution the westward expansion began, and the men who settled the West were from the East, who carried with them the same ideas and principles that had become indoctrinated in them. The famous Ordinance of 1787, the first colonization on the American continent by the American Nation, not only provided for the government of a vast territory, but in express terms excluded slavery forever from the territory. Slavery as it existed must be recognized, but it would not be allowed to take new root in the virgin lands of the West.

For fifty years we are to see an intensely virile, resourceful, courageous people devoting all their energies solely to one end — to making money. North and South, East and West, commerce and

trade filled the thoughts of every man. The army of civilization was ever advancing; mile after mile it crept forward, often halted but never repulsed, fighting stupendous battles against overwhelming odds, but in the end triumphant, until at last the goal is reached and the flag waves exultant on the borders of the Pacific as it had been unfurled in the extreme South and in the far North. But wherever that flag was carried, across its folds lay the shadow of slavery. As settlements became territories and territories were admitted to statehood, the question must first be decided whether they should be slave or free; whether the political principles of the South or North should prevail; whether the Union was one and indissoluble or a compact of sovereign states dissolvable at the pleasure of any of the signatories.

For fifty years it is a record of compromise, evasion, futile expedient;¹ a history of cowardice, dishonesty, and untruth. For half a century the sinews of men cracked as they bent their backs to the task of taming the continent, and as they worked they saw that shadow darkening, fearing that the storm was about to burst, hoping that the day of disaster would be averted until the next generation came upon the scene. Those fifty years of fighting had prepared men for action. They had not become

¹ Calhoun seriously believed that disruption could be prevented by an amendment to the Constitution providing for a double Executive, a Northern and a Southern President, each with the veto power upon legislation hostile to his section!

soft or cowardly. When the challenge was given there was instant response. For the second time a Nation sprang to arms. For a second time the appeal was to the arbitrament of the sword.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EFFECT OF THE CIVIL WAR ON NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE Civil War is a momentous epoch in American development, and produced lasting psychological, political, and social consequences. Prior to the war the confederacy that politically was known as the United States was loosely jointed, and the bonds that held it were so tenuous that the danger of a rupture was always imminent. For more than fifty years the life of the nation hung by a thread. War cut that thread and the Union was bound with ropes of steel. The house whose foundation stones were laid in blood was cemented anew in blood. Before Sumter the national spirit was feebly developed; since Appomattox the spirit of nationality is one of the most striking characteristics of the American people. It was the Revolution and the victory over Great Britain that gave the Americans such supreme confidence in themselves and made them go forward, but that confidence lessened as they approached the time when the future of the Republic was to be decided by war. Since then no man has lost confidence. There has never been a doubt. The Republic is perpetual.

It has already been pointed out that the chief

cause of the war was the economic differences between North and South, but men are rarely influenced by a single motive. A critical analysis will show that four causes operated to bring on the war.

1. *Political.* The North and West believed that the Union was one and indivisible and to preserve it no sacrifice was too great; the South held that the right of separation was inherent, and to deny that right was a denial of liberty and freedom of action that was opposed to the spirit of American institutions and the political compact on which the American Republic was founded.

2. *Selfishness.* The South believed that without slavery its agriculture could not be properly carried on; slavery was not only necessary but absolutely vital to its existence. A free labor market would revolutionize industrial conditions and bring about great confusion in the social system. The North could not fail to see that either there would be an expansion of slavery in the new states of the West and South or slavery would be penned up in the original slave states, which would lead to the creation of an independent slaveholding republic. That spelled ruin to the North, which saw the great wealth of the South flowing east,—that is, to Europe, instead of North,—that is, to the Atlantic seaboard; it feared a tariff laid by the Republic of the South on all Northern manufactures; possibly an export tax on cotton so as to cripple North-

ern cotton mills for the advantage of European rivals.¹ Cotton was King in the South, and the patient beast of burden that carried the North on its back. The whirring spindles of New England fed thousands of people and daily added to their wealth; stoppage of the mills meant starvation and ruin. There were Southern men like Calhoun,² for instance, who believed that the natural alliance of the South was with the West, and that it was possible to divert the Western commercial stream to Southern rather than to Northern ports; and the North feared this diversion. A Southern Republic would be followed in all probability by a Republic of the West, and even if the West remained part of the original Union, Southern competition must destroy the Northern monopoly of the Western market.

3. *Altruism.* As the climax approached, the economics and politics of slavery were submerged by the moral wave that overran the North. To the leaders in the movement for abolition, to nearly all those earnest men and women who helped the cause by money and services, the fine-spun theories of the rights of the state or the powers of the federal government meant little if anything; whether

¹ In the last decade before the war the business men of Mobile urged patriotic citizens not to purchase Northern goods, but to import direct from Europe so as to make the South independent of the North and ultimately to destroy their manufacturing interests. — Coman: *The Industrial History of the United States*, pp. 252-54.

² Cf. Calhoun's letter to some citizens of Athens, Georgia, August 5, 1836.

the freedom of the slave would destroy the agricultural system of the South was a thing of small consequence. They were possessed by an almost religious exaltation. God had called them to liberate the oppressed, and to redeem America from an infamy that was as destructive to the body and soul of the master as to those of the slave. The same spirit that drove the colonists to revolt, because there was a great injustice to be redressed, was now again called into life. Slavery was unjust, immoral, cruel. It must be driven out, as the English were driven forth when their rule was harmful and morally wrong.

Finally, it was the culmination of the long smouldering jealousy between North and South; that antagonism that began with the beginning of American history and grew with the growth of the nation.

I have referred in a previous chapter to the effect of war on the character of a people, especially when a people are in the plastic stage of their national development. War does not soften or make men tender or teach them a love of the beautiful. It does, perhaps, produce a rude sort of chivalry, respect for courage and suffering uncomplainingly borne, but its great and lasting effects are the admiration aroused by physical bravery and the success that comes from men offered up as a sacrifice to victory. War marks the cheapness of human life, for cost is never counted, and no commander hesitates at sac-

rifice to win a battle. Concealed in high-sounding words, — patriotism, love of country, defense of native land, national honor, — the motive that makes men fight is hidden, but the real incentive is ambition. There is no surer way to gain fame than death or victory on the battlefield; Westminster Abbey or a peerage is the lure of the patriot.

Conditions were peculiarly fit for the character of a people to be affected by war. Americans long resented what they believed were the libels of Mrs. Trollope and Dickens, and the American who came to manhood about the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and read the descriptions of manners and life during the thirty years or so preceding the Civil War, read what seemed to him to be so absolutely foreign to American life that in his anger he ascribed these criticisms to malice, ignorance, or envy. Yet while Americans remember Mrs. Trollope's *Domestic Manners of the Americans* and Dickens's *American Notes*, and *Martin Chuzzlewit*, comparatively few have read George William Curtis's very dull *Potiphar Papers*, in which with the grace of a dancing elephant he either libeled his countrymen a great deal worse than did any foreign author, or, what is much more probable, presented a fairly accurate picture of American society as seen through the eyes of the satirist. But that which used to rattle, and no longer does (for Americans have now sufficient perspective to enable them to see that it was no more disgraceful for them to have

passed through an evolutionary social stage than it was for the forbears of Englishmen to have gone naked with painted bodies) was not an exaggerated picture.

America never sank to such a low social state as between 1830 and the beginning of the Civil War. The men of English lineage, with their traditions of English birth, had passed, and the Americans had not found themselves. At a time when Europe was distinguished for the perfection (even if artificiality) of its manners and its adherence to form and meaningless convention, manners in America were derided, and the influence of political democracy swept away ceremony and ridiculed convention. The stilted language and precise dress of the first President had given place to the oaths and careless apparel of a successor; the men of landed estates and correct deportment were succeeded by the son of the small farmer and the tailor. It was a day of the rough-and-ready. Just as there have been times in the development of society when men prided themselves on their elegance and their sense of the exquisite, so now they were proud of their brusqueness and their contempt of the æsthetic. The United States as a Government and the Americans as a people gave no encouragement to art, discovery, science, or invention, except such discoveries or inventions as had an immediate practical result and were a further means to creating wealth. In this period no American produced a single work

of art, there is no painting or sculpture or music that is part of the national life. Books were written that have lived, but literature is of all forms of artistic or emotional expression the easiest, and cannot be silenced. It was the legacy of colonial life that made the Americans such ready disputants, and the written word is only another form of the spoken. A more severe discipline is required before the sculptor or the artist reaches his perfection; and, as we had occasion to point out in a previous volume, art comes to a people, not while it is engaged in the intense struggle for material existence, but after it has the leisure to enjoy and appreciate luxury and beauty.

Four years all the world watched this great struggle. The forces engaged, the cost of carrying on operations, the stake involved made this one of the greatest of modern wars, but something even more than that gave it peculiar interest to Europe. A political system was put to the test — a system that nearly all Europe hoped would prove a failure. Few Europeans believed in democracy, still fewer understood its real meaning. A system that according to Old World ideas was a perversion of the order of nature and the established laws of society, that experience had demonstrated was unworkable because it was founded on wrong principles, the New World with the arrogance of ignorance had set up in defiance of all teaching and in contempt of age-long wisdom. Democracy was a fair-weather craft. It

was now to encounter storms and founder miserably, a warning to presumption.

Peace brought intense pride. Prophecy had been refuted; prediction ridiculed. The war was the capstone to the foundation laid by the war of independence. It taught the Americans their own resources, their own strength, their own courage. No longer need they ask if they were a Nation, for national sovereignty had asserted itself. No longer need they ask if the Republic were to endure, for it had been tested in fire. In the face of Europe — envious, suspicious, unfriendly — they had won their title. From the crisis they emerged triumphant; supremely confident in their invulnerability, their strength, their ability to deal successfully with any emergency that might arise. The future could have no terrors for them. They looked to Europe, a Europe of which they had stood in awe, and they saw a Europe regarding them with amazement, not unmixed with admiration and a vague wonderment how next this youthful giant would display its strength.

Peace was a material as well as a moral victory. To the materialist it proved the strength of matter, and convinced him that war, like trade, is won by the longest purse; that the strength of a nation is not in its artists or poets or philosophers, but in its looms and forges and farms. To the moralist it was the triumph of righteousness. Slavery, that unholy institution, had been destroyed; the Lord had de-

livered his enemies into the hand of Joshua; the South had been properly chastised; the black was a man and a brother and his soul was saved.

The South was sullen and resentful (and who shall blame it?), but in the North and West, the ever-expanding West, the blood ran in the veins of the people as if they were filled with new wine. They had triumphed. The shadow that so long had lain over the country was no more. Slave or free? no one longer asked, for all were free. There was a tremendous rebound from the depression of war. Fighting men put up their swords and turned to business; every one was anxious to make money and recover lost time. There were opportunities such as had never before been known. The West was crying to be conquered. There were farms to be cultivated to feed a nation every year increasing its numbers by leaps and bounds, railroads to be built to carry the produce of the farms to the East and to Europe. Cities rose as if by magic. A golden stream poured from the earth. It was a day of reckless finance and vicious business methods and the sacrifice of principles to success, but no one cared. Filled with feverish energy, the one thought of all was to win. Under this forced draft there developed a people keyed to the highest tension. They became extraordinarily keen in business, they did things on a grand scale and they were witness to the prodigality of Nature, which made them as reckless as Nature herself. There had probably never

been a time in the history of the world when a people were guilty of such shocking improvidence as the American people from the close of the Civil War until the nineteenth century was drawing to its close. Forests ruthlessly felled, the soil robbed so as to be made to yield with the least labor, animal life wantonly destroyed, water power sacrificed or allowed to go unused, is the story of those years. Extravagance, waste, a scorn of careful economies or details were seen everywhere. To make money rapidly, to amass a fortune in a year or two, was the desire of every one; to save and slowly to build up was the ambition of no one. Men lived in the present and gave no thought to the future.

All this had one effect. It intellectually isolated the Nation and made it narrow and self-centred. People had neither time nor inclination for aught save money-making and politics. Men became intensely materialistic. Neither literature nor art made any appeal. This is the period in American development when it reached its lowest intellectual ebb. For many years following the death of Lincoln there came no great man to the presidency, for with the exception of Grant, whose fame won on the battle-field was dimmed by his incumbency of the White House, the successors of Lincoln were men of small calibre. There is no first-rank statesman or diplomat. There is neither poet nor writer; there is no sculptor nor painter to bring glory to a people. It is a day of the commonplace and the

mediocre, save always in the genius for money-making.

Intellect was held in contempt and money in respect. Men of brains who were content to use their brains for purposes other than to make money were not understood, for, as Stevenson says, it takes two to make a thought, one to utter it and the other to understand it. But a million dollars interpret themselves. Only a poet can appreciate poetry, but a peasant can see and feel a bridge.

A modern American writer believes that in no country is the prestige of wealth less powerful than it is in the United States. "This, of course, the foreigner fails to perceive; he does not discover that it is not the man who happens to possess money that we regard with admiration, but the man who is making money, and thereby proving his efficiency and indirectly benefiting the community. To many it may sound like an insufferable paradox to assert that nowhere in the civilized world to-day is money itself of less weight than here in the United States; but the broader his opportunity the more likely is an honest observer to come to this unexpected conclusion."¹

The spirit of to-day was the same spirit that filled the American people after the war. The admiration was for the money-maker, because then as now the power to make money was the proof of efficiency and the benefit conferred on the com-

¹ Matthews: *American Character*.

munity and the country at large. It was the concrete expression of genius that could not be denied. A man who built a railway and made millions must possess ability far beyond the average; the man whose statesmanship saved the country from the peril of war or humiliation was not necessarily great, because any man felt himself competent to fill any political office. It was this conviction that the business of government required less ability than the management of a factory that made Americans hold statesmanship lightly, although they respected political office for the social distinction and the emoluments it conferred. Any man might aspire to political prominence; training or experience was not considered necessary; fear of a governing class and the ambitions of would-be office-seekers made rotation in office and short terms the principle of American political life.¹

Mere size of country does not make a people continental in thought; in fact, it may be one of the reasons to make them insular, and it was the great area of the United States that helped intellectually to isolate the American people. Their continent was so vast that it was all-sufficient for them, and they came to believe that they could cut themselves off from contact with the rest of the world and not suffer; that they had within themselves the means of development. Size also tended to extreme localism. Distances were so great, means of com-

¹ Cf. Elliott: *Biographical Story of the Constitution*, p. 155.

munication so uncertain, and traveling so expensive that the great majority of the American people knew their country by hearsay only. Thought became localized and the community set the standard. In 1861 large cities were few and widely scattered. The United States was a country of villages, farming communities, and small cities remote from the great centres, and thought percolated slowly. The great cities looked with contempt on the "provinces," whose people believed they were more virtuous and made of stronger and better stuff than the dwellers in large cities corrupted by an artificial civilization. The rural and semi-urban population in their self-sufficiency were content to be left to themselves. Self-sufficiency, I should say, was really the keynote of the American character of that day.

Psychologically these were some of the effects of the war. Politically the war had results equally important, which also influenced the psychology of the people. The war magnified the military hero and the "army vote"; army service was the quickest road to civil preferment. It is not without significance that from the close of the war until a new generation was born, to whom the war was simply an historical episode, every President had seen army service, and the prominent figures in public life were the men who had been equally prominent on the field. Nor is this surprising. The perils and hardships of the war knit men in the bonds of close

comradeship and established the freemasonry that comes from dangers shared. An extravagant country treated the men who had defended it with extravagant generosity, by giving them liberal pensions and recognizing that they had preferred claims to civil employment. Politicians were quick to see that here was a great political asset, and that by catering to the vanity and cupidity of the men who had served in the ranks they had an element large enough to control elections. For years demagogues outvied each other in their devotion to the "veterans," and proved their unselfishness by fresh assaults on the Treasury; the recipients of this bounty, to increase their own importance, in the hope to obtain still further pensions and preferences, and because of a genuine admiration they had for the commanders under whom they had served, voted to keep in power the party and the men who were so devoted to their interests.

A majority of the people were engaged in money-making, but there was a not inconsequential minority who looked to politics as a means of livelihood and to obtain prominence. Political office was the American equivalent of European titles and decorations. The ten years or so following the war were the greatest test to which American institutions were subjected. They were to prove whether democracy was strong enough to withstand personal ambitions or was to go the way of all former similar experiments and perish under the assaults of a mil-

itary dictator. There was the temptation and the opportunity for the establishment of a military dictatorship that would have robbed the people of their power and turned a democracy into an autocracy; the man was there, and behind him was the force to execute his will. But the devotion of the American people to a democratic form of government resisted all assaults. The military remained subordinate to civil authority; the form and spirit and letter of the Constitution was never violated. The South was in a hopeless political minority, but the North dealt with the South in a broad spirit of generosity and friendship; the South, a conquered people at the mercy of their conquerors, suffered no humiliation.

But while no slight was put on the South, and it was treated no differently from the North, the South was unable to exercise any voice in national affairs. For all practical purposes but a single political party existed, and as always happens when power is unchallenged, the results were disastrous. It was perhaps the most shameless era in American politics; politics corrupted business and business corrupted politics; politics and business were so interwoven for common profit that both were dishonored. Without the fear of an opposition the dominant party could do what it pleased, and it did many disgraceful things. The greatest harm that was done in all these years was to debauch the public conscience and to create the belief that politics

were a thing of barter and sale; that politics were necessarily mercenary, and what every one did no one could find fault with, as it was simply a matching of wits, and the shrewdest scoundrel would win; that dishonesty in business or politics was not a moral crime, but a venial offense, to be reprobated only when it brought detection. The state of political and business morality in the United States was very similar to that which existed in England when offices were openly bought and sold, places were put up to the highest bidder, and the public man of integrity was sufficiently rare for history to note. It is a striking thing, however, that while political and business morality was debauched, private morality remained unaffected. The desire to obtain money led to none of that licentiousness and looseness of conduct that have marked a similar stage in the social evolution of other people. America still remained Puritan, and Americans demanded a strict morality in their social intercourse. In fact, they went to the other extreme. The test of conduct was devotion to business, and amusement was regarded as trivial and frivolous; if not precisely immoral, at least unworthy. It was a drab, monotonous life that the people led, with little enjoyment and scant leisure.

CHAPTER XX

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE OF THE SPANISH WAR

THE old story of the small stone that eventually threw the river out of its course finds its repeated parallel in history. An event of minor consequence has changed the current of a people's destiny, just as a thing so trifling as to be considered at the moment of no importance has affected the life of an individual. A short war, comparatively easy of victory, was destined profoundly to influence not only American policy but also American psychology. Unintentionally, and for a second time, Spain was to shape the destiny of this nation.

The war in which the United States was to engage in 1898 produced results no less momentous than the two other great wars which marked the successive stages of its development. Its first war, that of the Revolution, brought a nation into being and broke the tie that bound the colonies to Britain. Its second war, that between the States, transformed a partnership into an imperial confederation and settled for all time the subordination of the state to the sovereign power of the Nation. Its third war, that with Spain, broke down the traditions of a century, and, in one respect at least, re-

versed the American political system as the fathers conceived it. When the American people, with a light heart, embarked on their military parade to Cuba, they could as little foresee what the results were to be as did the ministers of an ill-starred king when they sought to impose stamp taxes on their colonists. All history shows that war has usually been the short cut to reform or progress; when as the result of war neither reform nor progress has followed, there has been an enlargement of the national vision and the thoughts of a people have been turned into a new channel. The precedents of history were not defied on the American continent in the closing years of the nineteenth century.

The form of the Constitution, the peculiar circumstances under which it was evolved, and the mental cast of the men who made it, show that it was never contemplated that the United States should possess and govern oversea dependencies. The Constitution made no provision for foreign possessions, nor for "subjects" as distinguished from "citizens," which is the differentiation between the Constitution of the United States and that of all other great nations. A European is a "subject," an American is a citizen, a distinction subtle enough and yet exact enough to mark the difference between European and American political philosophy and to distinguish the relation of the individual to the state in a monarchy and a democracy. When the framers of the Constitution wrought that in-

strument, the principle upon which they worked was that birth created American citizenship precisely as in Asiatic countries men are born into their caste; and an Asiatic can no more conceive of liberation from his caste than the American fathers could picture an American not a citizen. The idea of foreign possessions or colonies did not appeal to them; they had been taught the bitter lesson of colonial government and realized that colonies were always the tendon of Achilles to the parent state, always the cradle of worry, always needing defense, and seldom if ever a source of profit. America was to teach the world two doctrines hitherto held to be heretical. One was the meaning of democracy, the other that a nation could become rich and powerful and enforce respect by keeping to its own continent, seeking no territorial aggrandizement, and remaining aloof from European politics. The United States was to hold a detached position, unvexed by the intrigues that sat heavy on the minds of European statesmen, undisturbed by dynastic ambitions or fear of assault. Detachment became an article of political faith and an innate belief of the people. Washington was the first great American to put this faith into words when, in delivering his *Farewell Address*¹ he warned of the dangers of "inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others."²

¹ September 17, 1796.

² Richardson: *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. 1, p. 221.

The great rule of conduct for us [he said] in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.¹

Pointing out that if this policy were followed, the time was not far off when the United States would be in a position to "defy material injury from external annoyance," he continued: —

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . . We may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.²

The effect on the minds of a people of the perversion of history would well repay investigation, for it is undoubtedly true that the world has been influenced not so much by what men said as by what

¹ Richardson: *Op. cit.*, p. 222.

² Richardson: *Op. cit.*, p. 223.

popular belief thought they said. How and where the myth originated that Washington solemnly warned his countrymen never to make an "entangling alliance" with any foreign nation diligent investigation on my part fails to disclose, but for a century the belief survived that this was the injunction laid on Americans by their first President. Statesmen and men of letters, the writer of history and the chronicler of the history of the day, have quoted "no entangling alliances" as the *ipsissima verba* of Washington and a *dictum* to be accorded the veneration of age. A thing, wise or foolish, need only be repeated often enough to achieve distinction and to be accepted by the unthinking majority as a heaven-born truth. Schoolboys were taught in the elementary classes that Washington had said that the United States must never contract an alliance with a foreign country; newspapers repeated it; the actions of statesmen and politicians were governed by a historical myth. It was not surprising that this oft-repeated warning should influence the political and social development of the United States. Public opinion would sanction many things, but the one thing that was anathema and would prove the undoing of any politician rash enough or stupid enough to propose it, was to form an "entangling alliance" or to become involved in "the ordinary vicissitudes" of European politics or "the ordinary combinations and collisions" of European "friendships or enmities."

This political doctrine became incorporated into the very fibre of the people. It is necessary to emphasize this, for I think the full force of the popular interpretation of that portion of Washington's "Farewell Address" in producing certain American mental characteristics has been too little understood; the natural result of historians writing history objectively instead of psychologically. It is doubtful if history affords a more remarkable instance of the mind of a people moulded by a political precept. In a previous chapter¹ I have shown that one of the effects of immigration was to make the American have a contempt for foreigners, to impress him with his own superiority, and to inculcate the belief that America was the envy of Europe. This feeling was further fortified by the American's faith in the wisdom of his policy that kept him aloof from the politics of Europe and caused him to hold in contempt European statesmanship — which to him seemed unworthy, petty, dishonest, and inspired always by selfish motives. Alliances were a sign of weakness, —they were proof that no nation was able to fight alone or maintain itself without assistance; in striking contrast when compared with America, which neither sought alliances nor granted them, which felt itself secure from attack and untroubled by the fears that made the European tremble for his national existence, who never knew when the whim of king or emperor might not bring

¹ *Vide* chapter xv.

on war and the fortunes of war make him the property of a new master in the same way that lands and slaves were bartered for a spendthrift's night of pleasure.

Belief in the wisdom of their political policy, their good fortune, and their superior natural position and advantages, made Americans the most intensely narrow, self-centred, and intellectually isolated of any people of modern times.¹ In parts of Europe we shall find peasants on the farms and the inhabitants of small villages and communes living as in a backwater, and as remote almost from the thought of the age as the great mass of Asiatics sunk in century-old traditions, and to whom time and all that it has brought mean nothing; but in Europe these are the exceptions and do not represent the mentality of a people. In America it was a whole people who shut themselves up behind their wall of self-centred complacency. The great political and social movements sweeping over Europe, that transformed the map of Europe no less than they changed European thought and altered the relations of society, were almost as unintelligible to Americans, and spiritually quickened them as little,

¹ "In fact the dress, manners, quality of household furniture, our sectional and parochial ideas, the style of oratory practiced and enjoyed, and our politics were then [1851] without international interest. Our general view of things was provincial. We not only deserved the criticism of Europeans, but, seen in retrospect, our fathers' follies provoke the same smile which the mature man wears when he remembers his own days of crude and verdant youth." — Griffis: "Millard Fillmore's Forgotten Achievements," *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, May, 1911.

as a vital discovery in science accelerates the pulses of a peasant who knows no more of life and its mysteries than the cow whose udder he presses. Nor can my statement be challenged because America welcomed Kossuth with open arms, or gave asylum to Fenians, or threw open its door to a young and handsome prince. These things appealed to the emotions, which are quickly aroused in the American; his love of a show, his desire to see a celebrity, or his longing for revenge. All that happened was cumulative proof to him that Europe was far behind America, and this conviction ministered to American vanity.

The serfs were liberated, and America said, "We have no serfs; a country so backward that serfdom still exists is without salvation; we thank God we are not as other peoples"; her own beam of slavery hidden by the mote of serfdom. The Reform Bills broke down parliamentary trafficking and extended the franchise. Americans pointed to their manhood suffrage; they had patterned for Europe to imitate. Starvation seized a people, they must be fed; America supplied the food. It was to America that all the world turned for its raw materials, for the things that were necessary to support life; without America looms and factories would stop. While Europe struggled with poverty, America saw her wealth growing at a prodigious rate, every day adding to the riches of a people whose sole thought was business, who were proud of their success, and who felt

they had set an example for the rest of the world. "The Americans would, in truth, be more than human if they had not at times lost their heads in the midst of their unparalleled achievements."¹

With the exception of the United States, there has never been a people, once they emerged from the tribal relation and when even a rude social state was developed, who devoted themselves, one may almost say dedicated themselves, to business, and made business, commerce, the amassing and accumulation of money, the main purpose of life. In other nations and among other peoples a part gave themselves to business, for business was essential to the welfare, prosperity, and strength of the nation, but it was rarely if ever that the "best people," that is, the best-born and the best-educated, turned to business as a serious vocation. In other nations there has always been a leisure class, and although it is the modern fashion to regard with scorn a leisure class, and to look upon it as setting an evil example, a class that has inherited its leisure as naturally as it has inherited its wealth and its traditions, has not been without its use in perfecting a complex social organization. A class of cultivated taste and with the means to enjoy the leisure that is theirs, is to the social state what salt is in the dietetic scheme, not life-sustaining in itself, but necessary to keep the body healthy and give a savor and relish to nutriment. In other nations there have been classes

¹ Coolidge: *The United States as a World Power*, p. 175.

who by inheritance or tradition gravitated naturally to politics, the army or the navy, art, law or medicine, by whom the professions alone were looked upon as honorable and by whom business was regarded with contempt.

I am not in any way attempting to prove that this social system was better than that which unique circumstances forced upon America, but I am merely showing how it came about that the American differs psychologically from the European, and why, furthermore, the money-making faculty of the American has been developed at the expense of his other qualities.

There have been in America, of course, from the first, preachers and doctors and lawyers, soldiers and sailors and teachers, but with exception so rare that they need not be considered there have been no families where the professional traditions have passed from father to son and the sons of sons, where the love of the profession and the honor of maintaining the family reputation have been greater incentives than the mere acquisition of wealth or the making of a living. In the early days, in fact until a day quite within the memory of persons not to be reckoned old, the preacher and the professor were looked upon as rather poor sticks. The business man, unable to understand that peculiar type of man content to eke out a precarious existence when he might be making a fortune, naturally came to the conclusion that pro-

fessors and teachers were men without ambition; that it required less ability to preach or to teach than it did to sell or to buy; and instead of the clergy and the pedagogues winning the respect of the laity they were regarded with contempt. Nor were members of other professions held in much higher esteem. Except in a few very large cities the physician was badly remunerated, while the lawyer, whom the community accepted as a necessary evil, more often starved than waxed fat on his fees. The boy foolish enough to prefer to make things out of clay, to paint, or to write, rather than to make figures in a ledger, was sorrowed over by his relatives and friends. Frankly he was a disappointment, for it was a sign of effeminacy, and there was no place for the weakling in the battle of the strong. The army and navy were not only professions, but they were also the means of earning a livelihood, as the United States has always paid its military men a living wage, and the young man who went into the service could look forward to an assured support.

Thus it has come about that the great mass of Americans having made business the serious affair of life, their energy and business faculties have been developed at the expense of their other faculties. Among a people who can make only a bare subsistence by unremitting toil, who with infinite labor and patience must nurse their crops, and who are engaged in a never-ending struggle with Nature, or whose manufactures are crude and their margin

of profit trivial; in short, wherever the struggle for existence is so severe that the slightest relaxation of effort or any untoward circumstance is followed by distress and often hunger, men become sordid, grasping, miserly, and cautious; they are afraid to take any chances, for the risks are too great, and mistake is almost irreparable. The Americans were early relieved of this fear. To them Nature has always been extremely bountiful, very lavish, prodigal in the extreme. The recklessness of Nature has made the American correspondingly reckless, and has developed in him the love of adventure and the spirit of the gambler. In this is to be found one of the reasons for a dominant characteristic psychologically of the American — his ability to generalize, but his inability to analyze. He is objective always; rarely, if ever, subjective.

Among the English — and the English being nearer akin to the American than any other people, it is natural to use them rather than other nations as the basis of comparison — the spirit of adventure has manifested itself in colonizing, in discovering new lands, in hunting big game, in penetrating into little known countries. This was usually inspired by the love of sport or the glory of country rather than the hope of immediate personal profit. In America the adventurous spirit displayed itself in pushing the boundaries of empire across the continent and bringing it under subjection; and later in business enterprises, not for the honor of

the nation, but for the personal profit that was to follow from success.¹ In business tremendous prizes were to be won, and the risks were equally great; the "odds" were so large that the gambler could not resist the hazard.² Because there was prospect of such rich rewards men were willing to take chances and trust to their luck to pull them through. Legitimate business was almost a gamble; it depended on good fortune rather than knowledge whether a mine was to "pan out" or "peter out"; it was more often luck than judgment that made men rich by the appreciation of real property. Side by side with the business man marched the speculator, who made no pretense to be other than he was; but it was not the speculator who amassed the great fortunes, — it was the business man who speculated more legitimately, who took risks because he could not avoid them, who ventured and won. To make money, to grow rich by hard work, to leave his wife and children well provided for was the creed of the American. He gloried in national wealth even if he possessed little himself; the national balance-sheet appealed to his imagination;

¹ "What is the difference? Well, first of all, the Englishmen play polo at home more for the sport of the game than they do for the sake of winning. They get more fun out of their playing, if you will, than we do over here. The Americans, on the other hand, have the scoring of goals always uppermost in their minds, and with that end in view they score as often as possible. Not that the Meadow Brooks are less sportsmanlike than the British, but, as Americans do in almost every line of endeavor, they make it their business to win." — *New York Globe*; quoted by the *Washington Post*, May 22, 1911.

² Cf. Croly: *The Promise of American Life*, chap. v.

he basked in the reflected light of his millionaires; he felt that he was the envy of the world, and he was content that the world should envy him, while he remained on his own continent unconcerned in the affairs of the world except as they affected his markets or his profits.¹

The war with Spain turned the current of thought of a people, took them out of their hermit-like existence, and broadened their vision.² It gave them a different view of the duties and responsibilities imposed on nations by their obligations to civilization, and it enabled them to weigh more justly and less pharisaically those acts of conquest and invasion which hitherto they had so severely condemned, and which they believed were inspired solely by greed and the lust of conquest. For one must do the American people justice and admit that they were quite unconscious of their smug complacency, their self-sufficiency, and above all their

¹ "No one can deny that the life of America has developed more rapidly and more fully on the industrial side than on any other. No one can deny that the larger part, if not the better part, of her energy and effort has gone into the physical conquest of Nature and the transformation of natural resources into material wealth. No one can deny that this undue absorption in one side of life has resulted in a certain meagreness and thinness on other sides. No one can deny that the immense prosperity of America, and her extraordinary success in agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and finance have produced a swollen sense of importance, which makes the country peddler feel as if he deserved some credit for the \$450,000,000 balance of foreign trade in favor of the United States in 1907, and the barber's apprentice congratulate himself that American wealth is reckoned at \$116,000,000,000, nearly twice that of the next richest country in the world." — Van Dyke: *The Spirit of America*, p. 117.

² Cf. Coolidge: *The United States as a World Power*, p. 132.

detestable hypocrisy; and that they were sincere in their belief when they said — and they never lost the opportunity to proclaim it — that they were not as other peoples or nations, but a great deal better and more virtuous than their neighbors. The ideal that forms such a large element in the American character, that legacy which they received from their Puritan forbears,¹ and that has imbued them with a healthy dislike of the gross or the immoral, causes them to have the same detestation of vice that cloistered virtue always has, which, untouched by temptation, has no compassion, because to yield to temptation is a mystery whose meaning is unknown. It is with nations as with individuals, excessive virtue has a tendency to make them spiritually hard, to dry up the springs of sympathy, to cause them to believe that they are better than they are, and to be unaware of their own frailties. No people treated an alien and subject race more shamefully than the Americans did the Indians,² but the Americans justified their conduct by the supreme law of civilization, by the necessity that forces a lower civilization to yield to a higher in the interest of progress.³ Indians were robbed and tricked and butchered; they were despoiled of their

¹ Cf. Butler: *The American as He Is*, p. 69.

² "The history of our Indian relations has proved how much real immorality may characterize the public dealings of a people who in their private dealings with one another are habitually honest and straightforward." — Hadley: *The Education of the American Citizen*, p. 14.

³ "That inevitable, eternal, inflexible law of God." — Abbott: *The Rights of Man*, p. 220.

lands so that speculators might profit; they were corrupted by the vices of their conquerors for the enrichment of thieving contractors; but public opinion sanctioned these infamies, or at least was indifferent to them, because they spelled progress. Other nations who were forced to subdue brown and black men and preach civilization with the bayonet and the bullet were denounced as bullies and cowards; the extermination of the red man and the theft of his heritage did not disturb the American conscience. It was "inevitable," and whatever is inevitable humanity may not challenge.

I shall not go too minutely into the causes that brought about the war with Spain, for that examination is not necessary here. The causes were partly commercial, partly political, partly hysterical, and partly humanitarian. There were a certain number of Americans who had commercial relations with Cuba and who believed that their profits would be larger and their security greater if Cuba was brought under the American flag. There were Americans who thought that political advantage was to be gained by plunging the country into war, a war that could have only one result and would entail no hardship on the United States. A conscienceless and unscrupulous press for sensational purposes inflamed public opinion against Spain, exaggerated the horrors of warfare, dwelt with disgusting detail on the atrocities committed by Spain, and threw the American people into a state of hys-

terical emotion. This led to a widespread feeling that a duty was imposed upon the United States to redress the wrongs of which the Cubans complained, that in the interests of humanity the United States must go to the succor of a people ground under the heel of the oppressor. It was this spirit of the old crusader, possessing so large a portion of the people, that forced the war with Spain. Churches preached it as a religious duty, newspapers urged it as a moral obligation, men who loved peace more than war could not resist the appeal to conscience. It was the same underlying motive that had been a moving cause both in the War of Independence and in the Civil War. In the former the colonists revolted against what they believed to be the injustice and oppression of their British governors, and what was unjust was wrong, and what was wrong must be righted; in the Civil War it was the moral question involved in slavery that brought to the support of the Government zealots who were unmoved by political issues or to whom the economics of free *versus* slave labor made no appeal.

It has frequently been said in the course of this study that the American has a mind that enables him to generalize, but not to analyze; that he leaps to a conclusion without going through the process of painful reasoning. This national trait was perhaps never more conspicuously displayed than when war was declared against Spain. The United States solemnly affirmed that its sole purpose was

to reëstablish order in Cuba, and that it had no intention of making the war a pretext for the acquisition of territory or the extension of sovereignty. A great many Americans regarded this as quixotic, for war was war and to the victor belonged the spoils of war, and Cuba was a rich prize; but to the great mass of people, those especially who were inspired by altruistic motives, and who sanctioned the war only because it was a war waged in behalf of humanity, it was the only code of conduct to govern a self-respecting people animated by a high purpose. But so little capable was the American of seeing more than the one thing of the moment that consequences were undreamed of; that the war would involve anything more than Cuba, no one thought of. It came as a surprise and a shock to Americans to learn that as a result of the war they were charged not only with the responsibility of restoring order in Cuba and setting up a stable form of government over which they were to exercise supervision, but that for the first time in their history they were the owners of over-sea possessions and must grapple with the hitherto unknown problem of governing alien peoples with whom they had nothing in common, whose language and customs and morals were to them totally foreign.¹

It sobered this exuberant and strangely boyish

¹ "At the beginning of the war there was perhaps not a soul in the whole Republic who so much as thought of the possibility of his nation becoming a sovereign power in the Orient." — Reinsch: *World Politics*, p. 64.

people. It brought for the first time a realizing sense of responsibility. It taught them what hitherto their ignorance had concealed: that a nation could not forever keep itself apart from the rest of the world, remaining merely a spectator in the great drama of *Weltpolitik*. The long reign of provincialism was at last ended. The great barrier of isolation had been beaten down. What Europe said or Asia did was now of immediate consequence to Americans, for the United States had been driven into the maelstrom of both European and Asiatic politics, and from it there was no escape. It had a chastening influence. America now found herself facing the same problem that has taxed the wisdom of the statesmanship of all time — the problem that had hitherto received merely her critical or indifferent attention: the government of subject peoples. Inexperienced, she set about her task with heavy heart, more tolerant than she had ever been, less certain of her own immaculate virtue, less inclined to criticise other nations for what she now saw was “inevitable,” only now inevitableness took on another form.

It has been remarked by all European observers of America that in the last ten years the American people have become saner and less given to becoming unduly excited without sufficient cause. This “sanity” comes from the broadening viewpoint of the American and the breaking-down of that isolation which for more than the first century of his ex-

istence made him indifferent to the affairs of the world, so engrossed was he in his own affairs, many of them, it is to be admitted, of great consequence, but more of them, it must be admitted, petty, trivial, and narrowing in their influence. In the truest meaning of the term the Americans were parochial, their horizon was the limit of the village instead of the Nation; a distorted view of nationality obscured their perspective of the world.

Many Americans have deeply regretted that the unforeseen consequences of the Spanish War drove their country into becoming involved in the politics of both Europe and Asia and that the early day of isolation has gone never to return. That is a question I need not discuss here, but the effect of the newer policy on national character must be noticed, and one may consider it purely as a psychological influence and without regard to the views he holds for or against "Imperialism."

Despite all that an "imperial policy" has cost the United States in men, money, labor, and responsibilities, it has been an expenditure not wasted. It has brought no financial return on the investment, for the American possessions do not "pay" in the commercial sense, but that is of the least consequence: the moral balance-sheet of a nation is made up of something finer, more enduring, in every way more admirable, than dollars and cents; a race is the product of blood and tears, for all travail is pain.

The broadening of the vision of the American, a more perfect sympathy, a truer understanding of the weary Titan's load, a refinement of international intercourse, a knowledge of political geography, the taking of the youth out of his own narrow and dwarfing environment and sending him to a foreign land, where for the first time he sees what other peoples have accomplished and other civilizations have wrought — these things are the debt that the American people owe to Spain, who twice was to be the instrument of their destiny. In the short time since the Spanish War, we have seen the American character modified as the result of war, — and I have already shown that every war in which the United States has been engaged has profoundly affected the American character, — and I am firmly convinced that the consequences will increase cumulatively with the passage of years. In the early days of colonization the unlimited power possessed by the governing class did them as much harm morally as the subject race was injured mentally and materially by being held in bondage, for governors were unrestrained and subject to no code except their own, and colonies were exploited for the profit of their possessors. Modern morality and humanity have changed this relation; colonial service is the hardest school of self-control, never-ending labor, constant study, and self-sacrifice; it makes men more pliable, less convinced of their own superiority and wisdom, continually asking

themselves whether they may not learn from the race over which they rule. The influence of a body of colonial administrators, men of honor and intelligence, who are inspired by a high purpose and take their work as the serious vocation of life, is felt in the parent state, and raises the general standard of political and governmental morality.

It has so often been pointed out that history is never catastrophic, but always the cumulative result of slowly moving forces, that we are not to suppose that the change which has come about in America came with a rush and was the result of a single cause. The Spanish War was the climax, and somewhat spectacularly riveted the eyes of the world on this new phase of American character, but the modification had been going on for years before Dewey steamed into Manila Bay; silent changes that had escaped notice.

In one of his lectures delivered to workingmen on the "Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature," Mr. Huxley used a homely illustration to show how indirect are the processes of Nature, and equally indirect are the processes of historical evolution and psychological development. Huxley cited Darwin's observation that there are many more humble bees in the neighborhood of towns than in the open country; and the explanation was that humble bees build nests in which they store their honey and deposit their eggs. The field mice are amazingly fond of the honey and larvæ; there-

fore, whenever there are plenty of field mice, as in the country, the humble bees are kept down; but in the neighborhood of towns the cats eat up the field mice, and of course the more mice they eat up, the fewer there are to prey upon the larvæ of the bees — the cats are therefore the indirect helpers of the bees. "Coming back a step farther, we may say that the old maids are also indirect friends of the humble bees, and indirect enemies of the field mice, as they keep the cats which eat up the latter! This is an illustration somewhat beneath the dignity of the subject, perhaps, but it occurs to me in passing, and with it I will conclude this lecture."¹

One of the indirect causes that led to the new position which the United States assumed among the nations after the Spanish War, may be traced back a decade when the country began the work of creating a modern navy. From being a nation that had repeatedly distinguished itself on the sea, that from its beginning had been noted for the seamanship and the ability her people displayed in building fast and stanch trading-vessels, America was content during the long years of peace to allow her navy to become the jest of her own people and to merit the contempt of the world. It was in keeping with their mental attitude for Americans to regard a navy as useless; it was at once the cause of and the result of that political isolation which Americans held to

¹ Huxley: *Darwiniana*, p. 445.

be the highest genius of statesmanship.¹ A navy was simply a useless expense, for the United States was safe from attack and it cherished no ambitious designs. It is characteristic of the American to blink facts when they are inconvenient and to delude himself into believing that what he wishes must be true. Americans imagined that again they were setting an example to all the world, and that it was possible for a nation to exist and cause itself to be respected without maintaining the means of defense; and they were more than satisfied when they were told that they were not heavily taxed, as were the people of Europe, to support great military establishments.

It was in Mr. Cleveland's first administration that the first keel of the modern navy was laid. The vessels of that day as compared with those of our own were small, insufficiently protected, and lightly gunned; the men who built them were without experience in the art of warship construction; they made many costly mistakes, as was natural, and the work was slow; but it was a beginning, and the ships they built were seaworthy. National vanity was appealed to, national consciousness was aroused. The American Navy that had been the target for sarcasm and attack had now acquired dignity, Americans felt that they had a weapon to

¹ "The American habit is to proclaim doctrines and policies, without considering either the implications, the machinery necessary to carry them out, or the weight of the resulting responsibilities" — Croly: *The Promise of American Life*, p. 306.

rely on in case of need; having this weapon they began to think, not deliberately but through the influence of suggestion, how and when and under what circumstances they could bring this weapon into play. Every new keel that was laid down, every new ship that was launched, gave impetus to "Imperialism," and in exact proportion weakened the century-old traditions of political isolation and the belief in the virtue of continental aloofness. We no longer worship symbolism, but mankind is unconsciously influenced by the symbolic, which we have clothed in the modern terminology of science and talk of the objective. The navy was symbolic to the American of his strength and power; exciting his imagination it linked him to a world even greater than his own; with its constantly increasing growth and strength came a new generation on the scene to whom the old teachings and the old traditions were despicable and who gloried in the proof of their country's might.

From time to time events impressed upon the country the wisdom of a navy, routing those old fogeys who clung to their antiquated notions that ships and guns and men trained to fight were an invitation to disaster. The enforcement of the fiat of the United States in South America was possible only because behind the diplomatic ultimatum were guns to carry destruction; a defiant message to the mistress of the seas was not to be treated entirely with contempt when there were ships to

make even a feeble defense; war with Spain would have been impossible but for the fact that the American Navy outclassed that of Spain. Sea power has not only influenced history by winning battles, but it has so influenced the thoughts of a people as to make it possible for battles to be fought that made history.

Not only international and continental isolation was broken down by the war with Spain, but it ended sectionalism. It had been nearly forty years since certain men of the South cast off the blue of their country to don the gray of their newer allegiance and fight against the people of which they were once part. The men of the South, some of them the former chiefs of the Confederacy, were among the first to respond to the call to arms when danger threatened a reunited people, and this proof of devotion to the common weal made even the most bigoted admit that the South no longer cherished resentment or remained "rebel" at heart.

CHAPTER XXI

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TARIFF THE FARMER

IN the tariff, which was partly a political and partly an economic measure, is to be found another of the causes that made the United States a self-centred and politically detached country. Politically and economically, the American system threw around the United States a wall to shut it out from European invasion, and behind this wall the American lived in his security, but debarred from that freedom of commercial intercourse other countries had known, this self-imposed isolation engendering commercial jealousy, which is the basis of nearly all political hostility. As I frankly avow myself a believer in the principle of protection, — although not in all the details of its administration, — I shall not be accused of supporting the theory of unrestricted free trade when I say that the American tariff has done incalculable harm to the American character. It is as a psychological influence and not as an economic cause that I discuss the tariff.

Behind his tariff wall the American felt himself secure from invasion so long as he kept his wall intact and the gates guarded, but feared always that an attack was planned. When he was compelled to

open his gates, he did so grudgingly and with suspicion, but he threw them wide with joyous shouting when they were to give passage to his commodities that Europe demanded, because Europe must have them or suffer inconvenience or starve. On the one hand, the American saw Europe clamoring for what America out of her bounty might sell; on the other, he saw Europe supplicating to be permitted to trade with him, and the wares Europe offered were not necessities to America, but things purely of luxury, or those articles which Europe made better or cheaper than America. The effect of the tariff, therefore, was to increase the general American belief that while Europe could not exist without America, America was independent of Europe; that the United States graciously conferred a favor when she generously sold her surplus cotton and corn so that the mills of Europe might continue to be operated and her workingmen fed. The cumulative result of this belief was to make men self-centred, complacent, extremely well satisfied with themselves and their own wisdom; proud of their country and its institutions, — for corn and cotton and other things were not the whim of Nature but the proper reward of democracy, — and firmly to convince them that they were more successful because they were more superior, and that it would be folly to jeopardize their happiness or their prosperity by becoming entangled in the concerns of Europe or identifying themselves in

any way, except commercially, with European affairs.

Every student, American as well as foreign, has considered the tariff purely as an economic question and failed to appreciate its psychologic importance; yet I am inclined to believe that in the unconscious psychological influence exercised by the tariff is to be found the reason for its great hold upon the American people. Among a people only a few reason scientifically and the majority do not reason at all; impulse and the unperceived promptings of psychology are the motivating causes of action or belief. The influences that shape the mind of the mass are the product of environment, association, and the contact of daily intercourse. The ordinary man reads little and thinks less, and if he hears the same thing repeated often enough in the circle in which he moves, by his fellow workman, or his fellow clerk, or his fellow member of the club, he comes eventually to accept it and to believe in it as the interpretation of his own understanding. These are the instrumentalities that create a national psychology. A few men were able scientifically to prove, to their own complete satisfaction at least, the economic benefits resulting from protection, but the mass took their economics, like their religion, on blind faith, and as something too occult for them to question. Without any clear understanding of the reason, they believed it was the tariff that made them prosperous; as it was the

tariff that made them prosperous they believed that Europe in its envy was trying to destroy the tariff. The mental effect of this national faith was to narrow the vision of a people, to distort international perspective, to pervert motives, and to exaggerate that sense of superiority that Americans themselves have recognized under the expressive name of "spredaeagleism."

Every student of America who has not been content to skim the surface or to indulge in hasty generalizations from superficial observation, has been impressed with the fact that what may be an absolutely correct analysis of American character or American social institutions to-day is worthless ten years hence, so rapid are the changes, so continuously is the law of evolution at work. In the last decade a great movement has been in progress that has in a marked degree influenced the life of this people and modified their view of life.

There has been a pronounced trend from the farm to the city. So great has this movement become that it has seriously disturbed sociologists as well as economists, the former regarding it as having a tendency to destroy the physique of the people and bring about a congestion of the large cities that is morally and physically demoralizing; the latter seeing in it the danger of a decline in agriculture and a consequent appreciation of all agricultural products, so that the time must come when the United States, instead of having the cheapest food supplies

in the world, which has been one of the great sources of its prosperity, will approach more nearly the condition of Europe.

The economic phase of the question I shall not discuss — partly because it does not properly belong here, and, more to the point, because these fears are groundless, as it is self-evident that when the demand exceeds the supply or prices rise so as to give the farmer excessive profits, men will be tempted by the larger return on their capital to take up agricultural lands. I shall confine myself to a consideration of the psychological and sociological questions involved.

Tradition and fiction have invested the farmer with certain desirable qualities; contact with the soil, it has come to be believed, makes men strong, honorable, haters of the unclean or sham; the farmer, absorbing from Nature her own teachings, unspoiled by the artificial conventions of the city, is supposed to be a better man than the city dweller; better in all that goes to make manhood, more truthful, a greater lover of virtue, more generous; the “sturdy yeomanry” has been accepted as the bedrock on which a nation rests. Now, while it may be true that the farmer and the yeomanry of Europe were, in the days when there was a yeomanry, possessed of these qualities, it is not true of the American farmer, as a class; and the influence of the agrarians, who have always constituted such a large proportion of the population in America,

has been decidedly detrimental. The farmer, whether American, that is, native-born, or foreign, that is, the immigrant who has come over to take up farming lands or to work on a farm as an agricultural laborer, has until recent years been — I am speaking of his class broadly and excluding the exceptional instances — illiterate or only scantily educated, narrow and grasping, deficient in initiative and resource, thriftless and discontented; not with the divine discontent that inspires men to do great deeds, but sunk in the discontent of fatalism that makes men curse fate without trying to bend fate to their will. The life of the American farmer made him mentally what he was. He lived remote from his fellows, he was cut off from association and society, he knew little or nothing of what was going on in the world about him, his life was one of hard and unremitting toil, too often badly rewarded; unversed in business, he was intensely suspicious of the factor and the commission merchant to whom he sold his crop, and believed that he was always being cheated, as he frequently was, — not, however, because he was of the simple and confiding nature that the popular myth created, but because of his ignorance and stubbornness. This distrust made him in turn dishonest and cunning; it made him also the victim of the sharper, who was always preying upon his credulity and avarice; and still further convinced him that every city man was a rogue, while his own roguery was not dishonesty, but the sport of fortune.

Since the world has ceased to be an aristocracy and has become politically and socially an industrial democracy, it is to the great middle class the politician caters, for it forms the bulk of the electorate, and it is to hear the voice of the man in the street that the democratic politician strains his ears. The middle class has always been the most conservative, the most difficult to induce to change; because it is middle class in fortune and intellect, it looks with suspicion on anything that is new, and it is dismayed by what is not conventional according to its own standards. While this class has no great prize to gain by revolution, it fears to lose what little it has by radical change. Created without ambition, it resents any variation in the existing order; envious of prosperity or intellectual supremacy, it proclaims its own mediocrity as proof of its virtue and honesty; habituated to rigid economy, it condemns all luxury as sinful and demoralizing. Possessed only of a limited education and undeveloped faculties, it is incapable of thinking for itself; technically not illiterate, it arrogates the right of opinion and criticism, and believes, in the conceit of its ignorance, that it is able to form an intelligent judgment of affairs or the actions of men. In this mundane world we must take the evil with the good as we find it. Democracy, that has brought us much good, has also cursed us with the creation of this commonplace middle class, which has been the clog on progress, not alone in America, but in

England, and wherever else democracy has overthrown aristocracy.

The European middle class is distinctly urban — its representative is in fact as well as in phrase “the man in the street”; but in America, while there is a large middle class in the cities and towns, it is the rural rather than the urban population that has always so largely influenced social institutions, dominated politicians, and shaped legislation for its own benefit. The politician came to look to the farmer for his approval, to do those things that he believed would meet with his commendation, and to refrain from those things that he feared would meet with condemnation. The narrowness, the avarice, the distorted view of the farmer compelled the politician, dependent upon his support, to accept, or at least to make a pretense of accepting, the same view.

The farmer prided himself on being “a plain, blunt man,” and he insisted that every one else, who would retain his confidence, must be equally “plain” and “blunt.” Enjoying no luxuries himself, knowing little of the decencies of life, affecting a contempt for class or caste, although making no attempt to conceal his contempt for the class below him, the agricultural laborer, — the “hired man,” as he called him, to mark more strikingly the gulf between them, — he influenced all society so far as he was able through the politician. Government was carried on in a niggardly and penurious fashion,

dignity was sacrificed for a sham democracy, politicians who were brought in contact with the farmer affected his style of dress and his manner of talk, flattering the farmer that his concept of life was correct; that only on the farm was honesty to be found, while the cities were corrupt, and men in high places pillaged the Republic. The American belief that their rulers are corrupt is the result of the politician catering to the farmer and telling him those things that he wanted to hear. The farmer naturally believed; much reiteration convinced him that his intelligence had not misled him. He quickly came to realize his political power. He insisted upon the passage of legislation that he believed would be for his benefit. I have already referred to protection as having had a psychological influence on the American people, and we again see how far-reaching its effects have been. The strength of the Republican Party has been the agrarians, who were to be relied upon to vote for the Republicans when the workingmen in the cities, discontented with conditions, voted for the Democrats. In the making of tariffs the Republicans carefully protected the farmers, and the farmers naturally voted for the Republicans because they had come to believe that a high tariff was in their interest.

May we not find one of the causes for that broadening of the American view and that saner estimate of life, to which reference has already been made,

in the influx from the farm to the city and the bringing of the farm in close contact with the city? There are very few farms, comparatively speaking, now isolated from urban communication as they were twenty-five years ago. The railroad, the telephone, the automobile, and the rural postman have made distance relative rather than a reality. A farmer who receives his newspaper and his letters daily, sometimes twice a day, who can talk to his man of business over the telephone, and receive the grain quotations from Chicago and Minneapolis as quickly and conveniently as if he sat in an office only a few feet from the Produce Exchange, who is in touch with the city or town by railroad or his automobile, no longer lives a hermit. Individually he has gone through the same process that the whole country has since the Spanish War broke down continental isolation. The American has become a citizen of the world, instead of merely an American. The farmer is fast becoming part of the great life around him, instead of remaining encased in the narrow confines of his own acres.

The agricultural life of the American people has experienced a vast change for the better in the last quarter of a century. The growth of cities, the creation of new centres, the extension of railways, and the knowledge slowly gained that good highways are one of the great agencies in civilization have greatly improved the material and intellectual condition of the farmer. The agricultural laborer

still remains low in the social scale and shows little promise of rising, but the man who owns his farm or has capital enough to rent on favorable terms bears slight resemblance to the pioneer farmer. The habits and traditions and customs inherited by a class, who form a class apart from the rest of the community, are not easily cast off nor entirely changed in the course of one or two generations. The farmer who comes from a farming family, who was born on the soil and has lived close to the soil, still retains many of the characteristics and mental traits of his father and grandfather; but he has been forced to rub against the world, and in the process his faculties have been sharpened, until he has become more intelligent and less narrow than his forbears. What perhaps more than anything else has changed the relation of the farm to the city is the American passion for education, and the ambition of the American girl, as determined as that of the American boy, to escape from the dull monotony of the farm and seek fortune and a more attractive life in the city.

The old days when children on the farms grew up almost illiterate, or at best received only a few months' elementary instruction in the course of the year, have gone with other inconveniences of a pioneer life, and the rural schools are now giving the children of the farms a thoroughly sound and practical education; the log cabin schoolhouse has been succeeded by a "consolidated school" in a

modern brick building, where, if the distance is so great that it is beyond comfortable walking distance for the scholars, they are taken there in carts and carriages at the expense of the community.¹ The child of the farmer can now acquire an education with little more physical effort than the child in the city.

Nor does the education end there. Nearly all the agricultural states — and that means practically every state west of the Alleghanies — have either a state university where instruction is given in agriculture or there are agricultural colleges, state maintained. The majority of these institutions are coeducational, the boys learning the science of farming as distinguished from the practical, and the girls domestic economy. It has often been said that the effect of these institutions is very bad, as two or three years, spent at the college or university at the most impressionable time of life, make the boy or girl dissatisfied with the dull routine and monotony of the farm after the variety and excitement of the city; that, instead of having fitted themselves to be good farmers or housewives, they have become imitation "gentlemen" and "ladies," with a veneer of conventional culture that makes them neither one thing nor the other.

It is the same charge that some sociologists have brought against the immigrant,² and which leads

¹ *Bulletin No. 232, Department of Agriculture.*

² *Vide chapter xv.*

them to deplore that the immigrant is encouraged to acquire education and thereby rise superior to that class in which it has pleased God to call him. I need not again discuss that phase of an extremely complicated and as yet undetermined result of our highly refined social system. It may be true that the perfect clodhopper is ruined and the perfect "gentleman" is not produced in the process, and there are people who will deplore the failure to accomplish the perfect result and maintain that nothing has been gained and the labor and cost have been wasted, but that must remain a matter of individual opinion. What is a fact, and is neither theory nor speculation, is that the whole life of the boy and his habit of thought are affected by this taste of city life. Either the lure of the city is too strong to be withstood, and he turns his back on the farm and seeks fortune in the city, which is one of the reasons why more and more the farm boy drifts to the city; or if he is content to go back to the land and follow in the footsteps of his father, he walks with head more erect and his feet more firmly planted. He has known intellectual discipline and is the better for it; he has rubbed elbows with men and has seen human nature in its various aspects; he may not understand the full meaning of life, but he has been unable to escape from some of its teachings; and culture and refinement, instead of being things to be despised, assume a virtue of their own. He brings to the farm and his commu-

nity a message; his influence affects the lives of his neighbors. It will take a great many years to work a radical change in the agricultural element in the United States, but that change is going on,—not easily observable from month to month, but noticeable from year to year, strikingly so if we contrast one decade with another. Back and forth that influence flows, from the farm to the city and from the city to the farm, making the farmer take a more rational view of life and the motives of men, and making men in the cities, the politicians especially, treat the farmer, not as a spoiled child who must be pampered and coddled if a display of temper is to be avoided, but as a sensible being who can be argued with and is capable of reasoning. The result is nationally a broadening of vision and a saner concept of life; a more rational judgment and a lessening temptation to create distrust and suspicion and find an unworthy purpose in all that is done.

It is worth while before leaving the subject to note that the augmentation of the city population by the rural has had no influence on the people who dwell in the cities, but changes in time, and usually a very brief time, the character and habits and view of life of the rural element attracted to the city. On a smaller scale the same process is at work that is continuously converting the immigrant into an American; it is the working of the same irrefutable law that makes a lower civilization yield to a higher

and causes the lower to imitate the superior, and in the process acquire some at least of the characteristics of the dominant people. It is the workings of this law that explain why the immigrant has not dragged down the American to his own level; for the same reason the young man from the farm and the country, who brings to the city the simple ways and pure life (according to tradition) of the farmer, rapidly comes to live and think as does the man whose place of birth is the city and who has spent all his life among its environments. Men adapt themselves to their moral and material conditions exactly as they do to their physical; they overcome Nature not by foolishly fighting it, but by yielding to it and making Nature their servant instead of their master. The immigrant, despite his numerical strength, is too puny to be able to change an established civilization, and must submit to it or be beaten in the struggle; the man from the farm must take on the ways and methods of the city or remain a farmer, and in that case he has been conquered by the city and goes back to the farm in despair.

CHAPTER XXII

DEMOCRACY, THE DEMAGOGUE, AND SOME DETAILS

THE first decade of the twentieth century, the decade following the Spanish War, will always be noteworthy in the history of American sociology. In some respects it has no historical parallel, and is one of the most extraordinary phases of social development the world has ever seen. It is the influence of the "moral uplift," the assumed ethical regeneration of the American people, which is popularly supposed to have wrought a stupendous change in American character.

It has been told elsewhere¹ why the American people held the law in light respect, and that peculiar conditions made it possible for the commercial pirate to flourish. In the days of piracy on the seas we may be sure that men who were engaged in legitimate trade looked upon piracy as a shocking and shameful thing; in the privacy of their counting-rooms merchants whose ventures had failed because their galleons had fallen the prey of pirates must have denounced the imbecility or cowardice of a government that permitted piracy to flourish; women whose husbands had been made to walk the plank, and men whose

¹ *Vide* chapter xiv.

sons were the victims of the rovers of the sea, must in their grief have accused the government of profiting by piracy — as it often did — and fatalistically resigned themselves to the inevitable. Piracy, as I have elsewhere said, flourished and was tolerated as a recognized institution so long as it was sanctioned by the moral conscience of the age, and it received its death-blow only when nations became more enlightened and more humane and public opinion was strong enough to make itself heard;¹ but a long period had to elapse before their intelligence was appealed to and their humanity was touched. I have written to little purpose if I have not made it plain that every historical movement which leads to progress and a higher plane of social development begins in the consciousness of a people that there are evils to be corrected or conditions to be made better. A feeling that is vague and nebulous slowly takes form and word until it gains strength and culminates in an explosion, either in

¹ "What is it that has rendered murder a rare exception instead of a frequent social event? It is not the existence of statutes which make murder a crime; it is the growth of a public opinion which makes the individual condemn himself and his friends, as well as his enemies, for indulgence in that propensity. There were laws enough against murder in Italy five hundred years ago; but these laws were practically inoperative, because they had not really formed part of the social conscience, as they have to-day. On the other hand, the social conscience of mediæval Italy, with all its laxity in the matter of murder, was strict in certain matters of commercial trust, on which it is to-day relatively loose. A man actually forfeited self-respect by a questionable financial transaction in those days as he did not forfeit it by the murder of two or three of his best friends. As a consequence, that particular kind of financial immorality was much rarer then than it is now." — Hadley: *The Education of the American Citizen*, p. 28.

revolt against duly constituted authority, or in anarchy against society itself, or in an attempt to revolutionize society so that it may reform itself. But such movements are never cataclysmic, they are of slow growth; they never come without warning if we have eyes clear enough to see and ears keen enough to hear the mutterings of unrest and discontent among a people.

That for half a century following the close of the Civil War, the American people suffered grievous wrongs from commercial piracy, no one will deny; that many thoughtful persons appreciated the evil and endeavored to remedy it is abundantly proven; that the mass of the people were indifferent and accepted the evil as inevitable, although with a dim longing for justice and honesty in business, contemporary testimony reveals. Where an evil exists, that evil will be ultimately corrected, unless a nation has become so corrupted and weakened by its own evil practices that it no longer has the manhood or moral fibre to seek regeneration. In that case national decay follows as a matter of course, and nations and peoples sink to a lower existence and are great only in the memory of the past.

Per se a democracy does not necessarily create the demagogue. The demagogue, it has been well said, is a by-product of democracy, not its fruit.¹ In all ages and under all political systems the dema-

¹ Butler: *The American as He Is*, p. 77.

gogue has flourished, but the peculiar political system that the American continent gave birth to, and the even more peculiar conditions that attended the growth and development of the American people, gave extraordinary encouragement to the spread and the power of the demagogue. America has always suffered under the curse of too much learning and too little education.

"The bookful blockhead, ignorantly read,
With loads of learned lumber in his head."

From the cradle her children have been crammed with book learning, very often a conglomeration of meaningless things, but it has been no part of the curriculum to teach them the real meaning of education, and to help them to discriminate, to sift out the false from the true, to think for themselves. Americans have rioted in grammar and remained ignorant of the alphabet.

The soil in which demagogism thrives most luxuriantly is that of the half-educated in comfortable circumstances, where life is easy, who flatter themselves that they are well informed and able to think for themselves. Where there is great illiteracy and much poverty, the demagogue makes headway more slowly, for the illiterate, weighted down by poverty, cannot be moved by appeals either to cupidity or intelligence, and longing as well as ambition have been crushed out. To create discontent, to convince the people that they were badly governed, to explain the reason for bad government

in the dishonesty and incompetence of rulers was the mission of the demagogue, who now found it more popular to style himself a "reformer."¹ He appealed to passion and envy. He arrayed class against class, he discovered wrong in all that was done.

I have already referred to the influence exerted on the demagogue by the farmer and the constant catering of the demagogue to the farmer. There have been agitators inspired by a great purpose, — zealots, fanatics, men of extreme views, illogical and dangerous as leaders, and yet who accomplished much good because they were honest, courageous, and unselfish, and were ready to wear the martyr's crown if they could lighten the burden of humanity. But the demagogues in America who have done so much harm, especially in the last decade or so, have been agitators for the love of agitation and for the sake of the profit derived from their occupation; selfish, ambitious, scheming men, who, to gratify their petty ambitions of power or place, have been willing to discredit their country in the eyes of the world and have strengthened rather than weakened the evils which they pretended to condemn.

The agitator who achieved was brave enough to

¹ "At the present time average well-intentioned Americans are likely to be reformers of one kind or another, while the more intelligent and disinterested of them are pretty sure to vote a 'reform' ticket. To stand for a programme of reform has been one of the recognized roads to popularity." — Croly: *The Promise of American Life*, p. 141.

battle against a wrong; intelligent enough to offer a concrete remedy for the evil of which he complained; his mission accomplished, strong enough to cast ambition aside. All history bears eloquent testimony to this truth — the Cromwells who did their perdurable work and the Tylers who pillaged and slew to no purpose. It is a vulgar error that genius is akin to insanity.¹ Genius, especially that genius which shapes the thoughts of men and turns the social stream into a new channel, is poise, sanity, admirable self-control. It is the imagination of genius, its far-reaching power to vision the future, its listening ear able to hear the inarticulate voice of nature as well as man, its contempt for the commonplace, and its detestation of the banal, that makes it incomprehensible to the mass, who sapiently shake their heads and shout "mad" as the easiest explanation of what is beyond their understanding.

The American demagogues proclaimed evils that were known to exist, but they offered no remedy; they were always ready with panaceas that were so flagrantly dishonest that they found no acceptance.² They kept the people in a state of perpetual

¹ "So far from the position holding true, that great wit (or genius, in our modern way of speaking) has a necessary alliance with insanity, the greatest wits, on the contrary, will ever be found to be the sanest writers. It is impossible for the mind to conceive of a mad Shakspeare." — Lamb: *Essays of Elia*, "Sanity of True Genius."

² "We are a people given to indulging in spasms! They are intense while they last. They are so unreasonable and unreasoning that they present a fine opportunity for the adroit demagogue." — Day: *The Raid on Prosperity*, p. 231.

discontent, for contentment and the acceptance of conditions would have deprived the demagogue of his occupation. They engendered universal suspicion and mistrust. At first destroying confidence in their political representatives and finding this to be popular, the demagogue, like the informer of the Inquisition, soon saw that it was profitable to assail the veracity and honesty of every one not belonging to that mythical element "the people," until finally every American came to believe that every other American was dishonest; and the world was witness to the amazing spectacle of a great nation talking and writing of their corruption, admitting it, accepting it, but making no attempt to purify the national honor. It was little wonder that all the world should accept the American estimate of American morality, and be justified in believing that as a people the Americans were unscrupulous, corrupt, dishonest, and without sense of ethical responsibility. It was another indictment brought against democracy by the enemies of democracy; it was another proof that democracy was a failure; and while a democracy could feed mankind with its wheat and clothe them with its cotton, it were a thousand times better for the moral welfare of the world that it should go hungry and naked rather than pay the price democracy exacted.

No historian need apologize for American political and civic corruption, first, because it is a fact that the historian is compelled to recognize; sec-

ondly, because the corruption in America of which so much has been said and heard is neither the effect of democracy nor is it peculiar to America. Corruption, political corruption especially, as I have pointed out in the previous volume, is a phase in the evolution of society, and as a people reach a higher plane corruption disappears and their concept of government becomes more ethical. This is shown not only in the character of the men whom they call to affairs, but in the character of their legislation, for it is as impossible to conceive that moral men will sanction immoral laws as it is that dishonest men will legislate honestly. Unconsciously a whole people become more moral, and this influences the relation of man to man; trickery instead of being secretly admired and envied is publicly condemned; to be dishonest in business under the color of law is as shameful as the "business" of the housebreaker or the footpad.

The American love of exaggeration makes him magnify his vices as well as his virtues. In his humorous moments the American is aware of this national quality and treats it whimsically; it is when the American is most serious that he exaggerates most and is quite unaware that he is guilty of hyperbole. And the foreigner takes him at his word. From second-hand information, based on American newspapers, magazines, and books, the speeches of professional American reformers, whether in their own country or abroad, or the hasty

impressions of visitors, who find an appeal to their vanity in contrasting the purity of their institutions with the viciousness of democratic institutions, is gathered this conclusion of American corruption. However, admitting that there has been, and, unfortunately, there still is to-day, much public and private corruption in America, I do not believe that any person who is competent to take a detached view of America, and who has sufficient knowledge to entitle him to speak with authority, will take such a despondent view of American morality as Americans themselves do. But it is not so much a question whether the American people are corrupt as whether they are less corrupt now than they were, say, ten or twenty years ago, for the answer will show the trend of their psychological development.

I have said before, — and it is a thing that can be said again, because it ought to be impressed on Americans themselves no less than on foreigners if they would obtain a clear understanding of American civilization, — America is simply passing through the same evolutionary stage that all nations and all peoples have to undergo. Civic and individual corruption seem to be inseparable from the life of a people in its early development.¹ The test of the moral strength and vitality of a people and their institutions is not whether at some time in their social progress they were corrupt, but whe-

¹ Cf. Root: *The Citizen's Part in Government*, chap. iv, *passim*.

ther they were corrupt without being ashamed of their corruption, whether they knew that corruption existed and yet had become so debauched that they accepted it as a matter of course, and were too inert to attempt to escape from its demoralizing influence. It has been explained in a previous chapter that peculiar circumstances gave unusual opportunity for civic and commercial corruption in the United States, and that in the early days the whole people were too busy building a place of shelter to have time to decorate it or even to keep it clean. The American people were like an untidy housewife, who disposes of the dirt by sweeping it under the bed. For many years the Americans were an untidy people — untidy in manners, dress, speech, habits, and concept of life. They knew that there was dirt all around and about them, but they were so busy and so careless that it did not annoy them.

The dirt went on accumulating until finally it became too obtrusive to be ignored, even by the most indifferent and case-hardened. When a nation for years has been educated to believe that dirt is not harmful, and that it must be accepted because Providence has decreed it, as the Spaniards did in the eighteenth century,¹ it is not easy for that very

¹ "When in the year 1760, some bold men in the Government proposed that the streets of Madrid should be cleansed, so daring a suggestion excited general anger. Not only the vulgar, but even those who were called educated, were loud in their censure. The medical profession, as the guardians of the public health, were desired, by the Government, to give their opinion. This

inconvenient person, the reformer, who is always poking his nose into other people's affairs and trying to upset established institutions, to convince them to the contrary. No one reformer taught the virtue of cleanliness, physical and moral; no one man was the Peter the Hermit to preach a crusade against the bondage of dirt. A thousand men were the apostles of the new dispensation, a whole people, virile and clean despite their corruption, a people fit to survive because their impulses were right even though they had been deadened by evil influences, were unconsciously seeking reform. It came through its own impetus. It grew because men saw the folly of corruption. Selfishness was the moving cause. Heretofore it had been the selfishness of the few banded together against the rights of the many, now the many were determined to exert their rights against the selfishness of the few. Law after law went on the statute books to curb the power of monopoly and make it more difficult for monopoly to exist, and to deprive wealth of

they had no difficulty in doing. They had no doubt that the dirt ought to remain. To remove it, was a new experiment; and of new experiments, it was impossible to foresee the issue. Their fathers having lived in the midst of it, why should not they do the same? Their fathers were wise men, and must have had good reasons for their conduct. Even the smell, of which some persons complained, was most likely wholesome. For, the air being sharp and piercing, it was extremely probable that bad smells made the atmosphere heavy, and in that way deprived it of some of its injurious properties. The physicians of Madrid were, therefore, of the opinion that matters had better remain as their ancestors had left them, and that no attempts should be made to purify the capital by removing the filth which lay scattered on every side." — Buckle: *History of Civilization in England*, vol. II, p. 75.

privileges that had been stolen from the people. The people were not easily aroused, for they were sunk in the fatuousness of their content and had been fed too long on the belief that their lot was more fortunate than that of any other people, and as a people they were more careless and more easily imposed upon than those of any other country. Yet with all their contentment there was always a healthy discontent, which is the sign of progress; and there was an almost passionate craving to find "an anodyne for the spiritual distress of men." One need never despair of an individual or a people who are discontented with conditions, and are endeavoring, even though blindly, and at times it would seem unintelligently, to find means to change them.

The moral wave that has swept over the United States during the last few years is the reaction from the material to the spiritual: the never-ending conflict that each man must wage in his struggle to triumph over the impulses of nature or to yield to the mystic forces that make him what he is. In those years following the Civil War, nature triumphed and the material was victor. There was neither time nor thought nor inclination for anything else. The spiritual fire that the crusade against slavery had kindled, that glowed at white heat during those years of agitation and that men fed with their bodies, spent itself when the iron heel of the North stamped upon slavery. The preacher no longer found an audience, for now there was no

great moral issue to arouse the emotions; holy living and holy dying could be attended to after the crops had been garnered and the golden grain had been transformed into grains of gold. The mad rush of the Argonauts to the Golconda of California was typical of that all-absorbing, wild scramble of the American people for wealth, which crushed out every other impulse and transformed every thought into a vision of money.

“There stands America,” says an American writer,¹ “bare-armed, deep-chested, with neck like a tower, engaged in this superb struggle to dominate Nature and put the elements into bondage to man. It is not strange that this spectacle is the greatest of influences, drawing the young like fishes in a net. Involuntarily all talents apply themselves to material production. No wonder that men of science no longer study Nature for Nature’s sake, they must perforce put her powers into harness; no wonder that professors no longer teach knowledge for the sake of knowledge, they must make their students efficient factors in the industrial world; no wonder that clergymen no longer preach repentance for the sake of the kingdom of Heaven, they must turn churches into prosperous corporations, multiplying communicants, and distributing Christmas presents by the gross.”

Mentally as well as physically an alert race, the American brain up to the present time has been a dis-

¹ Sedgwick: *The New American Type, and Other Essays*, p. 106.

tinct disappointment to the well-wishers of America. Its material future no one questions, but there has as yet appeared no realization for those who looked forward to see an American produce something so great in literature, music, painting, or sculpture, or make such a discovery in science (not industrial science, but science that has a meaning beside its commercial value), that all the world would acclaim it as the work of a master. The world has hoped, or at least that portion whose belief in a *bourgeoisie* is firmly centred, that in a *bourgeoisie* creative faculty may produce the same phenomena as in an aristocracy, and that the absence of artificial class distinctions does not necessarily crush out artistic expression. It has already been explained that one of the reasons why the æsthetic sense is so little developed in the American is the specialization of their faculties and energies in the conquest of the material, which has deadened their appreciation of art and has given them little opportunity to devote themselves to anything except the pursuit of wealth; but there are other reasons. Under this forced draft of excessive physical energy the American mind has become shallow, almost childish, with an extraordinary power to generalize, but strikingly deficient in the ability to analyze; a mind with neither depth nor breadth nor grasp. The highest form of intellectual development is synthesis, and that faculty is almost entirely absent in the American, who, in the same marked degree, is deficient

in the power of abstraction. The abstract does not appeal to him; facts, concrete results, too often empirical, are the only things that impress him.

This mentality colors the whole life and thought of the people; it makes them what they are, just as, *a priori*, their minds are the reflex of their life and institutions. In other countries, — in England especially, — customs, precedent, the common law — not alone the common law of the courts but the unwritten code of society — govern, and thus make, it is true, for rigid adherence, but also for great flexibility by constantly keeping in motion the opposing forces of collectivism and individualism. Although the Americans have a much greater individual initiative than the English, they are unable to accomplish anything unless they sink their individuality and become part of an organized society or association formally created for a specific purpose.¹ To instance: The American, generous and sympathetic, seldom if ever is his own almoner, but he joins a society and subscribes liberally to the cause of charity. The American explanation would be, first, that he is too busy to find a worthy object of relief; therefore, instead of personally giving his money here or coal or medicine or food there, he sends his check to the society, this involving only the time required to sign his name. Furthermore, he has come to believe that charity is

¹ "An extraordinary capacity for self-organization," in Doctor van Dyke's approving words (*The Spirit of America*, p. 168).

merely another phase of "business," and that for charity to be properly and economically administered, it must be supervised by persons whose business is the business of charity, who are as expert in their own line as he is in his, whose knowledge and experience entitle them to be regarded as authorities. Having respect only for specialized knowledge and conscious of his own deficiencies, it seems as necessary to engage an expert on charity as it is to engage an expert on engineering or medicine when their services are required.

This fondness — this passion, almost, it might be termed — for organization and association has become so ingrained in the American character that it has become one of the dominating influences of American life. It has tended to develop the power of organization and the system of associated endeavor to an extraordinarily high plane of perfection, and it has lessened the power of individual effort. No man will lead a movement, but he will willingly become the president of a society if his neighbors and friends will join as members; his importance and influence depend not so much on his character or convictions as on the size of the association which sponsors him and for which he is spokesman.

No doubt a great deal of harm has been done by the indiscriminate giving of money to the undeserving poor, but as it is the boast of the law that better a hundred men shall go unwhipped of justice

than one innocent shall suffer, so perhaps charity loses nothing if occasionally the undeserving profit and the distress of the deserving is not overlooked in the fine weighing of claims to succor. It is not of course to be denied that organization and system are necessary, that the greatest results are accomplished by carefully planned work rather than by haphazard efforts; but charity loses its delicate flavor when the aim appears to be, not to do the most good in the least ostentatious manner, but to be able to compile figures where "cost" is worked out in the same way that a railway manager calculates in decimals the expense of moving a ton of freight a mile. There is encouraged a smaller admiration for the work of the charitable society and greater appreciation of the mechanism of its management. Teachers, charity workers, hospitals, schools, every agency, in fact, for the benefit of society, now pins its faith to organization. It is the universal cry. By organization shall man be made whole and the wicked turn to light. In place of the old personal contact between pupil and teacher, personality and individuality being the great controlling force, there is an organization of teachers who pass on the merits or demerits of the pupil, to whom a pupil is an impersonal atom, a cog merely in the wheel of organization. Organization is proclaimed as the essential thing. Clergymen preach it; the more highly organized the congregation, the more numerous the organized societies, the more

successful the parish. While every member of the congregation is encouraged to join one or more of the societies connected with the parish, individual effort is not encouraged, for in a highly organized society there is no place for the individual except as an integer of the organization.

It follows as a matter of course that the result of this social training is to strengthen the belief in the material and to dwarf the imaginative faculty. It is not the eloquence or sincerity of the preacher that makes his church famous; rather it is the skill of his business manager, for, although he is not given that title, every church has its business manager and his corps of assistants, to bring "business" to the church on Sunday just as on the other six days of the week their own business is their chief concern.¹ Business is a fetish.

The psychological effect of American wholesale methods — establishing a standard quotation for souls,¹ buying "Christmas presents by the gross,"

¹ "Even the business of saving souls cannot afford to dispense with business methods. Appropriately enough, it is a gentleman from Pittsburg who is to preside over the committee that has for its slogan, 'A million dollars for foreign missions and twenty-five thousand souls saved.' From Pittsburg we thus learn that the standard quotation on souls is forty dollars, a bit of information which is sure to fire the flagging zeal of every contributor to foreign missions. No playing here with vague generalities, no allusion to the countless millions of the East, or the heathen sitting in darkness and unenumerated by the census-man. After this, every man knows what he gets; he pays down his forty dollars and he gets one soul saved. That the contributions will now pour in there can be no doubt. Seldom has such a bargain in this line been offered. The scheme needs only to be completed by a giant clock which should show from day to day and from week to week the steady accretion of souls." — *New York Evening Post*, June 1, 1911.

organizing a "campaign" to create a love for the æsthetic or to popularize Wagner — deprives the American of one of the greatest joys of life. To him the end is everything, the means nothing; but he loses sight of the fact that it is the accomplishment of results rather than the results themselves that marks the difference between the workingman who mechanically sets the bricks and the architect who sees in every brick the expression of his genius. The American does not do his higher thinking for himself, but is satisfied to have it done for him and made as easy as possible so that he can readily assimilate it. He feeds his mind as well as his body on extracts and concentrated foods, because they are time-savers and represent what he so much admires — the perfection of machinery and business organization over hand labor and individual effort. He takes kindly to "canned goods," whether milk or music, pork or philosophy, honey or humor, lard or literature, provided they are put up by a reliable firm and have been sufficiently and flamboyantly advertised. "We want," says an American writer, "our literature reduced to 'snappy' paragraphs, we want what we call culture in the form of capsules, — half-hour readings and lectures between the intervals of our more serious business, — because we feel that somehow we ought to have these things, and we want to get through with them in as short order as possible."¹ This expresses the

¹ Brooks: *The Wine of the Puritans*, p. 43.

universal desire of the American "to get there." His pleasure is not in reading but in *having* read — he has reached his goal, but to reach it he must employ the same labor-saving devices that he does in industrialism; there must be no wasted time in description when the fate of the heroine is yet to be determined.

To be regarded by the community as a "good business man" is one of the surest recommendations for civic or political preferment. But it does not necessarily follow that because a man has made a fortune in selling furniture or boots, he is qualified to administer the affairs of a city or the state; in fact, his training usually quite unfits him for taking a large and detached view of life; his soul and his mind have been narrowed and cramped by the pursuit of money and the continual calculation of profits. This worship of business and its high priest, the successful man of business, has made it impossible for the professional man (always excepting the lawyer, who is so interwoven with business that he is a part of it) to obtain political preferment or to be a directing force in the affairs of state. In Congress, for instance, at the present time there sits no member whose claim to distinction is that he has written a great work on history, science, or political economy, or who holds a chair at one of the leading universities, or who has made a scientific discovery of lasting value; the type of man to be found in Parliament, in the Chamber of Deputies, in the

Reichstag, in the Cortes, in fact in every European legislature. The qualities that command European approval are no claim to favor in American politics. The writer, the economist, the scientist, the professor, are all well enough in their way, but their way does not lead to politics; for politics are practical, and the man who sits at his desk laboriously turning out a few words at a time, instead of turning the torrent of his words at a stenographer, shows that he is unpractical, and there is no place for such as he in an intensely practical world. One cannot conceive of a poet, a really great poet, as a candidate for Congress. In the first place, it would be impossible for him to secure the nomination, for the political managers would treat his aspirations as a huge joke and dispose of them accordingly; but conceding that by an accident he should be nominated, ridicule would defeat him. Every newspaper would print parodies of his blank verse, "the poet in politics" would be as amusing to the crowd as the clown in the circus, so long as the novelty lasted, and then the public would scornfully ask what a poet knows about politics, a trade the mysteries of which the business man and the practical politician are alone competent to master.

Prior to the Civil War little attention was paid to science, because science was abstract, and therefore it made no appeal to Americans, and it was also deemed "unpractical." With the close of the Civil War the same impetus was given to manufac-

turing and industrialism in America that England had felt after the Napoleonic wars. Americans realized that, unless they substituted scientific methods for rule of thumb, it would be impossible for them to compete with foreign nations, and they turned their attention to the study of science and went about it with the same thoroughness they had shown in the subjection of the continent. Science is now ardently pursued. Every year vast sums are spent to teach science in high schools, colleges, universities, and technical institutions; heavy endowments have been made for scientific research; state and federal governments spend millions for scientific investigations; and the farmer, the woodsman, the manufacturer, is taught at the expense of the people how to improve his crop or his products by making science a partner in the firm. But while science is appreciated for what it does, the scientist enjoys little consideration. Science can increase the yield of an acre and make more dollars come out of the earth, therefore science is held in respect; but it is the farmer who profits and not the scientist. The farmer takes all that science gives him and has rather a contempt for the scientist. It is the American way.

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